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The aim of this thesis is to propose a heuristic comparison between Origen’s and 
Augustine’s different understandings of the role of the Holy Spirit in their 
interpretation of the Gospel of John. In particular, I will analyse the functions of 
the Spirit both in his Trinitarian role and in his soteriological agency. In carrying 
on this analysis, I will provide an evaluation of the extent to which the two authors’ 
pneumatologies are shaped by the Gospel of John. The work is divided in three 
parts (A, B, C), composed of six chapters. 
 
In chapter I (introduction), I will present the methodology, grounds and aims of 
the present comparison, together with an evaluation of scholarly debate and of 
primary sources. 
 
In part A, I will deal with the role of the Spirit as a Trinitarian agent. I will analyse 
the ways in which Origen (chapter II) and Augustine (chapter III) represent the 
Spirit as a Trinitarian hypostasis, his ontological derivation and his status in the 
Trinity.  
 
In part B, after a short analysis of the significance of dualism in the Gospel of 
John (represented by the concept of ‘the world’), I will present the soteriological 
role of the Spirit in Origen’s and Augustine’s commentaries (respectively, chapter 
IV and V), with a particular focus on the relation between the Spirit and ‘the world’.   
 
Finally, in part C (chapter VI), I will propose a comparison of Origen’s and 
Augustine’s pneumatologies in light of the dualistic framework which they both 
derived from the Johannine Gospel, with a particular focus on the interpretation 
of the Father-Son-Spirit relation and on the dualism between God and ‘the world’. 
 
Hence, this thesis will offer not only a re-evaluation of the two authors’ 
pneumatologies, but also a new assessment of the Johannine derivation of their 
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The aim of my research is to enquire about the status and role of the Holy Spirit 
in Origen’s and Augustine’s Commentaries on the Gospel of John. On one 
hand, I will focus on the intra-Trinitarian status of the Spirit; on the other hand, I 
shall analyse the two authors’ interpretation of the Spirit as that agent – 
described in the fourth Gospel as the gift of God – which guides human beings 
in the process of Salvation.1 In analysing both the Trinitarian and the 
soteriological agency of the Spirit in the two authors’ theologies, this thesis will 
discuss the extent to which Origen’s and Augustine’s pneumatologies are 
shaped and informed by the Gospel of John. The very characteristics of John’s 
Gospel – in particular, the Father-Son-Spirit relation and the dualism between 
God and the world – represent the bases on which the two authors deal with 
two main Christian problems: the intra-Trinitarian shape of God and his relation 
to “the world”, interpreted both as the original creation and as human beings in 
their present condition. I will also show that, led by the text of the Gospel, both 
authors present a very close link between Trinitarian theology and Soteriology.  
 
Until few years ago, Origen and Augustine were taken as representatives of two 
different traditions: the “Greek Eastern” and the “Latin Western”. It was a 
common opinion that, while the former presented a Trinitarian theology mostly 
focused on the Father, the latter was focused on God’s essence. Therefore, 
Origen and Augustine were usually chosen by scholars as representatives of 
two different Christian traditions, namely the Greek and Latin ones. In the last 
twenty years this construction has been criticized by many scholars.2 The 
heuristic comparison carried on in my thesis does not aim to replicate the old 
“East” versus “West” paradigm. Rather, through the study of Origen’s and 
Augustine’s pneumatologies, this work will unfold how and why their 
understandings of the themes and theological categories of the fourth Gospel 
                                                     
1 For the idea of the Spirit as gift in the Gospel of John see: Jn. 4:10; 7:37-39; 14:16-17; 14:26; 
15:7. 




represent two very different possibilities of interpreting Christianity as a whole.3 
In this sense, the two authors are forefathers and examples of two different 
trajectories or paradigms in the history of Christianity. These paradigms that I 
will present in this thesis, are different from that of “Greek” and “Latin” 
Christianity, since they rather have to do with the way the two authors interpret 
the two main Johannine themes: the relation between hypostases (thus, the 
Trinitarian theology) and the dualism between God and “the world”.  
  
Origen has a rational (λογικός) and noetic interpretation of the Scriptures and of 
reality, based on a tenacious defence of free will and a stubborn faith in the 
redeeming power of rationality. Everything that exists is rational; the world is 
rational as well as God and his will.4 The Spirit is therefore mainly interpreted as 
the rational and divine Trinitarian entity in which humanity is called to partake in, 
until the actual universal salvation of all rational beings will be achieved. In this 
sense, in Origen’s interpretation, the Spirit is the Trinitarian agent that smooths 
the difference between God and the world. Therefore, while maintaining a 
strong Johannine focus on the redeeming action of the Saviour, his 
interpretation smooths the Gospel’s dualism between the Spirit and the world.5  
 
Augustine’s exegesis and ontology are shaped on rational beliefs as well. His 
interpretations of the Trinity and his discussion of “the world” both respond to 
the need of explaining reality in rational terms. Nevertheless, his theological 
mindset struggles to find an explanation for the overwhelming presence of evil 
in human affairs. His dumbfounded awareness of evil, together with his 
understanding of the incapacity of human being to be free from evil, opens the 
gates to a radical interpretation of the Gospel’s dualism.6 In his theology, the 
                                                     
3 A clear example is the influence Origen’s doctrine of the Spirit had on the Cappadocian 
Fathers and on the Post-Nicaean debate. The same Gregory of Nazianzus explicitly states it 
saying that: ‘Origen is the stone on which all of us were sharpened’. Gregory’s quotation is from 
Kilian McDonnell, 'Does Origen Have a Trinitarian Doctrine of the Holy Spirit?', in Gregorianum 
75 1 (1994), p. 5-35, p. 6 n. 7. For a debate on Origen and Origenism after Nicaea see: 
Emanuela Prinzivalli, Magister Ecclesiae: il dibattito su Origene tra il III e il IV secolo, Roma 
2002; Emanuela Prinzivalli, ‘La controversia origeniana di fine IV secolo e la diffusione della 
conoscenza di Origene in Occidente’ in Augustinianum 46 1 (2006), p. 35-50. 
4 One could argue that even matter is rational insofar as it serves God’s plan of redemption for 
every being with a rational will. 
5 On dualism in the Gospel of John see in particular, infra, part B.   
6 See the analysis by Blumenberg, who identifies in Augustine’s theodicy the main problematic 




Spirit is interpreted both as the ontological bond of love in the Trinity and as the 
grace of God that pulls the elect out of the world.7 Thus, Augustine’s system is 
based on the contrast between the goodness of God, who saves God’s chosen 
creatures through an act of personal love for each redeemed man and woman, 
and the astonishing perversion of the world. Salvation is not for “the world”, but 
for single and particular human beings. Consequently, Augustine constantly 
opposes the Spirit to the world, for the world is bad in its own essence. The 
dualism of the Gospel of John is thus interpreted in a radical way.  
  
The ‘debate’ between these two souls of Christianity, represented here by 
Origen and Augustine, could be said to span the entire history of Christianity. It 
is possible to find traces of it in the ninth century controversy between Eriugena 
and Gottschalk,8 as well as in the sixteenth century argument between Erasmus 
and Luther9 or in the seventeenth century controversy between Jansenists and 
Jesuits.10 Although analysing these debates falls beyond the scope of my 
research, I deem a heuristic comparison between Origen and Augustine 
valuable for a number of reasons. First, my analysis will encourage a better 
understanding of the two authors’ theologies, particularly their pneumatology, 
and, secondly, it will point out with greater accuracy the Scriptural (in particular, 
Johannine) bases of these two different theological trajectories which are visible 
throughout the whole history of Christian thought.  
 
Having provided a general outline of my research, I will now illustrate the 
reasons why I have chosen to study the Spirit specifically in the two authors’ 
respective Commentaries on John.11 Then, I will discuss the current 
                                                                                                                                                         
problem of evil led to the abandonment of Augustine’s solutions by the modern age. See Hans 
Blumenberg, Die Legitimitat der Neuzeit, Frankfurt am Main 1966 trans. The Legitimacy of the 
Modern Age, Cambridge 1986, in particular p. 309-361.  
7 Augustine deems the gift of God, that is, Spirit-Grace, to be completely free from the bond of 
human actions, for it is impossible for humans to deserve it. For this reason, some scholars 
have defined his theology as a ‘theology of terror’ see: Kurt Flasch, Logik des Schreckens. 
Augustinus von Hippo: Die Gnadenlehre von 397, Mainz 1995. 
8 See: Dermot Moran, The Philosophy of John Scottus Eriugena. A Study of Idealism in the 
Middle Ages, Cambridge 2004. 
9 See in particular the debate over free will, that is Luther’s De Servo Arbitrio (1525) written in 
response to Erasmus of Rotterdam’s De Libero Arbitrio (1524).  
10 See: Gaetano Lettieri, Il metodo della grazia. Pascal e l'ermeneutica giansenista di Agostino, 
Roma 1999. 
11 Hereafter Origen’s Commentary on John will be quoted as ComJn Augustine’s Tractates on 




scholarship, showing where my work places in it, and the methodology I will use 
in analysing the two authors’ works. Finally, I will introduce the primary sources.  
I.1.1 Why Commentaries on John’s Gospel?  
 
I believe the two commentaries on John give the scholar an exceptional point of 
comparison of the two theologians’ doctrine of the Spirit.  
 
First, it is worth noting that both authors consider the fourth Gospel as the most 
important book of all the Scriptures: Origen claims it is the ‘firstfruits of all the 
Scriptures’, while Augustine refers to John the evangelist as: ‘An eagle who saw 
with his own eyes the eternal Truth’, adding that ‘Saint John the apostle, not 
undeservedly in respect of his spiritual understanding compared to the eagle, 
has elevated his preaching higher and far more sublimely than the other three 
[evangelists]’.12 Both theologians consider this Gospel as the highest pinnacle 
of Scripture, the one in which the most sublime doctrines are expounded.13 As a 
matter of fact, they both noted that this Gospel is centred on Christ’s divinity, 
while other Gospels are mainly about Jesus’ humanity.14 From a methodological 
point of view, claiming that the fourth Gospel is the most important and profound 
text of the Scriptures leads to the consequence that what the exegete says in 
interpreting this text should be considered normative even in the interpretation 
of other texts. If the Gospel of John is indeed the ‘firstfruits of all the Scriptures’, 
containing the ‘eternal Truth’ of God, then the doctrines expressed within the 
interpretation of the Gospel ought to be taken in higher consideration than those 
expressed in the interpretation of other texts.15 This statement should not be 
                                                     
12 See ComJn, I.19; I.21; I.44. and TrIoh, XXXVI.5. Augustine’s first quotation is from The 
Harmony of the Gospels, I.6.9. The second quotation is from TrIoh, XXXVI.1.  
13 The fact that Augustine refers to the Gospel of John as the most important text of all 
Scriptures not only in his Tractates, but also in other works (e.g. The Harmony of the Gospels), 
proves that such a claim should not be taken as a rhetorical tool, but as a genuine theological 
statement. The same could be said of Origen, who makes no such claim for any other book of 
the Scriptures.  
14 See ComJn, I.40 and TrIoh, XXXVI.1; LXVIII.6.  
15 I deem this observation to be particularly interesting with regard to Origen’s exegesis, since 
the large majority of works by modern scholars on Origen’s hermeneutics is based on his 




rigidly interpreted, but I deem it useful to solve some inconsistences with other 
exegetical works.16  
 
Secondly, the role of ‘Spiritual Gospel’ makes the fourth Gospel particularly 
interesting for studying Origen’s and Augustine’s conception of God. The high 
Christology shown in the Gospel of John, particularly in the Prologue, makes it 
the most valuable source for understanding the scriptural basis for the two 
authors’ conceptions of the Trinity. Other scholars have already noticed this 
characteristic in both Origen and Augustine. It is not surprising then that there 
are a great number of studies on the relation between the Father and the 
different aspects (ἐπινοίαι) of the Son in Origen’s work on John.17 These works 
will be addressed and discussed in my thesis, with particular regard to those 
who study the relation between Son, Spirit and world. For instance, Greggs’ 
interpretation of the relationship between the ἐπινοίαι of the Son – taken as the 
means by which the Son deals with the problem of the universality of God and 
the particularity of the creation – and the Spirit, which makes the reality of that 
universal work of the Son living and acting in individuals and communities in the 
present age.18 On the other hand, scholarship on Augustine’s Tractates on John 
has been mainly focused on his notion of the Trinity. The first part of this thesis 
will therefore consider the peculiar role that the Spirit plays inside the Trinity, 
focusing on the intra-Trinitarian relationship between the hypostases. 
Nevertheless, differently from the aforementioned scholarship, it will try to 
unfold not only the Trinitarian thought of the two authors, with a particular focus 
on the Spirit, but also the influence the Gospel of John had on the formation of 
their theologies. 
                                                     
16 This is especially true regarding Origen’s most debated doctrines – e.g. apokatastasis and 
pre-existence of the souls. I deem it methodologically wrong to give the same importance to 
what Origen says in the Homilies on the Old Testament to what is said in the Commentary on 
John. In fact, Origen admits that these kinds of matters are reserved for those who are more 
advanced and, therefore, cannot be preached to all the people. See ComJn, XX.2-7. 
17 See: K. Torjesen, ‘The Logos incarnate and Origen's exegesis of the Gospel’ in Richard P. C. 
Hanson and Henri Crouzel, Origeniana Tertia, Roma 1985, p. 29-41; Richard P. C. Hanson, 
‘Did Origen teach that the Son is ek tēs ousias of the Father?’, in Lothar Lies (ed), Origeniana 
Quarta, Innsbruck 1987, p. 200-202; Rowan Williams, ‘The Son's knowledge of the Father in 
Origen’ in L. Lies (ed), Origeniana Quarta, p. 146-153. See also Edward Moore, ‘Christ as a 
Demiurge: The Platonic Sources of Origen’s Logos Theology in the Commentary on John’, in 
Philotheos 8 (2008), p. 200-207.  
18 See: Tom Greggs, Barth, Origen, and Universal Salvation: Restoring Particularity, Oxford 
2009; see in particular p. 55-84 (Pre‐existence and restoration: Logos and and Logika) and p. 





There is a third characteristic that makes the fourth Gospel a pivotal text for the 
study of Origen’s and Augustine’s thought: the dualistic structure of the Gospel. 
Since the work of Bultmann, the radical dualism presented by the Gospel has 
been one of the most important threads in scholarship on the Gospel of John.19 
This dualism opposes the goodness of God’s revelation carried by the 
Redeemer to the wickedness of “the world” in which the Redeemer came.20 
Defining the idea of dualism, one must be very careful not to confuse John’s 
dualism with Gnostic – in particular, Valentinian – or Manichaean dualism. It is 
not my intention here to affirm the derivation of the Gospel of John from 
Gnosticism, as Bultmann did. Nor will I discuss the extent to which Gnostic 
dualism could be rightly considered to be a derivative of the dualism that we 
already find in the Gospel of John, thus considering John as the source of the 
Gnostic dualism, as Pétrement did.21 Nevertheless, I believe that they share a 
fairly similar dualistic structure, which – however – they interpreted very 
differently. Gnostics knew and used the fourth Gospel. As a matter of fact, both 
Gnosticism and Manichaeism have a radical cosmic dualism, in which the good 
power of a superior God fights against the wicked powers of the inferior God 
who created the world. Gnostic theological systems are based on the idea that 
the world is perverted in its essence, thus having no possibility of being 
redeemed. In fact, Gnostic myths are based on the idea that in the beginning, 
some portions of the good God fell down into the wicked world. The actions of 
the Redeemer are limited to those people who naturally and ontologically 
possess a divine nature. These pneumatic human beings22 are awakened by 
the work of the Redeemer, who pulls his children from the world of darkness, 
leading them back to the fullness of light (the Pleroma). Moreover, this cosmic 
                                                     
19 See: Rudolf Bultmann, Das Evangelium des Johannes, Göttingen 1964, trans. The Gospel of 
John: A Commentary, Oxford 1971.  
20 Acknowledging that, of course, Bultmann’s interpretation is dated and disputed, I still think 
that the issues he raised regarding dualism were the kinds of issue that were pondered by 
Origen and Augustine. Therefore, I use Bultmann here to bring those particular issues into 
focus. 
21 Simone Pétrement, Le Dieu séparé: les origines du gnosticisme, Paris 1984, trans. A 
Separate God: The Christian Origins of Gnosticism, New York 1990. 
22 I am referring here to the anthropological division into three natures – spiritual, psychic and 
hylic – held by the great majority of Gnostic systems, in particular Valentinianism. See, for 
example, Origen’s understanding of the fragments of Heracleon reported in Origen’s ComJn, 
X.210-215. Whether Heracleon himself considered these three natures as fixed is a problem 




structure is expressed through a complex mythology that traces the cause of 
the perversion of the world in the primordial sin inside the Godhead. Such 
cosmic dualism is not the same as the one we find in the Gospel of John, since 
the fourth Gospel presents rather a historical dualism. In the Gospel, the 
darkness comes into existence because of the will of the world to turn away 
from the light. This estrangement of the world from God led to the necessity of a 
Redeemer, who enters into a world that has lost the capacity of understanding 
his Word. The Word of the Redeemer is therefore incomprehensible to the 
world of darkness. Moreover, this world has no possibility of saving itself without 
the powerful action of the Redeemer and his good revelation. Henceforth, 
history becomes the History of Salvation, that is, the history of the coming of the 
Saviour into the world in order to convert the portion that he chose and destroy 
the darkness. In fact, no communication is possible between the world of 
darkness and the Redeemer. The darkness simply cannot accept the light, just 
as the world hates the Redeemer and his community. In other words, the radical 
opposition between the Flesh (the world of darkness) and the Spirit (the light of 
God), is not natural, but depends on the will of believers. The insistence on the 
flesh taken up by the Saviour tells us about the possibility of turning the world, 
at least a part of it, to God. The entire Gospel is therefore structured in pair of 
opposites: the light and the darkness, the Redeemer and the Devil, the 
community of the apostles and the world.23  
 
I think the dualistic character of the fourth Gospel is of the greatest importance, 
since the way in which Origen and Augustine interpreted the Gospel’s dualism 
marks the difference between their interpretations of the Johannine doctrines. 
For this reason, the second part of my dissertation shall analyse the way Origen 
and Augustine deal with the concept of “the world” and connect it to their 
pneumatologies. In fact, understanding the way by which these dichotomies are 
interpreted and resolved by the two authors enlightens us as to Origen’s and 
Augustine’s interpretations. Such a work is particularly needed since it has not 
                                                     
23 For the history of the development of the Gospel of John and of the Johannine community 
see the masterpiece by: Raymond E. Brown, The Gospel according to John, II vols, New York 
1966-1970. See also: Raymond E. Brown, The Community of the Beloved Disciple, New York 
1979. See also the more recent: Harold Attridge, ‘Johannine Christianity’, in Margaret M. 
Mitchell and Frances M. Young (eds), The Cambridge History of Christianity: Origins to 
Constantine, Cambridge 2006, p. 125-143. More bibliography and discussion on dualism in the 




been done before. In particular, this thesis will unravel the way in which both 
Origen and Augustine fought against two different cosmic dualisms: Valentinian 
Gnosticism, for Origen, and Manichaeism for Augustine. Therefore, the way in 
which they approached a historically dualistic text such as the Gospel of John is 
of the utmost importance in order to detect the speculative distance between 
the two theologians and the Johannine derivation of their thoughts.  
 
I.1.2 Why Study the Spirit in Origen’s and Augustine’s 
Commentaries? 
 
One of the problems of studying the Spirit in Origen’s and Augustine’s exegesis 
on John is that, according to many scholars, a constructive doctrine of the Spirit 
is not traceable in the fourth Gospel itself.24 If truth is to be told, the text is more 
concerned with the revelation of the Son and his relation to the Father. 
However, the Spirit is clearly presented in the Gospel of John in relation to the 
binitarian structure of the Father and the Son. In many passages the Spirit is 
said to be sent by the Father in the name of the Son, as a gift for human beings 
– e.g. Jn. 7:37-39 and Jn. 14:26. Of course, it is not the intention of this work to 
enquire about the pneumatology of the Gospel of John itself. Rather, I will be 
investigating the development of pneumatology in the early church as it 
emerges from readings of John’s Gospel. Therefore, a comparative study 
regarding the role of the Spirit in Origen’s and Augustine’s texts is essential in 
trying to resolve some of the questions raised above.25  
                                                     
24 For references see: Tricia Gates Brown, Spirit in the Writings of John: Johannine 
Pneumatology in Social-scientific Perspective, New York 2003, p. 1-21 and 62-70. 
25 The importance of the role of the Spirit in Origen’s work is highly debated, especially in 
German scholarship. From Harnack’s time Origen was often blamed for not having sufficiently 
developed a clear doctrine of the Spirit. See: Adolf von Harnack, Lehrbuch der 
Dogmengeschichte, Friburg 1890, trans. Outlines of the History of Dogma, Cambridge 2009. 
Many scholars still think of the Spirit as an almost functionless figure in Origen’s thought. See in 
particular: Wolf-Dieter Hauschild, Gottes Geist und der Mensch: Studien zur frühchristlichen 
Pneumatologie, München 1972; Wolf-Dieter Hauschild, Lehrbuch der Kirchen- und 
Dogmengeschichte: Alte Kirche und Mittelalter, Gütersloh 1995; See also the more recent: 
Wolf-Dieter Hauschild and Volker H. Drecoll, Pneumatologie in der alten Kirche, Bern u.a. 2004. 
This traditional view has been strongly criticised by: Christoph Markschies, ‘Der Heilige Geist im 
Iohanneskommentar des Origenes. Einige vorlaufige Bemerkungen’, in Christoph Markschies 
(ed), Origenes und sein Erbe. Gesammelte Studien, Berlin 2007, p. 107-126, who traces in the 
Commentary on John a clear role of the Spirit in the history of salvation. On Origen’s doctrine of 





It is now worth explaining in more detail the reasons why I have chosen to study 
the Spirit within Origen’s and Augustine’s commentaries on John. The answer 
to this question is twofold. On the one hand, the role of the Holy Spirit in the 
fourth Gospel – that is, his function of active force of God by participating in 
which the Johannine community understood itself as anointed – is highly 
significant for the two authors. In fact, the Spirit is the keystone for the 
Trinitarian and dualistic problems raised by the evangelical text. The doctrine of 
the Spirit is therefore very challenging, and John’s Gospel constitutes one of the 
most important scriptural sources for both authors. On the other hand, I deem it 
particularly useful not only to study their doctrine of the Holy Spirit, but to 
enquire about their understanding of the Spirit in their exegeses. Consequently, 
this work wants to put emphasis on the commentaries as a source of theological 
– not only hermeneutical – information. The scholarly attempt to systematise 
Origen’s and Augustine’s thought sometimes risks failing to give enough 
consideration to the theological doctrines of the two authors as presented in 
their exegeses. Indeed, studying the Trinitarian role of the Spirit in Augustine’s 
Tractates on John is different from using one of his systematic works – e.g. On 
the Trinity – for in the Tractates Augustine has to deal with the many 
ambiguities of the Gospel’s text. Equally, it is not the same to study the relation 
between the Spirit and the world as systematically expounded by Origen in On 
First Principles and to study it in Origen’s careful exegesis of the ‘firstfruits of all 
the Scriptures’. The real significance of every theological doctrine is measured 
by the application of the same doctrine to the biblical exegesis. Therefore, my 
research will demonstrate the extent to which the two authors’ pneumatologies 
are drawn from, rather than imposed on, the text of the fourth Gospel. The 
doctrine of the Spirit (which stood in the centre of Augustine’s thought and is 
one of the most controversial issues in Origen’s scholarship) in the exegesis of 
the fourth Gospel (which poses all the theological questions explained above) is 
therefore an extremely interesting case study.  
 
 
                                                                                                                                                         
Origen's Argument with Modalism and its Afterlife in Didymus, Eunomius, and Gregory of 
Nazianzus’, in Vigiliae Christianae 65 (2011), p. 227-248. See also: George C. Berthold, ‘Origen 




I.1.3 Scholarship on Origen and Augustine  
 
The aim of the present work is to make a more in-depth contribution to 
comparative studies of Origen and Augustine, proposing a systematic 
comparison between Origen’s Commentary on the Gospel of John and 
Augustine’s Tractates on John. In fact, a methodical comparison between these 
two works is not present in the scholarship.26 The paucity of comparative 
scholarship on the theological contents of Origen’s and Augustine’s 
Commentaries on John is, in my opinion, due to the presence of more 
systematic works of the same authors – e.g. On First Principles and Against 
Celsus regarding Origen; On Christian Doctrine, The City of God, On the Trinity 
regarding Augustine. For this reason, a study of the theological contents of the 
two commentaries is particularly needed, since it provides the possibility not 
only of identifying the two author’s doctrines, but even to study how they fit 
within the living practice of exegesis. My work aims at considering 
commentaries on the Bible as theological sources, for it is exactly from the Bible 
that the two authors took the scriptural material for their – sometimes opposed – 
doctrines.  
 
However, such a bibliographical deficiency might be explained with a lack of 
consensus over the general theology of these two thinkers.27 One of the main 
disputes regarding Origen’s thought – a dispute in which the interpretation of his 
Commentary on John plays a major role – is that concerning his relation to 
Platonic philosophy as well as the philosophical derivation of some of his most 
controversial doctrines – in particular, the apokatastasis and the pre-existence 
of the soul. This debate has seen advocates of both sides. An example is that of 
the dispute between O’Leary, who believes that Platonism exerted a substantial 
                                                     
26 Nevertheless, there are some comparative articles. For an essay on Augustine’s and Origen’s 
interpretations of Jn. 13 on the figure of Judas and the consequent problem of evil see: Gaetano 
Lettieri, ‘Origene, Agostino e il mistero di Giuda: due esegesi in conflitto di Ioh XIII’, in Mario 
Maritano and Enrico dal Covolo (eds), Commento a Giovanni. Lettura origeniana, Roma 2006, 
p. 83-133. On the Spirit in Origen’s Commentary see: Giuseppe Ferraro, Lo Spirito Santo nel 
quarto Vangelo: i commenti di Origene, Giovanni Crisostomo, Teodoro di Mopsuestia e Cirillo di 
Alessandria, Roma 1995. On the Spirit in the Tractates see: Giuseppe Ferraro, Lo Spirito e 
Cristo nel commento al quarto Vangelo e nel trattato trinitario di sant'Agostino, Città del 
Vaticano 1997.  
27 It is neither possible nor useful to attempt here an exhaustive literature review on Origen and 
Augustine. This brief overview does not claim to give an exhaustive account of scholarship, but 




influence on Origen’s thought28 and Edwards, who has a minimalist opinion 
regarding the effect of Platonic categories on Origen.29 On the other hand, the 
scholarship on Augustine has been divided over two main points: 1) the 
interpretation of Augustine as a systematic thinker in all his writings and 2) the 
interpretation of Augustine’s doctrine of grace. A first group of scholars tends to 
minimize Augustine’s theological turning point, which occurred during the writing 
of the Various Questions to Simplicianus (397). Hence, they tend to interpret 
Augustine as a consistent thinker, denying that the doctrine of grace led him to 
hypothesize the idea of predestination – at least until a very late stage of his 
life.30 The second group tends to emphasize the differences between 
Augustine’s production during his youth and his maturity, using the Various 
Questions to Simplicianus as a watershed. Hence, they stress the change in his 
theology, affirming the development of notions of predestination.31 The 
monograph by Lettieri is a relevant example of the second group.32 Other 
scholars have gone on a different path. A particular mention should be given to 
the work of Harrison, who denies a discontinuity between the first and the 
second Augustine, stating that the main themes that scholarship usually 
                                                     
28 Joseph Stephen O'Leary, ‘Platonic Dissolution of History in Origen's Commentary on John X 
5-34’, in Jane Baun, Averil Cameron, Mark Edwards and Markus Vinzent (eds), Studia Patristica 
46, Leuven 2010, p. 241-247.  
29 See: Joseph Stephen O’Leary, Christianisme et philosophie chez Origene, Paris 2011 and 
Mark Edwards, Origen against Plato, Aldershot 2002. Both these works will be discussed later 
on in this dissertation.  
30 On the interpretation of the whole Augustine’s production as a unity see: Peter Iver Kaufman, 
‘The Lesson of Conversion. A Note on the Question of Continuity in Augustine's Understanding 
of Grace and Human Will’ in Augustinian Studies 11 (1980), p. 49-64. On the same wavelength 
see: Francisco J. Weismann, ‘The Problematic of Freedom in St. Augustine: Towards a New 
Hermeneutic’, in Revue des Études Augustiniennes 35 1 (1989), p. 104-119. See also: Carol 
Harrison, Augustine: Christian Truth and Fractured Humanity, Oxford 2000. For a philosophical 
interpretation of Augustine see: Werner Beierwaltes, ‘Zu Augustins Metaphysik der Sprache’, in 
Augustinian Studies 2 (1971), p. 179-195. Beierwaltes’ work is completely focused on Christ’s 
ontological role. In underlining the function of the Son as the ontological mediator between 
God’s eternal Being and the becoming of the world, Beierwaltes does not take the doctrine of 
grace very much into account. See also: Werner Beierwaltes (ed), Platonismus und Idealismus, 
Frankfurt Am Main 1980, in which the author interprets the entire history of Christianity as 
history of its becoming philosophy.  
31 In this regard see the apodictic statement of: James Wetzel, ‘Snares of Truth: Augustine on 
Free will and Predestination’, in Robert Dodaro and George Lawless (eds), Augustine and his 
Critics, London 2000, p. 121-141: ‘Without the doctrine of predestination there is no Augustinian 
theology of grace’, p. 125. For a radical interpretation of Augustine’s doctrine of predestination 
see the work of Kurt Flasch, Augustin: Einführung in sein Denken, Stuttgart 1980, who offers a 
complete different interpretation between Augustine the ‘theologian’ and the Augustine the 
‘philosopher’. While recognising the doctrines of grace and predestination as the basis of 
Augustine’s theological thought, Flasch separates this component from the ‘philosophical’ one, 
which Augustine supposedly inherited from neo-platonic speculation.  
32 Gaetano Lettieri, L' altro Agostino: ermeneutica e retorica della grazia dalla crisi alla 




attributed to the second Augustine, namely ‘the Fall and original sin, the inability 
of the will to do the good without divine aid, and the necessity for divine grace to 
move the will’, are features of his early theology as well.33 So far as my work is 
concerned, I will not address directly neither the debate over Origen and 
philosophy, nor that of Augustine’s turning point. Nevertheless, both these 
debates will be addressed tangentially, while the main aim of my research 
remains showing the Johannine declination of the two authors’ pneumatologies. 
Therefore, rather than addressing the influence of philosophy in Origen’s 
thought, I will focus on the “Johannine consistence” of his pneumatology. 
Similarly, instead of focusing on the various meanings and shades of 
“predestination” in Augustine’s thought, I will underline the way in which 
Johannine dualism influenced his thought.  
 
It is now time to analyse the comparative scholarship, that is, the scholarly 
context of this dissertation. In 1948, at the beginning of his monograph on 
Origen, J. Daniélou wrote: ‘Origen and St. Augustine were the two greatest 
geniuses of the early church’.34 Such a comparison between Origen and 
Augustine proposed by one of the most important promoters of contemporary 
scholarship on Origen cannot be fortuitous; nor it is fortuitous that studies on 
Origen flourished in the cultural milieu of La Nouvelle Théologie.35 Being utterly 
aware of the theological distance between Origen and Augustine, Daniélou’s 
statement intended to recover Origen from the theological disgrace to which he 
had been condemned for too many centuries. Daniélou acknowledged Origen 
as the champion of a different kind of Christianity, which, according to him, was 
minimalised in western culture. From Daniélou’s time onwards, scholarship 
proposed many studies about the relationship between Origen and Augustine.36 
Daniélou’s readings of Origen have been challenged by many scholars in the 
last 60 years. Nevertheless, a number of works on Origen and Augustine still 
                                                     
33 See: Carol Harrison, Rethinking Augustine's Early Theology: An Argument for Continuity, 
Oxford 2006, p. 19. 
34 Jean Daniélou, Origène, Paris 1948, trans. Origen, New York 1955, p. VII. 
35 About the theological movement of La Nouvelle Théologie and its inestimable contribution to 
Origen’s scholarship – and, in general, Patristic studies – see: Brian E. Daley, ‘The Nouvelle 
Théologie and the Patristic Revival: Sources, Symbols and the Science of Theology’, in 
International Journal of Systematic Theology 7 4 (2005), p. 362–382. 
36 Even before World War II, a comparison between these two authors was attempted by: John 




echo his statement – e.g. I. Ramelli: ‘Augustine of Hippo is only comparable to 
the greatest patristic philosopher, Origen of Alexandria’.37 Daniélou, like many 
other modern scholars, understood that the importance of these comparative 
works lies in the inestimable significance that Origen and Augustine had not 
only in their own times, but also in the construction of later Christian traditions. 
As a matter of fact, comparing them means understanding the seeds through 
which Christianity itself grew. 
 
Scholarship on the comparison between Augustine and Origen can be divided 
in two categories: studies on the influence Origen had on Augustine, which are 
mainly focused on the derivation of some Augustine’s doctrines from Origen, 
and comparative studies of their doctrines.  
 
Regarding the influence Origen might have had on Augustine, there is no 
consensus among scholars. Some scholars, such as Edwards and Harrison, 
are very sceptical about the influence Origen had on Augustine.38 With the 
exception of Courcelle and Altaner, scholars have generally ruled out the idea 
that Augustine could have had direct knowledge of Origen’s On First 
Principles.39 The few elements of connection that convinced these two scholars 
of this possibility have been proven insufficient by many other scholars, such as 
La Bonnardière.40 Other scholars, among whom it is worth quoting Heidl, 
Grossi, Teske, Ramelli and others, assert that Origen’s influence, with particular 
regard to his exegetical works, was, on the contrary, quite important. Assessing 
such a matter in one of her articles, Gasparro has suggested that, rather than 
considering some of Origen’s positions, especially those regarding the nature of 
the soul, as purely “heretical”, Augustine tended to regard them as “errors” 
                                                     
37 Ilaria Ramelli, ‘Origen in Augustine: A Paradoxical Reception’, in Noumen 60 (2013), p. 280-
307, 281. 
38 See: C. Harrison, Rethinking Augustine's Early Theology, p. 120 n. 24; Mark Edwards, 
‘Augustine and His Christian Predecessors’, in Mark Vessey and Shelley Reid (eds), A 
Companion to Augustine, Oxford 2012, p. 215-226, 223-224. 
39 Pierre Courcelle, Les lettres grecques en Occident de Macrobe à Cassiodore, Paris 1948, p. 
185; Berthold Altaner, ‘Augustinus und Origenes’, in Historisches Jahrbuch 70 (1951), p. 15-41. 
40 Anne-Marie La Bonnardière, ‘Jérôme informateur d'Augustin au sujet d'Origène’ in Revue des 




rather than “heresies”.41 Grossi has hypothesised the existence of four phases 
of Augustine’s relationship to Origen, spanning from curiosity, to admiration, to 
hostility, with a last phase identified with his thought after the condemnation of 
Pelagianism.42 Notwithstanding Augustine’s wavering attitude toward Origen, 
we know that the bishop of Hippo considered Origen a great biblical exegete, 
leading some scholars to look for Origenian influences on Augustine’s exegesis. 
Bammel noticed a number of parallels in Augustine’s exegesis of the Epistle to 
the Romans with Rufinus’ translation of Origen’s Commentary to the Romans.43 
Moreover, in an influential monograph, Heidl suggested that the libri pleni that 
Augustine was studying just before his baptism and that he mentioned in 
Against the Academics are to be identified with Origen’s Homilies on the Song 
of Songs in Jerome’s translation and, possibly, even with his Commentary on 
the Song of Songs. In addition, backing the thesis first proposed by Teske, he 
found much Origenian exegesis in Augustine’s On Genesis against the 
Manichees.44 In a quite recent monograph, Keech advocates for a strong 
Origenian influence on Augustine’s Christology, with a particular focus on the 
reception of Origen’s exegesis of Rom. 8:3 and its reference to Christ’s 
sinlessness. According to the author, Augustine ultimately ‘fought the heresy of 
Pelagius with the orthodox exegesis of Origen’.45 Whether the complex 
arguments presented by the aforementioned scholars are compelling is not the 
matter of my thesis. For sure, we know that, if Augustine actually read some 
                                                     
41 Giulia Sfameni Gasparro, ‘Agostino di fronte all’eterodossia di Origene: un aspetto della 
questione origeniana in occidente’, in Giulia Sfameni Gasparro (ed), Origene e la tradizione 
origeniana in occidente. Letture storico-religiose, Roma 1988, p. 123-150. 
42 Vittorino Grossi, ‘L’origenismo latino negli scritti agostiniani: dagli origenisti agli origeniani’, in 
Augustinianum 46 1 (2006), p. 51-88. On the presence of Origen in Augustine’s thought during 
the last years of his life see also: Vittorino Grossi, ‘La presenza in filigrana di Origene nell’ultimo 
Agostino (426-430)’, in Augustinianum 30 (1990), p. 423-440. Findings and conclusions of this 
work were re-published and synthesised in Vittorino Grossi, ‘La presenza di Origene nell’ultimo 
Agostino (426-430)’, R. J. Daly (ed), Origeniana Quinta, p. 558-564. 
43 See: Caroline P. Bammel, ‘Justification by Faith in Origen and Augustine’, in Journal of 
Ecclesiastical History 47 2 (1996), p. 223.235. On the differences and similarities between 
Origen’s and Augustine’s exegeses of Paul see: Caroline P. Bammel, ‘Augustine, Origen and 
the Exegesis of St Paul’, in Augustinianum 32 (1992), p. 341-368. 
44 György Heidl, The Influence of Origen on the Young Augustine: A Chapter of the History of 
Origenism, Piscataway 2003. Even before Heidl’s work, Origen’s influence on Augustine’s On 
Genesis against the Manichees was stated by: Roland J. Teske, ‘Origen and St. Augustine first 
Commentary on Genesis’, in R. J. Daly (ed), Origeniana Quinta, p. 179-185. On the passage of 
Against the Academics, II.2.5 see: György Heidl, ‘Augustine Contra Academicos 2,2,5: Origen 
in the Background?’, in Adamantius 5 (1999), p. 53-61. See also: György Heidl, ‘Did the young 
Augustine read Origen’s Homily on Paradise?’ in Wolfgang A. Bienert and Uwe Kuhneweg 
(eds), Origeniana Septima, Leuven 1999, p. 507-604. 





writings of Origen he must have done it in Latin translation, due to his deficient 
knowledge of the Greek language.46 It is also worth noting that the large 
majority of scholars have concluded that Origen’s influence on Augustine is 
limited to the first years of his life, while the “Origenistic debt” was then refuted 
and dismissed – either consciously or unconsciously – in Augustine’s mature 
thought. For sure, we know that Augustine mentions Origen on very few 
occasions.47 In almost all of these, Augustine criticises Origen’s theodicy and, 
most of all, his doctrine of redemption, with particular regard to universal 
salvation and the possibility of a second fall.48 A particular mention is due to 
Augustine’s references to Origen in The City of God. I am referring especially to 
Augustine’s refutation of ‘those merciful thinkers’ who reject the eternity of hell 
and those who affirm the doctrine of the pre-existence of the soul – see On First 
Principles, I.6.49 Nevertheless, none of these references can prove beyond 
reasonable doubt Augustine’s first-hand knowledge of Origen, that is, a 
knowledge which is not mediated by the so-called “Origenistic controversies”. In 
Against Priscillianists and Origenists, IV.4 Augustine refers to Origen’s orthodox 
teaching on the ‘immutability and eternity of the Trinity’ as something Orosius 
has learned from others. In On Heresies, XLIII he admits to having learned 
about heretical doctrines imputed to Origen – the denial of the resurrection of 
the dead, the creaturehood of Christ and of the Holy Spirit, the allegorical 
interpretation of the Bible – through a letter of Epiphanius. Equally, he refers to 
the opinion of others that defend Origen, who say that Origen teaches that 
Father, Son and Spirit are of one substance. Finally, he reports the opinions of 
‘others, who have read his books’ who confute him also regarding these matters 
(quamvis et in istis eum convincere studeant qui eius plura legerunt).50 The 
picture coming out of these few quotations seems that of a cautious prudence in 
reporting what others said about Origen. No reference to the subordination of 
the Son is found in Augustine’s account of Origen, despite the fact that, as this 
                                                     
46 Augustine complains explicitly his lack of knowledge of Greek in On Christian Doctrine, II.11 
and II.16, where he exhorts the students to study Hebrew and Greek in order to avoid his own 
frustration in approaching the original texts.  
47 See for example: Retractations, I.7.6 and 2.44; On Heresies, XLIII; Imperfect Work against 
Julian, V.7; Against Priscillianists and Origenists 4.4 and 6.7; The City of God, XI.23.2 and 
XXI.17. 
48 Whether these themes are actually to be ascribed to Origen would be too long to ascertain 
here. For sure, Augustine deemed them to be Origenian.  
49 See: The City of God, XI.23 and XXI.17.  




thesis will prove, Augustine clearly refutes a theory of the procession of the 
Spirit from the Son which is quite similar to that proposed by Origen.51 
Moreover, no direct reference in Augustine’s Tractates on John to Origen’s 
Commentary on John could be found. This lack is not surprising, considering 
that the Tractates on John is a work of Augustine’s maturity. Whether or not 
Origen had exerted some influence on the young Augustine, this influence was 
long gone before the writing of the Tractates. 
 
Besides analysing the historical connections between the two authors, a 
number of comparative works have been written concerning the theological 
doctrines of these two theologians. These studies, mainly articles, took into 
account different aspects of their theological doctrines, covering a wide range of 
fields, including the interpretation of some specific passages, comparing the two 
authors’ exegesis of small portions of text.52 O’Leary focuses his attention on 
the relation between the Trinitarian procession of the Son and his soteriological 
role in the two authors.53 Slotemaker enquires about their different – and yet, 
similar – conception of the primacy of the Father in the Trinitarian communion.54 
Ludlow proposes a comparative reading of their interpretation of “Spirit” and 
“letter”.55 Lettieri proposes a comparison between the two authors’ interpretation 
of the figure of Judas in the fourth Gospel.56 My study aims to contribute to this 
line of scholarship and I will engage critically with these works throughout my 
work.57 
 
                                                     
51 See: infra, III.5 and VI.2.2. 
52 See, for example, an article on the exegesis of Paul: Stephen Hildebrand, ‘The Letter Kills but 
the Spirit Gives Life: Romans 7 in the Early Works of Augustine and in Rufinus’ Translation of 
Origen’s Commentary’, in Augustinian Studies 31 1 (2000), p. 19-39. 
53 See: Joseph Stephen O’Leary, ‘The Invisible Mission of the Son in Origen and Augustine’, in 
W. A. Bienert and U. Kuhneweg (eds), Origeniana Septima, p. 605-622. 
54 John T. Slotemaker, ‘The Primity of the Father in Origen of Alexandria and Augustine of 
Hippo: Beyond East and West’, in Sylwia Kaczmarek and Henryk Pietras (eds), Origeniana 
Decima, Leuven 2011, p. 855-871. 
55 Morwenna Ludlow, ‘Spirit and Letter in Origen and Augustine’, in  Paul S. Fiddes and 
Gunter Bader (eds), The Spirit and the Letter. A Christian Tradition and a Late-Modern 
Reversal, London 2013, p. 87-102. 
56 See: G. Lettieri, ‘Origene, Agostino e il mistero di Giuda’; Gaetano Lettieri, ‘Apocatastasi 
logica o apocalisse della carne? Origene e Agostino paradigmi divergenti d’identificazione 
storico-sociale cristiana’, in Eugenio Canone (ed), Anima-corpo alla luce dell’etica. Antichi e 
moderni, Firenze 2015, p. 133-146. 






The aforementioned scholarly debates will be constantly addressed in the 
present work. However, as I have already stated, my thesis will focus only on 
the two commentaries on the Gospel of John, drawing some conclusions on the 
Johannine influence on the two authors’ conception of the role of the Holy Spirit. 
Acknowledging the differences with their other works, I will try to reveal the 
doctrines of the two authors just as they result from their commentaries, using 
other works mainly as points of comparison.58  
 
To achieve my goal, I will conform to the historical-critical method. As such, I 
will analyse the commentaries from a historical and philological perspective, 
freeing my research as much as possible from any kind of confessional or 
sectarian prejudice. The theological, historical and philosophical questions 
raised in this work will be treated exclusively as historical and scientific 
evidence, while no moral or theological judgement will be proposed. 
 
It is now worth remembering here the methodological value of the heuristic 
comparison in the work I am about to embark on. This work is not interested in 
affirming Augustine’s knowledge of Origen’s Commentary on John. No attempt 
will be undertaken to demonstrate Augustine’s familiarity with the Alexandrian 
theologian; neither is this work intended to prove the historical derivation of any 
of Augustine’s theological doctrines from Origen. The main point of my work is 
to carry out a heuristic comparison between the two major theologians of the 
Patristic age in order to highlight the precise character of the theological 
trajectories and paradigms of two of the most influential theologians in Christian 
history. For this reason, each chapter will explore the same research questions, 
offering first an analysis of the doctrines as they emerge from their 
commentaries on the Gospel of John and, secondly, a comparative analysis of 
my findings.  
 
                                                     
58 Such a work is made possible by the fact that both the commentaries were written in the 




I.1.5 Three Theological Questions    
 
Both Origen and Augustine consider God as a Trinity and investigate the 
relation between the three hypostases: the Father, the Son and the Spirit. 
Moreover, both authors show a hermeneutic of the Gospel based on the idea of 
turning the material Gospel into the spiritual Gospel.59 The tension between the 
Letter and the Spirit – which they both take from the epistles of Paul – is still the 
main criterion through which they read the entirety of the Scriptures.60 In 
addressing the problematics raised by the texts, this work will enquire about the 
role of the Spirit with regard to three main aspects inferable from the Gospel of 
John.61 This work will deal with three research questions: 1) the role of the Holy 
Spirit in the two authors’ Trinitarian constructions (the Spirit in God); 2) their 
interpretation of the Johannine concept of “the world”; 3) the peculiar 
relationship between the Spirit and the world. 
 
Thus, my thesis will be divided into three parts. Part A, which comprises 
chapters II and III, will explore the Trinitarian role of the Spirit as an ontological 
hypostasis, investigating the Trinitarian role of the Spirit in Origen and 
Augustine respectively. The second part of this thesis (part B, composed by 
chapters IV and V) will be devoted to showing Origen’s and Augustine’s 
interpretation of the Johannine concept of the world and of the role the Holy 
Spirit plays in the relationship between God and the world. At the beginning of 
part B, I will propose a brief analysis of the concept of “the world” in the Gospel 
of John. Chapter IV will show Origen’s understanding of the relationship 
between world and Spirit, while Chapter V will investigate Augustine’s 
understanding. Finally, the third part of the thesis (part C), composed of chapter 
VI, will deal with the comparison of the two author’s Trinitarian doctrine, 
interpretation of the world and understanding of the soteriological role of the 
Spirit. In proposing such a comparison, this last chapter will also systematise 
                                                     
59 See ComJn, I.40 and the whole TrIoh, I.  
60 In this regard see the aforementioned article of M. Ludlow, ‘Spirit and Letter in Origen and 
Augustine’. See also S. Hildebrand, ‘The Letter Kills but the Spirit Gives Life’; C. P. Bammel, 
‘Augustine, Origen and the Exegesis of St Paul’. 
61 In all three aspects, the definition of the Spirit as the ‘gift’ of God to creatures is of the highest 
importance. In fact, the Spirit is defined as the gift of God in the whole Gospel - e.g. Jn. 14:16-
17; Jn. 14:26; Jn. 15:7. Spiritus, caritas and donum are explicitly connected by Augustine in On 




the findings of my research, thus unfolding two different paradigms that mark 
the two authors’ pneumatologies and the connection between Trinitarian 
theology and soteriology in their interpretation of the fourth Gospel.  
 
Regarding the first question, I will prove that Origen believes that the Spirit 
proceeds only from the Father through the Son; therefore, the Spirit is 
conceived as the last of the Trinitarian hypostases. Although he cooperates with 
the Son, the Spirit is subordinated to him, as well as to the Father.62 Chapter II 
will discuss this subordination and will show how the distinction between the 
hypostases indicates a different ontological status as well as a different way of 
operating towards human nature.63 Chapter III of this thesis will instead deal 
with the Spirit’s role in Augustine’s Trinity, showing the outstanding importance 
the procession of the third hypostases gets in Augustine’s trinitarian thought. 
Augustine – as a consequence of the Nicaea’s dogmatic precepts and in 
opposition to the Arian heresy64 – proposes a concept of Trinity in which the 
three hypostases are totally equal and share the same substantia.65 Each one 
of them is God, but all three are one God. Through this perfect equality, all 
kinds of subordination cease. As the Son is the perfect image of the Father, 
also the Spirit has the same properties as the other hypostases. The distinction 
between the personae refers, therefore, only to their relation. It follows that the 
procession of the Spirit is not only from the Father, but from the Son as well.66 
Both chapter II and chapter III will also show the extent to which the two 
authors’ Trinitarian speculation is linked to different understandings of the text of 
John. 
 
                                                     
62 See ComJn, II.73-75; II.77; II.83; II.87. 
63 The idea of an ontological subordination in Origen’s doctrine of the Trinity was questioned by 
some scholars. For an introductive account see: Tadrous Y. Malaty, Origen: The Deans of the 
School of Alexandria, New York 1995, p. 276-282 and Henri Crouzel, Origen, San Francisco 
1989, p. 103.The reason for questioning this category stands on the fact that Origen speaks of 
the coeternity of the three hypostases. Therefore, Origen’s subordinationism must not be 
considered to be ontological, but mainly logical. Therefore, the difference between the 
hypostases only derives from their logical order. This view will be questioned later in this work. 
64 See: Lewis Ayres, Nicaea and Its Legacy: An Approach to Fourth-Century Trinitarian 
Theology, Oxford 2004. 
65 See TrIoh, XXXVI.9: “Una substantia est, una divinitas, una coaeternitas, perfecta aequalitas, 
dissimilitudo nulla”. See also: Augustine, On the Trinity, VI.5-7. 
66 See for example TrIoh, XCIX.8. This innovation by Augustine was gradually accepted by Latin 
Christianity. Far from being an otiose debate between specialists, it was to bring many 
consequences in history, being eventually one of the most important disputes that led to the 




Chapter IV will discuss how Origen deals with the Johannine concept of the 
world, suggesting that Origen, who is particularly active in deconstructing the 
gnostic dualism, tends to smooth the Gospel’s dualism. His interpretation of the 
world reflects an understanding of the differences between creatures as a mere 
difference of logical and ontological levels of understanding the Truth. Every 
creature, the ruling principle of which is identified as reasoning (λογικός), has a 
share in the Son according to the noetic understanding of his epinoiai. Salvation 
is interpreted as the spiritual and noetic journey that leads progressively from 
the darkness of the perceptible world to the light of the noetic knowledge of 
God. In this journey, the Spirit plays a crucial role.67 Therefore, the Gospel’s 
dualism between God and the world is interpreted as the difference between 
noetic and perceptible world. Contrariwise, in chapter V, I will suggest that 
Augustine interprets John’s dualism in a strict sense. Although Augustine 
proposes an anti-Manichaean interpretation of “the world”, which might signify 
both the original good creation of God and the present condition of sin, his 
exegesis is mainly focused on the world as place of perdition ruled by the Devil 
and tainted by evil. The worldly rejection of light is taken as a distinctive sign of 
the privileged love addressed by God only to some of his children. Moreover, 
the world’s incapacity to save itself without the powerful help of God leads 
Augustine to identify the only possible redemption as lying in the Holy Spirit, 
who is utterly separated from the world.  
 
Besides illustrating the two authors’ interpretation of the concept of the world, 
chapter IV and V will deal also with the relation between the Spirit and the 
world, which is the third theological question this thesis will address. First of all, 
this thesis will show that, in both authors, trinitarian theology is strongly related 
to soteriology. Therefore, the ontological role that the Spirit plays in the Trinity 
determines his soteriological role in dealing with the world. I will show that, in 
Origen, the Spirit’s subordination to the Father and the Son and his liminal 
nature of a divine agent which is, in a certain way, both God and a creature, is 
pivotal to understand his soteriological characteristic. Indeed, the Spirit is 
                                                     
67 Thus, it will be necessary to discuss Origen’s terminology to define the ‘spiritual’. In fact, 
Origen makes a distinction between what is the noetic (νοητόν), spiritual (πνευματικόν), or 
rational (λογικός). An explanation of these three terms and their diversity will be undertaken 




interpreted as the giver of the spiritual substratum which allows creature to turn 
from the perceptible world to the noetic one. The way creatures participate in 
the Spirit is therefore different from that by which they participate in the Son, as 
the Spirit and the Son are ontologically different. Quite differently, Augustine 
understands the Spirit as that hypostasis which makes it possible for the Trinity 
to be a unity. Since the ontological nature of the Spirit is that of being 
communion and unity in and of the Trinity, the Spirit also represents the eminent 
agent through which human beings attain salvation. Therefore, for human 
beings being saved means being pulled out from the world by entering in the 









I.2 THE SOURCES 
I.2.1 ΩΡ ΓΕΝΟΥΣ ΤΩΝ Ε Σ ΤΟ ΑΤΑ ΩΑΝΝΗΝ ΕΥΑΓΓΕ ΟΝ 
ΕΞΗΓΗΤ ΩΝ. Scholarship, Dating and Textual Problems 
 
 
‘We must dare to say that the Gospels are the firstfruits of all the Scriptures, but 
that the firstfruits of the Gospel is that according to John, whose meaning no 
one can understand who has not leaned on Jesus’ breast nor received Mary 
from Jesus to be his mother also’ (ComJn, I.23). Through these words Origen 
starts his Commentary on the fourth Gospel. Therefore, in analysing such a 
work, the modern scholar has to deal with the responsibility of studying Origen’s 
most important exegetical work. Moreover, as noted in 1959 by Gögler, Origen’s 
Commentary on John is to be considered the oldest preserved commentary on 
a text of the New Testament.68 For these reasons, the Commentary has been 
well-studied both as a source of Origen’s doctrines, and as an example of 
Origen’s exegesis of a biblical text. It is possible to divide the scholarship on the 
Commentary into four categories. Firstly, there are many essays about Origen’s 
exegesis of single passages of the Commentary.69 Secondly, there are several 
articles and papers on the theological contents of the Commentary. It is worth 
noting that the large majority is about the Logos theology, that is, the logical and 
ontological relation between the Father and the Son/Logos.70 Thirdly, a massive 
number of works are to be found on the relation between Origen’s Commentary 
and that of Heracleon, his Valentinian Gnostic opponent whose fragments are 
preserved in Origen’s text.71 Since Origen’s Commentary is written as a 
response to that of his Gnostic adversary, facing the problem of his dialectical 
                                                     
68 Rolf Gögler, Einführung zu Origenes, Das Evangelium nach Johannes, Einsiedeln 1959, p. 
15. 
69 See for example the numerous essays of Simonetti in: Manlio Simonetti (ed), Origene 
esegeta e la sua tradizione, Brescia 2004.  
70 See Henri Crouzel, Théologie de l'image de Dieu chez Origène, Paris 1956; Marguerite Harl, 
Origène et la fonction révélatrice du Verbe incarné, Paris 1958; K. Torjesen, ‘The Logos 
Incarnate and Origen’s Exegesis of the Gospel’, p. 29-42. 
71 In this regard see the recent article by Carl Johan Berglund, ‘Origen’s Vacillating Stances 
toward his “Valentinian” Colleague Heracleon’, in Vigiliae Christianae 71 5 (2017), p 541-569. In 
this article, the author tries to understand the dependability of Origen’s quotation of Heracleon’s 
text, highlighting that ‘Origen’s stances may correspond to an equal variance in the 




relation to Gnosticism is indeed crucial.72 In my opinion, this relation must not 
be understood as a mere opposition, but as a constant attempt to 
demythologize the Gnostic myth by means of a rigorous use of the anagogical 
method.73 Therefore, although it is not the main point of this work, in tackling 
Origen’s exegesis I will take into consideration Heracleon’s propositions, 
particularly regarding their divergent interpretation of one of the most important 
Johannine themes: the interpretation of ‘the world’.74 
 
Finally, regarding Origen’s hermeneutics, the Commentary has been extremely 
important in a number of works through the years, as it provides an essential 
textual basis (in Greek language) for understanding Origen’s hermeneutical 
principles and theological doctrine. The main objective of this thesis is not that 
of attempting a structural comprehension of Origen’s hermeneutics.75 
Nevertheless, it is worth noting the distance between the exegetical 
methodology enunciated by Origen in On First Principles, IV.2-3 and the 
exegesis of the fourth Gospel. As already noted by R. Heine and others,76 
                                                     
72 On the relation between Origen and the Gnosticism see: J. Daniélou, Origen; Hans Jonas, 
Gnosis und spätantiker Geist: Die Mythologische Gnosis, Göttingen 1934; Manlio Simonetti, 
‘Eracleone e Origene’, in Vetera Christianorum 3 (1966), p. 111-141; Manlio Simonetti, 
‘Eracleone e Origene: continuazione e fine’, in Vetera Christianorum 4 (1967), p. 23-64; Manlio 
Simonetti, ‘Eracleone e Origene sulla Samaritana’, in Vetera Christianorum 53 (2016), p. 5-18; 
Josep Rius-Camps, El dinamismo trinitario en la divinisación de los seres racionales segun 
Orígenes, Roma 1970; Holger Strutwolf, Gnosis als System. Zur Rezeption der 
Valentinianischen Gnosis bei Origenes, Göttingen 1993; Antonio Orbe, Estudios Valentinianos 
I: Hacia la primera teología de la procesión del Verbo, Roma 1958; Antonio Orbe, Estudios 
Valentinianos II: En los albores de la exégesis joanea (Joh 1,3), Roma 1955; Antonio Orbe, 
Estudios Valentinianos III: La unción del Verbo, Roma 1961; Antonio Orbe, Estudios 
Valentinianos IV: La teología del Espíritu santo, Roma 1966; Antonio Orbe, Estudios 
Valentinianos V: Los primeros herejes ante la persecución, Roma 1955.  
73 Regarding the dialectical relationship between Origen and Valentinianism and the crucial 
importance of their respective interpretations of the fourth Gospel in differentiating the two see 
Gaetano Lettieri, ‘Il nous mistico. Il superamento origeniano dello gnosticismo nel Commento a 
Giovanni’, in Emanuela Prinzivalli (ed), Il Commento a Giovanni di Origene: il testo e i suoi 
contesti, Villa Verrucchio 2005, p. 177-275. 
74 In this regard see infra, II.1.3; II.2.2; IV.1.3; IV.2.3.1. 
75 I quote here some of the major works in this regards: Richard P. C. Hanson, Allegory and 
Event: A Study of the Sources and Significance of Origen's Interpretation of Scripture, 
Westminster 1959; Henri de Lubac, Histoire et esprit: l'intelligence de l'Écriture d'après Origène, 
Paris 1950, trans. History and Spirit: the Understanding of Scripture according to Origen, San 
Francisco 2007; Karen Jo Torjesen, Hermeneutical Procedure and Theological Method in 
Origenʼs Exegesis, Berlin 1986. It is also worth noting the use of the commentary in the attempt 
of de-platonizing Origen by M. Edwards, Origen against Plato. Much more bibliography will be 
provided in due course.  
76 See Ronald E. Heine, Origen: Commentary on the Gospel According to John, Books 13-32, 
Washington 1993, p. 10-23; Manlio Simonetti, ‘Il Commento a Giovanni tra esegesi e teologia’, 




Origen rarely proposes three levels of exegesis in the existing portion of the 
Commentary. In expounding the text, he usually presents two levels of 
comprehension: the one according to the letter (πρὸς τὸ ῥητὸν) and the 
anagogical one (ἀναγωγὴ).77 The last one is the more important, thus is to be 
understood by the more advanced believers. The anagogical meaning is 
presented by Origen as either a noetic (νοητόν), a spiritual (πνευματικόν), or a 
rational (λογικός) meaning. In translating Origen’s Greek, I will use the word 
‘noetic’ as the translation for νοητόν, the word ‘rational’ as the translation of 
λογικός and the word ‘spiritual’ as the translation for πνευματικόν.78 A distinction 
between these three terms will be proposed in this thesis. I will particularly show 
the difference between noetic and spiritual, showing that, while the former 
indicates a purely intellectual participation in the Son, the latter points out to a 
substantial participation in the Holy Spirit.79 This is also the reason why Origen 
describes the task of the exegete as the turning of the perceptible gospel (τὸ 
αἰσθητὸν εὐαγγέλιον) into the spiritual (πνευματικόν) and intelligible (νοητόν) 
Gospel (ComJn, I.44-46).80 
 
Regarding the circumstances for the writing of the Commentary, Origen 
probably composed it at the request of his friend Ambrose.81 The Commentary 
shows all features of a scholastic work, written for students who were familiar 
with the Scriptures. For this reason, Origen does not usually offer a single 
interpretation of the Gospel’s narrative. It is rather usual for him to propose 
several possible readings, thus giving to the reader the possibility of choosing 
the most appropriate one. The Commentary was meant to be a huge 
production. We know for sure that Origen wrote thirty-two books, covering from 
the beginning of the Gospel to Jn. 13:33. Nothing suggests that Origen ever 
                                                                                                                                                         
sacra’, in Adele Monaci Castagno (ed), Origene. Dizionario: la cultura, il pensiero, le opere, 
Roma 2000, p. 424-437. 
77 See for example ComJn, XXVIII.48-49. Origen’s use of technical exegetical terminology is 
highly debated in the scholarship. Among the others, see Manlio Simonetti, ‘Considerazioni su 
allegoria e termini affini in alcuni scrittori greci’, in M. Simonetti (ed), Origene esegeta e la sua 
tradizione, p. 51-70; Peter W. Martens, Origen and Scripture: The Contours of the Exegetical 
Life, Oxford 2012; For an historical background see: John David Dawson, Allegorical Readers 
and Cultural Revision in Ancient Alexandria, Berkeley 1992.  
78 R. P. C. Hanson, Allegory and Event, p. 245 states that there is a different meaning for each 
of these terms. 
79 In this regard, see in particular infra, IV.2.4.2. 
80 See infra, IV.1.1. 




finished this work. It is highly probable that the thirty-second was the last book 
Origen ever dictated. Only nine of them are preserved, books I, II, VI, X, XIII, 
XIX, XX, XXVIII and XXXII. A number of fragments of the Commentary are 
extant as well. Nevertheless, modern scholars have convincingly questioned the 
authenticity of most of these fragments.82 Only five of them can be attributed to 
Origen beyond any reasonable doubt.83  
  
Even more complex is the attempt to date this work.84 Several theories were 
proposed over the last century. Even if a consensus on the dating of every 
single book does not exist, we know for sure that the first five books were 
dictated by Origen while he was in Alexandria. This means that they belong to 
the same period of the Commentary on Genesis and On First Principles. In 
book VI.8-10, Origen says that his work was interrupted at the beginning of the 
sixth book because of the trouble he had in Alexandria with the bishop 
Demetrius, and that he restarted the sixth book in Caesarea. Nautin places the 
year of Origen’s move from Alexandria to Caesarea in 234.85 This dating was 
criticized by R. Heine, who places the move in late 232 or early 233. Heine 
underlines that Origen wrote four books on Genesis and ‘at least five, and 
probably eight or more, books of the Commentary on John, and his treatise On 
Prayer after he arrived in Caesarea, but before the persecution of Maximinus, 
which started in 235. It is highly probable that Origen needed more than a few 
months to accomplish such a great amount of work. Moreover, in ComJn, VI.10, 
Origen complains about his delay in writing the book because of the absence of 
stenographers at his arrival in Caesarea. Consequently, I find Heine’s point 
more consistent with the evidence than the one of Nautin.86  
 
We are not sure of the numbers of books Origen wrote after his settlement in 
Caesarea and before the persecution of Maximinus. P. Koetschau found a 
                                                     
82 See the exceptional work of: Ronald E. Heine, ‘Can the Catena Fragments of Origen's 
Commentary on John Be Trusted?’ in Vigiliae Christianae 40 2 (1986), p. 118-134. 
83 Those are the fragments from Eusebius, Historia Ecclesiastica, VI.25.7 and from the 
Philocalia which constitutes the partial text of books IV and V. For this reason, I will use in this 
work only the fragments whose authenticity cannot be reasonably questioned. Every time I will 
use any other fragment I will point it out.  
84 The dating I follow here depends greatly on: R. Heine, Origen: Commentary […] Book 13-32, 
p. 4-19. 
85 Pierre Nautin, Origène: Sa vie et son oeuvre, Paris 1977, p. 426.  




reference to ComJn, X.246 in On Prayer, 15.1.87 Since On Prayer was surely 
written before 235 then the tenth book was written before the persecution. On 
the other hand, no evidence has been found for dating book XIII. We can 
assume, with Heine, that this was composed before the persecution, but this 
assumption is fairly arbitrary. The third group of books were probably dictated 
while Gregory the Thaumaturgus was a student of Origen. Koetschau, Crouzel 
and Heine agree in taking Gregory’s allusion in his Oration 
and Panegyric Addressed to Origen, 2.18 as a reference to ComJn, XXXII.87.88 
If we admit that Gregory left Origen in 245 or before, this means that Origen 
finished the extant books of the Commentary by 245.89 A more convincing 
attempt was made by R. Heine, who found some clear references in the 
Panegyric to the twentieth book of Origen’s Commentary.90 Because of the 
close relation between the nineteenth book and the twentieth, it is reasonable to 
say that they were composed in the same period. Accepting both these 
conjectures, we can date the third group of books (XIX-XXXII) in a period 
between the end of the persecution (238) and the departure of Gregory 
(between 243 and 245). 
 
In conclusion, setting aside the problems of dating the single tractates, it is clear 
that the Commentary on John is a late work of Origen, composed in his full 
maturity. This makes the work even more valuable in trying to disclose Origen’s 
theological doctrines.  
  
                                                     
87 Paul Koetschau, Beitrage zur Textkritik von Origenes' Johannescommentar, Leipzic 1905, p. 
75-78. 
88 Paul Koetschau, Des Gregorios Thaumaturgos Dankrede an Origenes, Freiburg 1894; Henri 
Crouzel, ‘Origène s'est-il retìré en Cappadoce pendant la persécution de Maximin le Thrace?’, 
in Bulletin de Littérature Ecclésiastique 64 (1963), p. 195-203; R. Heine, Origen: Commentary, 
[…] Book 13-32, p. 15-16. Koetschau claims Gregory’s idea of ‘getting around with unwashed 
feet’ to be a reference of Origen’s symbolic interpretation of the foot washing as the soul 
cleansing. This reference is the only one we have about the composition of the thirty-second 
book. Although at the moment it is the best evidence we have for dating the last part of the 
Commentary, I do not think this can be considered a definitive proof.  
89 Eusebius, Historia Ecclesiastica, VI.30 says Gregory arrived in Caesarea during the reign of 
Gordian (238-245). P. Nautin, Origène, p. 411, set the departure of Gregory in 245. Other 
scholars prefer to set Gregory’s departure in 243. R. Heine, Origen: Commentary […] Book 13-
32, p. 18 proposes to date the composition of books XIX-XXXII around 241-242. 
90 Ronald E. Heine, ‘Three Allusions to Book 20 of Origen's Commentary on John in Gregory 
Thaumaturgus’ Panegyric to Origen’ in Elizabeth A. Livingstone (ed), Studia Patristica 26 




Finally, it is worth spending a few words on the manuscript tradition of Origen’s 
Commentary on John. The manuscript tradition refers to eight manuscripts. It is 
possible to classify them in two groups. The first one is derived from the Codex 
Monacensis Graecus 191 (XIII century), the second follows the Codex Venetus 
43 (XIV century). According to the three major critical editions, it is highly 
probable that the Codex Venetus 43 was a transcription of the Codex 
Monacensis Graecus 191, with some supplements from some codices now lost. 
For this reason, our knowledge of the text is basically based on only one 
manuscript, the Codex Monacensis Graecus 191. The first edition of the text 
was made by Pierre-Daniel Huet, Origenis in sacras scripturas commentaria, 
Rothomagi 1668, based on the Codex Regius Parisiensis (XVI century). The 
second important edition by Carolus Delarue, Origenis opera omnia I-IV, Paris 
1738-1759 was based on the Codex Barberinus Graecus V, 52 (XV century) 
and the Codex Bodleianus Misc. 5 (XVII century). Migne used this edition in 
1857. Finally, there are three great modern editions of the work. The first one is 
by Alan England Brooke, The Commentary of Origen on St. John's Gospel, 2 
vols, Cambridge 1896, based on the Codex Monacensis Graecus 191. It was 
followed some years later by Erwin Preuschen, Origenes Werke, vol. 4: Der 
Johanneskommentar. Die griechischen christlichen Schriftsteller 10, Leipzic 
1903, based on the same manuscript. Finally, the most recent edition is by 
Cécile Blanc, Origène. Commentaire sur saint Jean, V vols, Sources 
chrétiennes 120, 157, 222, 290, 385, Paris 1966-1992. While keeping in mind 
the remarks of both Preuschen and Koetschau, Beitrage Zur Textkritik, in this 
work I will follow Blanc’s edition for the text of the Commentary, and 
Preuschen’s edition for the ordering and enumeration of the fragments. Beside 
those already cited, it is worth quoting the partial translations of the 
Commentary by Allan Menzies, The Ante-Nicene Fathers, vol 4: Tertullian, 
Minucius Felix, Commodian, Origen, New York 1905 and Rolf Gögler, 
Einführung zu Origenes, Das Evangelium nach Johannes. A very good 
translation and comment in Italian was done by Eugenio Corsini, Commento al 
Vangelo di Giovanni di Origene, Torino 1968. See also the more recent edition 
by Vito Limone, Origene; Commento al Vangelo di Giovanni, Milano 2012. For 
an introduction and translation of the entire text in English see: Origen: 










I.2.2 Aurelii Augustini In Iohannis Evangelium Tractatus. 
Scholarship, Dating and Textual Problems 
 
Augustine’s CXXIV Tractates on the Gospel of John is one of his most 
theologically rich exegetical works. Augustine was committed to it for over 
fifteen years, probably from 406 to 423. For this reason, the lack of adequate 
scholarship about its theological contents may appear odd to those who firstly 
approach this work.91 However, it would be improper to say that the Tractates 
has been ignored by scholars. On the contrary, according to the review 
provided by H. R. Drobner, it is one of Augustine’s more analysed texts, 
together with On the Trinity and On Christian Doctrine.92 This inconsistency can 
be explained by the fact that the majority of publications are more concerned 
with the transmission of the text, problems of dating and classification of the 
literary genre than with the theological content of the Commentary. 
Nevertheless, there are a considerable number of studies regarding single 
Tractates and many studies on Augustine’s exegetical and hermeneutical 
methodology.93 The paucity of studies on the theological contents can be due to 
a lot of factors, like the difficulty of finding a precise date for the work, the 
absence of a well-defined literary genre and the absence of a focal topic. 
Moreover, the same structure and length of the Tractates might have 
discouraged historians from presenting a unified work that interprets the 
theological content. Lastly, as I stated before, the sporadic nature of studies on 
the theological contents of the Tractates is probably due to the presence of 
more systematic works of the same author – e.g. On Christian Doctrine, The 
                                                     
91 This situation had been already noticed at the beginning of the twentieth century by: Hugh 
Pope, ‘St Augustine’s Tractatus in Iohannem: A Neglected Classic’, in The American 
Ecclesiastical Review 49 (1913), p. 161-172. It is quite disconcerting to note that, about one 
hundred years later, the status quaestionis remains, albeit some exceptions, substantially 
unchanged. In this regard see: Douglas Milewsky, ‘Augustine's 124 Tractates on the Gospel of 
John’, in Augustinian Studies 33 1 (2002), p. 61-77. 
92 See: Hubertus R. Drobner, ‘Studying Augustine: An Overview of Recent Research’, in R. 
Dodaro and G. Lawless, Augustine and his Critics, p.17-34. 
93 There are of course remarkable exceptions. See for example: John M. Norris, ‘The 
Theological Structure of St. Augustine's Exegesis in the Tractatus in Iohannis Euangelium’, in 
Joseph T. Lienhard, Earl C. Muller, Roland J. Teske (eds), Augustine: Presbyter Factus Sum, 
New York 1993, p. 385-394; John M. Norris, ‘Augustine and Sign in Tractatus in Iohannis 
Euangelium’, in Frederick van Fleteren and Joseph C. Schnaubelt (eds), Augustine: Biblical 




City of God, On the Trinity etc. – which reinforces the scholarly tendency not to 
analyse commentaries for their theological contents.  
   
Regarding the literary genre, the main question concerns the relation between 
the tractate, the homily and the commentary as literary forms. Homily and 
commentary were the most popular genres among Christians authors of the first 
two centuries. While homilies come from Jewish practices of commenting on the 
Bible in the synagogue, academic commentaries are a Hellenistic inheritance.94 
In Augustine’s time, the two genres were already set. In On Christian Doctrine 
Augustine offers an explanation of what is to be found in a tractatus: Debet 
igitur divinarum scripturarum tractator et doctor, defensor rectae fidei ac 
debellator erroris, et bona docere et mala dedocere, atque in hoc opere 
sermonis conciliare aversos, remissos erigere, nescientibus quod agitur quid 
expectare debeant imitare.95 The tractate is therefore a third literary genre that 
is quite similar to the homily. The tractate could be preached and then written or 
vice versa, just like the homily. In one of his Epistles Augustine himself 
compares them, stating their equivalence: Tractatus populares quos Graece 
homilias vocant.96 Therefore, tractates were preached for the utility of the 
hearers and should be considered almost equivalent to homilies.97 
 
As aforementioned, the literary genre is only one of the problems faced by the 
interpreter. Another one concerns the dating of each tractate. Since Maurini’s 
edition in 1680, scholarship used to indicate 416 as the composition date of the 
work. In 1930, Marie Comeau published a work analysing a passage of On The 
Trinity XV.27.48 supposedly taken from TrIoh, XCIX.8, thus confirming the 
traditional dating of the work.98 Everything changed in 1933, due to the work by 
                                                     
94 In this regard see: Manlio Simonetti, ‘Omelie e commentari patristici’, in Claudio Moreschini, 
Esegesi, parafrasi e compilazione in età tardoantica. Atti del terzo convegno dell’Associazione 
Studi Tardoantichi, Napoli 1995, p. 361-381. 
95 On Christian Doctrine, IV.4.6: ‘It is the duty, then, of the interpreter and teacher of Holy 
Scripture, the defender of the true faith and the opponent of error, both to teach what is right 
and to refute what is wrong, and in the performance of this task to conciliate the hostile, to rouse 
the careless, and to tell the ignorant both what is occurring at present and what is probable in 
the future’. 
96 Epistle, CCXXIV.2: ‘The tractate for the people that are called homily by the Greeks’.  
97 See Gustave Bardy, ‘Tractare, Tractatus’, in Recherches de Science Religieuse 32 (1946), p. 
211-235; See also Christine Mohrmann, ‘Praedicare, Tractare, Sermo: Essai sur la terminologie 
de la prédication paléochrétienne’, in La Maison-Dieu 39 (1954), p. 97-107. 




Seraphinus Zarb.99 Having noted the differences in length and style between 
the first and the second part of the Commentary, he proposed to date the first 
block of tractates (TrIoh, I-LIV) in 413, the second (TrIoh, LV-CXXIV) in 418. 
Furthermore, he justified these differences stating that, while Augustine 
preached the first block, he only dictated the second, reserving the preaching 
for a later time. Then, having traced some strong anti-Donatist passages, which 
are absent in the second block, he altered the previous dating. Zarb’s dating 
system was commonly accepted, albeit with some adjustments by other 
scholars, until 1965,100 when Anne-Marie La Bonnardière proposed a different 
interpretation regarding the style of the TrIoh, LIV-CXXIV.101 According to her, 
the stylistic difference between the first and the second group of Tractates is 
due to the fact that the second was written by Augustine as a guide for 
preachers (‘schemas de leurs futurs sermons’),102 as suggested by Augustine in 
On Christian Doctrine IV.29.62. Moreover, she proposed classifying the first 
group of Tractates (TrIoh, I-LIV) in four subgroups. The first one, (TrIoh, I-XII), 
was preached around 406-407, since all treatises convey traces of the vibrant 
anti-Donatist controversy and do not mention the Council of Carthage of 411. In 
addition, there are allusions to some imperial legislation promulgated in those 
two years. The second group (TrIoh, XIII-XVI) was probably preached around 
407-408, although it lacks any evidence suggesting a specific dating. The third 
group (TrIoh, XVII-XXIII) is dated around 417-418 due to the strong dispute 
about Arianism, caused by the invasion of the Goths of 417. The fourth group 
(TrIoh, XXIV-LIV) was preached around 419-421. The rest of the Tractates 
(TrIoh, LV-CXXIV) were dictated, not preached, by 423. The last significant 
                                                     
99 Seraphim M. Zarb, ‘Chronologia Tractatum S. Augustini in Evangelium Primamque Epistulam 
Ioannis Apostoli’, in Angelicum 10 (1933), p. 50-110.  
100 See for example: Maurice Le Landais, ‘La seconde partie de l’In Joannem de saint Augustin 
et la date du commentaire’, in Recherches de Science Religieuse 36 (1949), p. 517-541. A few 
years later the author published the most famous work: Maurice Le Landais, ‘Deux années de 
prédication de Saint Augustin: Introduction à la lecture de l’In Iohannem’, in Etudes 
Augustiniennes 28 (1953), p. 9-95. Here Le Landais demonstrated the contemporaneity 
between TrIoh, I-XII and the Expositions on the Psalms 119-133 and the first ten Homilies on 
the First Epistle of John. Le Landais proposed to date it all between December 414 and August 
415. 
101 See: Anne-Marie La Bonnardière, Recherches de chronologie augustinienne, Paris 1965. 
About the chronology of Augustine’s work see the more recent work of Pierre-Marie Hombert, 
Nouvelles recherches de chronologie augustinienne, Paris 2000. 




work about dating was published by Marie-François Berrouard. As I will show 
below, I deem her conclusions to be quite acceptable, pending new evidence.103  
 
Consequently, at present, it is possible to classify the Tractates of the 
Commentary in four main groups:104 
1) The first group consists of TrIoh, I-XVI. Here Augustine comments on the first 
four chapters of the Gospel. They were definitely preached before the Council 
of Carthage (411), in which the Donatists were defeated by the catholics. The 
precise dating is 406-407, as proposed by La Bonnardière and Berrouard.  
2) The second group is composed of TrIoh, XVII-LIV. TrIoh, XX-XXI-XXII have a 
peculiar history and must not be considered part of this group. TrIoh, XVII-LIV 
are characterized by strong debate against Pelagius and Arius. Berrouard 
claims this controversy shows that the date of preaching must have been before 
417, proposing 414 as the most likely date. Since they are strictly bonded 
together, then it is probable they were preached in a very short length of time.  
3) The third group is comprised of TrIoh, XX-XXI-XXII. First of all, they present 
textual problems: some codices do not contain these three Tractates.105 
Moreover, they interrupt Augustine’s speech. In TrIoh, XXIII.15 Augustine says: 
Iam hoc et hesterno die satiassime audistis.106 With these words, he is not 
referring to the TrIoh, XXII, rather to the Gospel passage commented on TrIoh, 
XIX.107 It may appear weird that Augustine intentionally omitted a part of the 
Gospel. Nevertheless, we do not have any evidence to illuminate the particular 
history of these Tractates. Berrouard proposes dating them between 419 and 
421, but this dating is fairly arbitrary.  
                                                     
103 See in particular Marie-François Berrouard, ‘La date des Tractatus I-LIV in Ioannis 
Evangelium de Saint Augustin’, in Recherches Augustiniennes 7 (1971), p. 105-168. It is 
particularly worth noting the connection between the draft of the second part and what 
Augustine affirms in Epistle, XXIII*A. See: Marie-François Berrouard, ‘L’activité letteraire de 
Saint Augustin du 11 septembre au I décembre 419 d’après la lettre 23*A a Possidius de 
Calama’, in Johannes Divjak (ed), Les lettres de Saint Augustin dècouvertes par Johannes 
Divjak, Paris 1983, p. 301-327. Finally, see the more recent study, in which she clarifies the 
dating of the Tractates: Marie-François Berrouard, Introduction aux homélies de Saint Augustin 
sur l'Évangile de Saint Jean, Paris 2004. 
104 The classification proposed here is based both on the works of Berrouard and the clear 
exposition of Giovanni Reale, Agostino: Commento al Vangelo di Giovanni, Milano 2010, p. 
XVII-XXII.  
105 For the peculiar history of these Tractates see: Marie-François Berrouard, Homélies sur 
l'Évangile de Saint Jean XVII-XXXXIII, Paris 1977. 
106 TrIoh, XXIII.15: ‘You have already heard enough about this yesterday’. 
107 The first scholar who noted this lacuna was: David F. Wright, ‘Tractatus 20-22 of St. 




4) The fourth and last group consists of TrIoh, LV-CXXIV. There is evidence of 
the fact that these Tractates were never preached by Augustine. This was firstly 
hypothesised by Zarb in 1933 and became evident after the publication in 1981 
of 27 unpublished Epistles of Augustine by Divjak.108 In the Epistle XXIII*A,3 
addressed to Posidonius of Calama and dated in December 419, Augustine 
claims to have dictated the first six speeches of this group, in a period from 11 
September to early December. About these Tractates, Augustine says: ut 
faciam de Ioannis quoque Evangelio ea quae restant, dictare iam coepi 
populares tractatus non prolixos mittendos Carthaginem.109 Therefore, these six 
Tractates were dictated and not directly preached. There is no reason for 
thinking it was not the same for the other Tractates of the group. About the 
dating, we are sure that these six tractates were dictated in 419. Regarding the 
rest of the Tractates we are only sure they were dictated after 419. Berrouard 
believes that all treatises were completed by 423. 
 
With regard to the manuscript tradition of the In Iohannis Evangelium Tractatus, 
we refer to a conspicuously large number of codices. On the one hand, the 
frequent use of this work during the Middle Ages led to the preservation of a 
good number of manuscripts. On the other hand, repeated reading caused the 
loss of the more ancient codices (VII-VIII century), which are indeed quite 
fragmentary. Nevertheless, despite the different ages of the numerous 
exemplars at our disposal – both in fragments and completed - it is easy to 
detect the lack of significant variations in the text of different codices. The text of 
the Tractates is overall very well preserved and almost never presents 
substantial differences. A checklist and analysis of the extant manuscripts can 
be found in the work of David F. Wright, ‘The Manuscripts of St Augustine’s 
Tractatus in Evangelium Iohannis: a Preliminary Survey and Check-List’, in 
Recherches Augustiniennes 8 (1972), pp. 57-104; David F. Wright, ‘The 
Manuscripts of the Tractatus in Iohannem: A. Supplementary List’, in 
Recherches Augustiniennes 16 (1981), p. 59-100. The first edition of the 
Tractates dates back to the beginning of the sixteenth century, by Nona pars 
                                                     
108 Augustinus. Epistulae ex duobus codicis nupter in lucem prolatae, Corpus Scriptorum 
Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum 88, ed Johannes Divjak, Vienna 1981. 
109 Epistle XXIII*A,3: ‘In order to complete what is still to do on the Gospel of John I started to 





librorum divi Aurelii Augustini: In evangelium secundum Iohannes tractatus 
CXXIV, ed Johannes Amerbach, Basel 1505. Not long after, a new edition was 
made by Erasmus of Rotterdam, D. Aurelii Augustini Hipponensis episcopi, 
omnium operum, Basel 1529. This edition had a great influence on the 
Reformation. A new edition which was meant to replace that of Erasmus was 
done by a number of catholic theologians of the University of Leuven in 1576: 
Tractatus in Evangelium Iohannis, ed Theologi Lovanienses, Antwerp 1576. In 
the 18th century it appeared the first edition made by the comparison of many 
codices by the work of the Benedictine monks of St Maur: Sancti Aurelii 
Augustini Hipponensis episcopi operum in Iohannes Evangelium tractatus, ed 
Maurina vel Maurini Paris 1679-1700. The text of this edition derived from the 
comparison of 18 codices. The accuracy of this edition made it the point of 
reference for all the next editions, like the 19th century: Patrologiae cursus 
completus series Latina 35: In Joannis Evangelium tractatus CXXIV, ed 
Jacques Paul Migne, Paris 1864, p. 1379-1976. Even the critical edition I used 
for this work, while amending some passages and collecting a greater number 
of manuscripts, is based on the Maurists’ edition: Augustinus. In Iohannis 
evangelium tractatus CXXIV, post Maurinos textum edendum. Corpus 
Christianorum Series Latina 36, ed Radbod Willems, Turnhout 1954. Regarding 
translations into modern languages, the Tractates received particular attention, 
being translated many times in different languages. Among the others, I quote 
here the massive edition of Marie-François Berrouard, Augustin d'Hippone. 
Homélies sur l'Évangile de Saint Jean, VII vols, Bibliothèque Augustinienne 71, 
72, 73A, 73B, 74A, 74B, 75, Paris 1969-2003. The latest translation in English, 
in several volumes is, Augustine. Tractates on the Gospel of John, V vols, The 


























II. The Spirit in God: Origen 
 
II.1: Proceeding from the Father: The Trinitarian Problem and 
the Ontological Relation between the Father and the Son 
  
II.1.1 Divergent Scholarship 
 
Starting a dissertation on the role of the Holy Spirit within Origen’s doctrine of 
the Trinity in the Commentary on John poses some methodological problems 
that need to be faced. The first problem is raised by the very nature of the 
object in question; indeed, every study which claims to understand and 
systematise the function, role and essence of the Holy Spirit in an author before 
the end of the fourth century is at risk of anachronism. As already stated by K. 
McDonnell: ‘not until the fourth century was the status and role of the Holy Spirit 
raised in any significant way’.1 This does not mean that the Spirit was not part of 
the common creed, or that Christians used to believe in a binitarian God – that 
is, a God formed by Father and Son only. Nevertheless, a systematic enquiry 
about the Holy Spirit is not traceable before the Cappadocian fathers. The 
council of Nicaea proposed a creed in which the Holy Spirit, albeit present, was 
largely ignored. The Nicene formula declaims a concise ‘We believe in the Holy 
Spirit’, thus not enquiring about his function and role.2 From these brief 
considerations it follows that, even though the Spirit was always included in 
Christian early creeds, the Holy Spirit as such was never taken as a primary 
object of enquiry. Therefore, every scholar who undertakes a study of the Spirit 
in the era before Cappadocian fathers must be extremely careful not to apply 
theological categories and systematisations that belong to later ages. 
Nevertheless, in the third century theological landscape, there is one significant 
exception: Origen. For all we know, he is the first theologian to propose a 
systematic enquiry about the role of the Spirit in the Trinity. Before him, we 
barely know anything about the consideration the Spirit had in the early church. 
There apparently was a common belief that the Holy Spirit was the source of 
                                                     
1 ‘Does Origen Have a Trinitarian Doctrine of the Holy Spirit?’, p. 5.  
2 See: L. Ayres, Nicaea and Its Legacy. 
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inspiration of the Old and New Testament, hence somehow connected with the 
divinity of Father and Son, but further speculations are unknown.3  
  
The two main texts in which Origen’s pneumatology is expounded are On First 
Principles and the Commentary on John. Here the second methodological issue 
is found: the very notion of the Trinity. As we will note below, according to many 
scholars, Origen does not have a consistent doctrine of the Trinity. The problem 
is a real one and it concerns both philology and theology.  
 
From a theological point of view, scholars still debate the real significance of the 
Trinity in Origen’s thought.4 The debate about the significance of Origen’s 
Trinitarian formulae is deeply connected with the role of the Spirit. In general, 
scholars who deny the presence of a constructive Trinity in Origen’s thought 
tend to deny a significant role to the Spirit. For instance, Harnack claims that the 
only reason Origen inserted the Spirit within the Trinity is that he could not deny 
the rule of faith,5 but there is no significant place for the Spirit in his theology.6 
Therefore, he claims Origen was not very interested in the Trinity as such. The 
same interpretative line has been followed by other scholars, such as Fortman, 
Trigg and Schülts.7 In addition, other scholars even deny that Origen was 
interested in the Spirit at all. Florensky refers to Origen’s pneumatology as a 
‘false window’,8 while Hauschild accuses Origen of having an immature 
pneumatology.9 The idea that bonds these scholars together is that Origen’s 
thought does not need a pneumatology; he inserted the Spirit only in reverence 
                                                     
3 See: Manlio Simonetti, Origene: I Princìpi, Torino 2002, p. 164 n. 1. 
4 A good review of the literature, though not up to date, can be found in K. McDonnell, ‘Does 
Origen Have a Trinitarian Doctrine of the Holy Spirit?’, p. 8-10. I mainly follow him in this brief 
presentation of the two groups, updating his analysis with more modern scholarship. 
5 In the preface of On First Principles Origen makes a brief summary of the rule of faith, 
regarding God, Christ, the soul, the Scriptures and the free will; all issues to which he attempts 
to respond more in depth in the tractate itself. In order to understand what is true and what is 
not, Origen states that everyone who wants to call himself ‘Christian’ must hold a doctrine that is 
based on the apostolic teaching and tradition: Illa sola credenda est veritas quae in nulla ab 
ecclesiastica et apostolica discordat traditione. (We maintain that the only Truth we have to 
believe in is the one that does not conflict in any way with the tradition of the church and of the 
apostles). See On First Principles, I.Praef.2. 
6 See: Adolf von Harnack, History of Dogma, New York 1961, Vol 4 p. 110.   
7 See: Edmund J. Fortman, The Triune God. A Historical Study of the Doctrine of the Trinity, 
Grand Rapids 1972; Joseph W. Trigg, Origen, Atlanta 1983; Christian Schütz, Einführung in die 
Pneumatologie, Darmstadt 1985. 
8 See: Pavel Florensky, ‘On the Holy Spirit’, in Alexander Schmemann (ed), Ultimate Questions: 
An Anthology of Modern Russian Religious Thought, New York 1965, p. 143. 
9 See: W.-D. Hauschild, Lehrbuch der Kirchen-und Dogmengeschichte; see also: W.-D. 
Hauschild and V. H. Drecoll, Pneumatologie in der alten Kirche. 
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to the rule of faith. The idea that the sanctification of creatures and the 
inspiration of the Bible could have been played by the Son/Logos without the 
help of the Spirit will be challenged in my dissertation.  
 
On the other hand, other scholars underline the brilliancy of Origen’s Trinitarian 
formula. By contrast with the first group I mentioned, they tend to emphasise the 
importance of the Spirit’s work in Origen’s thought. Among these, it is worth 
mentioning von Balthasar and Kannengiesser, who defines the treatise On First 
Principles as mainly focused on the Trinity.10 In the last two decades it is 
possible to enumerate an increasing number of scholars among the latter 
group. In 1994, McDonnell wrote an ambitious article in order to demonstrate 
the pivotal role and function of the Spirit in Origen’s conception of the Trinity, 
underlining the high influence it had on the Cappadocian Fathers.11 In 2005, 
Markschies challenged Hauschild’s view by stressing the Spirit’s importance in 
the work of sanctification of the redeemed creatures.12 Similarly, in 2009, 
Greggs proposed a comparison between the Holy Spirit’s works of sanctification 
in Origen and Barth.13 Many more scholars could be quoted in this regard.14 
 
Among this second group of scholars there is a consolidated tendency to 
smooth Origen’s Trinitarian subordinationism and to elevate the Holy Spirit to 
the same rank of the Son.15 They claim that Origen’s subordinating language 
should not be interpreted strictly from an ontological perspective, suggesting 
that one should interpret Origen’s language either in terms of the economic 
function of the Spirt or in terms of the relation of origin between the Spirit and 
the other persons of the Trinity. Hence, when they admit a kind of 
subordinationism among the persons of the Trinity, they usually speak of a 
logical, rather than ontological subordinationism, stating that the Father is not 
                                                     
10 Hans Urs von Balthasar, Origen: Spirit and Fire: A Thematic Anthology of His Writings, 
Washington D.C. 1984; Charles Kannengiesser, ‘Divine Trinity and the Structure of Peri 
Archôn’, in Charles Kannengiesser and William Lawrence Petersen (eds), Origen of Alexandria: 
His World and His Legacy, Notre Dame IND 1988, p. 231-249. 
11 K. McDonnell, ‘Does Origen Have a Trinitarian Doctrine of the Holy Spirit?’. 
12 C. Markschies, ‘Der Heilige Geist im Iohanneskommentar des Origenes’. 
13 T. Greggs, Barth, Origen, and Universal Salvation, p. 152-170. 
14 Among the others, M. Edwards refers to the Spirit as an extremely important marker in order 
to distinguish Origen’s speculation from the Platonic and middle Platonic philosophy. See: M. 
Edwards, Origen against Plato, p. 74-76. On the role of the Spirit in Origen’s Trinity see also: 
Christoph Bruns, Trinität und Kosmos. Zur Gotteslehre des Origenes, Munich 2013. 




ontologically superior to the Son or to the Spirit.16 The problem of this approach, 
firstly undertaken by Crouzel, is that it results in the annihilation of the 
ontological and soteriological differences between the Son and the Spirit, thus 
transforming the Spirit in a useless duplicate of the Son. Consequently, this 
approach fails to comprehend both the need and reasons for Origen’s 
pneumatology. Therefore, by contrast with both McDonnell and Greggs, I will 
show that the particularity of the Spirit’s role in Origen’s soteriology comes 
exactly from his peculiar essence, that is, from his subordination to the Son, 
which allows him to perform his mediating role between God and creation. 
 
The presentation of the role of the Spirit in this chapter will proceed alongside 
the consideration of the significance of the Johannine text in Origen’s Trinitarian 
thought. Moreover, I shall show the extent to which the text of the Gospel 
influences and shapes his understanding of the role of the Spirit and how crucial 
the Commentary on John is in understanding his theological intentions. Some of 
the most important considerations of the relations between Father, Son and 
Spirit come from his exegesis on the prologue of the Gospel, particularly Jn. 1:1 
– ‘In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word 
was God’ – and Jn. 1:3 – ‘Through him all things were made’. I will show that 
both the role of the ontological status of the Spirit and the relation between 
Father and Son derives directly from Origen’s reflection on this Johannine 
movement of procession and derivation. Regarding the Son, Origen’s 
speculation is presented as a synthesis between those passages that affirm the 
oneness and equality of the Son to the Father with those that affirm 
subordination, like Jn. 14:28 ‘the Father who sent me is greater that I’. Equally 
important are the passages of Jn. 8, particularly Jn. 8:19; 8:42, where the 
Father-Son relation is expounded, and of Jn. 13, where the glorification of the 
Son is presented.17 Regarding the role of the Spirit, the entire argumentation 
proposed by Origen is based on Jn. 1:3. As ‘all things were made through him 
(the Logos)’, Origen proposes a complicated doctrine which allows to the Spirit 
                                                     
16 See in particular: H. Crouzel, Origen, p 103. 
17 See in particular: Jn. 8:19: ‘You do not know me or my Father,” Jesus replied. “If you knew 
me, you would know my Father also’. Jn. 8:42: ‘If God were your Father, you would love me, for 
I have come here from God. I have not come on my own; God sent me’. Jn. 13: 31-32 ‘Now the 
Son of Man is glorified and God is glorified in him. If God is glorified in him, God will glorify the 
Son in himself, and will glorify him at once.’ 
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both the role of God and creature.18 In his On First Principles, Origen affirms 
that the Spirit is the only member of the Trinity which could not be known 
without the help of the revelation.19 Origen’s speculation on the text of John 
represents the boldest and most complete attempt to unravel his nature and 
role. 
 
As I acknowledge that tackling the relationship between the three hypostases 
means trying to unravel the question about Origen’s subordinationism, this shall 
be my research question in this chapter. In order to answer this question, I will 
firstly enquire about the Trinity as a whole (II.1.2); then, I will analyse the 
relation between the Father and the Son (II.1.3) and only finally will I investigate 
the status and functions of the Spirit, focusing on his intermediate status of God 
(II.2.1) and creature (II.2.2).  
 
II.1.2 To What Extent Does Origen Have a Doctrine of the Trinity? 
 
First, it is worth spending few words on Origen’s reference to God as triune: 
does Origen have a constructive doctrine of the Trinity? As I have already 
stated, together with On First Principles, the Commentary on John is the most 
relevant text for Origen’s pneumatology. From a philological perspective, a 
major discrepancy can be found between Origen’s Greek terminology and the 
Rufinus’ Latin translation. The Greek word τριάς (Trinity) occurs only three times 
in Origen’s entire corpus; whereas, the term trinitas (Trinity) is constantly used 
by Rufinus in his translation of On First Principles. For this reason, F. H. Kettler 
suggested that the term trinitas should always be considered an interpolation by 
Rufinus, who changed the wording ‘Father, Son and Spirit’ into the term 
trinitas.20 Out of the three mentions of the Greek term τριάς, two occur in the 
Commentary.21 In particular, in the sixth book it is used in relation to baptism. It 
                                                     
18 See also the very important passage of Jn. 4:24: ‘God is Spirit’. 
19 On First Principles, I.3.1. 
20 See: Franz Heinrich Kettler, Der ursprüngliche Sinn der Dogmatik des Origenes, Berlin 1966, 
p. 36; See also: Georg Kretschmar, Studien zur frühchristlichen Trinitätstheologie, Tübingen 
1956, p. 127, who holds the same opinion. What Kretschmar fails to notice is the equivalence of 
the occurrence of Mt. 28:19 in On First Principles I.3.2 and in ComJn, VI.166, where God is 
equally named ‘Trinity’. In this regard see: M. Simonetti, Origene: I Princìpi, p. 166 n. 10.  
21 ComJn, VI.166 and ComJn, X.270. The other occurrence is in Commentary on Matthew, 
XV.31. Other possible occurrences are found in Fragments on John, XX and XXXVI. 
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is possible then to reach two partial conclusions: the first one is that Origen 
rarely uses the term Trinity; the second one relates to the use of the word 
trinitas in reference to the baptism in On First Principles I, 3.2.22 Since the 
quotation of Mt. 28:19 is the same, we must rule out the possibility of Rufinus’ 
manipulation. Anyhow, the first book of On First Principles is entirely dedicated 
to the analysis of God as threefold: in the preface, Origen clearly affirms that 
God is one, explaining that the Father, the Son and the Spirit are one God.23 
Moreover, given that in Origen’s time the theological vocabulary was not yet 
settled as it was in the fourth century, I deem Kettler’s observation theologically 
weak. Even if the term was interpolated by Rufinus, the theological concept of 
the Trinity is still present in Origen’s text. Therefore, it would be difficult to deny 
that Origen has a constructive doctrine of the Trinity.  
 
Anyway, studying the doctrine of God in the Commentary on John gives us the 
privileged perspective of engaging with a work preserved in Greek. Because I 
am enquiring about God-in-himself, the passages of the Commentary shown in 
this chapter are mainly taken from the commentary on the prologue of the 
Gospel, where Trinitarian reflection is largely developed. Therefore, it is 
possible to work directly with Origen’s text without worrying about the possible 
misunderstandings or alterations of the Latin translator. To this end, the sixth 
book of the Commentary gives us certainty about Origen’s use of the word 
Trinity. Moreover, even if the word is rarely used, it is possible to find further 
evidence of this concept in the thirty-second book of the Commentary. Here, 
commenting on Jn. 13:19 – ‘you may believe that I am’ – Origen proposes a 
short creed. Discussing the basic rule of faith, Origen states one has to agree 
with some essential beliefs in order to be called Christian: 
 
                                                                                                                                                         
Nevertheless, the authenticity of these fragments is disputed. However, it is interesting to note 
that also Fr. XXXVI uses the word Trinity in a baptismal context.  
22 See: On First Principles I, 3.2: Ex quibus omnibus didicimus, tantae esse et auctoritatis et 
dignitatis substantiam Spiritus sancti, ut salutare baptismus non aliter nisi excellentissimae 
omnium Trinitatis auctoritate, id est Patris et Filii et Spiritus sancti cognominatione compleatur, 
et ingenito Deo Patri, et unigenito eius Filio nomen quoque sancti Spiritus copuletur (From all 
these quotations we learn that the person of the Holy Spirit is of so great authority and dignity 
that saving baptism is not complete except when performed with the authority of the whole 
Trinity, that is, by the naming of Father, Son and Holy Spirit (Mt. 28:19); and that the name of 
the Holy Spirit must be joined to that of the unbegotten God the Father and his only begotten 
Son).  
23 See: On First Principles, I.Praef.4. 
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First of all believe that God is one, who created all things, and fashioned 
them (Πρῶτον πάντων πίστευσον ὅτι εἷς ἔστιν ὁ θεός, ὁ τὰ πάντα κτίσας καὶ 
καταρτίσας καὶ ποιήσας) and made all things to exist out of what does not 
exist. And one must also believe that Jesus Christ is the Lord, and believe 
in all the truth about him in relation to his divinity and humanity (κατὰ τὴν 
θεότητα καὶ τὴν ἀνθρωπότητα ἀληθείᾳ). And one must also believe in the 
Holy Spirit (Δεῖ δὲ καὶ εἰς τὸ ἅγιον πιστεύειν πνεῦμα), and must believe that, 
because we possess free will (καὶ ὅτι αὐτεξούσιοι ὄντες), we are chastened 
for our sins and rewarded for our good actions (ComJn, XXXII.187-189).24  
  
First, it is necessary to explain that Origen clearly sets up this creed in 
opposition to the Gnostics – who ‘do not believe that the God of the law and of 
the Gospel is one’ – and the Monarchians – who ‘reject the substantive 
existence (ὑπόστασιν) of the Only Begotten and Firstborn of all creation’.25 The 
Trinitarian shape of this creed is self-evident, as is the unity of God, who is said 
to be ‘one’. This short creed ought always to be borne in mind in tackling 
Origen’s doctrine of God in the Commentary. Furthermore, the passage also 
reveals the ambiguity of Origen’s conception of God, precisely regarding the 
Holy Spirit. The Holy Spirit is said to be something Christians ‘have to believe in 
(δεῖ πιστεύειν)’, while no additional indication is given about his nature and role. 
Notwithstanding the lack of clarity, it appears that every part of the Trinity has a 
substantive existence (ὑπόστασιν) that is different from the others.26 This 
becomes clear in a pivotal passage for the analysis of Origen’s pneumatology, 
where he states: ‘We, however, are persuaded that there are three hypostases 
(ὑποστάσεις), the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit’ (ComJn, II.75),27 adding 
later that nothing we can say about the Trinity and its hypostases is to be taken 
as a chronological discourse. There is no time in God (ComJn, II.131).28 The 
three hypostases, together with the unity and uniqueness of God, are the main 
themes of Origen’s conception of the Trinity. As a matter of fact, he constantly 
insists on the uniqueness and unity of God; God is said to be ‘altogether one 
                                                     
24 Translations of the ComJn proposed in this thesis are broadly based on: R. Heine, Origen: 
Commentary […] Books 1-10, and R. Heine, Origen: Commentary […] Book 13-32. 
Nevertheless, I frequently change and adjust Heine’s translation. These adjustments are not 
reported in the footnotes. Translations from On First Principles are mine.  
25 ComJn, XXXII.190 and XXXII.193.   
26 See the aforementioned refutation of the Monarchians in ComJn, XXXII.190 and XXXII.193. 
27 ComJn, II.75: Ἡμεῖς μέντοι γε τρεῖς ὑποστάσεις πειθόμενοι τυγχάνειν, τὸν πατέρα καὶ τὸν υἱὸν 
καὶ τὸ ἅγιον πνεῦμα’.  
28 On the absence of time in the Trinity see also: On First Principles, I.3.4 and IV.4.1. 
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and simple’, ‘immutable and unchangeable’ and ‘the only one who possess 
immortality’.29  
  
So far, I have shown evidence of the Trinitarian shape of God in Origen’s 
thought. The next subsection will focus on explaining the relationship between 
the Father and the Son within the Commentary, thus focusing on 
subordinationism. The choice of tackling the relationship between the Father 
and the Son before the Spirit is due to the shape of Origen’s theology. In fact, 
the kind of relation between Father and Son highly influences his 
pneumatology.  
 
II.1.3 The Father and the Son: Subordinationism 
 
It is worth noting that Origen usually discusses the unity of God when he speaks 
of the relationship between the Father and the Son. Analysing the first two 
verses of the Gospel Ἐν ἀρχῇ ἦν ὁ όγος, καὶ ὁ όγος ἦν πρὸς τὸν Θεόν, καὶ 
Θεὸς ἦν ὁ όγος, Origen proposes a clear distinction between the Father and 
the Son. Origen claims that the use of the article in the first sentence (ὁ όγος 
ἦν πρὸς τὸν Θεόν) must be taken as a reference to the power and divinity of the 
Father alone. Saying that the Logos was with the God (τὸν Θεόν) implies that 
only the Father can be properly called the God, while the Logos is only called 
God (Θεὸς) without the article. Origen thinks that the Father is the only being 
who possesses predicates in a proper sense. The predicate of “immortality” 
(ἀθανασίαν) occurs in relation to God the Father alone.30 Origen pushes his 
analysis further, saying that, just as there is only one of whom it is possible to 
say ‘he is the God’, there is only one Logos who can be properly called the 
Logos. Therefore, the difference between the Father and the Son comes from 
the derivation of the second from the first. The only “very God” is the Father 
(αὐτόθεος ὁ θεός ἐστι), who is the only self-sufficient God, God-by-himself, 
while the Son is God because of participation in Him. This poses the problem of 
unity between the Father and the Son, since it is not Origen’s intention to deny 
                                                     
29 ComJn, I.119; II.75; II.123-125; XIII.219. However, these passages show that these attributes 
can be properly predicated only of the Father. The Son and the Spirit possess them only by 
participation.  
30 See ComJn, II.123; II.163-170. 
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the uniqueness of God. Has the Son an individual nature and an essence (τὴν 
ἰδιότητα καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν)31 that is different from the Father? Origen replies: 
 
We must say that at one time the God, with the article, is the God-in-himself 
(αὐτόθεος ὁ θεός ἐστι). […] On the other hand, everything besides the God-
in-himself, which is made God by participation in his divinity, would more 
properly not be said to be the God, but God (πᾶν δὲ τὸ παρὰ τὸ αὐτόθεος 
μετοχῇ τῆς ἐκείνου θεότητος θεοποιούμενον οὐχ «ὁ θεὸς» ἀλλὰ «θεὸς). […] 
The God therefore is the true God (Ἀληθινὸς οὖν θεὸς ὁ θεός). The others 
are gods formed according to him as images of the prototype (οἱ δὲ κατ’ 
ἐκεῖνον μορφούμενοι θεοὶ ὡς εἰκόνες πρωτοτύπου). But, again, the 
archetypical image of the many images is the Word with the God (ὁ πρὸς 
τὸν θεόν ἐστι λόγος) who was in the beginning. By being with the God he 
always continues to be God (ComJn, II.17-18). 
 
God the Logos is therefore God by derivation and participation. In this way 
Origen tries to solve the problem of the uniqueness of God and the individual 
existence of each person of the Trinity. In the passage preceding the 
aforementioned one (ComJn II.16), Origen uses the words ‘individual nature’ 
and ‘essence’ (τὴν ἰδιότητα καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν) both for describing what is proprium 
to each person of the Trinity – therefore, the real individual essence of each 
person – and for underlining the unity between Father and Son. Furthermore, I 
would argue that the radical subordination of the Son to the Father is quite clear 
from this passage.32 This is because the Son is God only insofar he eternally 
contemplates the Father, for he entirely derives his divinity from the Father.33 
   
Does that mean that the Son is not divine by nature but only by participation? 
Has the Son another nature apart from participation in the Father? The passage 
cannot entirely solve these problems. What is not clear in this passage is the 
way in which we have to understand the subordination of the Son to the Father. 
Is it to be understood as an ontological subordination or as a logical one? That 
                                                     
31 ComJn, II.16.  
32 I agree with: M. Edwards, Origen against Plato, p. 70, when he states that: ‘There is no doubt 
that in his Trinity the second and third hypostasis are the servitors of the first’. It is also true that 
subordinationism was not considered a heresy in the first three centuries, for the large majority 
of theologians used to deny even a hypostasis to the Son. See ibidem, p. 84 n. 136. 
33 Regarding the contemplation of the Father by the Son see, among the others: ComJn, II. 126; 
II.131. See also: ComJn, XX.153-159, which I will analyse later in this section. 
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is, is it related to the nature of each person or is it just an expression of 
economic functions and relation of origin? It is worth spending few more words 
on where the difference between ontological and logical subordinationism lies. 
We can speak of ontological subordinationism only if the Father and the Son 
are two different ontological entities, each one with an individual reality 
(hypostasis) and essence (ousia). If, on the contrary, the Father and the Son 
are just different aspects of the same ontological entity, than it is possible to 
speak of a logical subordinationism. Moreover, it is necessary to define the 
ideas of priority and superiority. Saying that an entity is superior to another one 
means that they both possess the same attributes – e.g. goodness – but that 
one possesses the attributes in a more perfect way than the other. On the 
contrary, saying that an entity is prior to another one means that they both 
share the same attributes at the same level, but the attribute of the second are 
completely derived from the first. The idea of priority and superiority can be 
present both in an ontological and in a logical subordinationism. My work will 
prove that Origen conceived an ontological subordinationism of priority in the 
intra-relationship between Trinitarian hypostases, an ontological 
subordinationism of both priority and superiority between God and the creatures 
and a logical subordinationism of both priority and superiority between the 
different aspects (ἐπίνοιαι) of the Son. 
  
In general, the possibility of ontological or logical subordinationism lies in the 
individual natures of the Father and the Son. In order to solve this problem, we 
must establish which are the predicates of each person. For sure, each person 
has his own substantive existence (ὑπόστασις), as Origen states many times in 
the Commentary.34 The Father is the only one who possesses divinity per se 
(according to himself), that is, who originates divinity as well as everything that 
exists. He utterly possesses all predicates of God. He is the only one to be 
really immortal (ComJn, II.123 II.166) invisible, bodiless35 and good (ComJn, 
I.251-253).36 In fact, the Father is mainly identified with the Good.37 In addition, 
                                                     
34 See: ComJn, I.151; I.243; II.75; X.246; XX.174. 
35 The attribute ‘incorporeal’ refers to the Trinity by derivation from the Father. See: On First 
Principles, I.6.4; II.2.2; IV.3.15.  
36 In this passage Origen refers to the goodness of the Father which, at the end of the world, will 
fill every creature with his goodness. In this way Origen interprets the refusal of Christ to call 
himself ‘good’ in Mk. 10:18: ‘Why do you call me good? No one is good except one, God the 
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Origen defines the Father not only as the one who possesses in a full sense all 
predicates, but even as the one who surpasses every possible definition, for his 
power and nature is beyond any nature and predicate (ComJn, I,149-151; 
XIX.37).38  
  
On the other hand, the Son is His Image. He is eternally generated by the 
Father (ComJn, I,204; XX.140) and he is the one who reveals the Father to the 
creation (ComJn, I.34; I.201; I.277). There was not a time when the Son was 
not.39 Therefore, it is not possible to speak of any kind of chronological or 
temporal subordinationism in Origen. The nature of the Son is to be The 
Wisdom-Word, the only begotten and firstborn of all creation (ComJn I.245; 
I.291).40 Nevertheless he needs the Father just as every other being needs him 
(ComJn, XIII.151). The first book of the Commentary is entirely focused on the 
relation between the Father and the Son and on the aspects (ἐπίνοιαι) of the 
Son, particularly in relation to the spiritual world (κόσμος νοητός).41 Here, the 
Son is defined as ‘many good things’ (πολλὰ ἀγαθά), in contrast with the Father 
who is the Good (ComJn, I.51-52). He is life, light, light of the world, true light 
and light of men, truth, way, resurrection, door, Wisdom and power. All these 
aspects and many others are called ἐπίνοιαι. They represent the different levels 
of understanding the rational creature (λογικὸς) can gain of the Saviour. Some 
                                                                                                                                                         
Father’. The justice of the Son is therefore a means through which he prepares unjust creatures 
to receive the Father, that is, the Good.  
37 See also: On First Principles, I.2.13; I.4.3; I.8.3; IV.4.8, where the Father is depicted as the 
Good always effusing his goodness.  
38 Jon M. Robertson, Christ as Mediator: A Study of the Theologies of Eusebius of Caesarea, 
Marcellus of Ancyra, and Athanasius of Alexandria, Oxford 2007, p. 24-28, presents the 
ontological role of the Son as mediator between the Father and the world as a result of the 
‘continuity of nature’ between the Father and the Son. Nevertheless, Robertson’s argument 
lacks an appropriate evaluation of the beyond-essence nature of the Father (ComJn, XIX.37). 
How is it possible to affirm the consubstantiality between the Father and the Son if the Father is 
beyond essence? Moreover, the fact that the Son is ‘light’ as well as the Father (see p. 27) does 
not absolutely prove an equal essence between the Father and the Son, for Origen clearly 
states in ComJn, II.149-151 the difference in οὐσία between the Father who is both ‘light’ and 
who ‘transcends the light’, and the Son who is just ‘light’. 
39 Reference to this statement can be found in On First Principles, I.2.9 and IV.4.1and in the 
Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans, I.5. The eternal generation of the Son from the 
Father shows the difference between Origen’s and Arius’ readings of Origen’s theology.  
40 The quotation of Colossians 1:15: ‘He is image of the invisible God and firstborn of all 
creations’ appears many times in other works as well. In Aginst Celsus it appears fourteen 
times. See for example Against Celsus, 3.34.  
41 See amongst others: ComJn, I.52-56; I.161-168; I.191-200; I.209-219; I.222-228; I.243-258. 
See in this regard T. Greggs’ interpretation of the ἐπίνοιαι as the means through which Origen 
combines universalism and particularity. The ἐπίνοιαι, insofar they stands for the various degree 
of participation in Christ, are necessaries in the process of ascent of every rational creature to 
God: ‘The fuller participation of our reason in the Logos is the means by which the logika are 
transformed into the logikoi’. See T. Greggs, Barth, Origen, and Universal Salvation, p. 81. 
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of them represent the Son in-himself; some others are ways through which the 
Son helps irrational beings to understand him (ComJn, I.203; VI.100-108; 
VI.222). Even the name ‘Logos’ is an ἐπίνοια of the Son (ComJn, I,52-60). 
Nevertheless, Origen warns the reader not to consider these aspects as related 
to the essence of the Son. In fact, the Son has one essence that is the same in 
all his aspects: ‘No one takes offence when we distinguish the aspects 
(ἐπινοίας) of the Saviour, thinking that we also do the same with his essence (τῇ 
οὐσίᾳ)’ (ComJn, I.200). Therefore, the Son is one-in-himself. The ἐπίνοιαι do 
not have any substantial existence, but they are only the way through which the 
Son makes the Logos – that is, himself insofar he is Logos – manifest to the 
world. As a consequence, the ἐπίνοιαι are multiple aspects through which the 
Logos acts in the world. By contrast with the Father, whose nature is one and 
simple, the Son can become many things. The only aspect which can claim to 
have a substantial existence is Wisdom (ComJn, I.243-251). The reason for this 
privileged status is that Wisdom is the name of the Son-inside-the-Father, apart 
from the relation with any other created being. In this regard, Origen writes: 
   
[Wisdom] does not have a hypostasis (proper existence) merely in the 
mental images of The God and Father of the universe (Οὐ γὰρ ἐν ψιλαῖς 
φαντασίαις τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ πατρὸς τῶν ὅλων τὴν ὑπόστασιν ἔχει ἡ σοφία) in a 
way analogous to the images in human thoughts (κατὰ τὰ ἀνὰ λόγον τοῖς 
ἀνθρωπίνοις ἐννοήμασι φαντάσματα). If someone is able to comprehend 
an incorporeal hypostasis (existence) comprised of the various ideas which 
embrace the principles of the universe, an existence which is living and 
animate (ἐστιν ἀσώματον ὑπόστασιν ποικίλων θεωρημάτων περιεχόντων 
τοὺς τῶν ὅλων λόγους ζῶσαν καὶ οἱονεὶ ἔμψυχον ἐπινοεῖν), as it were, he 
will understand the Wisdom of God who precedes the whole creation (ὑπὲρ 
πᾶσαν κτίσιν σοφίαν τοῦ θεοῦ) (ComJn, I.243-244). 
 
Wisdom is therefore the proper name of the Son which, before every creation, 
always was with the Father and in the Father. Digging deeper in the ἐπίνοιαι of 
the Son, Origen divides the aspects of the Son in two categories. On the one 
hand, there are four ἐπίνοιαι which belong to the Son-in-himself. These are: 
Wisdom, Logos, Truth, Beginning.42 On the other hand, some ἐπίνοιαι only refer 
                                                     
42 The dependence of Origen’s theology of the ἐπίνοιαι on the gnostic – in particular Valentinian 
– aeons and syzygies has been already proved in G. Lettieri, ‘Il nous mistico. Il superamento 
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to the relation between the Son and the fallen creatures. Anyway, Origen 
believes it is impossible for the creatures to know all the ἐπίνοιαι of the Son 
from the beginning (ἀρχή) to the end (ComJn, I.222-224). For this reason, he 
asks if it is possible that: 
 
since there is a system of ideas in Him, [the Son] (συστήματος 
θεωρημάτων ὄντος ἐν αὐτῷ) insofar he is “Wisdom” (σοφία), there are 
some ideas that are incomprehensible to all begotten nature except himself 
(ἐστί τινα θεωρήματα ἀχώρητα τῇ λοιπῇ παρ’ αὐτὸν γεννητῇ φύσει), which 
he knows for himself (ἅτινα οἶδεν ἑαυτῷ) (ComJn, II.126). 
   
The question Origen is asking here is: is it possible that there are some things – 
therefore, some attributes – known only by the Father and the Son? For now, I 
would leave the question unanswered in order to clarify this point later on in this 
very section. Nevertheless, I would like to point out that the passage clearly 
states the superiority of the Son to every other existing being.  
  
So far, I have shown the many aspects of the Son. Moreover, I have shown the 
close dependence of the Son on the Father. There is no doubt that, among all 
the beings, the Son is the closest to the Father. In commenting on Jn. 1:1 ‘in the 
beginning was the Word’ and ‘all things came into being (ἐγένετο) through him 
(the Logos)’, Origen says: 
  
As, therefore, ‘all things came into being (ἐγένετο) through him,’ not, all 
things were (ἦν) through him, and, ‘without him nothing came into being 
(ἐγένετο),’ not, without him nothing was (ἦν), so ‘what came into being 
                                                                                                                                                         
origeniano dello gnosticismo nel Commento a Giovanni’, p. 177-275. It is particularly interesting 
to note how Origen structured his system of ἐπίνοιαι according to the Valentinian Ogdoad (see 
Irenaeus, Against Heresies, I.1-8), quoted in ComJn, I.56. In ComJn II,155 Origen quotes 
Ptolemy (see Irenaeus, Against Heresies, I.1.1) referring to: ‘those who have invented the 
mythology concerning aeons in pairs (περὶ αἰώνων ἐν συζυγίαις μυθολογίαν), and who think that 
Logos and Life have been produced by Intellect and Truth (ὑπὸ νοῦ καὶ ἀληθείας προβεβλῆσθαι 
λόγον καὶ ζωὴν)’. Origen dismisses this opinion proving that Life (ζωή) has its origin in the 
Logos, therefore cannot be its consort. The Valentinian myth, in connection with Heracleon, is 
quoted in many other passages both in relation to the ἐπίνοιαι and to the doctrine of the three 
natures. See for example ComJn, XIII.73 and XIII.120. Origen’s theology of the ἐπίνοιαι can 
therefore be interpreted as the successful attempt at a demythologization of Gnostic speculation 
through a theology which applies the ontological role of the gnostic aeons to the logical aspects 
of the single Son. Since the ἐπίνοιαι lack a proper essence different from that of the Son, they 
are merely logical steps leading the creatures from material ignorance to immaterial knowledge, 
like the saints who ‘live a completely immaterial and bodiless life in blessedness (ἄϋλον πάντη 
καὶ ἀσώματον ζωὴν ζώντων ἐν μακαριότητι τῶν ἁγίων)’ (ComJn, I.97). 
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(γέγονεν) in him,’ not what was (ἦν) in him, ‘was life’. And again, not what 
came into being (ἐγένετο) in him was the Word, but what was (ἦν) in the 
beginning was the Word (ComJn, II.131). 
   
The difference between the Logos and any other being lies in the eternal 
generation of the Son from the Father without any mediation. The close 
connection between the Son and the Father makes the Son the Perfect Image 
of the Father and the means through which everything that exists came into 
being.43 The Son is the only one who is eternally with the Father. Therefore, the 
Son is the only one who needs no mediator to know the Father. In the same 
way Origen explains the depiction of the Son as μονογενής (only begotten) in 
the Gospel of John (Jn. 1:18 and 3:16) (ComJn, I.276; II.73-77). This privileged 
status makes the Son the only true Image. Nevertheless, it still remains to 
investigate what it means for the Son to be ‘image’ (εἰκών). While the quotations 
presented so far come from the commentary on the Gospel’s prologue, where 
the Son is presented in his closeness to the Father, Origen has also to deal with 
other passages of the Gospel where Christ is said to be inferior to the Father, 
for ‘the Father who sent me is greater that I’ (Jn. 14:28). In one passage – 
where the influence of Platonic thought is particularly strong – 44 Origen reflects 
on the nature of this image: 
                                                     
43 My translation of ἐγένετο with ‘come into being’ is due both to the lack of difference in 
Origen’s language between the verb γίγνομαι and γεννάω and to my intention to differentiate 
the ways in which different things came into being. Origen uses this expression to indicate the 
coming-into-being of both the Spirit, which is fully divine, and all other fallen creatures. To this 
end see infra, II.2.2. In this particular passage, I use this translation in order to underline the 
difference between the Son, who is eternally in God, and all other beings, which necessitate the 
Son to contemplate the Father. 
44 The relationship between Origen and Platonic tradition is highly debated within scholarship. I 
have already quoted some works about this. I would merely observe here that the passage I will 
quote, the authenticity of which is beyond doubt, is found almost word by word in the Chaldean 
Oracle, 3-4. Being a text of the second century, the Chaldean Oracles antedate Origen – for 
sure, they antedate Porphyry. See: M. Edwards, Origen against Plato, p. 75. Even if Origen did 
not know the Oracles, the similarities between the two passages remain a witness of his 
closeness to the Platonic tradition. See also Albinus, Epitome, 14,3, who speaks of the rising of 
the soul of the world and its ruling over the universe in place of the Father, for his impossibility 
of facing the multiplicity (an idea which resembles the one expressed in ComJn, II.31). J. 
Daniélou, Origen, p. 90-92 traces in Origen’s reference to the Father as αὐτόθεος an echo of 
Numenius. Numenius’ system is based on three gods: The Father, the Son and the Grandson 
or, alternatively, the Father, the Creator and the Cosmos. The Father is the only one who can 
be rightly called αὐτοάγαθος, (see Eusebius of Caesarea, Preparation for the Gospel, 11.22) for 
the Son – which is the demiurge and the creator of the world, just as in Origen’s system – 
receives all from the Father. M. Edwards denies this correspondence ‘as Numenius’ appellation 
for the First God is autoagathon (Good itself), not autotheos (God itself)’. Nevertheless, I find 
quite hard to maintain this objection, for in the whole Commentary (ComJn, II. 152-153) God the 
Father is presented as the only one who possesses the real Goodness in himself. See also: 
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But, although the Saviour transcends in his essence (ὑπερέχων οὐσίᾳ), 
rank, power, divinity (πρεσβείᾳ καὶ δυνάμει καὶ θειότητι) – for the Word is 
living – and Wisdom (σοφίᾳ) beings that are so great and of such antiquity, 
nevertheless, he is not comparable with the Father in any way. For he 
[Christ] is an image of the goodness and brightness not of God, but of 
God’s glory and of his eternal light (Εἰκὼν γάρ ἐστιν τῆς ἀγαθότητος αὐτοῦ 
καὶ ἀπαύγασμα οὐ τοῦ θεοῦ ἀλλὰ τῆς δόξης αὐτοῦ καὶ τοῦ ἀϊδίου φωτὸς 
αὐτοῦ), and he is a breath, not of the Father, but of his power; and he is a 
pure emanation of God’s almighty glory, and an unspotted mirror of his 
activity (ἀτμὶς οὐ τοῦ πατρὸς ἀλλὰ τῆς δυνάμεως αὐτοῦ, καὶ ἀπόρροια 
εἰλικρινὴς τῆς παντοκρατορικῆς δόξης αὐτοῦ καὶ ἔσοπτρον ἀκηλίδωτον τῆς 
ἐνεργείας αὐτοῦ) (ComJn, XIII.152-153).45 
  
Just a few lines before these, Origen stated that ‘The Father exceeds (ὑπερέχει) 
the Saviour as much, or even more, as the Saviour himself and the Holy Spirit 
exceed the rest’ (ComJn, XIII.151). The passage seems to suggest a strong 
ontological subordinationism of the Son to the Father. The essence of the 
Father is so transcendent that the Son is not even his image, but the Image of 
his Power. This peculiar position is exactly the same of the sequence Father-
Dunamis-Son traceable in the Chaldaeon Oracle.46 Furthermore, this is not the 
only passage where the Son is called image not of the God but of His power.47 
In ComJn, XXXII.350-357 he says only the Son is the reflection of the glory of 
God the Father, anticipating the partial reflections on the rest of the rational 
creation (τὴν λογικὴν κτίσιν), for nobody except the Son contains the whole 
reflection of the full glory of God. The Son is therefore the reflection and image 
not of the Father, but of his glory. Moreover, Origen asks if, in addition to being 
glorified in the Son, God (the Father) is glorified in a greater manner in himself, 
when he is engaged in self-contemplation ‘on the basis of the knowledge and 
contemplation of Himself (ἐπὶ τῇ ἑαυτοῦ γνώσει καὶ τῇ ἑαυτοῦ θεωρίᾳ) which 
                                                                                                                                                         
ComJn, I.251-253 and On First Principles, I.2.13; I.4.3; I.8.3; IV.4.8, where the Father is 
depicted as the Good that always effusing his goodness. 
45 Regarding the idea of ‘glory’ and ‘mirror’ see: Wis. 7:25-26 and Heb. 1:3. Origen uses these 
biblical quotations in order to show the subordination of the Son to the Father.  
46 See Mark Edwards, ‘Being Life and Mind: A Brief Inquiry’, in Syllecta Classica 8 (1997), p. 
191-205. See in particular p. 198.  
47 See: On First Principles II.8.5 and I.2.10-12 Origen stresses how the action and the power of 
the Son corresponds to that of the Father only in the sense that the Son acts as a minister of 
the Father. See also: I.Pref.4. 
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surpasses the contemplation of the Son’(ComJn, XXXII.350-357). In this 
contemplation, he is gladdened with satisfaction and joy and pleased with 
himself and rejoices. Origen stresses that these terms are used improperly, 
since it is impossible to explain this issue in human terms. 
  
In general, I think it is possible to affirm that Origen presents two tendencies. 
On the one hand, he tends to exalt the Only-Begotten nature of the Son above 
every other being. On the other hand, Origen wants to defend the absolute 
transcendence of the Father above every other being, including the Son.48 
Nevertheless, it could seem that the ineffable nature of the Father makes him 
incomprehensible to every being with the exception of the Son (ComJn, I.187).49 
A good example of this ambiguity is the relation between the Father and the 
truth. Origen defines the Son as truth, for ‘according to the will of the Father he 
has embraced the whole principles of the universe’ (ComJn, I.186). Origen adds 
that, insofar as the Saviour is the truth, he must understand everything of the 
Father, for, ‘if the truth is complete, he must be ignorant of nothing true’ 
(ComJn, I.187). Therefore, one must refute the doctrine that there is something 
of the Father that the Son does not know. But, in the same passage, Origen 
admits also the possibility of the existence of ‘things which do not belong to the 
appellation “truth”, but are beyond it’ (ComJn, I.187), which is exactly the case 
of the Father. In fact, in other passages, where Origen defines the Son as ‘true 
light’, Origen declares that: 
 
Now, to the extent that God the Father of the truth (ὁ πατὴρ τῆς ἀληθείας 
θεὸς) is more than (πλείων) and greater than (μείζων) the truth and, being 
the Father of Wisdom, is greater than and surpasses Wisdom (ὁ πατὴρ ὢν 
σοφίας κρείττων ἐστὶ καὶ διαφέρων ἢ σοφία), to this extent he transcends 
(ὑπερέχει) being true light (ComJn, II.150). 
                                                     
48 It is impossible not to connect the ineffable nature of the Father in Origen’s thought to the 
Valentinian reference to the Father as the unknowable Abyss (βυθός). See: Irenaeus, Against 
Heresies, I.1.1 and I.2.1. See for example what Origen says in ComJn, II.18 about the Son who 
‘would not remain God if he did not continue in unceasing contemplation of the depth of the 
Father (οὐκ ἂν μείνας θεός, εἰ μὴ παρέμενε τῇ ἀδιαλείπτῳ θέᾳ τοῦ πατρικοῦ βάθους)’. This 
contemplation exactly corresponds to that of the Intellect (νοῦς) towards the Father/Abyss 
(πατήρ/βυθός) in Ptolemy (Irenaeus, Against Heresies, I.1.1). In this respect, the Father of 
Origen is the same as the incomprehensible Pre-Father (προπάτωρ) of the Valentinians. See: 
H. De Lubac, History and Spirit p. 265 and H. U. von Balthasar, Origen: Spirit and Fire, p. 7, 
who states that Origen’s subordinationism is dependent on the Greek-Gnostic substratum. In 
this sense it is interpreted as a means to bridge the gap between God and the world.  
49 The same concept is expressed in On First Principles, I.1.5; I.1.8; IV.4.1, where Origen states 




Therefore God, insofar he is the Father, is more and greater than all the 
principles of the universe, including the Son.50 In fact, the declaration that God 
is more and greater than Wisdom – that is, the Son-in-himself – states a clear 
priority of the Father to everything else. The depiction of the Father as the agent 
which is greater that the truth, as compared to the Son which is the absolute 
truth, is pivotal in order to understand the way in which, in Origen’s thought, the 
subordination of the Son to the Father can be ontologically described only as a 
subordination of priority. Indeed, in this passage, the Father is not said to be 
“truer” than the Son. On the contrary, the Son is fully true, thus possessing truth 
to the maximum level. Nevertheless, the Father is “greater than the truth” for his 
very essence surpasses not only the human possibility of language to describe 
it, but also the truth itself. Nevertheless, the Father cannot be said to be truer 
than the Son because, from an ontological point of view, they both fully possess 
truth. The same can be said of the relation between the Father and the being. 
On the one hand, the Father is the only one who fully possess Being. On the 
other hand, the Father is said to be beyond essence and Being. This majesty of 
the Father is due to his ineffable nature, his being beyond every possible 
definition, even beyond any essence (τῇ ὑπερέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας) (ComJn, 
XIX.37). In two other extremely important passages of the Against Celsus 
Origen affirms that the Father not only transcends Being and is ‘beyond 
essence’, but he is also ‘beyond mind and essence’ (ἐπέκεινα νοῦ καὶ οὐσίας 
εἶναι).51 For this reason, even if the Son can be aware of the ineffable nature of 
the Father, he cannot be ineffable himself. Indeed, this ineffability does not refer 
to an ontological condition of the Father, but rather to the fact that God the 
Fathers in-himself falls beyond the very notion of Being and, consequently, of 
ontology. As such, in Origen’s thought, by contrast with his Platonic 
counterparts, “ineffability” cannot be considered an ontological attribute. Indeed, 
just as it has been noted by Tzamalikos, the Father ‘is beyond any notion of 
essence. It is God who attributes to essence its ontological significance, if 
any’.52 As such, the fact that the Father surpasses Being, thus being “ineffable”, 
is not regarded by Origen as a flaw in his ontology according to which the 
Father and the Son possess the same ontological properties at the same level. 
                                                     
50 Origen adds in ComJn, II.149 that the Father is also different in essence (οὐσία). 
51 See: Against Celsus, VI.64; VII.38. 
52 Panayiotis Tzamalikos, Origen: Cosmology and Ontology of Time, Leiden 2006, p. 88. 
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Therefore, even if the Son is not ineffable, it is not possible to say that he lacks 
an ontological attribute, for ineffability is not an ontological characteristic.53 
Therefore, Origen still can affirm that the Son is the perfect ontological image of 
every attribute, of every power, of every glory of the Father, but he lacks 
ineffability, for he cannot be above Being. Only to this extent, it is possible to 
affirm that the Son is the perfect image of the Father. Following this line of 
thought, Origen defines the Father as the per se (according to which) of the Son 
and the Son as the per se (according to which) of the creatures. Therefore, 
while the Fathers is the perfect God in se (in-himself) and per se (according-to-
himself), the Son is God in se (in-himself) but is not God per se (according-to-
himself). This is how Origen explains the expression Ἐν ἀρχῇ ἦν ὁ όγος, 
referring ἀρχή both to the Father and the Son:  
  
For if human beings are according to the image (Εἰ γὰρ οἱ ἄνθρωποι «κατ’ 
εἰκόνα»), and the image (that is, the Son) is according to the Father (ἡ 
εἰκὼν δὲ κατὰ τὸν πατέρα), it follows that the according to which and 
beginning of Christ, on the one hand, is the Father (τὸ μὲν «καθ’ ὃ» τοῦ 
Χριστοῦ ὁ πατὴρ ἀρχή), but, on the other hand, Christ is the according of 
which of human beings (τὸ δὲ «καθ’ ὃ» τῶν ἀνθρώπων ὁ Χριστός) (ComJn, 
I.105).  
  
The Son is the perfect derivation from the Father, according to which he exists, 
while the creatures are made through the Son, that is to say, they are images of 
the Image.  
  
I have already defined the Father and the Son as two different hypostases, but I 
would like to take the analysis further. The term “hypostasis”, in Origen’s 
language, indicates a reality with a proper and individual existence; 
nonetheless, besides the different individual reality, do the Father and the Son 
                                                     
53 I completely agree with R. Williams, ‘The Son's Knowledge of the Father in Origen’, p. 146-
153, who traces in the Commentary of John an ambiguity regarding the Son’s knowledge of the 
Father. He rightly interprets ComJn, I.187 and II.150 as references to the impossibility of the 
Son to have the entire knowledge of the Father. He realised that ‘what the Father knows, 
however, are not some extra facts unknown to the Son, but the simplicity of his own Nature’ p. 
147. Therefore, Williams recognises that it is unthinkable that the Son might fail to embody a 
perfect and total contemplative union with the Father. ‘Yet, logically, the Son cannot know the 
Father in his simplicity, but only as an infinite depth never to be fully sounded’. 
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have the same essence (οὐσία)?54 This problem is far from having being 
solved, for many scholars have affirmed that Origen depicted the Father and the 
Son as being consubstantial.55 For this reason, some of them claim there is not 
an “ontological”, but a “logical” subordination between the Father and the Son.56  
 
First of all, I think that the question is misplaced. Insofar as both the Father and 
the Son are ontological entities, their subordinationism cannot be anything but 
ontological.57 The derivation of the Son from the Father is an ontological 
derivation, not a logical one. If it was only logical the Son would not have a 
proper distinct existence (like the ἐπίνοιαι). For this reason, I disagree with 
scholars who affirm a logical subordinationism of the Son to the Father.58 What 
they failed to notice is that any kind of subordinationism between two 
ontological entities, which possess a distinctive existence (being hypostases), 
necessarily implies an ontological subordinationism. Nevertheless, it is worth 
reminding the reader once more that, Origen’s thought, the ontological 
subordinationism between two entities should not be understood as a 
                                                     
54 It is worth remembering that Origen considers ‘of the same essence’ two beings that are ‘co-
ordinate members of a single class, beings sharing the same properties’. See: Rowan Williams, 
Arius: Heresy and Tradition, London 1987, p. 134. 
55 The question over the possible use of the word homoousios (of the same substance) by 
Origen in reference to the Father and the Son is highly debated. See among the others: Manlio 
Simonetti, ‘Ancora su homoousios a proposito di due recenti studi’, in Vetera Christianorum 17 
(1980), p. 85-98. See also the debate between Richard P. C. Hanson, ‘Did Origen Apply the 
Word Homoousios to the Son?’, in Richard P. C. Hanson (ed), Studies in Christian Antiquity, 
London 1983, p. 53-70 and Mark Edwards’ reply: ‘Did Origen Apply the Word Homoousios to 
the Son?’ in The Journal of Theological Studies 49 2 (1998), p. 658-670. The only reference we 
have comes from a fragment of his lost Commentary on Hebrew, quoted and maybe altered by 
the translator. In this regard, I agree with the opinion of R. Williams, Arius: Heresy and Tradition, 
p. 134-138. Anyway, even if the passage was authentic, the word homoousios is used by 
Origen in an analogical way, not to indicate a dogmatic formula, as stated by M. Edwards, ‘Did 
Origen Apply the Word Homoousios to the Son?’, p. 670. 
56 See for example: H. Crouzel, Origen, p. 188. Crouzel claims that ‘The subordination of the 
Son to the Father does not bring into question either identity of nature or equality of power. The 
Son is both subordinate and equal to the Father. […] The subordination arises in the first place 
from the fact that the Father is Father, origin of the two other Persons and initiator of the Trinity. 
The latter role concerns the economy […] denotes the activity of the Trinity externally, in the 
creation and in the Incarnation- Redemption’. I disagree with Crouzel on this point. This view will 
be challenged later in this chapter. On Crouzel’s wavelength see: K. McDonnell, ‘Does Origen 
Have a Trinitarian Doctrine of the Holy Spirit?’ and Ilaria Ramelli, ‘Origen’s Anti-
Subordinationism and its Heritage in the Nicene and Cappadocian Line’, in Vigiliae Christianae 
65 (2011), p. 21-49. 
57 I agree here with George Leonard Prestige, God in Patristic Thought, London 1952 and E. J. 
Fortman, The Triune God, p. 56. Nevertheless, although the ontological subordination of the 
Son to the Father affects the status of the Spirit, I do not think his role in soteriology is 
diminished. 
58 See for example: K. McDonnell, ‘Does Origen Have a Trinitarian Doctrine of the Holy Spirit?’, 
p. 34. He writes: ‘Origen’s subordinationism language is either an expression of a relation of 
origin, or of an economic function, and is not ontological’.  
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subordination of one hypostasis over the other at an ontological level, thus 
implying the loss of ontological properties. By contrast, Origen’s 
subordinationism is an ontological subordinationism of priority. On the contrary, 
a logical subordinationism can be affirmed only of the epinoiai of the Son; in that 
case it is possible to state that, for example, the aspect of ‘Light’ is logically 
subordinated to that of the Logos.  
   
Secondly, in spite of some passages that may apparently suggest the contrary, 
Origen never claims in the Commentary that Father and Son are consubstantial. 
On the contrary, he states there is an ontological difference, a difference in 
οὐσία:59 
   
Now, since the Saviour here is ‘light’ in general and in the catholic epistle of 
the same John, God is said to be ‘light’ (ὁ θεὸς εἶναι φῶς) (1Jn. 1:5) one 
could think that it is confirmed from this source too that the Father is not 
distinct from the Son in essence (τῇ οὐσίᾳ μὴ διεστηκέναι τοῦ υἱοῦ τὸν 
Πατέρα). But another, who speaks more accurately (ἀκριβέστερον) and 
speaks more soundly (ὑγιέστερον) will say that the light which shines in the 
darkness and is not overcome by it (Jn. 1:5) and the light in which there is 
no darkness at all are not the same (οὐ ταὐτὸν εἶναι) (ComJn, II.149-151). 
   
The one who ‘speaks more accurately’ sees that it is impossible to affirm that 
the Father and the Son have the same essence, for not only does the former 
causes the existence of the latter, but the Son can be surrounded by darkness – 
although he cannot be overcome – whereas the Father, is ontologically too 
transcendent to see any darkness at all. The Father, being all one and simple, 
is light without darkness, while the essence of the Son allows Him to deal with 
the multiplicity through his ἐπίνοιαι. The Logos is the ontological mediator who 
guarantees the connection between God-Father and the World-Creature 
(ComJn, II.199-209; VI.88-92; XX.46-64).60 In the next section I will show how 
Origen also rebuts the idea that the Holy Spirit has the same essence of the 
Father and the Son in ComJn, II.74-75.61 Moreover, in ComJn, X.246 Origen 
                                                     
59 I agree with L. Ayres, Nicaea and Its Legacy, p. 24-28 who states that Origen clearly presents 
the Father and the Son as different ousiai.  
60 In this regard see: On First Principles, I.Praef.4; I.7.1; II.6.1; II.9.4; IV.4.3. 
61 The passage was misread by both K. McDonnell, ‘Does Origen Have a Trinitarian Doctrine of 
the Holy Spirit?’, p. 12 n. 46 and I. Ramelli, ‘Origen Anti-Subordinationism and its Heritage in 
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rebuts some wrong readings of the passage of the casting out of the merchants 
from the temple in Jn. 2:14-17. This is how Origen describes these heretics: 
  
Those who are confused on the position of the Father and the Son (οἱ 
συγχεόμενοι ἐν τῷ περὶ πατρὸς καὶ υἱοῦ τόπῳ) think that these statements 
prove that the Son does not differ from the Father in number, but that both 
being one, not only in essence but also in substance (μὴ διαφέρειν τῷ 
ἀριθμῷ τὸν υἱὸν τοῦ πατρός, ἀλλ’ ἓν οὐ μόνον οὐσίᾳ ἀλλὰ καὶ ὑποκειμένῳ 
τυγχάνοντας ἀμφοτέρους), they say they are the Father and the Son in 
relation to certain different aspects (κατά τινας ἐπινοίας), not in relation to 
their hypostasis (οὐ κατὰ ὑπόστασιν) (ComJn, X.246).62 
  
Therefore, Origen deems belief in the consubstantiality of the Father and the 
Son to be an error to avoid; equally, the belief that Father and Son are only 
different aspects (ἐπίνοιαι) of one existing reality (hypostasis) is considered 
heresy.63 The real distinction between them stands in the fact that they are 
different hypostases, but the essence of the saviour is not comparable with that 
of the Father (ComJn, XIII.152-153).64 Moreover, the passage shows that it 
                                                                                                                                                         
the Nicene and Cappadocian Line’, p. 27-28. They refer to this passage as an assertion of 
consubstantiality, while Origen openly rebuts this idea, stating that this is absurd for it would 
make the Spirit the same of the Father. Ramelli even takes the above-mentioned quotation of 
ComJn II.149 as a reference to consubstantiality between the three hypostases of the Trinity. In 
doing so, she equalises Origen’s conception of God to the one of the Cappadocian fathers.  
62 Origen is using here the difference ‘in number’ to point out the different individual existence 
(hypostasis) of Father and Son. Regarding the different ὑποκείμενον of the Son and of the 
Father see: Origen, On Prayer, XV. In that passage, Origen recognises that the difference 
between Son and Father concerns both the οὐσίᾳ and the ὑποκείμενον. It seems to me that the 
different ὑποκείμενον should be understood here not as a reference to a different substratum 
between the two, but rather as related to a difference in subject. Thus, the Father has a different 
ὑποκείμενον from the Son because they are two different ontological subjects. 
63 This was the position of the Monarchians, widely refuted by Origen. 
64 For this reason, I do not find convincing the statement of H. Crouzel, Origen, p. 187-188: 
‘Origen is expressing the equivalent of the Nicene homoousios’. Knowing the impossibility of a 
merely logical subordination of the Son to the Father but lacking textual evidence to affirm the 
consubstantiality, Crouzel tries to use ComJn, XX.153-159 in order to prove that the Son (the 
begotten) never comes out of the Father (the begetter). Therefore, he concludes that they have 
the same ousia. Moreover, he affirms that Origen does not present the problem of their 
relationship in an ontological way. The problem is that ComJn, XX.153-159 does not say that. In 
the passage Origen writes: ‘When the Son is in the Father (ὁ υἱὸς ἐν τῷ πατρί ἐστιν), being in 
the form of God before he empties himself (ἐν μορφῇ θεοῦ ὑπάρχων πρὶν ἑαυτὸν κενῶσαι), the 
God is his place, as it were (οἱονεὶ τόπος αὐτοῦ ἐστιν ὁ θεός). And if indeed one considers him 
who, before he has emptied himself, is in the original form of God (ἐν τῇ προηγουμένῃ 
ὑπάρχοντα θεοῦ μορφῇ), he will see the Son who has not yet proceeded from God himself 
(ὄψεται τὸν μηδέπω ἐξεληλυθότα ἀπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ υἱὸν αὐτοῦ), and the Lord who has not yet 
proceeded from his place (καὶ κύριον τὸν μηδέπω ἐκπορευόμενον ἐκ τοῦ τόπου ἑαυτοῦ)’. 
Keeping in mind the difference between the God (ὁ θεός, the Father) and God (θεός, the Son), 
the passage affirms that the Son has his proper place (τόπος), not his proper essence (οὐσία), 
in the bosom of the God (ὁ θεός, that is, the Father). There is no reference to the essence of the 
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would be incorrect to speak of a logical distinction between Father and Son: 
being two distinct ontological entities, there is an ontological difference between 
them, for they are not different aspects (ἐπίνοιαι) of the same essence. 
 
It is worth mentioning here a controversial passage of On First Principles, which 
apparently contradicts what stated here. In On First Principles 1,3.7 Origen says 
that: Nihil in Trinitate maius minusve dicendum est.65 However, this statement 
only apparently contradicts Origen’s subordinationism. Here, Origen refers to 
the common work of sanctification of the believers by the three Persons of the 
Trinity, which does not mean that he denied subordinationism, rather that the 
work of sanctification belongs to the entire Trinity for the source of divinity is 
one.66 Therefore, it does not express any consubstantiality between the persons 
of the Trinity,67 for the Son and the Father can be said to be One only insofar 
they possess one will. Nevertheless, for the Son’s will is the mirror of the 




In the Commentary Origen presents the Father and the Son as two different 
ontological entities. They are both God, for they possess one deity that flows 
from the Father to the Son. The Father, insofar he is Father is ontologically 
                                                                                                                                                         
Son, but only to the fact that the Son-in-himself is eternally in the form (ἐν μορφῇ) of God (θεοῦ, 
without the article). Therefore, the Father is the place of the Son, where the Son gains his 
divinity, his original being God (without the article), Son of the God. Firstly, the fact that the 
proper place of the Son is the Father does not prove any consubstantiality. Secondly, the 
reason why the Son-in-himself never comes out of the Father is that he does not possess 
divinity as οὐσία but as μορφή. Thirdly, the fact that the Son is always with the Father is an 
ontological statement, for they have different hypostases. 
65 On First Principles 1,3.7: ‘Nothing in the Trinity can be called greater or less’. Some scholars, 
following the text of Karl Fr. Schnitzer, Origenes über die Grundlehren der 
Glaubenswissenschaft, Stuttgart 1835, and Koetschau, (Origenes Werke, vol. 5: De principiis. 
Die griechischen christlichen Schriftsteller 22, ed Paul Koetschau, Leipzig 1913), believed this 
passage to be interpolated by Rufinus. I personally agree with M. Simonetti, Origene: I Princìpi, 
p.177 n. 51, who claims the passage to be authentic. In fact, the passage follows a quotation of 
Ps. 36:6. The same interpretation of Ps. 36:6 related to the work of sanctification of the Trinity is 
found in On First Principles, IV,4.3 and in Homily of Leviticus, 5,2. Moreover, in ComJn, I.42 
Origen admits the possibility that Ps. 36:6 refers both to the Father and the Son. 
66 The fact that the source of divinity is one in the Trinity is not questioned in this work. In fact, 
the source is always the Father, and the divinity flows from Him to the Son and through the Son 
to the Spirit.  
67 The only place where Origen speaks of one substance in three hypostases is the Scholia in 




more than the Son, in the sense that there is an ontological – not temporal – 
relation of priority of the Father to the Son. Moreover, insofar the Father is more 
than Wisdom he is ineffable. In a pivotal passage of the Commentary Origen 
says that the same essence of God is transcended by the power and the nature 
of the God that is beyond essence (τῇ οὐσίᾳ ἢ τῇ ὑπερέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας 
δυνάμει καὶ φύσει τοῦ θεοῦ) (ComJn, XIX.37). So the Son in se (in-himself) is 
Wisdom, Logos etc, but the Father is Wisdom, truth and any other attribute in se 
(in-himself) and per se (according to himself). There is an ontological 
subordination, but it is a subordination of priority, not of superiority.68 In fact, in 
order to exist, a subordination of superiority would imply that one entity – 
namely the Father – possesses some attributes in a more perfect way than the 
second entity – namely the Son. According to Origen, this cannot be the case, 
for the Son is the perfect image of the Father, who possesses every attribute in 
the most perfect way. Indeed, As I have explained above, the majesty of the 
Father toward the Son is not related to the fuller possession of ontological 
attributes, but to the fact that, by contrast with the Son, the Father in himself 
cannot be fully encapsulated in neither an ontological discourse nor in the 
category of Being. As such, the Father is beyond being and beyond mind, thus 
being ineffable. In addition to this meta-ontological nature, the Father is also the 
fullness of every possible attribute that we see in the Son. Thus, according to 
Origen, the transcendence of being and though, proper only of the Father, falls 
beyond the reign of the ontological attributes.69 Nevertheless, the priority of the 
Father to the Son does not only mean an ontological precedence of the Father. 
Indeed, not only the Father comes first, but he is the only one who performs the 
acts of will in-himself and according-to-himself. So, while the Father acts in the 
Son and the Son needs the Father to be God, the Father does not need the Son 
to be God. But the Son is the only means through which the will of the Father is 
active in the world, for the perfection of the Father does not allow him to deal 
                                                     
68 Origen does not use the vocabulary of ‘priority’ and ‘superiority’. Nevertheless, as I hope to 
have shown in this section, it can be a good means in order to understand his complex thought. 
69 See also Against Celsus, VI.64. These statements resemble the Platonic idea of ‘Good 
beyond being’. See: Plato, The Republic, 509b. However, it is interesting to note here that in 
both in Against Celsus VI.64 and VII.38, Origen claims that God (the Father) not only 
transcends being, but he also transcends mind (ἐπέκεινα νοῦ καὶ οὐσίας εἶναι). This is also why 
Origen considers the father and the Son to possess the same attributes at the same level. This 
fact represents an innovation with respect to the platonic tradition, as already noted by 
Whittaker and Tzamalikos. See: John Whittaker, ‘ΕΠΕ Ε Α ΟΥ Α  ΟΥΣ ΑΣ’, in Vigiliae 




with the multiplicity. Therefore, the Son does not lack the attributes of the 
Father. The majesty of the Father towards the Son is to be found in the Father’s 
will and power. As a matter of fact the Father acts in the Son, but the Son does 
not act in the Father; equally, while the will of the Father is the will of the God, 
the will of the Son is the will of the Father.70 The Son acts, wants and does what 
the Father acts, wants and does for necessity, for the Son’s actions and will are 
completely derived from the Father.71  
  
This paragraph has shown that subordinationism is crucial in understanding 
Origen’s doctrine of God, especially regarding the relation between Father and 
Son. Notwithstanding what some scholars might say, I deem it wrong to believe 
that the idea of subordinationism is inappropriate before the fourth-century Arian 
controversy.72 On the contrary, it is the duty of every scholar to understand what 
kind of subordinationism Origen presented without any apologetic intent. As I 
have tried to prove, speaking of a logical subordinationism is methodologically 
incorrect in the case of Father and Son. Scholarship often used the idea of 
logical subordinationism in order to ‘defend’ Origen from the accusation of being 
Arius’ predecessor. In truth, I think that such an accusation is sufficiently proven 
to be wrong by the analysis depicted so far. Moreover, it is worth keeping in 
mind that subordinationism as such is not an Origenian distinctive trait, but it 
rather represented the norm in Trinitarian thought of the theologians of the first 
three centuries.73 However, I think that speaking of logical subordinationism is 
                                                     
70 Thus, Origen can say that ‘it is only the Son who has comprehended all the complete will of 
the Father and does it ( όνος δὲ ὁυἱὸς πᾶν τὸ θέλημα ποιεῖ χωρήσας τοῦ πατρός)’ (ComJn, 
XIII.231). Origen’s reference to the unity of will and action in the Trinity (see: On First Principles, 
I.3.7) must not be misunderstood: the actual source of the will is always the Father.  
71 L. Ayres, Nicaea and Its Legacy, p. 27 states that Origen’s account for the Father’s eternal 
will ‘gives to the result of that will a quasi-necessity, and the paradigmatic example of the 
Father’s eternal will is the Son’s eternal existence’. Nevertheless, speaking of the Father’s 
necessity for something but himself does not make sense in Origen’s theology, for it would 
imply a lack of something in the Father. While the Son necessitates the Father, it is not true the 
other way around. The only circumstance in which the Father necessitates the Son is the 
relation to the rational creatures.  
72 Among many scholars quoted so far, see: M. Edwards, Origen against Plato, p. 70, where he 
defines as ‘anachronistic’ to speak of subordinationism in Origen. See also: L. Ayres, Nicaea 
and Its Legacy, p. 21.I agree with Ayres about the differences between Origen’s and Arius’ 
subordinationism.  
73 For sure, Origen’s subordinationism is not that of Arius, for no temporal subordinationism is 
possible in Origen’s Trinity. See for example what is written by Mark Edwards, Catholicity and 
Heresy in the Early Church, Ashgate 2009, p.113: ‘Subordinationism is almost a synonym for 
Arianism in modern historiography, but in the Church of the first five centuries it was not a 
recognized category of error’. Nevertheless, I think it is clear that even if subordinationism was 
not recognised as an error and most early theologians used it, this does not mean that Origen 
was not subordinationist. Rather, I believe that it proves the contrary.  
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ontologically wrong and misleading for the reader. In fact, speaking of logical 
subordinationism means to deny the individual existence of the Son, as well as 
his being a different entity form the Father. For these reasons, I propose here a 
distinction between priority and superiority, hoping it will cast some light on the 
Father-Son ontological relationship. 
  
What about the Spirit? How does he fit in the binitarian relation showed so far? 
For sure we know he is part of the perfect and divine Trinity. The next section 
will analyse his ontological status inside the Trinity.  
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II.2: The Spirit as One of the All Things Made Through the 
Logos: According to Origen, Is the Spirit a Creature? 
  
II.2.1 The Spirit as God in God   
 
In my previous analysis of the ontological relationship between the Father and 
the Son in Origen, I have shown that subordinationism is not an incidental 
element; rather, it is necessary for understanding not only the functions, but 
also the ontological significance of each Trinitarian hypostasis. I defined the 
relationship between the Father and the Son as a subordinationism of priority, 
that is, a subordinationism that is not related to the perfection of the attribute 
(goodness, truth, etc), but rather to 1) the ontological precedence of the Father, 
2) the ineffable meta-nature of the Father (his being ineffable and over every 
essence), 3) the act of will and power which is properly located in the Father 
and only mirrored in the Son. Applying the same scheme to the Spirit can be 
tricky. As noticed by many scholars,74 Origen’s conception of the Holy Spirit 
fluctuates between a clear affirmation of equality in rank to the other two 
hypostases and a strong subordinationism. This fluctuation has led to many 
misunderstandings about his ontological role and function.75 I have already 
presented evidence that Origen considered the Holy Spirit as a fundamental 
part of the Trinity.76 The aim of this section is to analyse the full significance of 
this statement. In On First Principles, I.3.1, starting the first methodological 
dissertation on the Holy Spirit in the history of Christianity, Origen says that, 
while the Greek and barbarian philosophers could hold a certain knowledge of 
the existence of the Father and the Son, de subsistentia vero Spiritus sancti ne 
suspicionem quidem ullam habere quis potuit praeter eos, qui in lege et 
prophetis versati sunt, vel eos, qui se Christo credere profitentur.77 Therefore, 
by contrast with the being of the Father and of the Son, knowledge of the Spirit 
is only accessible by means of revelation, not by means of reason. Of course, 
this does not mean that, after having acquired by revelation a certain vague 
                                                     
74 See, in particular, T. Greggs, Barth, Origen, and Universal Salvation, p. 152-170. 
75 See the short literature review about the Holy Spirit in supra, II.1.1.  
76 See among the many ComJn, II.75-86 and XXXII.187-189. Against the accusation of 
binitarism in Origen’s theology see: C. Markschies, ‘Der Heilige Geist im Iohanneskommentar 
des Origenes’. Nevertheless, Markschies’ work is more focused on the role of the Spirit in 
soteriology than on his immanent status in the Trinity. 
77 ‘No one except those who are familiar with the law and the prophets, or those who profess 
the belief in Christ, could have even a suspicion of the subsistence of the Holy Spirit’.  
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knowledge of the existence of the Spirit and of his works, a rational investigation 
on his role and essence should not be undertaken. Some of the most important 
considerations regarding pneumatology in the Commentary on John come from 
Origen’s exegesis of Jn. 1:3: ‘All things came into being through him (the Logos) 
(πάντα δι’ αὐτοῦ ἐγένετο)’. Origen declares that this expression clearly indicates 
that everything was made by God. Therefore, everything was not made by 
(ὑπὸ) the Logos (the Son), but through (διὰ) the Logos ‘by one better 
(κρείττονος) and greater (μείζονος) than the Logos. And who would this other 
one be except the Father?’ (ComJn, II.72). Hence, Origen asks whether the 
Holy Spirit is to be considered as one of the all things that came into being 
through the Logos. First of all, Origen rejects two different solutions to the 
problem: he says that the Spirit cannot be unbegotten (ἀγέννητον) for the 
Father is the only ἀγέννητον one (ComJn, II.74); secondly, he discharges the 
opinion of those who think ‘the Spirit has no distinctive essence different from 
the Father and the Son (δογματίζων μηδὲ οὐσίαν τινὰ ἰδίαν ὑφεστάναι τοῦ ἁγίου 
πνεύματος ἑτέραν παρὰ τὸν πατέρα καὶ τὸν υἱόν ComJn, II.74);78 thirdly, he 
rejects the opinion of those who believe that ‘the Spirit is the same with the 
Father (τὸ αὐτὸ αὐτὸ τυγχάνειν τῷ πατρί)’, adding that the commonly-
acknowledged distinction between the Holy Spirit and the Son is revealed in Mt. 
12:32 and Mk. 3:29 (ComJn, II.74).79 Then Origen gives his solution: 
  
We, however, are persuaded that there are three hypostases, the Father, 
the Son, and the Holy Spirit, (Ἡμεῖς μέντοι γε τρεῖς ὑποστάσεις πειθόμενοι 
τυγχάνειν, τὸν πατέρα καὶ τὸν υἱὸν καὶ τὸ ἅγιον πνεῦμα) and we believe that 
only the Father is unbegotten (ἀγέννητον μηδὲν ἕτερον τοῦ πατρὸς εἶναι 
πιστεύοντες). We admit, as more pious and true, that the Holy Spirit is the 
most honoured of all things made through the Word (τὸ πάντων διὰ τοῦ 
λόγου γενομένων τὸ ἅγιον πνεῦμα πάντων εἶναι τιμιώτερον) and that he is 
[first] in rank of all the things which have been made by the Father through 
Christ (<πρῶτον> πάντων τῶν ὑπὸ τοῦ πατρὸς διὰ Χριστοῦ γεγενημένων) 
(ComJn, II.75). 
                                                     
78 K. McDonnell, ‘Does Origen have a Trinitarian doctrine of the Holy Spirit?’ p. 12, misreads the 
passage, saying this proves that the Spirit is ranked equally with the Father and the Son. 
79 ‘Whoever speaks a word against the Son of man shall be forgiven, but whoever blasphemes 
against the Holy Spirit will not have forgiveness in this world or in the world to come’. This 
statement is very important in understanding Origen’s pneumatology. It will be analysed both in 
this chapter and in infra, IV.2.4.3. Here, it is used only to prove beyond doubt the ontological 




The ontological status of the Spirit as part of God is thus confirmed. Indeed, in 
this passage the Spirit is indicated as one of the three hypostases of the Trinity. 
On one hand, it is possible to state that every accusation of binitarism in 
Origen’s theology collides with the letter of his text; on the other hand, the 
evident subordination of the Spirit to the Father and the Son is absolutely 
undeniable. The Spirit is immanent in the Godhead, but he is inferior to the Son 
in dignity because of his ontological origin. While the Son is directly derived 
from the will and power of the Father, the Spirit comes from the will and power 
of the Father through the operation of the Son. Moreover, Origen discharges the 
opinion of those who states an equality of essence (οὐσία) between the Father 
and the Spirit, or even between the Son and the Spirit. Since ‘through Him (the 
Logos) all things were made’, Origen focuses himself on understanding the 
specific meaning of ‘all things’ (πάντα) and ‘through Him’ (δι’ αὐτοῦ): 
 
Must we understand the statement all things come into being through Him to 
exclude the aspects (ἐπίνοιαι) which were in Him (the Son)? The latter 
seems me better. […] Consequently, apart from the things which are 
observed in Christ (χωρὶς τῶν ἐπινοουμένων τῷ Χριστῷ), all things were 
made through the Word of God, since the Father made them in Wisdom 
(ποιήσαντος ἐν σοφίᾳ αὐτὰ τοῦ πατρός) (ComJn, II.89-90). 
  
According to this passage, the Spirit appears to be not only inferior to the Son, 
but even to all his ἐπίνοιαι. However, this suggestion is erroneous, because the 
ἐπίνοιαι, insofar they are aspects of the Son, do not possess neither a proper 
hypostasis nor a proper essence (ComJn, I.200). Because they do not have a 
proper existence, they did not came into being. On the contrary, the Spirit is 
certainly a hypostasis.80 Nevertheless, his dependency on the Son is absolute: 
 
The only-begotten alone (μόνου τοῦ μονογενοῦς) is by nature (φύσει) Son 
from the Beginning (υἱοῦ ἀρχῆθεν). The Holy Spirit seems to have need of 
the Son ministering to his hypostasis (οὗ χρῄζειν ἔοικε τὸ ἅγιον πνεῦμα 
διακονοῦντος αὐτοῦ τῇ ὑποστάσει), not only for him to exist (εἶναι), but also 
for him to be wise (σοφὸν), and rational (λογικὸν) and just (δίκαιον), and 
                                                     
80 For the use of the term ‘hypostasis’ and its connection to the Middle and Neo-Platonic 
speculation and the Gnosticism see: Alastair H. B. Logan, ‘Origen and the Development of 
Trinitarian Theology’ in L. Lies (ed), Origeniana Quarta, p. 424–429. 
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whatever other things we ought to understand him to be by participation in 
the epinoiai of Christ, which we mentioned previously (πᾶν ὁτιποτοῦν χρὴ 
αὐτὸ νοεῖν τυγχάνειν κατὰ μετοχὴν τῶν προειρημένων ἡμῖν Χριστοῦ 
ἐπινοιῶν) (ComJn, II.76). 
   
The Spirit’s existence is indeed subordinated to the Son, from whom he 
receives all attributes. In this sense, the Spirit is more dependent on the Son 
than the Son is on the Father. Therefore, on the one hand, the Father is the 
only one worthy of owning predicates in a proper sense;81 on the other hand, 
the nature of ‘beginning’ and ‘Wisdom’ that characterizes the Son leads to an 
ontological – not chronological for there is no time in God – coexistence 
between the Father and the Son. In other words, while the Son is in the Father 
who grants him all his knowledge, the Spirit came into being (ἐγένετο) by the 
Father through the Son (ComJn. II.75).82 Moreover, being one of the ‘all things’, 
the Spirit is considered to be part of the creation operated by the Father through 
the Son.83  
 
So far, it is clear that there is an ontological subordinationism of the Spirit to the 
Son.84 It is for sure a subordinationism of priority, for the Son is ontologically – 
never chronologically – before the Spirit. Therefore, the Spirit needs the Son in 
order to possess attributes (rationality, truth, etc.). Thus, the relationship 
between the source of the divinity (the Father) and the Spirit can also be 
defined as a relationship of double-priority, for the Spirit is in need of the Son 
who is in need of the Father.  
 
                                                     
81 See for example: ComJn, II.123; II.163-170. 
82 Nevertheless, the fact that the Spirit came into being does not imply the idea that he is not 
God. Indeed, As I indicate further on (section II.2.2), Origen understand the coming into being 
as meaning the derivation of the Spirit through the Son, not than his creation out of nothing. 
83 As I will discuss in the next paragraph, Origen does not mean the term ‘creation’ as creation 
ex nihilo, but only that the Spirit is one of the all things that came into being through the Son. 
See ComJn, II.131: ‘As, therefore, “all things came into being (ἐγένετο) through him”, not, all 
things were (ἦν) through him, and, “without him nothing came into being (ἐγένετο)”, not, without 
him nothing was (ἦν), so “what came into being (γέγονεν) in him”, not what was (ἦν) in Him, 
“was life”. And again, not what came into being (ἐγένετο) in him was the Word, but what was 
(ἦν) in the beginning was the Word’. 
84 I think that McDonnell’s statement: ‘the subordinating texts are concerned with the hierarchy 
of origin, and are economic rather that ontological’ is sufficiently challenged by the texts I have 
shown so far. See K. McDonnell, ‘Does Origen have a Trinitarian doctrine of the Holy Spirit?’, p. 
19. Origen’s commentary on Jn. 1:1-2 is clearly an ontological text. Origen is not speaking of 
the economy, but of the ontological status of the Spirit.  
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Moreover, Origen stresses the ontological difference between the Son and the 
Spirit, stating that the Son is the only one to be Son by nature (υἱοῦ ἀρχῆθεν 
φύσει ComJn, II.76.), while the Spirit is not. This must imply an ontological 
difference in nature between the two entities not only related to an ontological 
precedence of the Son to the Spirit, but also to the very essence of the two 
entities. The Father, the Son and the Spirit are not of the same substance. 
Origen clearly states it when commenting on the episode of the Samaritan 
woman at the well. Discussing the statement ‘God is Spirit’ in Jn. 4:24, Origen 
says that the appellative ‘Spirit’ cannot be interpreted as a reference to the 
essence of God. God is Spirit in the same way in which he is said to be light 
and fire. He is light insofar he enlightens the noetic eyes (νοητός), and is fire 
insofar he burns and consumes everything that is material (ὑλικός) (ComJn, 
XIII.132-139). Equally, God is said to be Spirit insofar the breath of the Spirit 
gives us life. On the contrary, Origen states that ‘The Father exceeds (ὑπερέχει) 
the Saviour as much as the Saviour and the Holy Spirit exceeds the 
rest’(ComJn, XIII.151). However, by contrast with ‘light’ and ‘fire’, the Holy Spirit 
has a proper existence, which means he is not simply an attribute of the Son. 
Nevertheless, it is clearly impossible to consider him as being of the same 
essence of the Father.85  
 
Being the Only Begotten, the Son has a privileged status inside the Trinity. The 
Son is therefore the only means through which every other being, including the 
Holy Spirit, can contemplate the Father (ComJn, I.104-105). Therefore, only the 
Son is the true image of God, while everything else is an image of the image. 
This statement is highly problematic, for it can be easily misunderstood: saying 
that the Spirit is one of ‘all things’, consequently an image of the image, means 
to downgrade him to a creatural level. Thus, we have to investigate whether, 
besides a subordinationism of priority, one can trace a subordinationism of 
superiority in Origen’s Trinity. While the Son is said to partake perfectly in the 
                                                     
85 In this regard, I disagree with both Orbe and Rius-Camps who understood the Spirit as the 
generic hypokeimenon of the Father and of the Son, thus making of the Spirit the Father’s and 
the Son’s substratum. I think that Origen’s exegesis of the passage of Jn. 4:24 definitely proves 
this opinion to be inconsistent with Origen’s texts. Orbe’s and Rius-Camps’ opinion has been 
already rebutted by Simonetti, who understood the divinity of the Spirit as coming from his being 
generated sub specie aeternitatis from the Father through the Son. See: Manlio Simonetti, ‘Note 
sulla teologia trinitaria di Origene’, in Vetera Christianorum 8 (1971), p. 273-307, in particular p. 
284; A. Orbe, Estudios Valentinianos I: Hacia la primera teología, p. 431; J. Rius-Camps, El 
dinamismo trinitario en la divinisación, p. 49. 
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attributes of the Father, it is possible that the hypostasis of the Spirit does not 
partake perfectly in the attributes of the Son. We have already seen how in 
ComJn, XXXII.350-357 Origen admitted the possibility that the Father can be 
engaged in self-contemplation ‘on the basis of the knowledge and 
contemplation of himself (ἐπὶ τῇ ἑαυτοῦ γνώσει καὶ τῇ ἑαυτοῦ θεωρίᾳ) which 
surpasses the contemplation of the Son’. Nevertheless, because the Son is the 
only perfect image of the Father, he seems to conclude that it is impossible to 
predicate any ontological attribute of the Father of which the Son is not 
partaker. The only exception to this idea is the idea of ineffability. Nevertheless, 
according to Origen’s reasoning, this idea is not an ontological predicate as this 
very idea falls beyond the realm of ontology. In a similar way, in another 
passage Origen seems to admit the possibility that the Son-in-himself – that is, 
when he is engaged in the primordial contemplation of the Father – possesses 
some attributes that are unintelligible to any other being: 
 
We must enquire, since there is a system of ideas (συστήματος 
θεωρημάτων ὄντος ἐν αὐτῷ) in him [the Son] insofar he is “Wisdom” 
(σοφία), if there are some ideas that are incomprehensible to all begotten 
nature except himself (ἐστί τινα θεωρήματα ἀχώρητα τῇ λοιπῇ παρ’ αὐτὸν 
γεννητῇ φύσει), which he knows for himself (ἅτινα οἶδεν ἑαυτῷ). We must 
not leave this matter unexamined because of reverence for the Holy Spirit. 
For that the Holy Spirit also is instructed by him is clear […]. Now we must 
enquire if the Spirit, by being instructed, contains all things which the Son, 
who is from the beginning, knows by contemplating the Father (τῷ πατρὶ 
ἀρχόμενος ὁ υἱὸς γινώσκει) (ComJn, II.126-127). 
  
Origen essentially leaves the question unanswered.86 Nevertheless, the doubt 
that the Spirit could not know all aspects of the Son – that is, to participate in a 
perfect way in all his attributes – is still present in Origen’s conception of the 
Trinity. In fact, the reason why Origen never fully investigates this problem is 
most likely due to the logical trap it causes in his system. On the one hand, 
Origen cannot openly affirm that the Spirit has less knowledge than the Son, for 
this would imply that the Spirit lacks of the fundamental characteristic of God, 
that is, the perfect possession of all attributes, although in a mediated form. On 
                                                     
86 Moreover, in ComJn, I.222-224, Origen states the impossibility of understanding all the 
epinoiai of the Logos, as some of them are comprehensible only to the Father and the Son.  
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the other hand, Origen cannot say that the Spirit has the perfect knowledge of 
the Father, because his knowledge of the Father is mediated by another 
hypostasis – namely the Son – and therefore it is not immanent. While the Son 
is immanent in the God, for his proper place is the Father, the Spirit, as an 
immanent hypostasis, dwells in the Son.  
  
II.2.2 The Spirit as a Creature in God  
 
In trying to resolve the set of problems presented in the last paragraph, it would 
be methodologically inexact to force Origen’s speculation on the Holy Spirit in a 
monolithic system that does not leave any room for ambiguities. On the 
contrary, it is the duty of an historian to acknowledge them and act accordingly. 
However, I think the problem can be partially solved by enquiring about the 
nature or the essence of the third hypostasis. In fact, the Spirit maintains a clear 
difference from the Father and the Son: while the Father is called Father insofar 
he has a Son, and the Son is called Son because of his relation to the Father, 
the Spirit is not called Spirit because of his relation to the Father and the Son, 
rather because of his relation to the created world. If the Spirit is one of ‘all 
things’ that came into being through the Logos, it means the Spirit is out of the 
privileged binitarian relationship between the Father and the Son. Origen writes: 
  
These things have been examined extensively […] to see how, if all things 
came into being through him [the Son], and the Spirit came into being 
through the Word (τὸ πνεῦμα διὰ τοῦ λόγου ἐγένετο), the Spirit is one of the 
“all things” considered to be inferior to him through whom he came into 
being (ἓν τῶν πάντων τυγχάνον ὑποδεέστερον τοῦ δι’ οὗ ἐγένετο 
νοούμενον) (ComJn, II.86). 
   
This passage seems to distance the Spirit from the Godhead and draw him 
nearer to the creation. How to explain the special prominence given by Origen 
to the fact that God is ‘one and simple’ (ComJn, I.119)?87 How does he explain 
statements as: ‘The Savior and the Holy Spirit transcend all created beings not 
only by comparison, but by their exceeding preeminence (πάντων μὲν τῶν 
                                                     
87 See also: On First Principles, I,1,6. In truth, a close examination of ComJn, I.119 shows that 
in depicting God as ‘one and simple’ Origen refers only to the Father (Ὁ θεὸς μὲν οὖν πάντη ἕν 
ἐστι καὶ ἁπλοῦν). On the contrary the Son is many things (τὰ πολλά).  
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γενητῶν ὑπερέχειν οὐ συγκρίσει ἀλλ’ ὑπερβαλλούσῃ ὑπεροχῇ φαμὲν τὸν 
σωτῆρα καὶ τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον)’ (ComJn, XIII.151)? Does he not contradict 
himself when in On First Principles I.3.3 he affirms usque ad praesens nullum 
sermonem in scripturis sanctis invenire potuimus, per quem Spiritus sanctus 
factura esse vel creatura diceretur?88 
    
The key is to be found in the concept of ‘creation’. In fact, the word ‘creation’ 
(κτίσις) and its cognates are used by Origen to indicate different things. On the 
one hand, he uses ‘create’ in reference to Pr. 8:22: ‘The Lord created me 
beginning of his work (Ὁ θεὸς ἔκτισέν με ἀρχὴν ὁδῶν αὐτοῦ εἰς ἔργα αὐτοῦ)’. 
This text is referred to Wisdom, that is, to the Son-in-himself, the one eternally 
contemplating the Father as ‘Wisdom’ (ComJn, I.111). In this sense, the word 
‘creation’ (κτίσις) must not be taken – as it was after Nicaea – in the usual 
meaning of creatio ex nihilo, but in that of something derived from something 
else.89 However, Origen never refers to the Son or to the Spirit as a creature 
(κτίσις) in the Commentary. Moreover, it is commonly agreed that Origen used 
to label with the name of ‘creation’ (κτίσις) everything that is derived (γενητός) 
by something else, with the exception of the Son who is the only one to be 
begotten directly from the unbegotten (ἀγέννητος) Father. Moreover, we already 
quoted a passage where Origen refers to the Son as the only one who is in the 
beginning and was not made/derived/begotten (ἐγένετο) in the beginning 
(ComJn, II.131), for he eternally was with the Father. It is worth remembering 
here that in the third century the double consonant was no longer pronounced in 
Greek. Hence, Origen uses γενητός/ἀγένητος and γεννητός/ἀγέννητος 
interchangeably, since the terminological distinction between the past 
participles of the verb γίγνομαι (with a single ν) to indicate coming into existence 
                                                     
88 ‘Up to the present we have been able to find no passage in the holy Scriptures in which the 
Holy Spirit was said to be made or created’. I do not think that there is any contradiction 
between this passage and the one in ComJn, II.75 and II.86. In fact, here Origen does not deny 
the possibility that the Spirit is a creature, but only that the Spirit is not called with the name 
κτίσις in the Scriptures. Nevertheless, in the Commentary, Origen inserts the Spirit in the ‘all 
things’ made through the Son, thus treating him as a creature. My interpretation is confirmed by 
the fact that, immediately after the quotation proposed, Origen refers to Pr. 8:22: ‘The Lord 
created me beginning of His work (Ὁ θεὸς ἔκτισέν με ἀρχὴν ὁδῶν αὐτοῦ εἰς ἔργα αὐτοῦ)’. Since 
the passage in the Proverbs is referred to the Son, it is clear one has to intend the word 
‘creature’ in its broad meaning, as I explain further ahead. 
89 Henri Crouzel and Manlio Simonetti, Origène. Traité des Principes, Paris 1980, p. 40-41 
maintain that Origen considered the word κτίσις as ‘taking origin from’. In this sense Origen 
refers to Wisdom as a creature. (ComJn, 90-109). This interpretation is now broadly accepted 
by the scholarship. See also: H Crouzel, Origen, p.198-204 and T. Greggs, Barth, Origen, and 
Universal Salvation, p. 154.  
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and of the verb γεννάω (with double ν) to indicate begetting was made long 
after Origen, during the Arian controversy.90 To sum up, it is possible to say 
that, on the one hand, sometimes – not often – Origen uses the word κτίσις 
(creation) to indicate both ‘creation’ and ‘derivation’; on the other hand Origen 
often uses the term γενητός to indicate everything that came into being. Hence, 
the Spirit is part of the creation only insofar we intend the term creation as 
everything that came into being, for the Spirit is begotten and is made by the 
Father through the Logos:91 the Holy Spirit and creation are alike in having been 
brought into being by the Father through the Son. Nevertheless, the Spirit is 
said to be God and part of the Godhead. His distinctive nature, by contrast with 
that of the Son, is to be ‘the most honoured of all things made (brought-into-
being) through the Word (τὸ πάντων διὰ τοῦ λόγου γενομένων τὸ ἅγιον πνεῦμα 
πάντων εἶναι τιμιώτερον)’ and to be ‘[first] in rank of all the things which have 
been made (brought-into-being) by the Father through Christ (<πρῶτον> 
πάντων τῶν ὑπὸ τοῦ πατρὸς διὰ Χριστοῦ γεγενημένων)’(ComJn, II.75). 
Consequently, one must admit that the Spirit is both God and creature, in the 
sense that his essence and nature is both of being God and generated. The 
ontological role of the Spirit is to stand between God and the creation, being 
both God and a generated being. Nevertheless, the Spirit is the only being 
made through the Logos that can be properly said to be God.92  
                                                     
90 See: H. Crouzel, Origen, p. 174-175. 
91 Most problems raised in Origen’s conception of the Trinity – subordinationism, eternity of the 
Son and, more generally, the idea of creaturely in God – were highly debated in the Arian 
controversy in the fourth century. The influence Origen had on both sides (anti-Arian and Arian) 
is undeniable. See on this: Manlio Simonetti, La crisi ariana nel IV secolo, Roma 1975. On the 
same wavelength see: Basil Studer, Trinity and Incarnation: The Faith of The Early Church, 
Edinburgh1993. See also: Elizabeth A. Clark, The Origenist Controversy: The Cultural 
Construction of an Early Christian Debate, Princeton 1992. Nevertheless, it is worth 
remembering, as L. Ayres does, that the partisan use of Origen of both sides occurred on an 
already revised version of his theology. Moreover, the fluctuating vocabulary Origen used 
increased the misunderstanding of his theology. See: L. Ayres, Nicaea and Its Legacy, p. 20 n. 
24. 
92 Regarding the role of the Spirit in the creation of the world see the interesting remarks by 
Francesca Cocchini, ‘Dalla regula fidei riflessioni origeniane sullo spirito santo’, in Lorenzo 
Perrone, (ed), Origeniana Octava, Leuven 2003, p. 593-603. Through the passage of On First 
Principles, I.3.3 Cocchini suggests that the passage of Gen. 1.2 offered to Origen the scriptural 
proof that the Spirit is not a creature, because he was present in the creation of the world. 
Unfortunately, since we do not have the Commentary on Genesis, this idea remains quite 
speculative. In a very recent article on the newly discovered Homilies on Psalms, Lorenzo 
Perrone supports Cocchini’s idea. See: Lorenzo Perrone, ‘La pneumatologia di Origene alla 
luce delle nuove omelie sui salmi’, in Francesco Pieri and Fabio Ruggiero (eds), Il divino 
in/quieto: lo Spirito santo nelle tradizioni antiche, Brescia 2018, p. 101-117. See also: 
Francesca Cocchini, ‘Note sulla dottrina pneumatologica origeniana’, in Francesca Cocchini 




It is now time to explain the many times where Origen speaks of the majesty of 
the Spirit. 1) Why does Origen in On First Principles and even in the 
Commentary, seem to suggest that the Spirit may be considered more majestic 
than the Son for the reason that sins against the Holy Spirit are unforgivable, 
while those against the Son are forgivable?93 2) Why, if the Spirit is subordinate 
to the Son, is the Spirit involved in sending Christ into the world? How can an 
entity, which is ontologically subordinated, influence a more important and 
superior one?94 3) Does the fact that only the saints partake in the Holy Spirit, 
while every human being partakes in the Son and in the Father, make the Spirit 
more important than the other two hypostases?95  
  
These apparent contradictions can be solved by acknowledging a difference 
between the ontological status of the hypostasis of the Spirit and his function in 
the economy of salvation. It is my intention to prove here that, in the above-
mentioned passages, Origen never refers to the ontological hypostasis of the 
Spirit, but always to his function in the economy of redemption of the fallen 
creatures. In fact, Origen explicitly affirms that ‘the Saviour was made less than 
him (the Spirit) not because of his nature (οὐχ ὡς φύσει), but because of the 
plan of the incarnation (οἰκονομίαν τῆς ἐνανθρωπήσεως) of the Son of God that 
was taking place’ (ComJn, II.81). The Son was sent in the world by the Holy 
Spirit because he willingly – it would be better to say: ‘according to the will of 
the Father’ – decided to empty himself and become less than he is. 
Consequently, being sent by the Spirit only shows the humility of the Son, who 
is ready to become less than the Spirit for the sake of fallen creatures. Anyway, 
the economic process does not imply any ontological diminishing in the Son, for 
Origen says that even in the moment of the incarnation the Son is fully in the 
Father as well as in Christ (ComJn, XX.153-159). 
  
Regarding the other two questions, it is worth noting that the work of the Spirit is 
always ontologically different from that of the Son, for the Spirit, being one of 
                                                                                                                                                         
interpretation I have proposed in this chapter on the meaning of the term ‘creature’ is extremely 
useful for this debate. 
93 See: ComJn, XIX.88 and XXVIII.54-55. See also: On First Principles, I.3.2. 
94 See: ComJn, II.81 and XXXII.187-189. See also: On First Principles I.Praef..4.  
95 See: On First Principles I.3.5-7.  
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those things which ‘came into being through the Son’, acts in a different way 
towards the fallen creatures. The difference between the economic functions of 
the two will be the subject of chapter IV of my thesis. For now, it is worth 
underlining that the fact that only the saints partake in the Spirit does not imply 
that the Spirit is greater than the Son. Origen refers to the Father as the one 
who is, therefore possessing being, and to the Logos as the one who is rational, 
therefore possessing reason.96 Therefore, the participation of the rational 
creature (λογικός) in the Father and in the Son is not undermined by the sin of 
the creature, for it is a natural participation.97 Consequently, a creature can 
participate in a less perfect way in the Logos of the Son, but cannot stop 
participating at all (ComJn, II.20). For this reason, even the Devil is called 
λογικός by Origen (ComJn, XX.198-210).98 On the contrary, the nature of the 
Spirit is to sanctify other creatures. For this reason, only blessed creatures can 
participate in the Holy Spirit (ComJn, XXXII.75).99 This does not imply an 
ontological priority of the Spirit towards the Son; on the contrary, it indicates his 
ontological dependence on the Son. For the same reason, Origen says that the 
sins against the Holy Spirit cannot be forgiven. Origen writes: 
 
And maybe, we ought to say that the creation (κτίσις) - but also the human 
race - in order to be set free from the slavery of corruption, was in need of 
an incarnate, blessed, and divine power (μακαρίας καὶ θείας δυνάμεως 
ἐνανθρωπούσης) which would also restore the things on earth to order. 
This activity fell, as it were, in some way to the Holy Spirit (ἐπέβαλλέ πως 
τῷ ἁγίῳ πνεύματι ἡ πρᾶξις αὕτη). Since the Spirit cannot bear it 
(ὑπομένειν), he sends forth the Saviour, because he alone is able to bear 
such a great conflict. Although it is the Father, as leader, who sends the 
Son, the Holy Spirit joins in sending him in advance (συναποστέλλει καὶ 
συμπροπέμπει), promising to descend to the Son of God at the right time 
(ἐν καιρῷ) and to cooperate in the salvation of man (συνεργῆσαι τῇ τῶν 
ἀνθρώπων σωτηρίᾳ) (ComJn, II.83). 
  
                                                     
96 See also: Against Celsus, VIII.15.  
97 This means that the nature of every rational creature is to be – therefore, to participate in the 
Father – and to be rational – therefore, to participate in the Logos.  
98 See also: ComJn, II.91-99, where the devil is said to be ‘creation of God’ insofar it is an 
existing being, but to be not creation of God insofar it is the devil, for every evil is a negation of 
being.  
99 See also: Fragments on John, fr. XXXVII; Commentary on the Song of Songs, III.213; On 
First Principles, I.1.3 and II.2.5; Homilies on Numbers, III.1 and VI.3; Homilies on Leviticus, VI.2; 
Homilies on Ezekiel, VI.5. 
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Insofar as the Holy Spirit is the first being of all creation, he was supposed to 
set creation free from sins after the fall, but could not bear such a great activity 
because of his created (generated) nature. At first sight this passage might be 
seen as an indication of the Spirit’s inferiority toward the Son, thus representing 
a flaw in Origen’s reasoning. Indeed, one could say that the Spirit lacks the 
ontological property of saving creatures. Nevertheless, I think such a conclusion 
would not be fair to Origen. Indeed, the abovementioned passage does not 
imply an ontological lack in the Spirit’s essence, but it is rather an indication of 
its specific soteriological role which is different from that of the Son. Indeed, as I 
will show in chapter IV Origen regards the Spirit to be a fundamental 
soteriological agent. Indeed, participation in the Spirit is necessary to obtain 
salvation. The reason why he is not the principal soteriological agent is that this 
role is better performed by the Son, who is the one through which all creation, 
including the Holy Spirit possess their attributes. However, just as the Son’s 
essence is fully understood in his relation to the Father, so the Spirit’s essence 
regards his relation to the Son from which he derives all his properties. As such, 
the Spirit derives from the Son also the property of saving the world. Therefore, 
the reason why the Spirit is not the principal agent of salvation, but only a 
secondary one comes from the fact that his properties are derived from that of 
the Son. On one hand, this passage shows the difference between the fallen 
creation (κτίσις), which is mutable and not divine in its essence and the Holy 
Spirit, which is generated but divine.100 On the other hand, this is the perfect 
indication of the ontological subordination of the Spirit towards the Son. This 
view is very consistent with Origen’s remarks on the forgiveness of sins against 
the Holy Spirit (Mt. 12:32). Commenting on Jesus’ words ‘you will die in your 
sin’ (Jn. 8:21),101 Origen says that: ‘even if (εἰ μὴ), however, there is no 
forgiveness already in the coming age (ἐν τῷ μέλλοντι αἰῶνι ἤδη), of course this 
does not mean (οὐ μέντοι γε) that there is not any forgiveness (οὐδὲ) even in 
the ages to come’ (ComJn, XIX.88).102 The same views are expressed 
                                                     
100 In this case the term κτίσις is only used in reference to the fallen creation.  
101 There Origen argues that, although in Matthew it is written that ‘anyone who speaks against 
the Holy Spirit will not be forgiven’ (Mt. 12:32), this does not mean there will be no forgiveness 
forever. 
102 I suggest here a different translation of the text from that proposed by R. Heine, Origen: 
Commentary […] Book 13-32, p.188. This is the Greek text: ‘Οἶδα δέ τινας οὐ μόνον ἐν τῷ αἰῶνι 
τούτῳ, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν τῷ μέλλοντι κρατουμένους ὑπὸ τῆς ἰδίας ἁμαρτίας, ὡς τούτους περὶ ὧν 
φησιν ὁ λόγος· «<Ὃς> ἐὰν βλασφημήσῃ εἰς τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον, οὐκ ἔχει ἄφεσιν οὔτε ἐν τούτῳ 
τῷ αἰῶνι οὔτε ἐν τῷ μέλλοντι»· οὐ μέντοι γε εἰ μὴ ἐν τῷ μέλλοντι αἰῶνι ἤδη, οὐδὲ ἐν τοῖς αἰῶσιν 
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commenting on Lazarus’ resurrection. Origen is clearly suggesting a deeper 
meaning for the Lazarus episode: all kinds of sins, even those against the Holy 
Spirit, are forgivable by the Son’s work. Lazarus is the type of a dead soul – that 
is, a sinner’s soul – saved by the power of Christ and therefore restored to its 
proximity to God (ComJn, XXVIII.54-55).103 
  
The complex relationship between the Spirit and the world will be the matter of 
chapter IV. For now, it is interesting to note that, despite what some scholars 
say, the ontological subordinationism of the Spirit does not make him less 
useful in the salvation process. On the contrary, it is exactly the ontological 
difference between the Son and the Spirit that makes the Spirit a key character 
in the redemption of fallen creatures. Affirming the perfect ontological equality of 
the Spirit with the Son is not only wrong, but even damaging for the role of the 
Spirit. If the Spirit had the same essence as the Son, he would be a useless 
duplicate of the Logos.104 On the contrary, I think the significance of the Spirit in 
soteriology comes from his ontological subordination. Stating this means to 
postulate a difference between Origen’s discourse on the Spirit as part of the 
immanent Trinity – that is, the Spirit in God – and the economic function of the 
Trinity. For this reason, I disagree with Greggs, who tends to unify these two 
aspects, minimalizing Origen’s ontological speculation about the immanent 
hypostases inside the Trinity in favour of the ‘economy of salvation’.105 On the 
contrary, I have shown that the Spirit cannot bear the task of restoring the fallen 
                                                                                                                                                         
τοῖς ἐπερχομένοις’ (ComJn XIX.88). Heine translates: ‘But I know that some are overcome by 
their own sin not only in this age, but also in the age to come, as those of whom the Word says: 
If everyone blasphemes against the Holy Spirit he has forgiveness neither in this age nor in the 
ages to come. If, however, there is no forgiveness in the coming age, neither there is any in the 
ages which come after it as well’. I suggest changing the translation of the last phrase: ‘Even if 
(εἰ μὴ), however, there is no forgiveness already in the coming age (ἐν τῷ μέλλοντι αἰῶνι ἤδη), 
of course this does not mean (οὐ μέντοι γε) that there is not any forgiveness (οὐδὲ) even in the 
ages to come’. I find this translation more convenient both from a textual and from a 
hermeneutical point of view. In fact, the expression οὐ μέντοι γε is always used by Origen in a 
strong adversative sense. See also: ComJn, XIII.231. The best punctuation for the expression 
οὐ μέντοι γε is found in C. Blanc, Origène: Commentaire sur saint Jean. Sources 
chrétiennes 290, p. 100-101. 
103 I refer to the problem of the forgiveness of post baptismal sins in Origen also in infra, IV.1.2; 
IV.2.3.2; IV.2.4.3. In this regard, see my own article: Giovanni Hermanin de Reichenfeld, 
‘Resurrection and Prophecy: The Spirit in Origen’s Exegesis of Lazarus and Caiaphas in John 
11’, in Markus Vinzent (ed), Studia Patristica 94, Leuven 2017, p. 143-153. 
104 K. McDonnell, ‘Does Origen have a Trinitarian Doctrine of the Holy Spirit’, has exactly this 
problem. This thesis will prove that affirming an ontological immanent subordinationism of the 
Spirit inside the Trinity does not diminish his soteriological role.  
105 T. Greggs, Barth, Origen, and Universal Salvation, p. 155 n. 23. 
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creature in God, for he lacks the ontological power of the Son, but he is still an 
essential means by which fallen creature achieve Salvation.106  
   
Finally, it is worth noting that the majesty of the Spirit towards the rest of the 
creation is due to the ontological status of the Spirit and to that of the other 
created beings. Being the Spirit in the Godhead and possessing all the 
attributes of God by participation in the Son, he was generated God by nature 
and participation. For this reason, it is impossible for the Spirit to sin or change 
or diminish his nature of God. There is a subordination of double priority of the 
Spirit in Origen’s Trinity, but Origen never affirms that the Spirit lacks some 
attributes of the Son. Therefore, the Son is prior to the Spirit but is not superior 
to the Spirit, for the superiority would imply the possession of the attributes in a 
more perfect way.107 On the contrary, the rest of the creation is subordinated to 
the Trinity according to a subordination of both priority and superiority. Indeed, 
each of the creatures possesses the divine attributes in a different way. The 
very difference between creatures depends on the different levels of perfection 
they gain. In ComJn, II.140-148, Origen speaks of the whole created world as a 
system of rational beings (λογῐκοί) made according to the image and likeness of 
God. The differences among these beings must not be found in their ‘nature’, 
insomuch as they are all rational, but in their ‘logical orders’ (οὐχὶ φύσεων ζῴων 
ἐστὶν ὀνόματα ἀλλὰ τάξεων) in which the rational nature (λογικὴ φύσις) has 
been prepared by God according to the sin of each creature. In this sense, 
there is no difference in Origen’s language between ‘rational creature (λογικός)’ 
and ‘human being (ἄνθρωπος)’, since every human being is a rational creature. 
Because the ruling principle of the whole creation is the Logos, there is no 
                                                     
106 See in particular ComJn, II.77. This passage will be deeply analysed in infra, IV.2.4.1.  
107 In this way, one has to understand the passage in On First Principles, I.3.4, where Origen 
says that the Holy Spirit does not know the Father through the Son: Neque enim putandum est 
quod etiam Spiritus Filio revelante cognoscit (‘indeed, it is not to be supposed that the Spirit has 
knowledge through the revelation of the Son’). In fact, the passage does not negate that the 
ontological attributes of the Spirit are not derived from the Son, but merely that this derivation is 
out of time. Origen goes on saying: Si enim revelante Filio cognoscit Patrem Spiritus sanctus, 
ergo ex ignorantia ad scentiam venit: quod utique et impium pariter et stultum est (‘For if the 
Holy Spirit knows the Father by this mean, he passes from ignorance to knowledge; this is 
certainly as impious as foolish’). Therefore, the passage is only concerned about affirming the 
eternity of the Spirit and the eternity of his knowledge of the Father. A similar passage can be 
found in ComJn, XIII.147-153, where Origen rebuts Heracleon’s attempt to equalise the 
knowledge of God held by the spirituals and the knowledge of God held by the Holy Spirit on the 
base of their consubstantiality (ἡ πνευματικὴ φύσις, ὁμοούσιος οὖσα). On the contrary, Origen 
states that the Holy Spirit always had the perfect knowledge, while the other creatures 
committed sin and fell away from God. The Spirit is the only one who always possessed the 
fullness of knowledge. Therefore, by contrast with the creatures, he cannot sin.  
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difference in nature between different types of rational creatures. Dissimilarities 
between creatures should not be found in nature, but in activity. This is how one 
should interpret the hierarchical scale of beings made by Origen in gods, 
thrones, dominions, powers, angels etc. (ComJn, I.209-219; II.11-18; II.21-24; 
II.30-33).108 On the contrary, as Radde-Gallwitz has noticed, the divinity and 
perfection of Holy Spirit must not be understood only as an activity.109 The Holy 
Spirit is an active agent, who possesses a distinctive existence that is always 
the same, for the Spirit is eternal in God.110 For the same reason, in a pivotal 
passage, Origen speaks of the incapacity of the creature to comprehend the 
complete will of God and act in accordance with it. In fact, only the Son and the 
Spirit are able to comprehend and do the exact will of the God – namely the 
Father – while every other creature can act ‘in accordance with God’s will (κατὰ 
τὸ θέλημα τοῦ θεοῦ)’. Origen adds that: ‘this does not suffice, however, in order 
to be formed according to the complete will (οὐ μέντοι γε διαρκεῖ πρὸς τὸ κατὰ 
τὸ πᾶν θέλημα τυπωθῆναι)’ (ComJn, XIII.231-232). On the contrary, the will of 
the Father perfectly flows from the Father to the Son and from the Son to the 
Spirit. As well as the Son, the Spirit perfectly operates and does the will of the 
Father, while the Father remains the ruling agent of the divinity. The 
subordination of the Spirit towards the Father and the Son is evident, but this 




In the Commentary on John Origen depicts a double image of the Spirit. The 
Spirit is a divine hypostasis made by the Father through the Son and he 
contemplates the unknowable ineffability and simplicity of Father through the 
Son. He can be called a creature only insofar he needs the Son and is 
generated through the Son. The difference between God-the-Spirit and all the 
other creatures is that, while the other creatures partake in God at many levels 
                                                     
108 Regarding the interpretation of Origen’s anthropology and his partition of rational creatures 
see: Emanuela Prinzivalli, ‘L'uomo e il suo destino nel Commento a Giovanni’ in E. Prinzivalli 
(ed), Il Commento a Giovanni di Origene, p. 361-379. 
109 See: A. Radde-Gallwitz, ‘The Holy Spirit as Agent, Not Activity: Origen's Argument with 
Modalism’, p. 229-235. Radde-Gallwitz analyses Fragments on John XXXVII, pointing out that 
the Spirit is not only an activity (ἐνέργεια) of God, but an active agent with a distinctive essence 
(οὐσίαν εἶναι τὸ πνεῦμα). Therefore, the Spirit is an active substance, but not merely an activity 
(οὐσία γοῦν ἐστὶν ἐνεργητική, ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἐνέργεια). 
110 See: On First Principles, I.3.4. 
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– thus the difference between different kinds of creatures must be understood 
as different levels of participation to the perfections of God, for they are all 
logikoi (λογικοί) – the Spirit partakes utterly in God, hence is God. Therefore, 
the Spirit, through the mediation of the Son, possesses all the attributes of the 
Son in their perfection – although Origen admits that he may lack some of them. 
The perfect possession of the attributes results in his divinity; consequently, the 
Spirit is able to perfectly conform himself to the will of the Father. As well as the 
Son, the unity in the divinity of the Spirit comes from the fact that he shares the 
same perfect will: the will of the Father. Therefore, the Spirit is divine and has 
always been divine.  
 
To sum up, in Origen’s Trinity is traceable an ontological subordinationism of 
priority between the Father and the Son, and an ontological subordinationism of 
double priority between the Father and the Spirit. The difference between the 
three hypostases of the Trinity relates both to their individual existence and their 
essence. The difference is not only in hypostases, but also in essence, for the 
Spirit needs the Son and he is not ontologically capable of functioning as a 
redeemer. Hence, the Spirit needs the Son, for the Spirit alone is not able to 
save the world. Additionally, he is not able to be wise and rational nor he 
possesses any epinoiai. Essence and hypostases are indeed different, but the 
divinity remains one. This entire system rest on Origen’s interpretation of Jn. 
1:1-3. 
  
Thus, this chapter proposes a clear difference between ontological/logical and 
priority/superiority subordinationism. I hope this could clarify the numerous 
misunderstandings between the role of Spirit and the one of epinoiai. Moreover, 
I have attempted to outline the importance of separating Origen’s consideration 
of the Holy Spirit as an immanent hypostasis within the Trinity and his thought 
about the Spirit’s role in soteriology. So far scholarship tended to fluctuate 
between those who affirm a strong ontological subordinationism, denying a 
primary role to the Spirit in soteriology and those who underline the 
soteriological importance of the Spirit, denying a strong subordinationism. I 
have tried to show here that affirming a strong ontological subordinationism 
does not diminish the soteriological role of the Spirit. On the contrary, it saves 
him from the role of duplicate of the Logos that some scholarship gave him. An 
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entirely different argument must be built referring to the creatures; in fact, as I 
will explain in the chapter IV, Origen establishes a subordinationism of both 
priority and superiority between them and God, for creatures possesses the 








In this chapter, I will discuss and analyse Augustine’s doctrine of the Trinity, 
with a particular focus on the Holy Spirit, as it is explained and discussed in the 
Tractates on John. In addition, I will detect and expose Augustine’s use of the 
Gospel of John as one of the most important biblical texts in the developing of 
his doctrine of the Trinity. Indeed, the chapter will show the extent to which 
Augustine’s Trinitarian speculation is patterned after his understanding of the 
fourth Gospel. Enquiring about the nature of God the Trinity from an ontological 
perspective, this chapter will be particularly focused on the two main ontological 
issues regarding the Spirit: his onto-relational nature of love and the doctrine of 
the double procession. 
   
Therefore, I do not want here to analyse the Spirit’s role in the construction of 
human identity – thus, the relationship between the Trinity and the human being 
– but rather I will examine what Augustine thinks humankind can grasp of the 
real nature of the immanent Trinity on the basis of the revelation of the fourth 
Gospel. This chapter is divided into five sections. The first (III.1) proposes an 
account of some trends in Augustine scholarship; the second (III.2) discusses a 
few methodological and hermeneutical problems related to the study of the 
Trinity in Augustine’s Tractates on John. The last three sections address the 
main issue of the chapter: the Spirit in the Trinity. In the first (III.3), I analyse 
Augustine’s account of God as ontological stability and idipsum; in the second 
(III.4), I discuss the ontological relationship between Father and the Son and the 
problem of God’s attributes. In the last (III.5), I focus on the procession of the 
Spirit, which will be shown to be the crowning element of Augustine’s Trinitarian 
architecture.  
 
The division between the analysis of God as Being/idipsum and God as a 
relational Trinity proposed in this chapter might seem odd – or even wrong – to 
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some among Augustine scholars.1 Augustine himself would probably have 
rejected a strict distinction, for the two topics are inseparably interwoven. 
Nevertheless, I have proposed it in order to help the reader to understand the 
way in which Augustine himself reflected upon the nature of God according to 
and led by, the text of the Gospel of John. Anyhow, it must be clear that this 
choice does not entail the idea that Augustine’s presuppositions about the 
divine nature undermine his own Trinitarian speculation. On the contrary, this 
chapter demonstrates that the identification between God and Being is 
employed by Augustine as a means to better understand the Trinitarian logic 
that is at the core of his investigation. In other words, it is the Trinity and the 
struggle to give an intellectual account of the relationship between the 
Trinitarian persons which is the main objective of Augustine’s investigations. 
The aforementioned identification between God and Being is therefore used by 
Augustine as the logical starting point in trying to understand the mystery of the 
One-which-is-Three.2 I would add that, in doing so, Augustine’s intention is that 
of being driven by the very logic he found in the Gospel of John. The Gospel 
itself is indeed much more focused on the relationship between the Father and 
the Son – and, in a more nuanced way, the Spirit – rather than on giving a clear 
answer to the problem of God’s essence. In the course of this exposition, I will 
show how Augustine patiently works at harmonizing the different sayings of the 
Gospel according to his pro-Nicene perspective. While Jn. 1:1: ‘In the beginning 
was the Word […] and the Word was God’ is repeated throughout the entire 
commentary, I will show that the real cornerstones of Augustine’s exegesis are 
to be identified in Jn. 5:26: ‘for as the Father has life in himself, so he has 
granted the Son also to have life in himself’ and in Jn. 16:13 ‘he (the Holy Spirit) 
                                                     
1 As Michel Barnes notes in his review of Ayres’ book on Augustine’s On the Trinity, two 
different interpretations of Augustine’s Trinitarian theology are extant in the scholarship. The 
first, identified with the works of Alfred Schindler, Michael Schmaus, or Edmund Hill tend to see 
Augustine’s Trinity as mostly concerned with philosophy and metaphysics. The second, 
exemplified by T. J. van Bavel, Goulven Madec, Basil Studer and Lewis Ayres himself ‘put 
Trinitarian theology squarely in the realm of faith’. See Michel René Barnes, ‘Review of 
Augustine and the Trinity. By Lewis Ayres’, in Modern Theology 29 1 (2013), p. 181-184. 
However, the distinction I am proposing in this chapter between idipsum and relational Trinity 
does not aim at affirming a superiority of metaphysics over faith in Augustine’s Trinitarian 
theology. Rather, this division is only a means for a better understanding of the intimate relation 
between the concept of idipsum and the Trinitarian procession.  
2 This principle is explicitly stated by Augustine in a letter to Nebridius regarding the Trinity and 
incarnation. There, Augustine states that, in studying any substance, one has to define the 
essence first, then its specific identity, and finally its relation to time. See Epistle XI.3: Nulla 
natura est, Nebridi, et omnino nulla substantia quae non in se habeat haec tria, et prae se gerat: 
primo ut sit, deinde ut hoc vel illud sit, tertio ut in eo quod est maneat quantum potest. 
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will not speak on his own; he will speak only what he hears’. As these three 
verses are used throughout the whole commentary on John, this chapter will 
also be particularly focused on the exegesis of the fifth, eighth and tenth chapter 
of the Gospel. The analysis of the most significant passages will show how, 
while Augustine is mainly concerned to avoid any interpretation that can lead to 
a subordinationist view of the Trinity, he finds in the person of the Holy Spirit the 
ontological gift of God which reveals God as the eternal mystery and 
communion of love.   
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III.1 Augustine’s Trinity in Contemporary Scholarship 
 
 
Rivers of ink have been spilled by scholars of all ages on Augustine’s doctrine 
of the Trinity, while a myriad of theologians and historians faced Augustine’s 
doctrine of the Trinity from different perspectives: some of them were moved by 
historical interest, others from a dogmatic perspective, some others by 
confessional intent.3 Obviously, it is not my intention to give here a full account 
of the scholarship on Augustine and the Trinity, but merely to highlight some 
trends which are of some interest for the present work.  
  
In general, all scholars agree that Augustine’s influence is extremely important 
for western understandings of the Trinity. On the one hand, while the debate on 
the introduction of the filioque still tears apart eastern orthodox and western 
catholic theologies,4 Augustine is still seen by some scholars as the initiator of 
the ‘evil trend’ that led to the separation of eastern and western churches.5 On 
the other hand, since the beginning of the twentieth century, Augustine’s 
Trinitarian concern has been interpreted by scholarship mainly under the light of 
his Neoplatonic background. This position is entirely justified by quantity of 
references to the ‘platonic books’ traceable in Augustine’s works.6 
Nevertheless, different positions are held not only regarding the extent to which 
Augustine’s Trinitarian thought is dependent on Neoplatonic speculation, but 
mainly on the significance of this influence on his thought.  
   
One of the main criticisms of Augustine’s Trinitarian theology, concerns the 
relationship between the immanent and economic Trinity. This critique is based 
on the so-called psychological analogy – that is, the Augustinian analogy 
between human mind and the Trinity – which has been the centre of attention 
for some of the most influential scholars of the twentieth century, such as 
                                                     
3 It goes without saying that the present work aspires to belong to the former category.  
4 In truth, Augustine was not the first theologian who introduced the idea of the filioque in Latin 
theology. Rather, he seems to gather this element from previous Latin tradition. One obvious 
example is that of Ambrose of Milan, On the Holy Spirit, I.11, who affirms that the Spirit 
‘proceeds both from the Father and from the Son’. For a thorough history of the filioque 
controversy see: Peter Gemeinhardt, Die Filioque-Kontroverse zwischen Ost- und Westkirche 
im Frühmittelalter, Berlin 2002.  
5 In this regard see: Edward Sieciensky, The Filioque: History of a Doctrinal Controversy, New 
York 2010. See also Dongsun Cho, ‘An Apology for Augustine's Filioque as a Hermeneutical 
Referent to the Immanent Trinity’ in M. Vinzent (ed), Studia Patristica 70 (2013), p. 275-283. 
6 See Confessions, VII.9(13); VII.20(26).  
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Michael Schmaus.7 The focus on the psychological analogy led some scholars, 
in particular, Karl Rahner, followed by others such as LaCugna8 and Gunton,9 to 
accuse Augustine in various ways of separating the Trinity in itself – the so-
called ‘immanent Trinity’ – from the ‘economic Trinity’. In particular, Rahner 
denounces Augustine’s Trinity for being substantially unrelated to creation, thus 
creating an unbridgeable distance between the immanent life of God and the 
economic Trinity in the creation.10 This accusation is based on the idea that 
Augustine’s main mistake was that of basing his Trinitarian speculation on a 
misleading analogy between the Trinity and human soul. 
 
O’Leary makes a similar argument when he comes to the point of defining 
Augustine’s work On the Trinity as a ‘disappointing conclusion to the great 
period of Trinitarian thought’.11 Against the opinion of scholars like Arnold and 
Studer, who both detected in Augustine’s Trinitarian theology an integrated link 
between economy and immanence, O’Leary’s criticism is again based on 
Augustine’s alleged incapacity to link economic and immanent Trinity together.12 
According to O’Leary, this incapacity is due to his persistent tendency to think of 
the economy according to a Platonist schema of image and archetype. 
Therefore, Augustine’s schema of sign/signified interprets the relation between 
immanent and economic Trinity in a dualistic way, hardly allowing an integration 
of the two, not even in the person of Christ.13  
                                                     
7 Michael Schmaus, Die psychologische Trinitätslehre des heiligen. Augustinus,  Münster 1927. 
The book is focused in its entirety on the psychological analogy. For a study specifically on 
Augustine’s understanding of human mind see: Gerard O’Daly, Augustine’s Philosophy of Mind, 
London 1987. 
8 See Catherine Mowry LaCugna, God for Us: The Trinity and Christian Life, San Francisco 
1991, in particular the third chapter: ‘Augustine and the Trinitarian Economy of the Soul’. For a 
critical evaluation of LaCugna’s work see: Alex Juguilon, ‘The Relational Ontology of 
Augustine's and LaCugna's Trinity’ in Obsculta 9 1 (2016), p. 83-95. 
9 Colin E. Gunton, ‘God the Holy Spirit: Augustine and his Successors’ in Theology through the 
Theologians: Selected Essays, 1972-1995, Edinburg 1996, p. 105-128. See also the sharp 
critique to Gunton’s thesis by: Neil Ormerod, ‘Augustine and the Trinity: Whose Crisis?’, in 
Pacifica 16 1 (2003), p. 17-32. 
10 See: Karl Rahner, The Trinity, New York 1970. In this regard, see also the critical evaluation 
on the relationship between Rahner and Augustine by Drayton C. Benner, ‘Augustine and Karl 
Rahner on the Relationship between the Immanent Trinity and the Economic Trinity’, in 
International Journal of Systematic Theology 9 1 (2007) p. 24–38. Rahner was highly influential 
for LaCugna’s work as well.  
11 Joseph O’Leary, ‘The Invisible Mission of the Son in Origen and Augustine’, p. 621. 
12 Johannes Arnold, ‘Begriff und heilsökonomische Bedeutung der göttlichen Sendungen in 
Augustinus’ De Trinitate’, in Recherches Augustiniennes et Patristiques 25 (1991), p. 3-69; Basil 
Studer, Augustins De Trinitate. Eine Einführung, Paderborn 2005. 
13 In this regard, see: Joseph O’Leary, Questioning Back: The Overcoming of Metaphysics in 




Another view that was broadly accepted in the past but has been criticised by 
recent scholarship can be traced back to the influence on twentieth century 
scholarship of De Régnon’s work, written at the end of the nineteenth century.14 
According to this trend of scholarship, Augustine is the initiator of a Trinitarian 
tendency in the West that, contrarily to the eastern traditions, tends to 
emphasize the unity of God at the expense of the reality of the three divine 
persons. This perspective was held by many critics of Augustine in the past 
century. For many years, scholars like Prestige, Gilson and TeSelle held the 
common opinion that one of the main differences between Augustine’s and the 
Greek Fathers’ doctrine of the Trinity can be traced back to the focal point from 
which the research begins.15 According to this view, Augustine, highly 
influenced by Neoplatonism, started his research on the Trinity by reflecting on 
God’s simplicity and on the identification between God and Being, explaining 
the persons only in a second phase. On the contrary, the Greek Fathers put 
their emphasis more on the persons than on God’s unity. 
 
All the accounts presented so far have been criticised and partially dismissed by 
more recent scholarship. In 1995 M. Barnes published an influential article, 
claiming Theodore De Régnon’s work as one of the most influential regarding 
the interpretation of Augustine’s Trinitarian doctrine.16 It initiated a change of 
perspective and a new trend of scholarship, mainly represented by Lewis Ayres 
and Michel René Barnes.17 Instead of focusing on Augustine’s philosophical 
debts, these authors aim at studying Augustine’s doctrine of the Trinity in the 
living context of post Nicaean Latin theologians. In particular, Barnes points out 
that ‘recourse in Trinitarian doctrine to a philosophical analysis of being is 
typical of Nicene and pro-Nicene argument of reasoning, and such recourse is 
                                                     
14 See: Théodore de Régnon, Études de théologie positive sur la Sainte Trinité, Paris 1898. 
15 See: George L. Prestige, God in Patristic Thought, London 1949, p. 235-237; Étienne Gilson, 
The Christian Philosophy of Saint Augustine, New York 1960, p. 200-205. Eugene TeSelle, 
Augustine the Theologians, New York 1970, p. 138-140. 
16 See: Michel René Barnes, ‘De Régnon Reconsidered’, in Augustinian Studies 26 2 (1995), p. 
51-79. In the wake of M. Barnes’ article, L. Ayres accused also De Régnon of being the 
forefather of this alleged wrong way of interpreting Augustine, especially ‘in setting the agenda 
even for those who reversed or adapted his categories’. See: Lewis Ayres, Augustine and the 
Trinity, Cambridge 2010, p. 1-2.  
17 See in particular: Michel René Barnes, ‘Rereading Augustine on the Trinity’, in Stephen 
Davis, Daniel Kendall, and Gerald O'Collins (eds), The Trinity: An Interdisciplinary Symposium 
on the Trinity, Oxford 2002, p. 145–176, and L. Ayres, Augustine and the Trinity. See also L. 
Ayres, Nicaea and Its Legacy. 
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not in itself distinctive to Augustine, nor, obviously, is it an innovation’. 
Therefore, Augustine’s insistence on simplicity and on its identification with 
Being does not come from Neoplatonism or from an alleged difference between 
East and West, but rather from the distinctive Christian cultural milieu of the pro-
Nicene era.18 Therefore, far from denying the influence of Platonism on 
Augustine,19 this new trend in scholarship intends to problematize Augustine’s 
dependence on non-Christian (also platonic) texts. First, these scholars aim at 
differentiating various influences of different traditions on Augustine in different 
periods of his life. Secondly, through an accurate analysis of pro-Nicaean 
authors, they point out the deep engagement Augustine had with different 
Nicaean interpretations by ‘a number of different pro-Nicene parties’, especially 
in developing his doctrine of the Trinity.20 Thirdly, they tend to read Augustine’s 
Trinitarian though focusing more on its relation to Christology and, generally 
speaking, the realm of faith rather than on its metaphysical or philosophical 
implications. This is particularly true in the case of Ayres, who gives the 
‘psychological analogy’ a lesser role in his monograph, compared to the 
importance given to Augustine’s Christian predecessors and his Christological 
epistemology.21 
   
In regard to the trends of scholarship cited so far, so far as this work is 
concerned, I will not discuss here Augustine’s dependence on Neoplatonism 
directly.22 Nor do I intend to propose here a detailed study of the psychological 
analogy. Nevertheless, this chapter will reject the allegation of the lack of 
relation between the immanent Trinity and the creation in Augustine’s thought. 
Indeed, this chapter will show that, far from being a blemish in his theology, the 
metaphysical abyss which separates God and creation is fertile ground on 
which Augustine built his pneumatology. The same Holy Spirit, which is the 
mystery of God’s communion, works at the salvation of human creatures. 
                                                     
18 M. R. Barnes, ‘Rereading Augustine on the Trinity’, p. 159.  
19 Indeed, influences of both specific themes and of a “general way of reasoning” are 
undeniable. Ayres, for example, maintains that: ‘Augustine adopted and adapted themes from 
non-Christian Platonic texts in three areas: his account of the character of divine existence as 
immaterial, omnipresent and simple; his account of the Father’s role as principium in the Trinity; 
his account of the Son as intellectus’. See: Ayres, Augustine and the Trinity, p. 37. 
20 Ibidem, p. 43. 
21 Ibidem, p. 43. 
22 It would be here impossible to discuss exhaustively Augustine’s debts to Neoplatonism. 
Anyway, while I find much commendable the effort to put Augustine’s theology in dialogue with 




Therefore, the ontological distance between Creator and creature reveals God 
as loving giver of the gift of grace, which the Holy Spirit is.23 In this sense, the 
distance between Trinity and creation is functional for Augustine’s existential 
understanding of evil and salvation. In particular, I will show how Augustine’s 
understanding of the text of John – particularly Jn. 5 – shape his understanding 
of Trinitarian relationship according to what I will call a paradigm of identity.24  
      
Finally, it is worth giving an account of the so called onto-theological 
interpretation of Augustine’s Trinity. The very idea of onto-theology is often 
related in modern scholarship to the critique of Greek metaphysics carried out 
by Heidegger and his later followers. According to this ‘Heideggerian’ 
perspective, this term signifies the pernicious metaphysical objectification of the 
mystery of Being. However, in this chapter, I will merely use it to point to the 
historical process – in which Augustine is a fundamental actor – which led to the 
identification of God with Being. However, this term, which Gilson connected to 
the so-called ‘metaphysic of the Exodus’,25 (with reference to the alleged 
identification between God and Being in Ex. 3:14) is used in different ways and 
according to different perspectives by authors like Beierwaltes, Madec and 
Dubarle.26 However, all these scholars agreed in considering Augustine’s onto-
theological metaphysic very similar to the Neoplatonic one, thus assuming that 
Augustine’s most important achievement was the ability to connect the Plotinian 
henology with the biblical revelation centred on Christ and creation.27 Whilst a 
similar position – though with some differences, especially regarding the 
relationship between Augustine and Aristotle – is held by Bradshaw,28 this trend 
                                                     
23 The fact that the gift of the Holy Spirit is not given to all human beings does not diminish, 
rather increase his value. The problem of the dispensation of the Spirit is not matter of this 
chapter, for it will be addressed in infra, V.3.3. 
24 In this regard, see particularly infra, VI.  
25 See Étienne Gilson, L'esprit de la philosophie médiévale, Paris 1932, trans. The Spirit of 
Mediaeval Philosophy, Notre Dame IND 1991.Gilson maintained that the identification between 
God and the Being was the most important contribution to the western thought operated by the 
Father so of the Church, particularly Augustine.  
26 See in particular: Werner Beierwaltes, ‘“Deus est esse - esse est Deus”. Die onto-
theologische Grundfrage als aristolelisch-neuplato- nische Denkstruktur’, in W. Beierwaltes (ed), 
Platonismus und Idealismus, p. 4-82. Goulven Madec, L' onto-theo-logie patristique, Paris 1979. 
Dominique Dubarle, Dieu avec l'être. De Parménide à Saint Thomas. Essai d'ontologie 
théologale, Paris 1986, in particular p. 167-258.  
27 For a critical discussion of strengths and weaknesses of this trend of scholarship, see G. 
Lettieri, L’altro Augostino, particularly the section named ‘Nota IX- L’agostiniana metafisica 
dell’Esodo come ontoteologia’, p. 524-526.  
28 See in particular: David Bradshaw, ‘Augustine the Metaphysician’, in George E. 
Demacopoulos and Aristotle Papanikolaou (eds), Orthodox Readings of Augustine, New York 
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of scholarship, mainly focused on the Augustinian identification between God 
and Being, is strongly criticised by Marion, whose ultimate goal is that of de-
ontologising Augustine’s thought.29 This debate will be taken into account in the 
present chapter. Indeed, I will be shown that, while it would be very unjust to 
reduce Augustine’s theology to an onto-theology, the very concept of onto-
theology is a very useful historical category when examining Augustine’s 
doctrine of the Trinity. Therefore, against Marion’s position, I will show that 
Augustine’s Trinitarian thought is based on the identification of God with Being.  
 
Lastly, due to its proximity to the present research, Kuehn’s article on the 
Johannine logic in Augustine’s Trinity deserves a particular mention.30 This 
article aims at investigating Augustine’s use of the Johannine corpus in his 
Trinitarian theology to find the ‘Johannine logic in his articulation of a 
fundamentally pro-Nicaean trinitarianism’.31 Despite the author’s claim of a 
strong exegetical logic in Augustine trinitarianism, the article is mainly focused 
on Augustine’s On the Trinity, while Tractates on John are barely used to clarify 
some obscure passages.32 Contrarily to Kuehn’s work, this chapter will be 
mainly focused on the Tractates in order to understand not only the logic 
underneath Augustine’s Trinity, but also the way in which Augustine discloses 
his theological doctrines while dealing with an exegetical text. This analysis will 
show the Holy Spirit as the most crucial character in Augustine’s doctrine of the 
Trinity.33 
  
                                                                                                                                                         
2008, p. 227-251; See also: David Bradshaw, Aristotle East and West: Metaphysics and the 
Division of Christendom, Cambridge 2004. 
29 In particular, see Marion’s remarks about Augustine’s use of idipsum: Jean-Luc Marion, 
‘Idipsum: The Name of God according to Augustine’, in G. E. Demacopoulos and A. 
Papanikolaou (eds), Orthodox Readings of Augustine, p. 167-189; Jean-Luc Marion, God 
without Being, Chicago 2012.  
30 Evan F. Kuehn, ‘The Johannine Logic in Augustine’s Trinity: A Dogmatic Sketch’, in 
Theological Studies 68 (2007), p. 572-594.  
31 Ibidem, p.575. On this Johannine logic see the following footnote.  
32 Kuehn maintains this Johannine logic can be detected in ‘three stages, each corresponding to 
a “movement” in John’s Gospel. The first movement consist of the Son’s procession from the 
Father in eternity and his incarnation in time’. The second ‘involves the Pater-Filius relationship’ 
focusing particularly on the incarnate Son in his equality and inferiority with the father. 
Regarding the third he writes that ‘the foundational binitarianism essential to the Johannine 
Trinitarian logic is completed with the pneumatological ministry of enlightening love’. See 
Ibidem, p. 576-577. 
33 This brief section of bibliography does not pretend to be exhaustive. It had only the purpose 
of presenting some of the trends in contemporary scholarship which will be faced in different 
ways during this chapter. 
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III.2 Hermeneutical Problems in Studying the Trinity in the 
Tractates on John 
 
 
Before starting the analysis of Augustine’s Tractates, three methodological 
considerations are in order, because the very nature of the text under analysis 
makes it easy to fall into methodological errors and hermeneutical difficulties.  
1) The first one regards the unity of these tractates. Indeed, the Tractates, 
which we treat as a whole, were written over a long period of time, from 406 to 
423.34 Therefore, one should always consider the possibility that Augustine 
changed his mind over time.  
2) The second one concerns the very genre of these tractates, written in form of 
sermons to be preached to Augustine’s own congregation.35 One could argue 
that they might lack both unity and theological depth, unlike his more systematic 
work – e.g. On the Trinity.  
3) The third and more general remark regards Augustine’s hermeneutic. In 
particular, it is concerned with the problem of apophaticism,36 that is, whether it 
is correct or not to understand Augustine’s doctrine of the Trinity as related to 
what modern theologians call the ‘immanent Trinity’. Does Augustine really 
believe that it is possible to understand how the Trinity works in-itself or, on the 
contrary, should his Trinitarian doctrines be taken merely as a human account 
of the highest Trinity, the logic of which is unknown to humans? 
  
Concerning the first objection I would argue that, although Augustine’s 
theological discussion of the Trinity and on the Spirit does show some 
developments, it nonetheless does not seem to change drastically in the course 
of these years. In particular, this chapter makes clear that the underlying 
‘generative logic’ – which one can describe as roughly based on the exegesis of 
Jn. 1:1, 5:19, 5:26, 8:24, 16:13 and 20:22 – at the core of Augustine’s 
speculation remains the same. From an ontological perspective, the pillars of 
                                                     
34 The problem of the chronology of TrIoh have been already exposed in supra, I.2.2. 
35 In truth, the last group of Tractates (TrIoh. LV-CXXIV) was possibly never preached to 
Augustine’s own congregation, as they were written by Augustine and sent to Carthage directly, 
as testified by the Epistle XXIII*A,3. In this regard, see supra, I.2.2.  
36 The term apophatic is, of course, used improperly. Indeed, this term belongs to a different 
period of Christian speculation, and it cannot be used properly before the Pseudo-Dionysus in 
the late fifth century. I use it here only to indicate a certain kind of negative theology which 
denies to human beings the possibility of knowing God in his own essence.  
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Augustine’s speculation are three: the identification of God as idipsum and 
Being; the acknowledgment of the quod habet hoc est – that is, the idea that in 
the Trinity each person’s essence corresponds to his attributes; the double 
procession of the Spirit from both the Father and the Son. All these doctrines 
appear from the first tractate and are consistently presented in the whole work, 
although with different degrees of speculation.37 
 
In regard to the second consideration, I would claim that, far from being a 
methodological weakness, the fact that these Tractates were preached has a 
surplus value. First of all, the very text at hand shows that Augustine is not 
afraid to deal with difficult-to-grasp theological and philosophical questions in 
his preached Tractates. Augustine himself, according to his hermeneutical 
principles, assumes there are different levels of interpretation of his own 
Tractates.38 Nevertheless, far from giving up in explaining the most complex 
theological doctrines, Augustine often exhorts his congregation to strive to 
understand his words.39 Secondly, the possibility of seeing how Augustine deals 
with these topics in his everyday duties as a preacher gives us more hints as to 
what his real focus was. Indeed, preaching to his congregation is neither an 
intellectual divertissement nor an unwanted obligation for Augustine. On the 
contrary, it is the marker of his own mission as a shepherd: that of saving souls. 
Therefore, the doctrines presented in the homilies should not be considered to 
be “inferior” to those expressed in his systematic treaties, because they 
represent the quintessence of what is necessary for Christians to be saved. In 
this regard, it is worth reminding the reader that, in Augustine’s own 
hermeneutic, striving for understanding the Trinity is not an act of intellectual 
triviality, but rather a means of salvation. Therefore, Augustine’s explicit 
intention is to build up a consistent commentary on the fourth Gospel that can 
be useful both to the ‘simple’ believers and to the ‘more advanced’.  
 
                                                     
37 See respectively TrIoh, II.2; XL.5-6; IX.7. The conclusion of this chapter will show an 
extremely advanced and mature doctrine of the Spirit in the last Tractates. See in particular the 
whole TrIoh. XCIX and CXXI.4. Nonetheless, what is written at the end is not conflictual with the 
rest of the Tractates.  
38 By the use of the Pauline metaphor of milk (simple faith) and solid food (grown faith mediated 
through reason), Augustine shows he is perfectly aware of the different level of understanding 
his audience used to have. Thus, his words can be interpreted as milk by the simple believers 
or as food by the more advanced. On the use of this metaphor in the text see: TrIoh, VII.23; 
XCVII.5; XCVIII.1-2; CII.4; CXVIII.3. 
39 See: in particular: TrIoh, XXIII.6; XXVII.7; XXIX.6; XXXVI.7.   
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Furthermore, it is worth spending some words on the relationship between this 
work and Augustine’s On the Trinity. Most of the Tractates on John were written 
during the same years in which Augustine wrote On the Trinity. Scholarship has 
already recognised some debts and intersection – sometimes even quotations – 
between the two works.40 This chapter will therefore be in dialogue with On the 
Trinity, but does not want to draw its conclusions from there. Indeed, this 
approach would frustrate its own purpose, that is, to detect Augustine’s 
Trinitarian pneumatology in the living context of its exegesis of John.  
 
The third consideration – regarding apophaticism – is the most challenging one. 
In tackling it, it can be of some use to analyse Augustine’s preaching on the 
man who, more than anyone else, was able to grasp the mystery of the Trinity: 
John the evangelist. The author of the Gospel is compared to a great mountain 
and to an eagle, which is able to transcend the whole created world in order to 
set his eyes on the immutable and eternal reality of God (TrIoh, I.7).41 By means 
of the grace of God, John was able to detach himself from the created order 
and have a glimpse of the eternal reality of the immutable Trinity. By contrast 
with the fullness of God, human beings are described as nihil (nothing), for they 
not only do not possess the fullness of being, but they are even in danger of 
losing the portion of being they have (TrIoh, I.4). Even John is not able to speak 
with clear words what he saw in the eternal reality of God, for human being 
needs symbols and shadows to have even only a partial understand of God’s 
reality (TrIoh, I.8). Therefore, in order to understand correctly the Gospel which 
is about to be commented upon, Augustine exhorts the listeners to raise 
themselves to a spiritual understanding (spiritalem intellectum, TrIoh, I.1). 
According to Augustine, the first consequence of this spiritual elevation consists 
in the acknowledgment of the impossibility for a finite and temporal creature to 
understand the immutable essence of God (TrIoh, I.8) perfectly. It is worth 
noting briefly that, according to Augustine’s ‘hermeneutic of the grace’,42 human 
understanding does not only originate from human capacity or knowledge, but 
                                                     
40 M.-F. Berrouard, Introduction aux homélies de Saint Augustin. 
41 On the figure of John the Evangelist see also: TrIoh, XVI.2. XVIII.1; XXXVI.1; XXXVI.5; 
XLVIII.6; LXI.6. 
42 See: G. Lettieri, L’altro Agostino, p. 205-231. 
105 
 
mainly from the gift of God.43 Augustine’s long introduction is a very useful 
means for modern scholars to understand his notion of ontology and the basic 
notions of the Tractates on John. The first idea regards the limitation of human 
knowledge, in opposition to the fullness of God’s substance. The second one 
concerns the general principle according to which it is possible for human 
beings to gain a certain knowledge of God in his reality – the aforementioned 
‘immanent Trinity’ – but only a partial one. Indeed, the pervasive presence of 
God makes him the only Being who is always present, for he does not suffer 
any alteration in time or space. Consequently, Augustine maintains that God is 
more present (praesentior) and actual than every other being, for he is an 
immutable substance, while ‘every created being is changeable’ (TrIoh, I.8).44 
Regarding the Trinitarian relationships, even the very procession of the Spirit 
stands as the practical sign of the impossibility for human being of gaining a 
perfect knowledge of the Trinity: 
     
Quid autem illic intersit inter procedere et nasci, et longum est quaerendo 
disserere, et temerarium cum disserueris definire: quia hoc et menti 
utcumque comprehendere, et si quid forte mens inde comprehenderit, 
linguae difficillimum est explicare, quantuslibet praesit doctor, quantuslibet 
adsit auditor (TrIoh, XCIX.4).45 
    
While this passage seems to draw Augustine nearer to the line of so-called 
apophatic theology, his scepticism on the possibility of gaining perfect 
knowledge of the Trinity does not exempt the exegete, nor indeed every 
Christian, from looking for the Truth. On the contrary, it seems to point to the 
                                                     
43 Augustine often reassures those who are unable to understand, exhorting them to believe in 
what he is preaching, for the capacity of intellectual understanding of the Word of God is a gift 
which is not given to everybody. See TrIoh, I.6-7 and the whole TrIoh, CV. 
44 Speaking of God as the one who is ‘more present’, Augustine is here playing with the two 
meaning of the word praesens. On the one hand, it indicates the act of presence (to be, here 
and now). On the other hand, it has the temporal meaning of being present, in contrast with the 
past and the future. In both ways God transcends human being, for he both contains all creation 
(thus being everywhere present) and has not change in time – thus being always present. See 
also: TrIoh, II.8-10; XII.5-6; XXXV.1-5; XXXVIII.10; LXIV.1-4; XCII.1; XCIV.5.  
45 ‘About what difference there is between proceeding and being born, it is both large a task to 
discuss it through enquiry and rash to define it once you have discussed it. For this is most 
difficult both for the mind to comprehend in any way at all and, even if the mind perchance 
comprehends something of it, for the tongue to explain it, however great a teacher is leading the 
discussion, whatever great a listener is present’. 
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impossibility of knowing God without being in communion with him.46 In other 
words, enquiring about the Trinity does give to the interpreter a solid knowledge 
of how the Trinity works. Nevertheless, the Trinity remains a mystery, for it is 
only through the perfect communion in the Holy Spirit that its being is 
understandable. Therefore, this chapter will show that the very understanding of 
the Trinity is not only a matter of reasoning, but primarily a spiritual gift, that is, a 
gift of the Holy Spirit, which is simultaneously the giver and the gift.   
                                                     
46 On Augustine’s hermeneutical circle in interpreting the Scriptures see, among the others: 
Carol Harrison, Augustine: Christian Truth, in particular chapter 2: ‘Res non verba: Christianity 
and pagan literary culture’, p. 46-78. On TrIoh in particular, see: J. Norris, ‘The Theological 
Structure of St. Augustine's Exegesis’, p. 385-394. 
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III.3 God as Ontological Stability: Being and Idipsum 
 
‘If you do not believe that I am you will die in your sin’ (Jn. 8:24) 
 
The very start of the Gospel poses the identity of the Word-Christ and God the 
Father as a crucial theme. In this section, I do not intend to enquire about the 
relationship between the Father, the Son and the Spirit,47 but rather about their 
identification as one God, one essence and one principium. Through a close 
examination of Augustine’s exegesis of John, this section aims at showing both 
the extent to which Augustine’s speculation on God and the Being is dependent 
on Johannine material and Augustine’s ontological reinterpretation of this 
material.  
 
The discussion of the very nature of God – its essentia or substantia – is 
foundational for defining and understanding the intra-Trinitarian relationship. In 
his Tractates on John, Augustine does not draw the same difference between 
essentia and substantia as he does in his On the Trinity VII.5.10.48 In the latter, 
he states that God is called substance improperly, for the idea of subsistere 
(subsist) points to something that constitutes the underlying nature of a subject 
(like colours or form in a body). On the contrary, the word essentia comes from 
esse, thus referring to the proper nature of God, ‘for he alone truly is, because 
he is unchangeable’.49 Nevertheless, since Augustine seems to use essentia 
and substantia interchangeably in most of his other writings including, of course, 
the TrIoh, I will use essence and substance as synonymous.50  
 
The most detailed discussion of the nature of God is undertaken in the 
commentary on Jn. 1:1 and Jn. 8:25. These two texts set the scriptural field for 
the two main themes of Augustine’s doctrine of God’s essence: the identification 
                                                     
47 This is the subject of the next section.  
48 See also Augustine’s remarks on the word essentia as the best translation of the Greek term 
ousia in The City of God, XII.3: Essentia, novo quidem nomine, quo usi veteres non sunt latini 
sermonis auctores, sed iam nostris temporibus usitato, ne deesset etiam linguae nostrae, quod 
Graeci appellant οὐσία; hoc enim verbum e verbo expressum est, ut diceretur essential; 
‘Essentia is a new word, indeed, which was not used in the Latin speech of old, but which has 
come into use in our own day so that our language should not lack a word for what the Greeks 
call ousia for this expressed very exactly be essentia’. 
49 On the Trinity, VII.5.10 
50 However, I will make clear that, when speaking of God’s substance, Augustine actually 
means God’s essence. On the use of essentia and substantia in Augustine see: Roland J. 
Teske, ‘Augustine’s Use of “Substantia” in Speaking about God’, in Modern Schoolman 62 3 
(1985), p. 147-163. See also: L. Ayres, Augustine and the Trinity, p. 199-203. 
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of God as the idipsum and the applicability of the concept of Being to the 
Father, the Son and the Spirit. Commenting on Jn. 1:1, Augustine writes: 
 
Et Deus erat Verbum. Hoc Verbum idipsum est, unde hesterno die multum 
locuti sumus […] In principio erat Verbum. Idipsum est, eodem modo est; 
sicut est, semper sic est; mutari non potest: hoc est est. Quod nomen suum 
dixit famulo suo Moysi: Ego sum qui sum; et: Misit me qui est (TrIoh, II.2).51 
  
Augustine is here referring to Expositions on the Psalms 121.5-11, which he 
preached to his congregations some days before preaching TrIoh II. There 
Augustine provides a longer discussion of what should be understood with the 
term idipsum, which appears to be the most appropriate descriptor of God.52 
This passage has been taken by many scholars as one of the most explicit 
times Augustine refers to God as Being itself. For this reason many scholars, 
such as Chadwick and Boulding, have translated the word idipsum as ‘Being 
itself’.53 Others, like Marion, have criticised this translation, proposing a 
translation which is much closer to the original meaning of the word, that is, the 
idea of self-sameness.54 Accordingly, this word would not indicate Being itself, 
but would rather express a general principle of identity within God.55 This 
debate is extremely significant, for it gives to modern scholars evidence 
regarding the extent to which is possible to speak of onto-theology in Augustine. 
   
First of all, it is worth noting that Augustine interprets the phrase ‘the Word was 
God’ in light of another passage of the Gospel, that is, Jn. 8:24: ‘for if you do not 
                                                     
51 ‘“And the Word was God”. This word is the self-sameness about which we spoke at length 
yesterday […]. “In the beginning was the Word”. He is the self-sameness; he is always in the 
same way. As he is, so he always is. He cannot be changed. He is this: he is. And he said this, 
his name to his servant Moses: “I am who I am”, and: “He who is sent me”’.  
52 See: Expositions on the Psalms 121.5-11: Quid est idipsum? Quod semper eodem modo est; 
quod non modo aliud, et modo aliud est. Quid est ergo idipsum, nisi, quod est? Quid est quod 
est? Quod aeternum est. Nam quod semper aliter atque aliter est, non est, quia non manet: non 
omnino non est, sed non summe est. Et quid est quod est, nisi ille qui quando mittebat Moysen, 
dixit illi: Ego sum qui sum? Quid est hoc, nisi ille qui cum diceret famulus eius: Ecce mittis me: si 
dixerit mihi populus: Quis te misit? quid dicam ei? nomen suum noluit aliud dicere, quam: Ego 
sum qui sum; et adiecit et ait: Dices itaque filiis Israel: Qui est, misit me ad vos. Ecce idipsum: 
Ego sum qui sum: Qui est, misit me ad vos.  
53 This translation is strongly criticised by J. L. Marion, ‘Idipsum’, p. 175. See in particular the 
English translations of Confessions by Henry Chadwick, Saint Augustine: Confessions, Oxford 
1991, and Maria Boulding, The Confessions, New York 1997.  
54 Although I agree with Marion regarding the translation of the word idipsum, I will show in this 
chapter that I do not think it is possible to deny that God is depicted as the Being itself by 
Augustine.  
55 J. L. Marion, ‘Idipsum’, p. 167-189. 
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believe that I am, you will die in your sin’.56 Secondly, the first verse of the 
Gospel is explicitly linked with Jn. 8:57-58: ‘before Abraham came to be, I am’. 
In interpreting these passages, Augustine clearly describes the word sum (I am) 
as the most adequate word the Bible uses to define the substance of God 
(“sum” vero ad divinam pertinere substantiam, TrIoh, XLIII.17). Finally, all these 
passages are connected to the revelation of God to Moses in Ex. 3:14 ‘I am 
who I am’. There is no doubt, then, that the phrase ‘I am’ is interpreted by 
Augustine as the most appropriate word with which God is described. Reflecting 
on the word sum Augustine asks why God chose only this word to indicate 
himself: 
   
Quid est: Si non credideritis quia ego sum? Ego sum, quid? Nihil addidit; et 
quia nihil addidit, multum est quod commendavit. […]Non ait et ibi: Ego sum 
Deus; aut: Ego sum mundi fabricator; aut: Ego sum omnium rerum creator; 
aut: Ego sum ipsius populi liberandi propagator: sed hoc tantum: Ego sum 
qui sum (TrIoh, XXXVIII.8).57 
  
To the modern reader, this passage is not only interesting for its ontological 
contents – that is, the affirmation of the multiplicity of the names of God – but 
also for the methodology used by Augustine to discuss the essence of God in 
his Tractates. When facing the problem of God’s substance, Augustine 
systematically opposes the true essence of God with the inadequate essence of 
his creatures. The very essence of God, which Augustine biblically indicates as 
sum, is always explained, commented and defined in comparison with the 
inadequacy of the created world to fit into this category.58 The radical opposition 
between God and the world,59 which Augustine draws from the very text of the 
Gospel of John, does not only regard the post-lapsarian relationship between 
God and the corrupted creatures, but is even related to the ontological structure 
of the created world. The difference between God and creatures stands 
particularly in the stability of God’s substance, as opposed to the mutability of 
                                                     
56 See Augustine’s interpretation in the whole TrIoh, XXXVIII.  
57 ‘What does it mean: “if you do not believe that I am”? “I am” what? He added nothing, and 
because he added nothing, what he brought to our notice is much. […] He did not say, I am 
God, or, I am the builder of the world, or, I am the creator of all things, or, I am the propagator of 
the freeing of this people. But he said only this: “I am who I am”.’ 
58 In particular, Augustine insists on the immutability of God as opposed to the mutability of the 
soul which, therefore, is not able to perfectly grasp God. In this regard see: TrIoh, II.2; XIX.11; 
XX.11; XXIII.9-10; XXXVIII.4-6; XXXIX.6-7; LV.1-2; XCIX.4.  
59 Which will be the core of the second part of this thesis (part B). 
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the created world. Therefore, the concept of God’s stabilitas plays a primary 
role in defining God as the one who is always eternal stability (aeternam 
stabilitatem, TrIoh, XL.8-9), as opposed to this instable world of perdition 
(instabile saeculum perditionis) where God came to establish his solid kingdom 
(fundatissimum regnum, TrIoh, LV.1-2). This relationship between God and 
created beings establishes the very possibility for the ontological existence of 
the created word, which owes its ontological status to the unending stability of 
truth (perpetua stabiitas veritatis), that is, the Trinity (TrIoh, XXXVI.10-13). 
Therefore, the investigation and exegesis of the Scriptures is interpreted by 
Augustine as a never-ending search for the mystery of the Trinity hidden in the 
pages of the Gospel. This search leads human beings to the knowledge of the 
inadequacy of everything which is created, when compared to God: 
     
Praesens quaero, nihil stat; quod dixi iam non est. […] Quod vixi iam non 
est, quod victurus sum nondum est. Praeteritum et futurum invenio in omni 
motu rerum: in veritate quae manet, praeteritum et futurum non invenio, sed 
solum praesens, et hoc incorruptibiliter, quod in creatura non est. Discute 
rerum mutationes, invenies Fuit et Erit: cogita Deum, invenies Est, ubi Fuit 
et Erit esse non possit (TrIoh, XXXVIII.10).60  
  
Time and mutability are therefore signs and evidence of the ontological 
instability of the created order. On the other hand, the absence of time, that is, 
the eternal est, constitutes the very substance of God.  
 
From the passages analysed so far, it is possible to draw one conclusion: 
Augustine clearly indicates the most appropriate characterisation of God as 
both idipsum and sum/est/esse. It is not clear whether this identification is 
sufficient for the modern interpreter to define Augustine’s Trinitarian theology as 
an onto-theology, that is, a theology in which an ontological identification 
between God and Being is traceable. Is Augustine speaking of God as Being in 
an ontological sense, or is he only using a biblical name (derived from Ex. 
                                                     
60 ‘I look for the present, but nothing stands still (stat). […] What I have lived no longer is; what I 
am going to live is not yet. I find past and future in every motion of things. In the Truth which 
abides I do not find past and future, but only the present, and what is without corruption, 
something which does not exist in a created being. Analyse changes in things: you will find “it 




3:14)? Is Augustine’s tendency to speak of the true substance of God in 
opposition to the created world a sign of his biblical, rather than metaphysical 
commitment? According to Marion, Augustine professes a definitive apophatic 
theology. Having no interest in giving ontological statements about God, he 
uses the word esse and idipsum only because he found those names in the 
Bible, but he has no intention to speak metaphysically about God. Contrariwise, 
I would say that Augustine’s exegesis on John clarifies that Augustine speaks of 
God in a metaphysical manner, interpreting him as Being itself. Indeed, the 
commentary on the fourth Gospel clearly shows the intention of linking the 
generative logic expressed by the text of Jn. 1:1 with the affirmation of the full 
divinity of Jesus. This link is obtained through the identification of both Father 
and Son with Being. This is particularly evident in Augustine’s exegesis of 
Jesus’ speech to the Jews in Jn. 8, which is commented on at length. Augustine 
interprets it in eleven tractates,61 most of which are dedicated to two themes: 
the nature of God – with particular focus on his being esse – and the intra-
Trinitarian relationship between the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit. In these 
tractates, Augustine exposes the ego sum as the expression of identity in God. 
The same interpretation is given to the identification of the Son as principium in 
Jn. 8.25: ‘They said to him, “Who are you?” Jesus said to them: “The 
Beginning”’.62 The word principium (beginning) is as fit as the word esse to 
describe the nature of God insofar it is an indication of his eternal stability and 
immutability:  
    
Deus autem hoc est quod est; ideo proprium nomen sibi tenuit: Ego sum qui 
sum. Hoc est Filius, dicendo: Nisi credideritis quia ego sum: ad hoc pertinet 
                                                     
61 TrIoh, XXXIII-XLIII.   
62 The text of Jn. 8,25 has always been a conundrum for exegetes. The Greek text runs: 
Ἔλεγον οὖν αὐτῷ· σὺ τίς εἶ; εἶπεν αὐτοῖς ὁ Ἰησοῦς· τὴν ἀρχὴν ὅ τι καὶ λαλῶ ὑμῖν. Difficulties 
arise in the interpretation of τὴν ἀρχὴν. Modern scholarship tends to interpret it in its adverbial 
meaning, although even in this case the translation is not always clear. On the contrary, 
Augustine follows the Latin translation which makes τὴν ἀρχὴν substantive: Tu quis es? et 
ait: Principium, quia et loquor vobis. Augustine was aware of the Greek text, for in TrIoh 
XXXVIII.11 he states that, on the basis of the Greek text, the word principium must be 
interpreted as an accusative, not as nominative. Therefore, he thinks the meaning of the phrase 
is: ‘Believe that I am the Beginning’. For a recent study on this verse with particular focus on the 
manuscript tradition see: Hans Förster, ‘Überlegungen zur Grammatik von Joh 8,25 im Lichte 
der handschriftlichen Überlieferung’, in Zeitschrift für die neutestamentliche Wissenschaft 107 1 
(2016), p. 1–29. On the Latin text of the Gospel of John Augustine was using see: Hugh 
Houghton, Augustine’s Text of John. Patristic Citations and Latin Gospel Manuscripts, Oxford 
2008. See in particular p. 107-120 and p. 264. 
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et: Tu quis es? Principium. Deus igitur incommutabilis est, anima mutabilis 
(TrIoh, XXXIX.8).63 
   
Saying that ‘God is this which is’, Augustine is firstly pointing out the 
immutability and self-sameness of God. That is exactly the first characteristic of 
God insofar he is Being: 
   
Tu quis es? Non enim cum dixisti: Nisi credideritis quia ego sum, addidisti 
quid esses. Quis es, ut credamus? Et ille: Principium. Ecce quod est esse. 
Principium mutari non potest: principium in se manet, et innovat omnia; 
principium est, cui dictum est: Tu autem idem ipse es, et anni tui non 
deficient (TrIoh, XXXVIII.11).64 
 
Being itself is such insofar as it cannot change. He always and eternally is the 
principium in which everything that has being in a derivative sense – that is, the 
creation – subsists. Therefore, Augustine is not basing a distinction between 
God and creation on a vague affirmation of the superior majesty of God over the 
creation, rather he is collecting from the Gospel the scriptural material to justify 
ontologically and metaphysically the difference between God and his creatures. 
Creatures are defective in the sense that they lack the fullness of Being, which 
is also why they need to participate in God to truly be: 
   
Res enim quaelibet, prorsus qualicumque excellentia, si mutabilis est, non 
vere Est; non enim est ibi verum Esse, ubi est et non esse. Quidquid enim 
mutari potest, mutatum non est quod erat: si non est quod erat, mors 
quaedam ibi facta est; peremptum est aliquid ibi quod erat, et non est 
(TrIoh, XXXVIII.10).65  
                                                     
63 ‘But God is this which is. Therefore, he kept for himself as his proper name: “I am who I am”. 
The Son is this, in saying “if you do not believe that I am”; to this also belongs: “who are you? 
The Beginning”. Therefore, God is immutable, the soul is mutable’. 
64 ‘“Who are you?” For when you said “if you do not believe that I am,” you did not add what you 
were. Who are you that we may believe? And the said: “the Beginning”. See what the Being is. 
The Beginning cannot be changed, the Beginning abides in itself and renews all things. He is 
the Beginning to whom it was said: “But you are the self-same and your years will not fail” (Ps. 
101.28)’. 
65 ‘For anything at all, absolutely of whatever excellence, if it is changeable does not have true 
being; for true Being is not there were non-being also is. For whatever can be changed, when it 
has been changed is not what it was. If what it was is not, a kind of death has occurred there. 
Something there which was has been completely taken away, and is not’. Augustine goes on 
saying: Nigredo mortua est in capite albescentis senis, pulchritudo mortua est in corpore fessi et 




It is hard not to trace a metaphysical intent in this quotation. Augustine is here 
making a coherent exegesis of three attributes which the Gospel refers to the 
Son: 1) the fact that he is (Jn. 8,24); 2) the fact that he is the truth (Jn. 8,27; 
14.6 et al.); 3) the fact that he is principium (Jn. 8.25). These attributes are 
reinterpreted in a metaphysical fashion as referring one to another: God is truth 
because he undergoes no change whatsoever; he is beginning because he has 
no beginning; he is Being because he is the fullness of himself. Being without 
need of participation in anything else but himself is thus the fullness of Being 
and Being itself.  
 
At the end of this short section, it is possible to propose some remarks on 
Augustine’s speculation on the nature of God. First, Augustine unquestionably 
describes God as Being itself. In doing so, Augustine uses the text of the 
Gospel as the authoritative basis from which his reasoning on God originates. 
To this end, Augustine seems particularly interested in defining God as 
immutable and unchangeable. The idipsum-which-God-is is the unchangeable 
self-sameness of God, who does not know time of difference in its own being. In 
this way Augustine understands the identity or self-sameness of God. God is 
simple, and this utmost simplicity is expressed by the concept of idipsum and 
Being. The true Being – Augustine reasons – must be one and simple. 
Therefore, the next section will be devoted to understanding in which way the 
self-sameness of God represents the ontological basis for the affirmation of his 
simplicity and, most of all, how this is related by Augustine to the intra-
Trinitarian relation of Father, Son and Spirit.   
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III.4 Trinitarian Relationships: The Son, the Quod Habet Hoc Est 
and the Problem of God’s Attributes 
‘The Father has granted the Son also to have life in himself’ (Jn. 5:26) 
 
The previous section mainly investigated the textual references used by 
Augustine to account for the identification between God and Being, thus 
highlighting also the constant juxtaposition between the perfect nature of God 
and the deficiency of the created world. I tried to make clear how the real focus 
of Augustine’s discourse on the nature of God lies in the principle of its self-
identity. This principle derives from a genuine interpretation of one of the most 
important foci of the Johannine text, that is, the affirmation of the identity of will 
and mission of Father, Son and even Spirit. In Augustine’s account, the self-
sameness of God, which is its perfect nature, marks the difference between its 
eternal incorruptibility and the precarious mutability of everything that does not 
possess True Being. Moving forward to the investigation of the relationship 
between the Father, the Son and the Spirit, Augustine applies the category of 
true Being to all of them.  
 
This section is focused on the identification between knowing and being in God, 
particularly on the reasons why it is so significant for the present research. The 
way in which this metaphysical formula is both applied to and derived from the 
text of the fourth Gospel is remarkably important for Augustine’s Tractates. In 
general, Augustine is interested in reconciling two lines of thought found in the 
fourth Gospel. The first is related to the affirmation of the total unity between the 
Father and the Son, best exemplified by Jn. 10:30: ‘I and the Father are one’.66 
The other is related instead to Jn. 8:28: ‘I do nothing on my own but speak just 
what the Father has taught me’, that is, Jesus’ description of the Father as the 
one who sent him, having authority over him.67 I will demonstrate that Augustine 
finds the solution in interpreting Jn. 5:26 – ‘For as the Father has life in himself, 
so he has granted the Son also to have life in himself’ – and Jn. 5:19 in an anti-
subordinationist way.68 Augustine is mostly concerned with the problem of 
                                                     
66 On this line of thought, of course, the Prologue of the Gospel plays a major role.  
67 See among others, Jn. 4:34; 5:23; 6:38; 7:28; 8:29; 12:44; 14:24.  
68 Jn. 5: 19: ‘Jesus said to them, “Very truly, I tell you, the Son can do nothing on his own, but 
only what he sees the Father doing; for whatever the Father does, the Son does likewise”’. 
Ayres believes the verse of Jn. 5:19 to be the most important verse for Augustine’s speculation 
on the Trinity. See: L. Ayres, Augustine and the Trinity, p. 233-250. Ayres states that Augustine 
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subordinationism in the Gospel of John, so much so that he pays particular 
attention in refusing every kind of subordinationism in the interpretation of the 
Scriptures, as also proven by the first four books of his On the Trinity.69 In 
particular, Augustine’s interpretation of these two verses marks the real 
difference with Origen’s Trinitarian speculation: while Origen understands these 
verses as implying the existence of two irreducible realities (the Father and the 
Son) by subordinating the latter to the former, Augustine explains that the Son’s 
dependence on the Father does not imply a subordination of the former to the 
latter.70 Thus, the use of Jn.5:26 is pivotal in many tractates (TrIoh, XIX.11-13; 
XXII.9-10; XXV.19; XLVII.14; LIV.7; LXX.1; XCIX.4). In all of them, Augustine 
understands the passage as indicating the fact that by the very act of begetting, 
the Father granted the Son to have life in himself. As such, Augustine’s 
understanding of the Trinity as existing in reality as a unity is based on the idea 
that the Son and the Spirit does not participate in the Father, but they are as the 
Father: 
 
Dedit ei ut Filius esset, genuit ut vita esset: hoc est: Dedit ei habere vitam in 
semetipso, ut esset vita non egens vita, ne participando intellegatur habere 
vitam […] Non quasi mutuatur vitam, nec quasi particeps fit vitae, eius vitae 
quae non est quod ipse; sed habet vitam in semetipso, ut ipsa vita sibi sit 
ipse (TrIoh, XIX.11-13).71 
 
Therefore, Augustine grounds the relation of identity in God in that “granting” 
which the Father gives to the Son by begetting him. This begetting is very 
different from the idea of ‘participation’ because, by contrast with the other 
                                                                                                                                                         
held four different interpretation of this verse, while also affirming that ‘at the heart of his 
preaching and teaching is an attempt to draw attention to the logic of the scriptural text’ (p.145).  
69 These books are keen on founding Augustine’s doctrine of the Trinity on the ground of 
scriptural interpretation. In this regard, in the summary of the whole work he does in the fifteenth 
chapter, Augustine states that his main goal was to prove that the Son is not ‘less than He who 
sends, because the latter sends and the former is sent, since the Trinity, which is equal in all 
things, and is also equally unchangeable in its nature, invisible, and present everywhere, works 
inseparably’. See: On the Trinity, XV.3.5. 
70 See ComJn. X.246-247; On First Principles I.2.6; I.2.12. In this regard see: L. Ayres, 
Augustine and the Trinity, p. 233-234. 
71 ‘He has given to him to be Son; he begot him to be life, that is, “He granted him to have life in 
himself” that he might be life, not needing life, that he not be understood to have life by 
participation. […] He does not, as it were, borrow life, nor does it become, as it were, a sharer of 





creatures, by being begotten the Son is in-himself (and not by participation) life, 
just as the Father and eternally coexist in perfect unity with the Father.  
 
Notwithstanding that the Gospel is much more interested in justifying Jesus’ 
salvific role by means of his proximity with the Father rather than in defining the 
ontological relationship between the Father and the Son, Augustine’s exegesis 
strives for harmonising the different sayings of the Gospel in a Nicaean-
compatible way.72 His first step in this direction explains the generation of the 
Son from the Father through the doctrine of the idipsum. Before giving an in-
depth explanation of Augustine’s thought, it is worth underlining that Augustine 
speaks of the identification between the Being of God and His Knowledge, His 
Will and His Power, always in relation to the Trinity.  
 
III.4.1 The Relation of Identity 
 
At the very start of his investigation into the Gospel, we have seen Augustine 
referring to the Son as the idipsum that God is (TrIoh, II.2), thus marking the 
absolute identity between the Word in God and God. By contrast with Origen, 
who locates the unity of the Father and the Son in the possession of the same 
attributes at the same ontological level, Augustine uses the concept of Being to 
establish the identity of the two.73 In order to do so, he needs to investigate in 
which way it is possible to speak of attributes or actions with regard to the True 
Being. The answer is anything but straightforward, for it is logically impossible to 
ascribe – at least in an absolute way – any attribute or action to God where that 
involves a change of status in him. However, Augustine finds himself needing to 
explain why the Bible constantly refers attributes to God. Indeed, human beings 
can rightly call God right, just, light, life and, of course, Being. Augustine 
concludes that, although these attributes can be predicated of God from a 
                                                     
72 Rather than interpreting it as a philosophical work, contemporary scholarship tends to see the 
fourth Gospel as belonging to the genre of “lives” or “biography”. Therefore, the genre of the 
Gospel of John is much closer to historiography. For a strong defence of the historiographical 
characteristics of the Gospel of John see: Richard Bauckham, The Testimony of the Beloved 
Disciple: Narrative, History, and Theology in the Gospel of John, Grand Rapids MI 2007, p. 93-
112. On the Father-Son relationship in John, Ramsey Michaels states: ‘The first contribution of 
John’s Gospel to the Theology of the New Testament […] is the notion of Jesus as God’s 
unique Envoy or messenger, simultaneously claiming for himself both Deity and obedient 
submission to Deity’. See J. Ramsey Michaels, The Gospel of John, Grand Rapids MI 2010, p. 
39.  
73 In this regard see infra, VI.2.  
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human point of view, it would be improper to think them as a different substance 
from the infinite and unchangeable essence of God.74 Hence, in itself, God is 
one essence, that is, his Being itself, and he does not allow any separation 
between the different attributes.  
 
A formula frequently used in the Tractates explains that, in God, to be is the 
same as to be life, to be right, or to be just, or even to know. There cannot be a 
learning process in God, for God is without time. Therefore, commenting on Jn. 
16:13: ‘he (the Spirit) will speak only what he hears, and he will tell you what is 
yet to come’, Augustine has difficulty explaining in what sense it is possible to 
speak of God in the future tense: 
  
Et ideo illi tantum convenerat dicere: Ego sum qui sum. Tamen propter 
mutabilitatem temporum in quibus versatur nostra mortalitas et nostra 
mutabilitas, non mendaciter dicimus, et fuit, et erit et est. […] quia, sicut iam 
diximus, hoc est illi audire quod scire, et scire ili hoc est quod esse (TrIoh, 
XCIX.5).75  
  
The problem of time in God is connected with the Ego sum in such a way that it 
makes possible for Augustine both to explain the text of the Gospel, which 
speaks of God in future and past tenses, and to give a metaphysical answer to 
the problem of God’s knowledge and essence.76 Augustine gives his solution by 
explaining that, just as essence, existence and life are one thing in God (as 
proven by his exegesis of Jn. 5:26), so the learning process through which the 
Spirit ‘speaks what he hears’ is grounded in its identity with the Father and the 
Son: 
  
                                                     
74 In this regard, see the explicit remarks at the end in On the Trinity, XV.5.7: ‘He has not 
obtained the wisdom by which He is wise, but He Himself is wisdom. And this life is the same as 
this strength or this power, and the same as this beauty by which he is called powerful and 
beautiful [...] Or again are goodness and justice also different from each other in the nature of 
God, as they are different in their works, as if they were two different qualities of God, one his 
goodness and the other his justice? Certainly not!’. 
75 ‘Therefore, it was proper for him to say: “I am who I am”. Nevertheless, on account of the 
changeableness of the times in which our mortality and our changeableness are involved, we 
do not falsely say “was” and “will be” and “is”. […] For as we have already said, for him to hear 
is the same as to know and for him to know is the same as to be’. In this regard, see also the 
similar passage of On the Trinity, V.8.9, and The City of God, VIII.6. 
76 On the same issue see also: On the Trinity, XV.7.13.  
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Mutabilis quippe est mens nostra, quae percipit discendo quod nesciebat, et 
amittit dediscendo quod sciebat […] Et ideo non est ista substantia 
verissime simplex, cui non hoc est esse quod nosse: potest enim esse, nec 
nosse. At illa divina non potest, quia id quod habet est. […] Sicut habet 
Pater vitam in semetipso, nec aliud est ipse quam vita quae in ipso est; et 
dedit Filio habere vitam in semetipso, hoc est, genuit Filium qui et ipse vita 
esset (TrIoh, XCIX.4).77 
   
The absence of time in God makes it impossible to speak of past and future, 
therefore Augustine postulates that God must be active in the sense that God’s 
actions are God’s own being. The identity between actions (such as the 
begetting of the Son) and being is the key concept on which Augustine bases 
his metaphysic of the Trinity. Since God is Being, Augustine postulates perfect 
equality between the Being of God and all the actions he is said to perform, 
which is possible only insofar we admit the perfect self-identity of God with 
Being-itself. This consideration is extremely important as it seems to hint at the 
idea that the deepest essence of God, insofar as it is Trinity, is found in the 
relational process of generation (of the Son) and procession (of the Spirit). In 
this sense, God’s own actions are not only his relations to the world, but mainly 
the generation of the Son and the procession of the Spirit, thus leading to the 
definition of the self-sameness of God as the relational process that reconciles 
identity and relationality.78  
  
In the quotations before the one I am analysing, Augustine was commenting on 
a passage in which the Spirit is said to be derived from the Father and the Son. 
In the following examples, Augustine uses the identity of knowing and being in 
God to explain both the derivation of the Son from the Father and the self-
sameness of the two. The oneness of God’s will, power and being is therefore 
always related by Augustine also to the Son and the Spirit. Just as in TrIoh, II 
the Word was identified with the idipsum, in the other Tractates, the Son is 
identified with the fullness of God, which consequently ‘has what he is’ (quod 
                                                     
77 ‘For indeed our mind is mutable, and it acquires by learning what it did not know, and loses by 
forgetting what it knew […] And therefore this substance is not most truly simple because for it 
to be is not the same as to know, for it can be and yet not know. But that divine substance 
cannot do this, because it is what it has. […] “As the Father has life in himself” and he himself is 
not something other than the life that he is in himself, so “he granted to the Son to have life in 
himself”, that is, he begot the Son who also himself was life’.  
78 This problem will be discussed in much more details in infra, III.5.  
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habet hoc est, XLVIII.6-7). This is to say that the Son does not only possess an 
intellectual ability that is always actual in his being, but even that his own 
actions and will are one. Therefore, Augustine states the equality between the 
Son’s substantia and his potentia (substance and power). For him, to be and to 
be able, to will and to do, are one thing (esse, posse, velle, facere), for his 
power is his substance (TrIoh, XX.4-7). Given the Aristotelian language adopted 
by Augustine, it is worth underlining the absence of any unexpressed potentia in 
God. Everything that God is – thus, logically, everything at all – is always and 
eternally present and actual. The same can be said of the Spirit, which is the 
plenitude of Being. Therefore, according to Augustine, it would be quite 
incorrect to say that the Son and the Spirit both possess being just as the 
Father does, for they are Being just as the Father is. The Son and the Spirit are 
each and every possible attribute at the maximum level. Once again, Augustine 
understands this identity to be ‘locked up’ as a ‘precious secret’ in the words of 
the text of Jn. 5:26 according to which the Father granted to the Son not only to 
have life, but to have life in himself: 
 
‘Haec sunt enim illa verba quae parvum intellectum perturbant. Quare 
addidit, in semetipso? […] Et hic secretum in verbo hoc clausum est […] 
Ergo quod dicitur, dedit Filio,tale est ac si diceretur, genuit filium: generando 
enim dedit. […] Quid est, in semetipso vita esset? Non aliunde vita 
indigeret, sed ipse esset plenitudo vitae’ (TrIoh, XXII.9-10).79 
 
Thus, every possible attribute we can speak of God is in God in such a way that 
it is impossible to distinguish them in his own being, for the Being of God is itself 
the wholeness of every possible attribute. This is true both for the Father, who is 
the one who generates, and for the Son and the Spirit who are generated and 
proceed in such a way as to be fully God in themselves. In this regard, it is 
worth remembering the difference between essence and substance in God of 
which I spoke in section III.3. God does not have a substance (substantia) 
insofar as He does not possess underlying qualities that determine his own 
being. On the contrary, his nature is an essence (essentia) insofar as it can only 
                                                     
79 ‘These are words which trouble our meagre understanding. Why did he add “in himself? […] 
And a secret is locked up here in this word […] Therefore, what is said “He has given to the 
Son” is such as if it was said, “He begot the Son”; for he gives by begetting. […] What does it 
mean, he might be “life in himself”? He would not need life from another source, but he would 
be the fullness of life’  
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be described with the most general characterisation of Being, of which all the 
attributes are derivative substances.  
 
Within this framework, Augustine explains the idea of God as simple. The idea 
of simplicity is based precisely on the coincidence between God’s knowledge 
and God’s Being. In this regard, the Gospel of John is the scriptural text which 
informs the main characteristic of the Trinitarian relationship between the Father 
and the Son. On basis of Jn. 5:26: ‘For as the Father has life in himself, so he 
has granted the Son also to have life in himself’, Augustine states that the Son 
is equal to the Father insofar as the Father eternally provides the Son with the 
same Being that he has, by begetting him. The attribute of life is here taken by 
Augustine as exemplifying the very essence of God. Thus, when commenting 
on Jn. 10.18 (‘This commandment I received from my Father’) Augustine 
connects this verse with the verse of Jn. 5:26, expressing the idea that the Son 
does not participate in the attributes of the Father, bur he receives substantially 
from him to be what he is: 
 
Cum autem dicitur Filius a Patre accipere quod substantialiter habet, 
quomodo dictum est: Sicut habet Pater vitam in semetipso, sic dedit Filio 
habere vitam in semetipso, cum Filius ipse sit vita; non potestas minuitur, 
sed generatio eius ostenditur […] Ei quem perfectum genuit, omnia 
gignendo dedit’ (TrIoh, XLVII.14). 80  
 
In another passage, Augustine describes the Son’s descent as the Father’s 
sending of his other self (se alterum misit, TrIoh, XIV.10-13). Both the Father 
and the Son have life and being, each one in himself; nonetheless, they differ in 
their relation to each other, for the Son was begotten by the Father and not vice 
versa. Therefore, the Father is said to be Father only insofar he has a Son, 
while the Son is Son insofar he was begotten by a Father (TrIoh, XIX.12-13). 
Nevertheless, their qualities and attributes are the same. In being born, the Son 
has – one should say, with Augustine, that the Son is – every attribute in 
                                                     
80 ‘But when the Son is said to receive what he has substantially from the Father, as it was said 
“As the Father has life in himself, so he has granted the Son to have life in himself”, since the 
Son in himself is life, his power is not lessened, but his generation is shown […] He gave all 
things to him whom he begot as a perfect being’’. 
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himself. He is not God because he participates in Father, but he is God in 
himself (TrIoh, XIX.13).  
 
III.4.2 Generation, Arianism, Subordinationism 
 
While the fifth chapter of the Gospel of John is to be identified as the Scriptural 
basis on which Augustine bases the relation of identity between the Father and 
the Son, the eighth chapter (in particular Jn. 8:26-32) is the locus for the 
explanation of the mutual relationship between Father and Son. Here, 
Augustine states that the Father spoke to the Son by begetting the Son. In fact, 
the nature of the Truth is simple (simplex), thus for God to be is the same as to 
know (hoc est filio esse quod nosse, TrIoh, XL.5). So, by begetting the Son, that 
is, by giving Being to the Son, the Father gave him knowledge. In the same 
way, the Father sends the Son and is with the Son always (TrIoh, XL.6). 
Therefore, it is not possible to distinguish the Father, the Son and the Spirit 
according to their power or to their being, but only according to the order of 
generation and mutual relation.81 While the Father is God, and the Son is God, 
and the Spirit is God, the Father is Father only in relation to the Son, just as the 
Spirit is Spirit in respect to Father and the Son (TrIoh, XXIX.5). As far as the 
essence of God is concerned, it is not possible to establish difference or 
distinctions between the three Trinitarian hypostases. The only distinction 
between them is to be found in their relation of origin. Thus, as it was made 
clear in previous quotations, Augustine explains in which sense it is possible to 
describe God as simple: the simple essence of God does not allow any 
difference between the three persons. Moreover, the perfect unity of being, will 
and power between the three persons of the Trinity stands as the marker of the 
ontological difference between the true Being and the creation.  
 
In the Tractates, the argumentation delineated so far is mainly used by 
Augustine in opposition to Arianism, which functions as opponent par 
                                                     
81 In this regard, Augustine’s interpretation does not differ much from the doctrine of the 
perichoresis of the Cappadocian fathers. For further details on the doctrine of perichoresis see: 
Daniel F. Stramara, ‘Gregory of Nyssa's Terminology for Trinitarian Perichoresis’, in Vigiliae 
Christianae 52 3 (1998), p. 257-263.  
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excellence of Augustine’s exegesis of the Gospel.82 Interestingly, Augustine’s 
boldest attacks on Arianism are launched in the exegesis of the fifth and the 
eighth chapter of John.  
 
Commenting on the former, Augustine presents two anti-Arian accusations, of 
which one seems to be the opposite of the other: the first is that they have a 
carnal interpretation of the Scriptures, the second is that they are pagans. 
Having a poor understanding of the unity of will and power between the Father 
and the Son (TrIoh, XIX.4-5), Arians tear apart the perfect unity of the Trinity, 
thus interpreting Word of God according to the flesh and gaining a carnal 
understanding of the Son of God – that is, an interpretation which accounts only 
for the created part of Christ. Indeed, they fail to acknowledge that the Trinity is 
absolutely simple (TrIoh, XXIII.7-9). Regarding the accusation of paganism, 
Augustine explains that by separating the Father, the Son and the Spirit, Arians 
essentially believe in three gods (TrIoh, XVIII.2-4).  
 
Commenting on the eighth chapter of the Gospel, Augustine has another 
polemical target besides Arianism: the Sabellians.83 This group was accused of 
regarding the Father and the Son as one person under two names. On the 
contrary, Arians do profess the Son as begotten, but they deny the equality of 
the Son with the Father, saying that the Son is a different thing – that is, a 
different substance – (aliud) from the Father (TrIoh, XXXVII.6-7). The Sabellians 
are accused of destroying two persons of the Trinity (TrIoh, XXXVI.9), by 
believing that the Father and the Son are two names, but one reality (duo 
nomina unam rem, TrIoh, XXIX.7). The Arians are accused of interpreting the 
Son as a different substance (substantia, TrIoh, XXXVII.6-7) and nature (natura, 
                                                     
82 Augustine explicitly refers to Arians among the members of his congregation in TrIoh, XL.7 
and, in a much more hypothetical form, in in TrIoh, XVIII.4. On the Arian crisis see: M. 
Simonetti, La crisi ariana nel IV secolo, and L. Ayres, Nicaea and its Legacy. Scholars are not 
sure of Augustine’s first-hand engagement with Arian doctrines. For example, Hill and other 
scholars think that Augustine’s references to Arians in the book five of On the Trinity should be 
taken as referring to the doctrine of Eunomius. Barnes argues against this conclusion, saying 
that the ‘anti-Nicene doctrines Augustine reports in Book V have their origins in Latin Homoian 
theology, and not in Eunomian theology’ (p. 185). He also adds that what Augustine knew of 
these Homoian doctrines has been probably learned from Ambrose, On Faith. See Saint 
Augustine: The Trinity, ed. Edmund Hill, Brooklyn 1991, p. 49; Michel René Barnes, ‘The Arians 
of Book V, and the Genre of De Trinitate’, in The Journal of Theological Studies 44 1 (1993), p. 
185–195. 
83 This group was not a real target for Augustine, as no Sabellian ideas were circulating among 
his congregation.  
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TrIoh, XXXVI.9) from the Father. Augustine presents his solution as the via 
media between the two heresies: the Father is Father, the Son is the Son; they 
are two persons but not a different essence (alius, non aliud, TrIoh, XXXVII.6-
7). Hence, both the Son and the Father are the very same thing (hoc ipsum, 
TrIoh, XXXVI.9), without any dissimilarity of nature (TrIoh, XXXI.1-4).84 It is 
worth noting that the most significant charges against Arianism are moved by 
Augustine through the mitigation of the text of Jn. 8:28 – ‘I do nothing on my 
own but speak just what the Father has taught me’ – by Jn. 10:30 – ‘The Father 
and I are one’. 
 
Leaving aside the accusation of having a carnal interpretation of the 
Scriptures,85 it is particularly interesting that Augustine accuses Arians of 
tearing the unity of the Trinity apart (TrIoh, XXIII.7-9) and believing in three gods 
(TrIoh, XVIII.2-4) particularly since Augustine has to fight the Arians by means 
of a text which offers many footholds for a subordinationist interpretation of the 
Son towards the Father. Therefore, Augustine addresses primarily the Arian 
belief that the Son is less than the Father – that is, their subordinationism – and 
only secondarily their carnal understanding of the Son as a creature.86 In 
Augustine’s opinion, the Arians failed to understand the inseparability between 
the Father and the Son, because they did not acknowledge the unity of will and 
power in God. Not accepting the idipsum, the Arians think of the Son as 
performing the same works as the Father – according to Jn. 5:19 – but not 
having the same essence of the Father. Using once again the language of ‘life’ 
and of ‘granting’ of Jn. 5:26, Augustine explains that quia et Pater habet vitam, 
et quod habet est: nec accepit tamen, quia non ex aliquo est. Filius autem 
accepit vitam, dante Patre a quo est: et ipse quod habet, est; habet enim vitam, 
                                                     
84 References to the Arians and the Sabellians are found also in TrIoh, LXXI.1-2, commenting 
on Jn. 14.10: ‘I do not speak on my own authority. Rather, it is the Father, living in me, who is 
doing his work’.  
85 This accusation must be taken as a rhetorical tool to dismiss the adversaries’ opinions. In 
TrIoh, XVIII.1 Augustine states that all heresies are born for a misunderstanding of the 
Scriptures, that is, are born of a carnal reading of them. On the contrary, the orthodox 
interpretation is the spiritual one. This accusation is, of course, a commonplace among ancient 
theologians.  
86 The accusation of making the Son of God a creature is obviously present in Augustine’s 
refusal of Arianism, especially in the commentary on the prologue. See TrIoh, I-10-14. 
Nonetheless, it does not seem to be the main ‘error’ on which Augustine insists in his polemical 
account of Arians’ beliefs.  
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et vita est.87 Therefore, Augustine states that performing the same work is not 
an accidental characteristic of the Son, nor something that happens to the Son 
by participation, but it is rather based on its ontological equality with the Father. 
Moreover, by admitting subordinationism between Father, Son and Spirit, 
Arians deny the unity of the Trinity. This account of the errors of the Arians had 
been preached in the first group of tractates (TrIoh, I-LV) and it was reinforced 
some years later when he dictated the last group of tractates (TrIoh, LV-
CXXIV). Here, Augustine directly refers to Nicaea’s pronouncements regarding 
the homoousios: 
 
Adversus impietatem quoque Arianorum haereticorum novum nomen Patris 
Homousion condiderunt: sed non rem novam tali nomine signaverunt; hoc 
enim vocatur Homousion, quod est: Ego et Pater unum sumus, unius 
videlicet eiusdemque substantiae (TrIoh, XCVII.4).88 
  
Besides the obvious meaning of proving the scriptural basis for the “new” 
term,89 Augustine is here implementing his doctrine, according to which the 
unum (one thing, neuter singular) and sumus (we are, plural) can only be 
explained through the perfect equality of substance between the begetter and 
the begotten. It does not suffice then that the Father, the Son and the Spirit 
share the same attributes or perform the same works. Rather, perfect unity 
must entail perfect ontological equality between the three hypostases. 
Differently from Origen, who indicates the unity of the divine Trinity in the 
sharing of the same deity – that is, in the possessing of all the attributes at the 
maximum level – Augustine professes that sharing the same true Being is 
necessary for understanding God as one and simple. Therefore, while in Origen 
the Son is said to participate in the attributes of the Father, Augustine states 
that the Son is the same Being as the Father. This view held by Augustine is 
                                                     
87 ‘The Father has life and is what he has. Yet he has not received it because he is not from 
anyone. The Son, however, has received life and the Father from whom he is gave it; and he 
himself is what he has, for he has life and he is life’ 
88 ‘And also against the ungodliness of the Arian heretics they instituted a new name, the 
Homousion of the Father, but they did not signify a new reality by such a name; for they called 
Homousion this which is, “I and the Father are one thing”, namely of one and the same 
substance’. Regarding the use of the word homoousios in reference to the Father and the Son 
see also Augustine, Epistle 423.  
89 In TrIoh, XCVII.4 Augustine quotes many examples of new words being introduced in 
Christian terminology. Regarding these ‘novelties of words in agreement with the doctrine of 
religion’ Augustine states that ‘the realities themselves existed before their names’. Therefore, 
these words are not contrary to the true essence of Christian beliefs. 
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thus based on the aforementioned generation of the Son from the Father in 
Jn.5:26 as a generation which eternally grants Being itself to the Son, without 
any need for the Son to participate further in the substance of the Father in 
order to be what he is: ipse existendo vita habet vitam, et ipse est quod habet, 
et quod vita est in ipso, ipse est in seipso: nos autem non ipsa vita, sed ipsius 
vitae participes sumus (TrIoh, LXX.1).90This view does not allow any sort of 
subordinationism in Augustine’s interpretation of the homoousios, since ‘of the 
same substance’ means also ‘the same thing’. Similarly, in a fictitious 
conversation with an Arian opponent, Augustine accuses every subordinationist 
doctrine of “smelling of paganism”: 
  
Tenes nobiscum quia in principio erat Verbum. Teneo, inquit. Et 
quia Verbum erat apud Deum? Et hoc, inquit, teneo. Sequere ergo, et hoc 
fortius tene, quia Deus erat Verbum. Et hoc, inquit, teneo: sed ille Deus 
maior, ille Deus minor. Iam nescio quid paganum redolet: cum christiano me 
loqui arbitrabar. Si est Deus maior, et est Deus minor; duos deos colimus, 
non unum Deum. Quare, inquit? et tu non duos deos dicis aequales sibi? 
Hoc ego non dico: aequalitatem enim istam sic intellego, ut ibi intellegam 
etiam individuam caritatem; et si individuam caritatem, perfectam unitatem. 
Si enim caritas quam misit hominibus Deus, de multis hominum cordibus 
facit cor unum […] quanto magis Pater Deus et Filius Deus in fonte 
dilectionis Deus unus est? (TrIoh, XVIII.4).91 
   
This passage shows the problem that Augustine holds to be implicit in any 
subordinationist doctrine. If the Son is not equal to the Father, then the unity of 
God is broken. Augustine cannot accept the possibility of grounding the unity of 
God simply in the Son’s participation in the Father, otherwise the former would 
not be perfect without the other and He would be in need of the Father to 
                                                     
90 ‘By existing he (i.e. the Son), the life, has life and he is what he has, and what life is in him, he 
is in himself; but we are not life itself, but partakers of life itself’. 
91 ‘You hold with us that “in the beginning was the Word”. “I do hold it”, he says. And that “the 
Word was with God”? “I do hold also this”, he says. Continue, therefore, and hold this more 
boldly, that “the Word was God”. “And I hold also this”, he says, but the one God is greater, the 
other God is lesser”. Now I can detect a certain pagan smell; I thought I was talking with a 
Christian. If there is a greater God and there is a lesser God, we worship two gods, not one 
God. “Why?” he says, “do you not say that two gods are equal to one another?”. This I do not 
say; for I understand this equality in such a way that I understand also undivided love there, and 
if undivided love, perfect unity. For if the love which God sent to men makes one heart from 
many hearts of men (Acts 4.32) […] how much more are God the Father and God the Son one 
God in the source of love?’. 
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manage his own being. In this way, Augustine can rightly profess God to be 
simple, for God is the True Being, and every person of the Trinity has true Being 
as his own essence, thus lacking nothing not by participation, but by being born. 
On the other hand, urged by the question of the fictitious Arian, Augustine 
needs to explain why and how God is said to be one. Differently form Origen, 
Augustine cannot accept a definition which applies to the Father alone the unity 
and self-sameness of God. In the third century, Origen could freely speak of the 
Father as the only one to be truly immortal (ComJn, II.123; II.166) invisible, 
bodiless, good (ComJn, I.251-253) and all the other attributes which can be 
worthily predicated of God; whereas the Son and the Spirit, though divine, 
participate of these attributes in different ways. Thus, the unity and simplicity of 
God were properly found in the Father only. Nonetheless, in Origen, God can 
be said to be one insofar the three hypostases share the same attributes at the 
same level. Contrariwise, after three centuries of theological debates, the two 
oecumenical councils of Nicaea (325) and Constantinople (381) and, most of 
all, the Arian crisis, Augustine has a very different mind-set. His solution is 
neither based on the common participation of the three hypostases in the same 
attributes, nor only on the fact that the three persons of the Trinity work together 
– for this is an effect, not a cause of his Trinitarian doctrine.92  
 
In the passages quoted above, Augustine makes clear his critique of any 
Trinitarian speculation which allows a subordination of one hypostasis to 
another. We do not know what Augustine would have said had he known 
Origen’s Trinitarian doctrine. It seems likely, however, that he would have 
accused it of collapsing into Arianism, for in his interpretation every kind of 
subordination is at risk of breaking the unity of substance in the Godhead. 
Lastly, regarding the logical problem of God’s oneness, Augustine identifies in 
the undivided love (individuam caritatem) the source of unity and of oneness 
according to which God is said to be one. This love is instantiated and 
personified by one of the three Trinitarian persons: the Holy Spirit. Therefore, 
the answer to the question of how God can be One-and-Tree lies in the 
ontological relationship between hypostases; more specifically, it is the proper 
work of the Holy Spirit. Thus, the next section will deal with the problem of the 
                                                     
92 This is particularly clear in TrIoh, XX.3, which will be analysed in the following section.  
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procession of the Spirit from the Father and the Son, which is indeed the main 
marker of Augustine’s Trinitarian doctrine.    
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III.5 The Holy Spirit: The Procession, the Filioque and their 
Ontological Implications 
‘He will not speak on his own; he will speak only what he hears’ (Jn. 16:13) 
 
In the previous section, it has been shown how Augustine’s argumentation on 
the unity and self-identity of God has been based on the foundational ground of 
Jn. 5:26, according to which the Father ‘granted the Son also to have life in 
himself’.  
 
This final section of this chapter will focus more specifically on the metaphysical 
function of the Holy Spirit in Augustine’s Trinity. In particular, it aims at showing 
Augustine’s use of the depiction of the Spirit he finds in the Gospel and how 
crucial the doctrine of the Spirit is in understanding Augustine’s Trinity. Here, 
Augustine’s pneumatology will be analysed in its Trinitarian characterisation, 
whilst the crucial role of the Holy Spirit in the relationship between God and the 
world will be the object of chapter V.  
 
As Jn. 5:26 set the ground for Augustine’s speculation on the Son, Jn. 16:12-15 
is the text on which Augustine based his discourse about the Spirit.93 The Holy 
Spirit, who does not ‘speak on his own’ belongs to the Trinity according to a 
different derivation from that of the Son. If the Son is derived from the Father in 
such a way that he is born of the Father, thus being called the Only Begotten 
(unigenitus), the Spirit is said to proceed; therefore, while the Son is said to be 
‘of the Father’, the Spirit is described to be ‘of the Father and of the Son’.  
 
The Spirit is first mentioned in the Tractates during the narration of the wedding 
at Cana. Commenting on Jn. 2:6: ‘There were six water jars there, holding two 
or three measures each’, Augustine interprets the two or three measures as a 
symbol of the divine nature. According to Augustine, the reason why the Gospel 
speaks of two or three measures is that the number two represents the Father 
and the Son, while three is a symbol of the Trinity: 
                                                     
93 Jn. 16:12-15: ‘I have much more to say to you, more than you can now bear. But when he, 
the Spirit of truth, comes, he will guide you into all the truth. He will not speak on his own; he will 
speak only what he hears, and he will tell you what is yet to come. He will glorify me because it 
is from me that he will receive what he will make known to you. All that belongs to the Father is 
mine. That is why I said the Spirit will receive from me what he will make known to you’. 
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Quia nominato Patre et Filio, consequenter et Spiritus sanctus intellegendus 
est. Spiritus enim sanctus non est Patris tantummodo, aut Filii tantummodo 
Spiritus; sed Patris et Filii Spiritus. […] Idem autem Spiritus Patris et Filii. 
Nominato itaque Patre et Filio, intellegitur et Spiritus sanctus; quia Spiritus 
est Patris et Filii. Cum autem nominatur Pater et Filius, tamquam duae 
metretae nominantur. Cum autem ibi intellegitur Spiritus sanctus, tres 
metretae. (TrIoh, IX.7).94 
  
This passage is worth a special mention not only for its theological content, but 
also because it is possibly the first time that Augustine speaks of the Holy Spirit 
as the Spirit of both the Father and of the Son. There is a similar passage found 
in On the Trinity IV.29: Nec possumus dicere quod Spiritus Sanctus et a Filio 
non procedat; neque enim frustra idem Spiritus et Patris et Filii Spiritus dicitur.95 
However it is unclear which of them Augustine wrote first.96 Anyhow, the pivotal 
point is that both passages are shaped according to the exegesis of Johannine 
passages of Jn. 14:26; 15:26 and 20:22. Indeed, Augustine’s interpretation of 
the Spirit is driven by the same Johannine logic that led Augustine to 
understand the whole binitarian relationship between the Father and the Son as 
a unity of the same substance according to the generation of an identical being 
from an identical being.97  
 
Furthermore, in the same Tractate IX, Augustine proclaims the equality between 
love and the Holy Spirit, since ‘fortasse scrutatae Scripturae indicant quod 
                                                     
94 ‘For since the Father and the Son have been named, it follows that the Holy Spirit must also 
be understood. For the Holy Spirit is not the Spirit of the Father only, or of the Son only, but is 
the Spirit of the Father and the Son. […] But the Spirit of the Father and of the Son is the same. 
Thus, since the Father and the Son have been named, the Holy Spirit is understood too, 
because he is the Spirit of the Father and the Son. Indeed, since the Father and the Son are 
named, so two measures are named. But, since the Spirit is understood there, there are three 
measures’.  
95 On the Trinity IV.29: ‘Nor we can say that the Holy Spirit does not proceed from the Son as 
well. Indeed, it is not without point that the same Spirit is called Spirit of the Father and of the 
Son’. 
96 Whether Augustine inserted this section on the Spirit in his Tractates because of his 
Trinitarian reflection in On the Trinity or, whether he developed his doctrine in On the Trinity due 
to his close examination of the Gospel of John is a dilemma which is impossible to tackle here.  
97 In this regard, it is worth noting the perfect compatibility between Augustine’s assertion at the 
beginning of the Tractates (TrIoh, IX.7-8) and what he says commenting on the Jesus’ breathing 
of the Spirit on his disciples (Jn. 20:22) in TrIoh, CXXI.4. 
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Spiritus sanctus caritas est’.98 While the definition of the Spirit as love is not new 
to Augustine’s theology, the passage is of great importance due to the 
description of the Spirit not only as the bond of love between God and 
humanity, but between Father and Son as well. In other words, the Spirit is here 
depicted as the ontological bond of love between Father and Son, the eternal 
gift of both in the immanent Trinity: Quisquis itaque nominat Patrem et Filium, 
oportet ibi intellegat tamquam caritatem invicem Patris et Filii, quod est Spiritus 
sanctus.99 Even before reaching the point of commenting on the three chapters 
of John specifically dedicated to the Holy Spirit (Jn. 14-16, TrIoh, LXXIV-CV), 
Augustine does mention and discuss the role of the third hypostasis in the 
Trinity many times in relation to the Father and the Son. The Spirit is the means 
by which Augustine explains the unity of the Father and the Son. Because the 
Spirit is love, he is depicted and subsists as the bond of unity between Father 
and Son: 
 
Deus misit Deum. Iunge ambos, unus Deus, Deus verax missus a Deo. De 
singulis interroga, Deus: et de ambobus interroga, Deus. Non singuli Deus 
et ambo dii, sed singulus quisque Deus et ambo Deus. Tanta enim ibi est 
caritas Spiritus sancti, tanta pax unitatis, ut de singulis cum interrogatur, 
Deus tibi respondeatur; de Trinitate cum interrogatur, Deus tibi 
respondeatur (TrIoh, XIV.9).100 
    
With this quotation, Augustine aims at resolving the problem we have set in the 
previous section regarding God’s unity and oneness. The most significant 
passage in this regard comes – not surprisingly! – from Augustine’s comment 
on the fifth and the eighth chapter of the Gospel (TrIoh, XVIII.2-4), where he 
identifies undivided love (individua caritas) – namely, the Holy Spirit – as the 
cause of unity between the Father and the Son. Alongside the two Johannine 
chapters, Augustine often quotes or mentions Acts 4:31-33, where the Spirit is 
depicted as the bond of love which caused the perfect unity of the first Christian 
                                                     
98 TrIoh, IX.8: ‘Perhaps a thorough investigation of the Scriptures does show that the Holy Spirit 
is love’.  
99 TrIoh, IX.8: ‘Therefore, whoever names the Father and the Son ought to understand therein 
their mutual love, as it were, of the Father and the Son, which is the Holy Spirit’. 
100 ‘God sent God. Unite both, you have one God, the truthful God sent by God. Ask about each 
one, there is God; ask about both, there is God. They are not God as individuals and gods 
together, but each single one is God and both together are God. For so great is the love of the 
Holy Spirit there, so great the peace of unity that, when it is asked about each one, let your 
answer be: God; when it is asked about the Trinity, let your answer be: God’. 
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community (TrIoh, XXXIX.5). The episode from Acts is taken as an example of 
the kind of unity the Spirit creates. Since the nature of the immutable and 
inseparable Trinity is to be what it has, the unifying power of the Spirit in the first 
community is used as a symbol of the perfect bond of unity between the Father 
and the Son in the Trinity. The same reasoning is present in On the Trinity, 
where Augustine states the equivalence between the paradigm of Spirit/love 
and that of Spirit/communion. The very nature of the Spirit is that of being love 
because that love is the instantiation of the ontological communion between the 
three hypostases.101 Interestingly, when this section of the Tractates on John – 
that is, the comment on the fifth chapter of the Gospel – was firstly preached, 
TrIoh, XX-XXII were missing, therefore they are most likely a later addition.102 
This is particularly interesting for, evidently, Augustine felt the need to repeat 
and deepen what he had already stated about the inseparability of the works of 
the Trinity:  
  
Quomodo Pater et Filius inseparabiles sunt? Quia ipse dixit: Ego et Pater 
unum sumus. Quia Pater et Filius non sunt duo dii, sed unus Deus, Verbum 
et cuius est Verbum, unus et Unicus, Deus unus Pater et Filius caritate 
complexi, unusque caritatis Spiritus eorum est, ut fiat Trinitas Pater et Filius 
et Spiritus sanctus. Non ergo tantum Patris et Filii, sed et Spiritus sancti, 
sicut aequalitas et inseparabilitas personarum, ita etiam opera inseparabilia 
sunt. […] sed quod fecit Pater, hoc et Filius fecit, hoc et Spiritus sanctus 
fecit (TrIoh, XX.3).103 
 
The equality and inseparability of the persons stand not only on the unity of 
God’s substance, but also on their relational qualities, as this unity is 
understood with regard to both the essence of the Trinity and its works. The 
unity of the divine actions is a recurrent theme in the Tractates, where the 
principle according to which the works of the Trinity are inseparable is very 
                                                     
101 See: On the Trinity XV.19.37: ‘And if the love whereby the Father loves the Son, and the Son 
the Father, reveals in an ineffable manner the union between both, what more fitting than that 
he, who is the Spirit, common to both, should be properly called love?’. See also: On the Trinity 
XV.18.32. 
102 In this regard, see the chronology of TrIoh in supra, I.2.2. 
103 ‘How is it possible that the Father and the Son are inseparable? Because he himself said: “I 
and the Father are one” (Jn. 10:30). For since the Father and the Son are not two gods, but one 
God, the Word and him who is of Word is one and only one, then we have one God, Father and 
Son joined in Love, and the one of their love is the Spirit, so that there is the Trinity, Father, Son 
and Holy Spirit. Therefore, as there is an equality and inseparability of the persons, not only of 
the Father and the Son, but also of the Holy Spirit, so also the works are inseparable’. 
132 
 
often stressed (TrIoh, LXXIV.3-5; LXXVIII.1-3; XCI.4). Therefore, in relation to 
the Father, the Son is depicted as ‘immutable, coeternal, immortal, without time, 
equally creator and disposer of time’ (TrIoh, XXIX.8). Equally, the Trinity itself is 
depicted as ‘one substance, one divinity, one coeternity, perfect equality, no 
dissimilarity at all’ (una substantia, una divinitas, una coeternitas, perfecta 
aequalitas, dissimilitudo nulla, TrIoh, XXXVI.9). Therefore, the Trinity as a whole 
is one eternity, one power, one majesty (una aeternitas, una potestas, una 
maiestas, TrIoh, XXXIX.1-4). While the Father is God and the Son is God and 
the Spirit is God, the Father is Father only in relation to the Son and the Spirit is 
Spirit in respect to Father and the Son (TrIoh, XXIX.5). The relational nature of 
the three hypostases does not change their essence, for they are always the 
same thing, but does impact their denominations as Father, Son, and Spirit. It 
then follows that, ontologically, the Trinity exists only as a unity. If the Father or 
the Son or the Spirit have existence as separate entities, the unity between the 
three would be ontologically broken. Contrariwise, inasmuch as each one of 
them is the fullness of Being, they can exist only as one Being. Therefore, 
Augustine admits the possibility of speaking of Father, Son and Spirit as 
separate entities, maintaining nonetheless that they exist in reality only in unity.  
 
As I mentioned previously, the unity of essence and works in the Trinity is 
particularly stressed in the comment on the “pneumatological section” of the 
Gospel of John (Jn. 14-16), since it has a special relevance to the Holy Spirit. 
Commenting on Jn. 14:26: ‘the Holy Spirit, whom the Father will send in my 
name, he will teach you all things’, Augustine stresses the commonality of 
teaching, learning and reminding among the three persons:  
   
Omnis igitur et dicit et docet Trinitas: sed nisi etiam singillatim 
commendaretur, eam nullo modo humana capere utique posset infirmitas. 
Cum ergo omnino sit inseparabilis, nunquam Trinitas esse sciretur, si 
semper inseparabiliter diceretur: nam et cum dicimus Patrem et Filium et 
Spiritum sanctum, non eos utique dicimus simul, cum ipsi non possint esse 
non simul (TrIoh, LXXVII.2).104 
                                                     
104 ‘Therefore, all the Trinity speaks and teaches; but unless it were also made known one by 
one, in no way could human weakness grasp it at all. Although, therefore, it is altogether without 
separation, the Trinity would never be known to exist if it were always spoken of as to its non-
separation. For indeed, when we speak of the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, we do not 
speak of them together in unity, although they cannot exist except together in unity’. 
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According to the economy of the divine revelation, it was necessary for the 
individual persons of the Trinity to be known as distinguished one from the 
other, but they must be understood ontologically without any separation. The 
Trinity was made known in separate persons only so that the human weak 
minds could grasp it (TrIoh, LXXVII.2 and XCV.1). Therefore, where any person 
is present, we have to understand the one Trinity, one God (TrIoh, XCIV.5).105  
 
Nonetheless, Augustine’s insistence on the fact that the Trinity is one in reality 
and that every work ascribed to one person can rightfully be said to be done by 
the whole Trinity has exposed him to accusations of having a quasi-modalist 
account of the Trinity. In this sense von Harnack declared that ‘Augustine only 
gets beyond modalism by the mere assertion that he does not wish to be a 
modalist’.106 Moreover, in the course of the twentieth century, many critics of 
Augustine accused him of stressing too much the unity of the Trinity at the 
expense of its relationality.107 The account of God as the eternal idipsum, its 
identification with Being and the affirmation of the absolute equality of the three 
hypostases supposedly respond more to a neo-platonic logic than to a biblical 
one. In response to this observation, I would argue that the analysis proposed 
so far has sufficiently shown the extent to which Augustine’s account on the 
Trinity is highly dependent on the text of the fourth Gospel. In this sense, the 
fact that Augustine’s Trinitarian investigation is concerned about excluding any 
possible subordinationist interpretation of the Gospel of John – through his 
                                                     
105 Interestingly, the same argument is brought forth in Gregory of Nyssa, On “Not Three Gods.” 
To Ablabius. For a thorough analysis of Gregory’s work see: Giulio Maspero, Trinity and Man: 
Gregory of Nyssa’s Ad Ablabium, Leiden 2007. Maspero agrees with Jaeger in defining 
Gregory’s pneumatology as one of the most complete form of ‘Christian humanism’. See: 
Werner Jaeger, Gregor von Nyssa’s Lehre vom Heiligen Geist, Leiden 1966, p. 1-4. In this 
regard, he states that ‘the Cappadocian Fathers reached the summit of Trinitarian reflection, 
with the distinction, on the level of the purest immanence, between essence and hypostasis’ (p. 
151). This would be particularly true for Gregory of Nyssa, ‘who developed all of his theology 
and pneumatology based upon the connection between immanence and economy’ (p. 151). 
Unfortunately, it is not possible to propose here a thorough comparison of the two authors. It is 
nevertheless very interesting to note – as Maspero does at p. 183 – the close similarity between 
Augustine’s idea of the Spirit as nexus amoris expressed in On the Trinity XV.17 and Gregory’s 
understanding of the Spirit as συνδετικόν who unites the Father and the Son. 
106 A. von Harnack, History of Dogma IV, p. 131. 
107 In this regard, see supra, III.1. 
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doctrine of the idipsum – seems to respond more to a genuinely pro-Nicene 
concern.108  
 
At this point of my investigation, there is one last problem worthy of further 
exploration. Those who are interested in Augustine’s legacy in the subsequent 
history of Christianity should keep in mind what the goal of his Trinitarian 
doctrine is: it aims primarily at proposing a coherent account of the Trinity that 
does not rely only on the sharing of a common “essence” or “deity” among the 
three persons – which is the Origenian solution – but it also tries to preserve the 
perfect unity and equality of the hypostases.109 Thus, the last part of this 
chapter aims at disclosing Augustine’s solution to what can be properly 
predicated of the Trinity as a whole and what can be said of every single 
hypostasis.  
 
The distinction between the existence of the Trinity in reality only as a unity and 
the attribution of the entirety of God’s substance to every single person of the 
Trinity is pivotal in understanding the relationship between relationality and 
identity in Augustine’s Trinity, and has been the battleground of different ideas 
among scholars. According to Lewis Ayres, Augustine proposes a paradigm 
according to which ‘each person is the essence of the other’, thus reconciling 
relationality and identity in his Trinitarian thought.110 Therefore, Ayres states that 
the Spirit in Augustine’s Trinity is the very essence of the Father and of the 
Son.111 This perspective is highly criticised by O’Leary, who points out that book 
7 of Augustine’s On the Trinity opposes this idea as it would imply that Father 
and Son are not holy without the Holy Spirit.112 My analysis will tackle this 
problem demonstrating that, at least in his Tractates on John, Augustine’s 
distinction between the existence of the Trinity in reality only as one and that of 
the hypostases separately is indicated by Augustine as the answer to this 
problem. While through the use of the concept of idipsum every hypostasis is 
                                                     
108 See both Barnes and Ayres: M. R. Barnes, ‘Rereading Augustine on the Trinity’, and L. 
Ayres, Augustine and the Trinity. See also L. Ayres, Nicaea and Its Legacy. 
109 In this regard, I completely agree with Lewis Ayres, ‘Sempiterne Spiritus Donum: Augustine's 
Pneumatology and the Metaphysics of Spirit’, in G. E. Demacopoulos and A. Papanikolaou 
(eds), Orthodox Readings of Augustine, p.127-152. 
110 L. Ayres, Augustine and the Trinity, p. 259. 
111 Ayres bases this idea on Augustine’s wavering suggestions in On Faith and the Creed and 
on Epistle 11; See: L. Ayres, Augustine and the Trinity, p. 88; 91; 61.  
112 Joseph Stephen O’Leary, ‘Review of Augustine and the Trinity. By Lewis Ayres’, in The 
Journal of Theological Studies 62 2 (2011), p. 755–759.  
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fully taken to be God, the very unity of the Trinity is grounded on the fact that it 
is the eternal process of generation and communion, of which the Holy Spirit is 
the most perfect expression. The true essence of the Trinity is therefore 
relational, as its very existence is the mutual process of relation between the 
three persons, each one of which exists in reality, but never exists as separated 
one from the other two.  
  
As previously stated, Augustine holds that it is impossible to distinguish the 
Father, the Son or the Spirit by their substance, since they only differ in their 
generation and relation. This is the principle that makes it possible to state that 
while both the Father and the Son are God, the Father is Father only in relation 
to the Son and vice versa (TrIoh, XXIX.5). Equally, the Spirit is said to be Spirit 
only in relation to the Father and the Son. However, there is an essential 
difference between these two cases: while Father and Son are relational terms, 
Spirit is not. Such a peculiarity is not overlooked by Augustine, who states that 
when the Gospel attributes something as a proper signification (proprie) of the 
Spirit, it also underlines that the work of one person is the work of the entire 
Trinity. What is then the proper signification of the Spirit? And, most of all, what 
is there that can be preached proprie of the Spirit?  
  
Augustine attempts to give his answer by commenting on Jn. 16:13-14: ‘He (the 
Spirit) will not speak on his own; he will speak only what he hears, and he will 
tell you what is yet to come. He will glorify me (Christ) because it is from me that 
he will receive what he will make known to you’. Here, the problem Augustine 
has to tackle is why the Spirit is said not to speak of himself. When similar 
passages are preached about the Son, Augustine usually explains them by 
referring to the human part of Christ, which is obedient to the divine nature of 
the Word.113 The unity of the person (unitate personae) of Christ makes 
possible the coexistence of human and divine substance (TrIoh, XXVII.1-4).114 A 
similar solution is, however, inapplicable to the Holy Spirit, for there is no human 
                                                     
113 This is how Augustine interprets the verse of Jn. 7:18: ‘Whoever speaks on their own does 
so to gain personal glory, but he who seeks the glory of the one who sent him, he is from the 
truth’. Augustine maintains that there are two ways of understanding this statement. The first is 
in relation to the human nature of Christ, since the man Christ gives glory to God by unifying his 
will with that of the Word. The second is in relation to the Word itself, which eternally has glory 
with the Father. See: TrIoh XXIX.8 and XXXIX.6-7.  
114 On the unity of the person in Christ see: TrIoh, XIX.14-15; XXV.1-7; XLVII.10-13; XLVII.7; 
LXIII.3; LXIX.1-4; LXX.1; LXXIV.3-5; LXXXII.3-4; LXXVIII.1-3; XCIX.1-3; CV.4-5.  
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nature to take into account (TrIoh, XCIX.1-3). Thus, the sentence is taken as a 
reference to the ontological origin of the Spirit, which proceeds from the Father, 
according to Jn. 15:26.115 It is in this context that Augustine discusses his 
hypothesis according to which the Spirit proceeds also from the Son. The first 
evidence of this possibility is found in Jn. 4:24, where the proprium of the Spirit 
is identified in the fact that his name does not indicate a one-way relationship to 
another person (like Father and Son), but rather a commonality of nature 
between the three persons: 
 
Nec ob aliud existimo ipsum vocari proprie Spiritum: cum etiamsi de singulis 
interrogemur, non possimus nisi et Patrem et Filium spiritum dicere; 
quoniam spiritus est Deus, id est, non corpus est Deus, sed spiritus. Quod 
ergo communiter vocantur et singuli, hoc proprie vocari oportuit eum qui 
non est unus eorum, sed in quo communitas apparet amborum. Cur ergo 
non credamus quod etiam de Filio procedat Spiritus sanctus, cum Filii 
quoque ipse sit Spiritus? Si enim non ab eo procederet, non post 
resurrectionem se repraesentans discipulis suis insufflasset dicens: Accipite 
Spiritum sanctum (TrIoh, XCIX.7).116 
  
Connecting Jn. 4:24 and Jn. 20:22, Augustine points to the fact that the proper 
name of the third person is the common name between Father and Son; 
therefore, ontologically, the name refers to the commonality of the same 
essence of the Father and Son. The very essence of God makes it impossible 
to consider the Holy Spirit – that is, the bond of love between the Father and the 
Son – merely as a contingent attribute of the first two hypostases. Admitting an 
extrinsic bond between Father and Son would negate the simplicity of their own 
essence, leaving their nature hostage to an attribute – that is, the Spirit – which 
instantiates a property that is not their own essence. Nor it is possible for 
Augustine to postulate the idea that the Spirit is a universal of which Father and 
                                                     
115 ‘When the Advocate comes, whom I will send to you from the Father – the Spirit of truth who 
goes out from the Father – he will testify about me’. 
116 ‘And for no other reason I think that he is properly called “Spirit”, since, even if we are asked 
about them individually, we can only say that Father and Son are spirit. For “God is Spirit (Jn. 
4:24), that is, God is not body, but spirit. What, therefore, they are called in common or even as 
individuals, this he ought to be called, I mean the one who is not one of them, but in whom the 
community of nature of both is evident. Why, therefore, should we not believe that the Holy 
Spirit also proceeds from the Son since he is also the Spirit of the Son? For if he did not 
proceed from him (the Son), after the resurrection, showing himself anew to his disciples, he 
would not have breathed upon them, saying: “Receive the Holy Spirit” (Jn. 20:22)’.  
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Son are particulars.117 The only way to get away from this problem would be to 
postulate the existence of two spirits: that of the Father and that of the Son. 
Since this would turn the Trinity into a quaternity, Augustine formulates the 
doctrine of the procession of one Spirit from both Father and Son. Augustine 
identifies in Jesus’ breathing of the Spirit on the disciples in Jn. 20:22 the 
scriptural place where the procession of the same Spirit from the Father and the 
Son is clearly indicated: Insufflando significavit Spiritum sanctum non Patris 
solius esse Spiritum, sed et suum (TrIoh, CXXI.4). Moreover, the double 
procession of the Spirit both from the Father and the Son gives Augustine the 
metaphysical means of explaining to what extent the procession of the Spirit is 
different from the generation of the Son. Just as Origen, Augustine has to 
defend the idea that the Son is the Only-Begotten, that is, the only entity to be 
born of the Father, according to Jn, 1:18 and 3:16-18. While Origen resolves 
this conundrum by stating the procession of the Spirit from the Father through 
the Son, Augustine places the solution in the fact that the Son was begotten as 
the one who has ‘life in himself’. As such the Son has in himself not only the 
attributes, but also the very generative nature of the Father. Therefore, 
according to the same act of generation which provided the Son with ‘life in 
himself’, the Father granted that the Holy Spirit might proceed from the Son as 
well:  
  
A quo autem habet Filius ut sit Deus (est enim de Deo Deus), ab illo habet 
utique ut etiam de illo procedat Spiritus sanctus: ac per hoc Spiritus sanctus 
ut etiam de Filio procedat, sicut procedit de Patre, ab ipso habet Patre. Hic 
utcumque etiam illud intellegitur, quantum a talibus quales nos sumus, 
intellegi potest, cur non dicatur natus esse, sed potius procedere Spiritus 
sanctus. [....] Filius quippe nullus est duorum, nisi patris et matris. [..] 
Spiritus autem sanctus non de Patre procedit in Filium, et de Filio procedit 
ad sanctificandam creaturam; sed simul de utroque procedit: quamvis hoc 
Filio Pater dederit, ut quemadmodum de se, ita de illo quoque procedat. 
Neque enim possumus dicere quod non sit vita Spiritus sanctus cum vita 
Pater, vita sit Filius. Ac per hoc sicut Pater cum habeat vitam in semetipso, 
                                                     
117 The same reasoning is shown by Augustine in On the Trinity, VII.1.2; VII.2.3.  
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dedit et Filio habere vitam in semetipso; sic ei dedit vitam procedere de illo, 
sicut procedit et de ipso (TrIoh, XCIX.8-9).118 
 
This passage could be rightly considered a summa of Augustine’s exposition on 
the Trinity in his Tractates on John; even more, it could be considered the 
formulation of Augustine’s mature Trinitarian theology. Augustine refers here to 
the common understanding of human generation in late antiquity, according to 
which the seed of the father goes inside the mother who then generates the 
offspring.119 Therefore, differently from every human generation, in which the 
seed of life proceeds from the father into the mother and then from the mother 
into existence, the mystery of the procession of the Spirit consists in the 
instantiation of the commonality between Father and Son – that is, their love – 
into a third entity with a proper existence. This solution not only allows 
Augustine to preserve the title of Only-Begotten for the Son alone, but it allows 
him to give a logical account of the reason why the Trinity is also a unity. 
Besides the commonality of nature that makes them the same thing, the three 
hypostases know, one in each other, their relational nature. While the Father 
knows the Son by begetting him, at the same time, he knows in the Son what it 
is to be begotten. The Son knows the Father by being begotten and knows from 
                                                     
118 ‘But of him of whom the Son has it that he is God (for he is God from God), he has it, of 
course, that the Holy Spirit also proceeds from him. And because of this the Holy Spirit has it 
from the Father himself that he proceeds also from the Son, just as he proceeds from the 
Father. Here, to some extent, it is understood, as far as it possible to understand for someone 
such as we are, why the Holy Spirit is not said to have been born, but rather to proceed. […] For 
indeed no one is the Son of two except of a father and a mother. […] But the Holy Spirit does 
not proceed from the Father into the Son, and from the Son proceed to sanctify the creature; but 
he proceeds from both at the same time, although the Father has given this to the Son, that the 
Holy Spirit proceeds as from himself, so also from him. And we cannot say that the Holy Spirit is 
not “life”, when the Father is “life” and the Son is “life”. And for this reason, just as the Father, 
although he has life in himself, has also given to the Son to have life in himself, so he has given 
to him that life proceed from him as it also proceeds from himself’.  
119 Most of ancient physicians, believed that both the father and the mother produced a different 
seed – where the female is usually considered the defective one – which then combines in the 
mother’s womb. Galen says that the combination of seeds results in the sex and physical 
characteristics of the offspring. See: Galen, On the Usefulness of the Parts of the Body, 14.6. 
Aristotle, on the contrary, worried of the possibility that a female could generate on her own if 
producing any kind of seed, admits as intellectually more satisfying the idea that the female 
does not produce any seed. Therefore, human generation depends only from male seed while 
the female works as receptacle. See: Aristotle, On the Generation of Animals, I.18.Augustine 
seems to refer to this second possibilities in his passage, as he refuses the hypothesis that the 
Father could generate through the Son as if the Son was the receptacle – that is, the mother – 
of the Spirit. On ancient theories of generation see: Helen King, ‘Making a Man: Becoming 
Human in Early Greek Medicine’, in Gordon Reginald Dunstan (ed), The Human Embryo 
Aristotle and the Arabic and European Traditions, Exeter 1990 p. 10-19; Ann Ellis Hanson, 
‘Conception, Gestation, and the Origin of Female Nature in the Corpus Hippocraticum, in Helios 
19 (1992), p. 31-71. 
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the Father what begetting means. The Spirit knows both Father and Son by 
proceeding from both, thus being their bond of love, the production of the 
mutual self-sameness of Father and Son. In them, he knows what begetting and 
being begotten are.120 Therefore, the difference between Origen’s and 
Augustine’s solution of the problem of the procession of the Spirit lies in the 
metaphysical premises of the concept of idipsum. While Origen postulates the 
Spirit as an entity that has its attribute by participation in the Son and is brought 
into being through the Logos, Augustine rejects this position, for the Father and 
Son possess the same attributes and they are one, because of the idipsum, and 
they are united in the eternal process of self-penetration instantiated in the 
Spirit.  
 
Hence, on the basis of the passages in the Gospel of John where the Spirit is 
said to be administered by the Son, Augustine conceives the doctrine of the 
double procession. While this procession is somehow described as mysterious 
by Augustine – as we have already noted at the beginning of this chapter – it is 
nonetheless the cornerstone for understanding not only the ‘immanent Trinity’, 
but also the way in which God relates to human beings. Far from being an 
intellectual divertissement, Augustine believes that enquiring about the Trinity 
leads the faithful to reach and touch the mystery of the infinite love and eternal 
communion that is God.121 Anyway, to put it with Augustine’s words at the very 
end of the last Tractate on the Gospel, capacitate legentium comprehendi 
fortasse non possent.122 As much as we can comprehend the procession of the 
Spirit, we will never comprehend what this Spirit is. Unless, perhaps, that this 
very Spirit would come to us to ‘speak of what he hears’ (Jn. 16:13).   
                                                     
120 On this interpretation of Augustine’s Trinity see the brilliant analysis carried out in L. Ayres, 
‘Sempiterne Spiritus Donum: Augustine's Pneumatology and the Metaphysics of Spirit’. 
121 In this regard, see: Joseph Ratzinger, ‘The Holy Spirit as Communio: Concerning the 
Relationship of Pneumatology and Spirituality in Augustine’, in Communio 25 (1998), p. 324-
337.  





   
  
This chapter has shown to what extent Augustine’s doctrine of the Trinity, 
particularly the double procession, is shaped according to his exegesis of the 
fourth Gospel. By investigating Augustine’s exegesis of the most important 
passages of the Gospel, it has been shown how Augustine not only uses the 
Gospel to support his own Trinitarian doctrine, but he is actually led by the 
Gospel’s logic in systematising his findings.  
 
First, this chapter has enquired about Augustine’s understanding of the essence 
of God as the eternal self-sameness, the absolute essence which does not 
admit any changing in his own essence. It has been highlighted how the 
identification of God as one Being, one idipsum and one principium became the 
hermeneutical principle that led Augustine’s reading of the whole Gospel, thus 
transforming the letter into spirit.  
 
Secondly, it has been made explicit (supra, section III.4) how the entire doctrine 
of the Trinity is built upon the Johannine denomination of the Son as the one 
who has ‘life in himself’ (Jn. 5:26). As such, the Son enjoys the same eternal 
self-sameness of the Father who generated him. Out of this binitarian 
relationship, the Holy Spirit proceeds not only as the product of the same 
eternal will that the Father communicates to the Son through his generation, but 
also as eternal love and eternal gift. As such, the Holy Spirit does not only 
possess the holiness of his Parents, but he is the everlasting generative 
communion between the three persons of the Trinity. While the Father is 
identified as the undefiled source of the Trinitarian communion, he gives to the 
Son as a gift to generate the Spirit. This generative act is, as it were, intrinsic to 
the Being of the Godhead. Therefore, the constant link made by Augustine 
between the role of the Spirit in Christian community and the role of the Spirit in 
the Trinity is not extrinsic to the divine communion. While the Trinity is said to 
operate together as one active actor, the sanctification of the creatures is said 
to be the proprium of the Spirit. Just as the perfect Trinitarian communion ought 
to be found in the Spirit, it is through the Spirit that God manifests himself as the 
eternal giver of grace and redemption. Paraphrasing the text of the Gospel, ‘that 
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is why I said the Spirit will receive from me what he will make known to you’: 
that you may know that God is communion and communion is love, and love is 
Spirit.  
 
Nevertheless, it remains impossible for the human mind to understand utterly 
what this love is. The Spirit, which knows everything of God due to his nature of 
eternal communion of God and in God is therefore the only means through 
which and in which human beings can have a glimpse of God’s reality. The 






























The World and the Spirit in the Gospel of John 
 
 
From its very beginning, the fourth Gospel presents the incarnation of Jesus 
Christ as the divine act that radically changes the relationship between God and 
his creation. The Logos which eternally is in and with God appears on the earth 
as the ‘light of all humankind’ (Jn. 1:3) coming down from heaven to bring 
salvation to the world. Nevertheless, from the Prologue onward, the Gospel 
dualism is revealed in the radical rejection of God’s salvific message by the world. 
Therefore, ‘the world did not recognize him. He came to that which was his own, 
but his own did not receive him’ (Jn. 1:10-11). The world’s refusal to accept the 
salvific message of God stands as the cause which leads to the radical separation 
– found in the whole Gospel – between “the chosen”, that is, between the small 
and marginalised portion of the those who accepted the coming of God, and the 
rest of the world that, because of its nature, hates Jesus and his disciples: ‘Yet to 
all who did receive him, to those who believed in his name, he gave the right to 
become children of God – children born not of natural descent, nor of human 
decision or a husband’s will, but born of God’ (Jn. 1:12-13). The radical dualism 
between God and the world, that is, the dualistic framework ruling the fourth 
Gospel, has been recognised by scholars throughout the last century.1 Therefore, 
scholars from all kind of backgrounds, like Ramsey Michaels, Reinhartz and 
Gundry have agreed on that.2 However, differently from other forms of cosmic 
dualism of the antique world – such as Manichaeism and at least some forms of 
Gnosticism – the same world which is depicted as corruption and darkness is 
nevertheless the object of God’s love, so much so that he sent his only begotten 
Son to redeem it. For this reason, ‘God did not send his Son into the world to 
condemn the world, but to save the world through him’ (Jn. 3:17). To put it with 
the words of Pétrement, ‘the author of the Johannine writings teaches both faith 
in a world created by God, which might be said to be monist, and faith in two 
                                                 
1 For an introduction on the differences between the various scholarly trends on the interpretation 
of the fourth Gospel in the last century see: Mark Edwards, John Through the Centuries, Oxford 
2004, p. 1-14.  
2 See: J. Ramsey Michaels, The Gospel of John; Adele Reinhartz, Befriending the Beloved 
Disciple: A Jewish Reading of the Gospel of John, New York 2002; Robert H. Gundry, Jesus the 
Word according to John the Sectarian, Grand Rapids MI 2002. In this regard, see infra, VI.3.1, 




fundamentally divided natures, one of which is God, the other the world, which 
might be called dualist’.3  
 
The very concept of the world appears therefore in all its ambiguity. On the one 
hand, it can mean the totality of God’s creation, produced and brought forth by 
the goodness of God through the Logos (Jn.1:3-4); despite its corruption, the 
world is still the object of God’s salvific love, the place where the Son came to 
save his creatures (Jn. 1:29; 4:42; 6:51; 8:12; 12:46-47). Even the disciples are 
said to be sent to the world in order to show to the world the light which comes 
from the Father (Jn. 17:18). On the other hand, the world is both the opposite and 
the opponent of Jesus’ message. Rejecting the salvation which came from God 
(Jn. 1:10-11), the world is depicted as the place of darkness, ruled by the devil, 
who is prince of the world, and by demonic powers, incapable of any conversion 
and alienated from God (Jn. 1:10; 12:31; 14:17-30; 16:11; 17:9-25). Thus, since 
the beginning of the Gospel, the theoretical possibility of the world’s being good 
is stripped out in a favour of a completely negative view of the world, seen as the 
perverse opponent of Jesus and his community (Jn. 7:7; 15:18; 16:20; 17:14).4 
Such a dire place is the battleground of Jesus and his disciples who, after the 
enlightenment, are no longer part of the world. Indeed, not only Christ, but even 
his disciples are no longer said to be “from” the world, but “in” the world (Jn. 8:23; 
13:1; 16:28; 17:16; 18:36). This radical distinction between a small portion of 
chosen and the world, which is present since the beginning of the Gospel in the 
opposition between ‘the world’ and ‘his own’, finds its completion in Jesus’ denial 
to pray for the world in Jn. 17:9: ‘I am not praying for the world, but only for those 
you have given me, for they are yours’. Finally, for the power of God, the word is 
conquered and defeated by the cross of Christ (Jn. 16:33).  
 
The opposition between God and the world reaches its apex in Jesus’ farewell 
discourse in chapters 14-17 of the Gospel. There, the figure of the world is put in 
direct opposition to the Paraclete, the Holy Spirit.5 The Spirit is both the marker 
                                                 
3 S. Pétrement, A Separate God, p. 175. 
4 On the concept of the world in the Gospel of John see: Craig S. Keener, The Gospel of John: A 
Commentary, Peabody MA 2003, p. 329-330. References to the Gospel quoted so far are not 
meant to be exhaustive. Much more loci could be quoted.  
5 On the possible reasons for the absence of any reference to the Spirit in chapters 8-13 of the 
Gospel of John see the interesting remarks by T. G. Brown, Spirit in the Writings of John, p. 166-




of the love of God for the community and of the self-identification of the 
community. God, who gives the “new commandment of love” (Jn. 15:12-17) 
grants knowledge of his divine message to the disciples by the pouring of the 
Spirit (Jn. 14:16-17; 14:25-26; 15:26-27 16:7-8; 16:13-14) that transforms sinners 
disciples into holy community. By contrast with the world which hates Jesus and 
his community (Jn. 15:18-25), the Spirit creates bonds of love among the chosen 
believers: ‘If the world hates you, be aware that it hated me before it hated you. If 
you belonged to the world, the world would love you as its own. Because you do 
not belong to the world, but I have chosen you out of the world—therefore the 
world hates you’ (Jn. 15:18-19). Therefore, the text of the Gospel presents the 
opposition between the world and the Spirit as structural: ‘He will give you another 
Paraclete, to be with you forever. This is the Spirit of truth, whom the world cannot 
receive, because it neither sees him nor knows him. You know him, because he 
abides with you, and he will be in you’ (Jn. 14:16-17). According to the 
participation in the Spirit, the disciples, just as Jesus, do not belong to this world: 
‘I am not asking you to take them out of the world, but I ask you to protect them 
from the evil one. They do not belong to the world, just as I do not belong to the 
world’ (Jn. 17:15-16). In the pneumatological chapters (Jn. 14-17) the Spirit is 
depicted as the distinctive possession of Jesus’ followers, in contrast with “the 
world” and “the Jews” who do not possess the Spirit. 
 
Both the theme of the relationship between “the world” and “the Jews” in the 
fourth Gospel, and that of the identification of the Spirit as the marker of Christian 
identity in the historical construction of the Johannine community would deserve 
a separate dissertation.6  
 
                                                 
Gospel’s attention ‘is more on the smouldering opposition to Jesus than on his offer of benefits 
from God’.  
6 Raymond E. Brown regarded the replacement of “the Jews” with “the world” in chapters 13-17 
of the Gospel as a testimony of a later period in the life of Johannine community when, after 
having completely rejected Judaism, the community was facing new troubles in the relationship 
with the Gentile world. Therefore, the two dictions of “the Jews” and “the world” can be interpreted 
as testimonies of two different chronological stages of the primitive Johannine community. A very 
different interpretation is given by Lars Kierspel. This author does not envisage a strong difference 
between the two terms, arguing that they were used almost interchangeably in order to generally 
describe Jesus’s opponents. See: Lars Kierspel, The Jews and the World in the fourth Gospel: 
Parallelism, Function, and Context, Tübingen 2006; Raymond E. Brown, An introduction to the 





Unfortunately, it is not possible to propose it here. Nonetheless, it is worth 
remembering that the aim of this short introduction is not to analyse the historical 
emergence of these theological themes in the Johannine community – a process 
which eventually led to the production of the text of the Gospel as we know it 
today – but rather to understand in which ways these themes were read and 
interpreted by Origen and Augustine. Differently from modern scholars, who read 
the Gospel as an historical source from which it is possible to extrapolate useful 
information on the life and development of the Johannine community in the first 
two centuries of Christianity, both Origen and Augustine read the text as a 
consistent Spirit-inspired work written by the beloved disciple John.7 Therefore, 
when analysing Origen’s and Augustine’s exegesis of the text, it is useful to bear 
in mind that the category of “the world” was understood by Augustine in its 
universal meaning, that is, a meaning that is not only related to the vicissitudes 
of the community which produced the text, but rather to the universal and salvific 
value inscribed in the Gospel’s message. Chapters IV and V will deal with the 
interpretation of the relationship between the Spirit and the world in Origen’s 
Commentary on John and Augustine’s Tractates on John. 
 
  
                                                 
7 See Origen’s and Augustine’s remarks on John the evangelist in: ComJn, I.19; I.21; I.44; TrIoh, 
I.4-8; XVI.2. XVIII.1; XXXVI.1; XXXVI.5; XLVIII.6; LXI.6. For modern debate on the authorship of 
the Gospel see: R. E. Brown, An introduction to the Gospel of John, p. 189-220. See also: C. S. 
Keener, The Gospel of John, p. 81-138. For a full bibliography on the authorship of the fourth 
Gospel see: Stanley E. Porter and Andrew K. Gabriel, Johannine Writings and Apocalyptic: An 









The dualism between the world and the Spirit is one of the most peculiar traits of 
the Gospel of John. The Spirit is the gift of God which is poured upon the chosen, 
transforming sinners into holy ones, whilst the world (Jn. 14:16-17; 14:25-26; 
15:26-27 16:7-8; 16:13-14) stands in contrast as the portion of the cosmos which 
refuses the redeeming action of the Saviour. Using the renowned light/darkness 
imagery, the author describes the world as the “darkness” into which the Saviour 
comes to convert those whom he has chosen. By rejecting the light brought by 
the Saviour, the world is separated from communion with God, a communion 
instantiated in the Paraclete, the Holy Spirit. Therefore, the fourth Gospel’s 
dualism is represented metaphorically through a series of binary oppositions, 
such as holy community/world, light/darkness, elect/rejected, Spirit/world.8 
Hence, the first aim of this chapter is to detect how Origen represents the relation 
between the Spirit and the world, thus also exploring his interpretation of the 
Johannine dualism. In order to prove my point, I have designed two sections. 
 
 First, this chapter will analyse Origen’s interpretation of “the world” (κόσμος), 
tackling the issue of Origen’s understanding of the theological concept of ‘the 
world’, as found in the Scriptures.9 The “world” of the Gospel of John is interpreted 
by Origen as the perceptible world (αἰσθητὸς κόσμος), composed of creatures at 
different levels of perfection. According to Origen, the level of perfection of the 
creatures in this perceptible world depends on their level of participation in the 
noetic world (κόσμος νοητὸς), regardless of the fact that they will all return to 
highest possible perfection eventually.10 Therefore, I will explain in detail the 
                                                 
8 On the fourth Gospel’s binary oppositions and on modern scholarship regarding the Gospel of 
John see the section at the beginning of part B of this thesis: ‘The World and the Spirit in the 
Gospel of John’.  
9 Therefore, this chapter does not aim at presenting a full account of Origen’s cosmology, but only 
at discussing Origen’s understanding of “the world” as a theological concept.  
10 It is not coincidental that, in the Commentary on John, the question of the eschatological destiny 




difference between the perceptible and noetic worlds, particularly challenging 
Tzamalikos’ interpretation of Origen’s understanding of this concept.11  
   
Secondly, this chapter wants to analyse the role that Holy Spirit plays in the 
salvation of human beings that are said to be ‘of this world’. In this regard, 
Origen’s understanding of how the Spirit works in the process of restoration of 
the creatures in their final state is extremely interesting. While recognising that 
Origen’s soteriology is mainly constructed on the salvific role of Christ, 
nonetheless this work aims to show that Origen envisioned a soteriological role 
for the Holy Spirit which is quite different from that of the Son. Although, as 
already noticed by Martens, a certain ‘overlapping of Christology and 
Pneumatology’ is detectable in Origen’s work, this chapter will show that the two 
hypostases play very distinctive roles in Origen’s soteriology.12 The soteriological 
difference between the Son and the Spirit can be exemplified in the difference 
between Origen’s λογικοὶ and πνευματικοὶ. I will argue that Origen uses this 
terminology to indicate different types of participation in God: while the term 
pneumatikos indicates one’s participation in the Spirit, the word logikos indicates 
one’s participation in the Logos. As the process of salvation in Origen can be 
explained with the concept of the participation in God, it seems reasonable to 
assume that creatures participate to a different extent in both the Logos and in 
the Spirit. While Origen considers the participation in the Logos as a permanent 
possession of every rational creature, which is accordingly called λογικός 
(logikos) regardless of its cosmological state, the attribute of πνευματικός 
(pneumatikos) belongs only to the saints, who achieve such status as a 
temporary possession. Nevertheless, the two conditions are intertwined for the 
more a creature is participant in the Spirit, the more it understands the Logos. In 
the process of ascent, the Spirit is the one who provides the different λογικοὶ with 
the spiritual substratum – the spiritual matter, as Origen would say – which allows 
creatures to pass from a cosmological status to another, until their final 
reunification in the Logos. The more spiritual a soul becomes, the more it is 
                                                 
indeed the ultimate example of the redeeming action of God toward creation. See: ComJn, I.95-
100; I.236; XX.171-181; XXXII.19-40. This issue will be analysed later in the chapter. See: infra, 
IV.2.2.2. 
11 P. Tzamalikos, Origen: Cosmology and Ontology of Time, p. 65-175. 
12 Peter Martens, ‘Holy Spirit’, in John Anthony McGuckin (ed), The Westminster Handbook to 




detached from “this world”, that is, the perceptible world (αἰσθητὸς κόσμος), and 
becomes participant in the Logos, that is, in the noetic world (κόσμος νοητὸς). So 
far as I am aware, none of the previous investigations on such topic has ever 
provided a constructive explanation for Origen’s use of this diverse terminology. 
 
By analysing the kind of relation existing between the perceptible world and the 
noetic world together with the one between the participation of the rational 
creatures in the Logos and in the Spirit, this chapter will also propose a slight 
difference between the spiritual and the noetic in Origen’s exegesis. Finally, it will 
show that it is exactly the liminal – that is, subordinated – nature of the Holy Spirit, 
that is, the fact that he is both God and creation which makes the Holy Spirit such 
a necessary tool in Origen’s soteriology. By the use of the terminological and 
ontological framework built on chapter II, this chapter will show how the Holy 
Spirit’s ontological subordination of priority to the Son is the very key to 
understand his soteriological role. While the Spirit is both God and creature, his 
pre-eminence towards the rest of creation is based on the ontological 
subordination of superiority which Origen envisions between him and the 
creatures. This ontological status is the key for understanding his role as the one 
who provides the rest of creation with the spiritual matter necessary to be 
sanctified and to gain a perfect participation in the Logos.  
 
By studying the relation and the difference between the soteriological roles of the 
Spirit and the Son, this work aims also at casting a new look on the topic of 
Origen’s pneumatology. Modern scholarly researches can be divided in two 
categories:13 on the one hand, some scholars deny the crucial soteriological role 
of the Spirit, thus claiming Origen’s pneumatology to be of secondary importance 
in the study of Origen’s soteriology.14 This thesis takes a different direction from 
this line of scholarship. On the other hand, a few scholars have affirmed the 
soteriological importance of the Holy Spirit in Origen, especially Markschies, 
McDonnell and Greggs.15 Nonetheless, among these scholars there is a 
                                                 
13 For a more complete scholarship review see supra, II.1.1. 
14 See, for example: Benjamin Drewery, Origen and the Doctrine of Grace, London 1960, p. 156-
157. 
15 C. Markschies, ‘Der Heilige Geist im Iohanneskommentar des Origenes’; T. Greggs, Barth, 





tendency to smooth Origen’s Trinitarian subordinationism and to elevate the Holy 
Spirit to the same rank of the Son. If so, one annuls the ontological and 
soteriological differences between the Son and the Spirit, thus transforming the 
Spirit into a useless duplicate of the Son. Consequently, this approach fails to 
comprehend both the need and reasons for Origen’s pneumatology. Unlike 
previous research on Origen’s pneumatology, my investigation will show that the 
Holy Spirit and the Son possess two different soteriological roles. The need of 
the Holy Spirit in the process of salvation comes from his created nature. The 
Spirit’s “creation” must be understood as an ontological subordination of priority 
towards the Son, as I have explained in chapter II.16 Therefore, I will suggest that 
the differences between the two can be understood only if one admits the 
subordination of the Spirit to the Son, since the Spirit’s soteriological role exists 
because of his subordination to the Son.  
 
The task I am proposing here is complicated by textual problems that cannot be 
overlooked. The main issue is represented by the fact that we do not possess the 
entirety of Origen’s Commentary on John; indeed, at the current state of research, 
it appears likely that Origen never finished his Commentary, leaving this work 
after having written the 32nd book.17 Moreover, out of the 32 books of the 
Commentary, only nine of them are preserved and available for us to study.18 So 
far as my research is concerned, this poses a serious issue because it seems 
likely that the so-called pneumatological books of the Gospels – Jn. 14-16 – were 
never commented on by Origen. While we can only speculate on the reasons why 
Origen never finished his masterpiece – reasons that are probably to be found in 
the lack of time and energy of the author rather than in new theological concerns 
– my research will – hopefully! – prove that the material in our hands is still more 
than enough to answer the previously outlined research questions. Reading 
Origen’s Commentary, it is clear that he is well aware of the Johannine dualistic 
structure, which he smooths out through a carefully constructed exegetical 
                                                 
16 See particularly supra, II.2.2.   
17 Therefore, Origen originally commented on a portion of the text which goes from the Prologue 
to Jn. 13:33. 




work.19 In other words, Origen’s exegesis aims at bridging the distance between 




                                                 
19 This thesis, following the work of Dively Lauro and Dawson, will work on the broad assumption 
of the consistency of Origen’s exegesis. These two authors have already proven it is reasonable 
to work from an assumption that Origen’s exegetical practice is broadly consistent with his 
exegetical principles expounded in the fourth book of On First Principles. I will not address this 
problem directly. However, I will show that Origen’s exegesis is both legitimate and consistent 
with the exegetical rules that he sets out at the beginning of the Commentary. Henceforth, this 
chapter will show the way Origen deals with the fourth Gospel, partially drawing from and partially 
applying his own theological doctrines to the text. On the internal consistency of Origen’s exegesis 
see: Elizabeth Dively-Lauro, The Soul and the Spirit of Scriptures within Origen’s Exegesis, 





IV.1 Noetic and Perceptible Cosmos: The Concept of the 
World in the Commentary on John 
 
In this section, I will present Origen’s twofold interpretation of the Johannine 
concept of “the world”. On the one hand, Origen uses this concept to indicate the 
perceptible world, formed by those creatures which, although being participant in 
the Logos, are mingled with materiality. On the other hand, he uses it to indicate 
the noetic world, which can be broadly defined as the locus rationalis shared by 
the Logos and the logikoi. As such, the noetic world is interpreted by Origen as 
the representation of the noetic aspects of the Son (the epinoiai), in whose 
participation the perceptible world subsists.  
 
To better illustrate this opposition, I will firstly deal with Origen’s hermeneutic of 
the Gospel, with particular regard to Origen’s opposition between the perceptible 
and the spiritual Gospel. Secondly, I will analyse in detail the most important 
passages of the Commentary where Origen deals with “the world”, focusing in 
particular on the salvation of the cosmos and on the soteriological role of the Son. 
Lastly, I will explain the radical opposition between noetic and perceptible world 
in Origen’s theology by means of the distinction, proposed by the author, between 
κτίσις and καταβολή. 
 
IV.1.1 Turning the Perceptible into the Noetic: The World in the Spiritual 
Gospel 
 
As I have already pointed out in the introduction of this work, the Commentary on 
John should be considered as one of the most – if not the most – important pieces 
of work Origen ever wrote.20 Even before starting his comments on the Prologue, 
Origen asserts that all four gospels should be taken as the “first fruits” (ἀπαρχή) 
                                                 
20 See supra, I.1.1. For this reason, I disagree with T. Greggs, who states that Origen’s assertions 
on the role of the Spirit in this work ‘may well be a result of the genre of Origen’s work’. See T. 
Greggs, Barth, Origen, and Universal Salvation, p. 153 n. 9. On the contrary, I think that, since 
Origen indicates the Gospel of John as the most important and profound book of the Bible, it 
should be taken as one of the most important piece of writing in trying to reconstruct or, so to 
speak, systematise his thought. This consideration is particularly true when considering the 
extraordinary importance of biblical exegesis in Origen’s thought. In this regard see: P. W. 




of the Scriptures as a whole (ComJn, I.12). Indeed, Since the gospels have first 
been proclaimed, the treasures of spiritual knowledge that have been hidden in 
the Old Testament have been made manifest to those who are able to read the 
noetic and spiritual meaning of the Gospel. Consequently, even the Old 
Testament, after the coming of Christ, has become “Gospel”: ‘Since the Saviour 
has come, and has caused the Gospel to be embodied in the Gospel, (ὁ δὲ σωτὴρ 
ἐπιδημήσας καὶ τὸ εὐαγγέλιον σωματοποιηθῆναι ποιήσας τῷ εὐαγγελίῳ) he has 
made all things Gospel, as it were (πάντα ὡσεὶ εὐαγγέλιον πεποίηκεν)’ (ComJn, 
I.33). Origen explains the “gospelisation” of all Scriptures by affirming that, just 
as the law of Moses used to be the shadow of the things to come, so the Gospel 
is the shadow of the mysteries of Christ (ComJn, I.39). In other words, Origen 
understands the Gospel as the place where all mysteries concerning noetic 
realities are written.21 As such, its body is a collection of symbols that points out 
the superior realities,22 called the eternal gospel: ‘And that which John calls an 
eternal Gospel (εὐαγγέλιον αἰώνιον), which would properly be called a spiritual 
Gospel (πνευματικόν), clearly presents both the mysteries presented by Christ’s 
words and things (ὑπὸ τῶν λόγων αὐτοῦ τά τε πράγματα) of which his acts were 
symbols” (ComJn, I.40). The task of the exegete consists therefore in the effort 
of turning the perceptible Gospel into the noetic and spiritual Gospel (εὐαγγέλιον 
νοητοῦ καὶ πνευματικοῦ) (ComJn, I.45). By understanding the spiritual Gospel 
one gets to understand the many aspects (epinoiai) of Jesus, thus gaining 
salvation.23 This process has its culmination in the Gospel of John, which is 
indeed declared by Origen to be the ‘firstfruits of all the Gospels’ (τῶν δὲ 
εὐαγγελίων ἀπαρχὴν τὸ κατὰ Ἰωάννην) as it reveals the more divine and hidden 
mysteries of Jesus’s divinity (ComJn, I.23).24 In order to understand this Gospel 
                                                 
21 In this regard, Origen describes the Scriptures as a field which has been sown with the seeds 
of the Logos (λογικοῖς σπέρμασιν) by the prophets and the apostles, see ComJn, XIII.305. The 
idea appears similar to the stoic notion of ‘seminal principles’ (σπερματικοί λόγοι), representing 
the rational principles that permeate and control matter, organizing it in a rational way. 
Nevertheless, this idea is not ascribed by Origen to the world, but rather to the Gospel, which 
here represents the “material substratum” out of which the interpreter draws the noetic meaning. 
In this regard, I disagree with P. Tzamalikos, Origen: Cosmology and Ontology of Time, p. 116. 
22 On the body of the text in Origen see Morwenna Ludlow, ‘Anatomy: Investigating the Body of 
the Text in Origen and Gregory of Nyssa’ in Morwenna Ludlow and Scot Douglass (eds), Reading 
the Church Fathers, London 2011, p. 132-153.  
23 This process is operated by the help of the Holy Spirit, as I will show in sections IV.2.3 and 
IV.2.4. 
24 For a thorough investigation of the meaning of the term “Gospel” in the Commentary on John 
and on the pastoral usefulness of Origen’s exegetical method see: Sarah Spangler, ‘“The 
Firstfruits of our Activity”: Examination of the Gospel and Pedagogical Function of Scripture in 




one has to become like John, to whom it has been granted to be called “son of 
Mary”, just like Jesus (ComJn, I.23). Therefore, the coming of the Saviour is the 
act through which all the Scriptures became Gospel, and the Gospel itself will be 
preached to the whole world (ComJn, I.86-87).  
 
Among the many hermeneutical implications of Origen’s understanding of the 
Gospel, I find particularly worth noting both the use of the adjective ‘spiritual’ and 
that of the term ‘world’.25  
 
On the one hand, Origen identifies the true Gospel with the spiritual Gospel, 
inspired by the Spirit and understood by those who are able to grasp its true 
meaning by participation in the Holy Spirit: ‘Let us now ask God to work with us 
through Christ in the Holy Spirit (διὰ Χριστοῦ ἐν ἁγίῳ πνεύματι) to explain the 
mystical meaning (μυστικοῦ νοῦ) stored up like a treasure in the words’ (ComJn, 
I.89). Therefore, it is his degree of participation in the Holy Spirit, which makes 
the exegete able to explain the mystical meaning. In this regard, it is worth noting 
Origen’s interpretation of the ‘fountain of water springing up into eternal life’ of Jn. 
4:14. Origen explains that this fountain represents the things learned of the Spirit. 
The Scriptures represent a mere introduction, which ‘has not contained some of 
the more lordly and more divine aspects of the mysteries of God’ (ComJn, 
XIII.27). Therefore, once the Scriptures have been understood, one must ‘go up 
from them to Jesus, that he may freely give us the fountain of water that leaps 
into eternal life’ (ComJn, XIII.37). Nevertheless, the Scriptures remain necessary 
in order to rise up to the higher noetic things (ComJn, XIII.51-56). 
 
On the other hand, the reason why the Gospel of John is said to be “firstfruits” 
comes from the fact that this Gospel, more than any other, traces the journey of 
the Son of God who descends in the world (κόσμος) in order to “take away the 
sins of the world” (Jn. 1:29) (ComJn, I.21). Finally, from an exegetical perspective, 
Origen’s understanding of the Scriptures as the perceptible body where the 
spiritual and noetic Gospel is hidden. The very same operation is done by Origen 
                                                 
Róbert Somos (eds), Origeniana Nona: Origen and the Religious Practice of his Time, Leuven 
2009, p. 337-344.  
25 Regarding Origen’s hermeneutics and the relationship between the exegetical principles 
expressed in On First Principles, IV and his exegetical practice see: Elizabeth Dively-Lauro, The 




in the interpretation of the Gospel when he splits the interpretation of the 
Johannine concept of ‘the world’ into two separate categories. In some instances, 
‘the world’ signifies the perceptible world, in some other, the noetic world.  
 
To these two interpretations of the term “world” many others should be added. As 
already noticed by Tzamalikos, Origen takes the term to be a homonym 
(ὁμώνυμος) (Commentary on Genesis 3; PG 12:89; Philocalia 14.2).26 In the 
same fragment, related to the interpretation of 1Jn. 5:19 – ‘the whole world is 
under the control of the evil one’ – Origen takes the world to mean only ‘earthly 
and human things’. Similarly, both in Commentary on Matthew XIII.20 and On 
First Principles I.5.5, he refers to the world as meaning the earth and its 
inhabitants. In other instances, he takes ‘the world’ to mean both the physical 
cosmos (both heaven and earth) and the earth and his inhabitants (see On First 
Principles II.3.6; Against Celsus VI.49; Commentary on Matthew XII.27). 
However, by contrast with the opinion of Tzamalikos, who claims that no 
qualitative difference should be found in Origen’s manifold exegesis of the term 
‘world’, concluding that this term always indicates the world as material,27 I 
maintain that the most significant explanation of the term ‘world’ is that proposed 
by Origen in the Commentary on John. Indeed, in all the aforementioned 
instances Origen takes the world to mean the perceptible world. As such, the 
term can both indicate the entirety of the world and of its inhabitants or a single 
part of it (heavens, earth, etc.). Nevertheless, there is no qualitative difference 
between these parts, as they are all part of the perceptible world. On the contrary, 
the distinction spotted in this thesis between the noetic cosmos and the 
perceptible cosmos allows Origen to propose a qualitative difference between the 
noetic – thus, entirely immaterial and utterly perfect – world and the perceptible 
– thus, deficient and material in its own essence – world.  
 
IV.1.2 The ‘Lamb of God Who Takes Away the Sins of the World’: The 
Salvation of the Cosmos 
 
                                                 
26 See: P. Tzamalikos, Origen: Cosmology and Ontology of Time, p. 100. 




One of the key passages in the Gospel regarding the relationship between Christ 
and the world can be found in the comment on Jn. 1:29. ‘Behold the lamb of God 
who takes away the sins of the world’.28 With regard to my present investigation, 
Origen’s exegesis of this passage reveals two aspects of this key concept: firstly, 
‘the world’ is said to consist of every created being residing in heaven and earth. 
Secondly, this entire world is the object of the Saviour’s redemption. The 
importance of this passage in Origen’s exegesis is testified to by its repetition 
throughout the entire Commentary in order to prove God’s intention to save the 
cosmos in its entirety. In Origen’s Commentary, this cosmos does not signify the 
physical earth only, nor the dwelling place of those human beings who are in need 
of redemption, rather the totality of existing beings in their different degrees of 
perfection:  
 
Since whatever is called Gospel is spoken in the whole world (ἐν ὅλῳ τῷ  
κόσμῳ), we understand that it is proclaimed in the whole world, not only in 
the surrounding earth, but also in the whole system of heaven and earth (οὐ 
μόνον τῷ περιγείῳ τόπῳ ἀλλὰ καὶ παντὶ τῷ συστήματι τῷ ἐξ οὐρανοῦ καὶ 
γῆς), or of heavens and earth (ComJn, I.87). 
  
When explaining the ‘system of heavens and earth’, Origen includes not only 
human beings and angels, but also principalities and powers and thrones and 
dominions (ComJn, I.88).29 In this first definition of the concept of ‘the world’, 
Origen reveals his intention of widening the salvific function of the Son not only 
to human beings but to all created beings.30 Similarly, in another passage in which 
he comments on Jn. 1:29 (ComJn, VI.301-305), Origen polemicizes against those 
who think that ‘the world’ should be taken as meaning the church alone. While 
Origen admits that it is possible, in some cases, to understand the church as ‘the 
                                                 
28 In the Commentary, Origen deals particularly with these passages: Jn. 1:29: ‘Here is the Lamb 
of God who takes away the sin of the world’; Jn. 8:12 ‘Again Jesus spoke to them, saying, “I am 
the light of the world. Whoever follows me will never walk in darkness but will have the light of 
life”; Jn. 8:23 ‘He said to them, “You are from below, I am from above; you are of this world, I am 
not of this world’; Jn. 15:19 ‘I have chosen you out of the world—therefore the world hates you’; 
Jn. 17:24 ‘because you loved me before the foundation (καταβολή) of the world’. 
29 A similar definition of the term world as consisting of all heavens and earth is given by Origen 
in Commentary on Matthew XIII.20; Against Celsus VI.59; On First Principles II.4.3.  





world’, he also points out to the fact that the remissions of sins is meant to be 
universal.31  
 
The remission of sins is operated by the lamb which, being the Logos-in-his-prime 
(λόγος ἀκμάζων), represents the perpetual noetic sacrifice (νοητὴ θυσία) offered 
by God to all beings partaking in the Logos (τῷ λογικῷ) (ComJn, VI.270). 
Therefore, the lamb represents the humanity of Christ (ComJn, VI.273), whose 
sacrifice permits the dissolution of the maleficent powers (δυνάμεων κακοποιῶν) 
of this world (ComJn, VI.281). As the death of Christ allows the evils of the world 
to be taken away, so the sacrifice of the martyrs frees the world from evil spirits.32 
In addition, the idea that Christ/Logos came to redeem the entire world is also 
reiterated in Origen’s exegesis of the Christological prophecy spoken by 
Caiaphas (Jn. 11:50: ‘it is expedient for us that a man should die for the people’). 
Here, Origen implies that even if Caiaphas understood only the literal meaning of 
his own prophecy, the skilled reader should able to discern that the deeper 
meaning of his prophecy, which is inspired by the Holy Spirit. The deeper 
meaning of the prophecy consists in the belief of the eschatological redemption 
of the world in all its ontological levels, thus including the “evil” Caiaphas and the 
Sanhedrin (ComJn, XXVIII.160).33 The inimitability of the sacrifice of Christ rests 
on the fact that, unlike anyone before him, he sacrificed himself for whole cosmos: 
 
                                                 
31 Indeed, this interpretation is indicated by Origen as providing only a partial understanding of 
the concept, thus not representing the deeper interpretation of this word. See also: ComJn, I.165-
167. 
32 The ways in which the lamb takes away the sins are represented by the epinoiai of the Son 
which are known only to a few people (ComJn, VI.298).  
33 Regarding the interpretation of this episode see my own article: G. Hermanin de Reichenfeld, 
‘Resurrection and Prophecy: The Spirit in Origen’s Exegesis’, p. 143-153. There I show that, in 
interpreting this prophecy as spoken by the Holy Spirit, Origen comes to the point of stretching 
his own conception of prophecy, considering the prophecy of Caiaphas to be not only true, but 
even related to the deeper spiritual way (βαθύτερον) of interpreting the sojourn of Christ, that is, 
the universal salvation of the whole rational world, thus showing this doctrine as the very keystone 
of his theology. On prophecy in Origen see also: Enrico Norelli, ‘La profezia nel Commento a 
Giovanni’, in E. Prinzivalli (ed), Il Commento a Giovanni di Origene, p. 301-331; Antonio Orbe, 
‘La excelentia de los profetas segùn Origenes’, in Estudios Biblicos 14 (1955), p. 191-221; M. 
Harl, Origène et la fonction révélatrice du Verbe incarné; Gunnar af Hällström, Charismatic 
Succession: a Study on Origen's Concept of Prophecy, Helsinki 1985; Enrique Nardoni, ‘Origen's 
Concept of Biblical Inspiration’, in The Second Century 4 (1984), 9-23; Caroline P. Bammel, 
‘Origen’s Definitions of Prophecy and Gnosis’, in The Journal of Theological Studies 40 (1989), 
p. 489-493; Giovanni Filoramo, ‘Lo statuto della profezia in Origene’, in Sandro Leanza (ed), Ad 
contemplandam sapientiam: studi di filologia letteratura storia in memoria di Sandro Leanza, 




But never yet has a story been told of one who was able to take responsibility 
for the purification on behalf of the whole universe, that the whole universe 
might be cleansed (ὑπὲρ ὅλου τοῦ κόσμου, ἵνα πᾶς ὁ κόσμος καθαρθῇ) […]. 
Nor can such a story be told since Jesus alone has been able to take up into 
himself on the cross the burden of the sin of all (πάντων) on behalf of the 
whole universe (τῶν ὅλων) apart from God (ComJn, XXVIII.163). 
   
The destruction of sins, which is operated in an orderly way by Christ, results in 
the final defeat of death (ComJn, VI.284-294) – that is, in the restoration of all 
things to their original status of divine contemplation in the perfect unification with 
the Son (ComJn, I.90).34  
 
IV.1.3 The ‘Light of the World’: The Participation of the Son in the Cosmos 
 
Another key passage in regard to ‘the world’ is found in Origen’s commentary on 
Jn. 8:12: ‘Again Jesus spoke to them, saying, “I am the light of the world. Whoever 
follows me will never walk in darkness but will have the light of life”’. Putting this 
passage in relation with that of Jn. 1:29, Origen explains how the eating of the 
lamb in the Old Testament represents the eating of the Logos, that is, the desire 
of every λογικός to understand the spiritual aspects of the Logos 
(τὰ πνευματικὰ λόγου) (ComJn, X.103). The intellectual participation of the 
λογικός in the spiritual aspects of Christ leads the λογικός to understand the 
meaning of the lamb ‘for the duration of the night of darkness in this life, until the 
dawn of the day of things after this life’ (ComJn, X.108). Throughout the entire 
Commentary, day and light are therefore interpreted as gift of knowledge, that is, 
as the noetic light that marks the presence of the Logos in the mind of the believer 
to such an extent as to lead the λογικός to experience ‘the end of the age (τὴν 
τοῦ αἰῶνος συντέλειαν) in his intellect (τῷ νῷ)’ (ComJn, X.44). Origen’s 
interpretation of Christ as the “light of the cosmos” signifies the universal donation 
of rational light to creation. This appellative is compared with other titles attributed 
                                                 
34 Regarding Origen’s universalism and his affirmation of the universal salvation of all rational 
creatures, it is worth remembering that Origen’s doctrine changes significantly according to the 
type of audience he was teaching. Therefore, while he seems to deny the permanent reality of 
hell, thus admitting the possibility of a universal salvation of all creatures in works intended for 
spiritually mature Christians (like the ComJn), he also speaks of the reality of hell in other works. 
In this regard see: Mark S. M. Scott, ‘Guarding the Mysteries of Salvation: The Pastoral Pedagogy 




to the Saviour in the Gospel, such as those of ‘light of man’ (Jn. 1:4) and ‘true 
light’ (Jn. 1:9). Regarding the latter, Origen explains that, differently from any light 
perceived by the senses, the Saviour enlightens the totality of the noetic world: 
  
The Saviour, on the other hand, is the light of the noetic world (νοητοῦ 
κόσμου) because he shines on those who are rational and on the ruling 
principles (τοῖς λογικοῖς καὶ ἡγεμονικοῖς), that their mind (νοῦς) may see its 
proper visions. Now I mean he is the light of those rational souls which are 
in the perceptible world (τῶν λογικῶν ψυχῶν τῶν ἐν τῷ αἰσθητικῷ κόσμῳ), 
of which the Saviour teaches us that he is the maker, being, perhaps, its 
directing and principal part, and, so to speak, the sun of the great day of the 
Lord (ComJn, I.161). 
 
The noetic world stands here as the utterly incorporeal and perfect world 
composed by the epinoiai of the Son. As such, the noetic world is a purely rational 
realm, which furnishes to the perceptible world the rational principles thanks to 
which the latter subsist. Therefore, the appellative of ‘light’ ought to be understood 
as one of the aspects (ἐπίνοιαι) of the Saviour, thus not in such a way that implies 
a mingling with the perceptible world. On the contrary, the Son is said to be light 
because of the noetic dispensation of his gifts - that is, of the noetic theophanies 
represented by the Son’s ἐπίνοιαι. As such, the ἐπίνοιαι are in no way mingled 
with the material nature of the world (that is, the ‘system composed of earth and 
heavens’) but only refer to those logical realities that are understandable by the 
mind alone:  
 
The Saviour, however, being the light of the world, does not illuminate 
corporeal natures (σώματα). He illuminates the incorporeal mind with an 
incorporeal power (ἀσωμάτῳ δυνάμει τὸν ἀσώματον νοῦν) in order that each 
of us, being illuminated as though by the sun, may also be able to see the 
other noetic beings (τὰ ἄλλα νοητά) (ComJn, I.164).35  
 
                                                 
35 The difference between the illumination given by the Saviour to every incorporeal mind (νοῦς) 
and that given by the saints, martyrs or even by the Church, stands in the fact that when one is 
illuminated by the Saviour one does not need any additional mediator; on the contrary, the saints 





Therefore, the Saviour is the only one to be called ‘light of the world’, because 
being ‘light of the world’ is much more than being only ‘light of humans’, as ‘the 
world’ does not only include “humans”’, but all rational creation (ComJn, I.168). 
This is indeed the creation (κτίσις) that will return to its state of purity, being ‘set 
free and released from the vanity of the bodies (τῆς τῶν σωμάτων ματαιότητος 
ἀπολυομένη) in the destruction of the world’ (ComJn, I.177-178). 
 
Hence, these passages present an alternative meaning of the term “the world”. 
Thus far, all instances suggested that Origen used this term to refer to the ‘system 
of heavens and earth’. Nonetheless, by contrast with Tzamalikos’ opinion, the 
cosmos that Origen is discussing in the previous quotations should not be 
considered as the ‘perceptible world’ (αἰσθητὸς κόσμος), but rather as the noetic 
cosmos (κόσμος νοητὸς).36 The difference between the two will be expounded 
later in more detail.  
  
It is worth clarifying that, although the rational creatures belong ontologically to 
this higher noetic world, they still dwell in the perceptible cosmos. As light, the 
Saviour illuminates the ‘ruling principle’ of these creatures, whose location 
remains in the perceptible cosmos, but whose true ontological belonging is in the 
noetic. The double membership of rational creatures into the two cosmoses is 
underlined by Origen in his exegesis of the so-called testimonies of John the 
Baptist.37 A particular mention deserves his interpretation of Jn. 1:26-27: ‘He who 
comes after me has stood in your midst, whom you did not know, the strap of 
whose sandal I am not worthy to loose’. This passage is repeated many times in 
the surviving books of the Commentary as the testimony of the permeation of the 
cosmos by the Saviour: 
  
                                                 
36 References presented so far should suffice alone to dismiss Tzamalikos’ claim that, in Origen’s 
thought, ‘the terms “world” and “spiritual” (that is, incorporeal) are incompatible with each other’. 
See P. Tzamalikos, Origen: Cosmology and Ontology of Time, p. 116. Besides speaking about 
the existence of the noetic world in ComJn I.161 and I.177-178, Origen also discusses it in 
ComJn, XIX.137-150.  
37 In the second book of the Commentary (ComJn, II.212-218), Origen analyses the speeches of 
John the Baptist into six testimonies. I testimony: Jn. 1:15-18; II testimony: Jn. 1:19-23; III 
testimony: Jn. 1:24-27; IV testimony: Jn. 1.29-31; V testimony: Jn. 1:32-34; VI testimony: Jn. 1:35-
37. In the sixth book, Origen explains the second, the third and the beginning of the fourth 
testimony, that is, the section of the Gospel of Jn. 1:19-29. The first testimony was probably 
commented on by Origen in book five, now lost with the exception of seven fragments. However, 
before commenting on the second testimony, Origen makes a digression regarding his own 




There is another testimony of the same Baptist about Christ, which teaches 
that his preeminent substance (προηγουμένην αὐτοῦ ὑπόστασιν) extends to 
all the world (ἐπὶ πάντα τὸν κόσμον) in relation to the rational souls (κατὰ τὰς 
ψυχὰς τὰς λογικάς). […] And consider if the statement can be understood in 
relation to the rational principle (λόγον) in each person (ComJn, II.215). 
  
According to this passage, the theological justification behind the Saviour’s 
permeation of the whole universe as light ought to be found in the rationality of 
the souls that populates the perceptible world. The very characterisation of 
creatures as λογικοὶ points toward their ontological participation in the Logos of 
God, since every logikos owes its rationality to the ontological participation in the 
Son/Logos. To prove his point, Origen adds that, just as the Father is in the Son 
and permeates him with his essence, so the Son permeates the whole world, 
which is figuratively represented by the shoes: ‘It is worthwhile to give attention 
to whether we must understand the words in relation to the fact that the Logos 
and Wisdom have permeated the whole cosmos, since the Father is in the Son, 
as we presented it (διαπεφοιτηκέναι δι’ ὅλου τοῦ κόσμου, τὸν δὲ πατέρα ἐν τῷ 
υἱῷ εἶναι)’(ComJn, VI.202). In another passage, Origen explains that the power 
of Christ is such that, ‘although he is invisible in his deity, he is present with every 
human being and is coextensive with everything, including the whole world (ὅλῳ 
τῷ κόσμῳ συμπαρεκτεινόμενος); This is revealed by the words: “He has stood in 
your midst”’(ComJn, VI.154). According to Origen’s interpretation of this passage, 
the Baptist is here pointing out to the fact that the “midst” of humans is the logos 
that resides in them, allowing them to be called λογικοὶ (ComJn, VI.189; II.215). 
This midst is then located in the heart, where the ruling principle (τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν) 
of the body stands (ComJn, VI.189; II.215). Standing in the midst of human 
beings represents therefore noetic coming – one could say, the noetic incarnation 
– of the Son of God in every rational creature, even in those that are not aware 
of his presence (Jn. 1:26).38 According to Origen, this is exactly what the gnostic 
teacher Heracleon failed to understand: he did not comprehend that the Logos 
has always been present in the world (ComJn, VI.194) for the Logos is ‘in the 
                                                 
38 Regarding the soteriological role of Christ and noetic incarnation see: Anders-Christian 
Jacobsen, Christ, the Teacher of Salvation: A Study on Origen’s Christology and Soteriology, 




midst’, that is, in human’s rationality (ComJn, VI.197).39 The incapacity to 
understand the noetic incarnation of the Saviour represents the incapacity to go 
“out of the world”, which is interpreted, in this case, as the reign of perceptibility 
as opposed to the pure noetic cosmos of which the Logos is the ruler. 
  
As a consequence, the identification of Christ as true light has been interpreted 
by Origen as representing the salvific mission of the Son, whose primary goal is 
to make God understandable for human beings.40 As such, the noetic light of 
rationality shines in the noetic world, rather than in the perceptible one, although 
the rational souls in the perceptible world have the possibility of contemplating it 
because of their participation in the Logos.  
  
IV.1.4 ‘You Are of This World, I Am Not of This World’: The Noetic and the 
Perceptible Cosmos 
  
As the term world has a double meaning, the Son’s descent in the world has been 
interpreted by Origen as both a physical and noetic descent. The former can be 
identified with the coming of the Saviour in the man Jesus, whose physical 
appearance performs the pedagogical function of bringing knowledge to human 
beings. The latter happens in the logikoi which are able to perceive the noetic 
things about Christ. In addition, Origen’s aforementioned hermeneutical 
principles according to which the Gospel is said to be the perceptible receptacle 
of its deeper noetic meaning is remarkably fruitful when Origen has to deal with 
the fourth Gospel’s division between those who are said to be ‘of this world’ and 
those who are said not to be. Origen’s interpretation of this Johannine dichotomy 
between the holy community and ‘the world’ is particularly stressed in his 
comments on one of the most important passages of the Gospel, that is, Jn. 8:23: 
‘And he said to them: “You are from below, I am from above. You are of this world, 
I am not of this world”’. In interpreting this passage, Origen firstly asks whether to 
be ‘from the earth’ (Jn. 3:31-32) is the same as to be ‘from below’, and whether 
to be ‘from below’ is the same as to be ‘of this world’. In trying to untangle this 
conundrum, Origen first tackles the question of what ‘from below’ and ‘from 
                                                 
39 Similarly, see ComJn, XIII.57-74, where Origen reports Heracleon’s interpretation according to 
which the fountain of Jacob depicted in Jn. 4.13 was deficient because it was ‘worldly’(κοσμικὴ).  




above’ mean. In regard to the former, he explains that to be ‘from below’ differs 
from being ‘from the earth’, since being ‘from the earth’ means to receive one’s 
origin ‘from material substance and bodies’ (ἀπὸ ὕλης γένεσιν καὶ σωμάτων), 
thus ‘forsaking the better things’ (ComJn, XIX.130). As a consequence, one who 
is from the earth is for sure also ‘from below’. Nevertheless, as far as the visible 
world is concerned, it is possible to be in the world and be either ‘from’ below’ or 
‘from above’, according to the relative cosmological position in this world: 
  
But the visible world (δεικνύμενος κόσμος) too, since it is material (ὑλικὸς) 
because of those who need material life, has places that differ. Nevertheless, 
in relation to things that are immaterial (τὰ ἄϋλα), invisible (τὰ ἀόρατα) and 
incorporeal (τὰ ἀσώματα) these are all below. […] But so far as places of the 
world being compared with places of the world is concerned […] things of the 
earth (τὰ περίγεια) are below, but the things of heaven (τὰ δὲ οὐράνια) are 
above, so that the one from below is necessarily of this world (ἐκ τοῦ κόσμου 
τούτου), but the one who is of this world is not necessarily from below 
(ComJn, XIX.132-133). 
   
Origen’s distinction between being ‘of the world’ and ‘from below’ as expressed 
in this quotation reveals a double attitude towards the text. On the one hand, 
when the concept of ‘below’ is used in its absolute sense, everything which is ‘of 
this world’ – that is, belonging to the systems of heavens and earth – is ‘from 
below’, as it is not comparable to the complete immateriality and incorporeity of 
the noetic world. As a consequence, everyone of this world is from below. On the 
other hand, when the concept of below is used in a narrow sense as referred to 
the visible world, there are those who are ‘from below’ (that is, those who are 
‘from earth’) and those ‘from above’ (that is, those who are ‘from heaven’).41 This 
interpretation is also given by Origen regarding the mission of John the Baptist, 
who is said to be an Angel sent by the Saviour in order to give testimony to him. 
There, Origen clearly admits that John’s soul pre-existed his body and that, being 
an emulator and imitator of Christ, he took a body out of his desire to minister his 
                                                 
41 This doctrine also allows Origen to postulate the lack of any injustice in God even in the case 
of Jacob and Esau, who were chosen before being born, as their merits and sins belong to their 
souls before they were born. See: ComJn, II.192. In this regard see also: On First Principles I.8.4; 
2.9.1-8; III.1. For a deep analysis of the biblical scriptural passages supporting Origen’s doctrine 
of pre-existence in Genesis see: Peter W. Martens, ‘Origen’s Doctrine of Pre-Existence and the 




goodness to human beings (ComJn, II.187). Consequently, Origen states that 
‘according to the deeper meaning, he was sent into the world, world being taken 
here as the earthly place where human beings are’ (ComJn, II.175). As such, 
John was sent ‘either from heaven or from paradise’ (ComJn, II.176). Therefore, 
just as the first Adam, John was sent from a higher place of ‘the world’ (heaven) 
into a lower place of ‘the world’ (earth). Among this category stand all those who 
are said to be the ‘citizens of the heavens’ (πολίτης τῶν οὐρανίων) who, although 
being from above in a local sense, are still ‘from below when compared with the 
noetic beings (τῶν νοητῶν)’(ComJn, XIX.134), which are completely immaterial 
and incorporeal. 
   
However, each soul’s membership in one place of the cosmos is said to be 
temporary as, according to Origen, it is possible not only for one of the earth to 
become of heaven, but also for one ‘of this world’ of being no longer part of this 
world (ComJn, XIX.135).42 In this regard, I find extremely interesting the 
connection Origen makes between this passage (Jn. 8:23) and the passage of 
Jn. 15:19: ‘You were of the world and I chose you out of the world, and you are 
no longer of the world’. The quotation of this passage reveals Origen’s attitude 
towards the so-called pneumatological books of the Gospel, where the concept 
of ‘leaving the world’ by means of the Holy Spirit is revealed as a key Johannine 
theme. Here, the exodus of souls from this perceptible world is accomplished by 
means of the Saviour, who ‘descends in the lower parts of the earth’ (ComJn, 
XIX.137) and even descends in Hades in order to save the lost souls (ComJn, 
                                                 
42 Regarding the possibility of transiting from one status to another according to the degree of 
one’s sin, Origen takes the geographical location of the Bible to signify different places of the 
cosmos, according to the so-called topography of the soul. In this regard see my own article: 
Giovanni Hermanin de Reichenfeld, ‘From Capernaum to Jerusalem: Noetic History and Historical 
Occurrences in Origen’s Sacred Geography of the Holy Land’, in Origeniana Duodecima, 
Forthcoming 2019. In this regard, it is particularly worth noting Origen’s cosmological 
interpretation of the city of Jerusalem, which is said to represent the natural place of the saint’s 
soul. However, this citizenship is not irreversible, as it can be undermined by sin: ‘And this city, 
to which none of those on earth ascends or enters (ἀναβαίνει οὐδὲ εἰσέρχεται), is also called 
Jerusalem. And every soul (πᾶσά ψυχὴ) which has a natural exaltation (φυσικὸν ἔχουσα δίαρμα) 
and sees noetic things (νοητῶν διορατικὴν) clearly and sharply is a citizen of this city. It is possible 
even for a resident of Jerusalem to be in sin, for even the best natural dispositions can sin 
(δυνατὸν γὰρ καὶ τοὺς εὐφυεστάτους ἁμαρτάνειν), destroying their goodness of disposition and 
not only sojourning in one of the foreign cities of Judea, but also being enrolled as a citizen there, 
unless they turn back quickly after the sin’ (ComJn, X.132-133). On Origen’s topography of the 
soul see: Eberhard Schockenhoff, Zum Fest der Freiheit: Theologie des christlichen Handelns bei 
Origenes, Mainz 1990, p. 79-80. See also: Dagmar Stoltmann, Jerusalem - Mutter - Stadt: zur 
Theologiegeschichte der Heiligen Stadt, Altenberge 1999, p. 185. Both studies are based on 




140-142). Therefore, Origen envisions a hierarchical structure in which there are 
multiple levels of being in the world: a) some, like the Devil, belong to the lower 
part of the world; b) others are in this world and are ‘from earth’, like the apostles; 
c) a few, like John the Baptist, are ‘from heaven’ but dwell nonetheless in this 
‘world’. 
  
There is no doubt, however, that all these creatures ‘from below’ are destined to 
ascend to the higher places. This spiritual ascent has been already accomplished 
by the soul of Jesus which ‘has leaped over all the heavens, already reached God 
himself’ (ComJn, XIX.145). Due to the Saviour’s example, all creatures have been 
made able to ascend, as he clarifies through the example of Jesus’ disciples who 
will be led ‘to the things that are above all the heavens (τὰ ὑπεράνω πάντων τῶν 
οὐρανῶν), that is to the things that are incorporeal (τὰ ἔξω σωμάτων)’ (ComJn, 
XIX.137). The ascent of the soul by means of the Saviour is then said to produce 
fruits of the Spirit (Gal. 5:22) as opposed to the works of the flesh.43 Hence, 
Origen’s interpretation of the distinction between the holy community and ‘those 
who belong to the world’ does not correspond to the distinction between those ‘of 
the earth’ and those ‘of the heaven’, but between those who still have a body and 
those whose very essence has become purely noetic, that is, utterly intellectual 
and incorporeal.44 The process of the soul of becoming noetic is accomplished 
by means of a noetic ascent that will eventually happen to all the souls residing 
in ‘this world’, even those in Hades, which will go ‘out of the world’ later than those 
of the earth (ComJn, XIX.141). The noetic ascent (νοητῆς ἀναβάσεως) that the 
soul will accomplish inversely resembles the noetic descent of the soul (τῆς 
νοητῆς καταβάσεως τῆς ψυχῆς) because of wickedness and evil thoughts 
(ComJn, XIX.144).  
   
                                                 
43 For the role of the Spirit, see infra, IV.2.4 
44 In this regard, it is again interesting to look at Origen’s interpretation of the city of Jerusalem. 
In ComJn, XIII.77-85 Origen states that Jerusalem is the Church built of living stone, ‘the place 
where spiritual sacrifices (πνευματικαὶ θυσίαι) are offered to God by people who are spiritual (ὑπὸ 
τῶν πνευματικῶν) and who have understood the spiritual law (τὸν πνευματικὸν νενοηκότων 
νόμον)’ (ComJn, XIII.84). Nevertheless, Origen adds that, when the fullness of time comes and 
‘one is no longer in the flesh but in the Spirit’, then there will be no need to worship in Jerusalem, 
since ‘the incorporeal worship (τὴν ἔξω σωμάτων προσκύνησιν) will begin at the time of 
perfection’ (ComJn, XIII.87). Consequently, Origen deems the adoration in Jerusalem or in any 
place of the perceptible world – no matter how high – to be disregarded in favour of the truly noetic 
adoration taking place in the noetic and incorporeal world. This interpretation is confirmed a few 
lines later, when he explains that he who is perfect does not worship the Father in Jerusalem, but 




Origen’s depiction of the concept of ‘the world’ now clarifies the opposition 
between the ‘perceptible world’ and the ‘noetic world’, which Origen deduces from 
the very text of the Gospel of John. Nonetheless, it is now necessary to enquire 
about the relation between these two worlds. Addressing one of the main 
concerns of the Gospel, that is, the removal of the elect from ‘this world’ and their 
consequent participation in the noetic world, Origen provides further details about 
how the noetic world should be understood: 
      
But there is also another world in which there are things that are not seen, 
besides the manifest and perceptible world (δεικνύμενον καὶ αἰσθητὸν 
κόσμον) that consists of heaven and earth, or of heavens and earth. Now 
this in its entirety is an invisible world (ὅλον τοῦτο κόσμος ἀόρατος) which is 
not seen, and a noetic world (νοητὸς κόσμος) on whose appearance the pure 
in heart will see [..] God, to the degree that God is disposed by nature to be 
seen (ὡς ὁρᾶσθαι πέφυκεν ὁ θεός) (ComJn, XIX.147). 
   
The noetic world stands here as the place where those who will be worthy will 
see God to the maximum extent of their own capacity. Being purely and 
absolutely noetic, this world constitutes the principle that rules the whole 
universe, since it would not be possible for the perceptible world to exist without 
participating in the noetic world. For this reason, Origen explains that it is possible 
to understand the Son of God to be ‘world’, especially insofar as Wisdom is one 
of his epinoiai: 
  
Since he is the principles (λόγοι) of absolutely everything according to which 
all things made by God in Wisdom have come to be […] he would himself be 
in himself “a world” that surpasses the perceptible world (τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ 
κόσμου) in its diversity and excels it as much as the principle (λόγος) stripped 
of all the material of the whole world (γυμνὸς πάσης ὕλης τοῦ ὅλου κόσμου) 
differs from the material world (τοῦ ἐνύλου κόσμου), a world constituted not 
on the basis of matter, but on participation of the things that have been set 
in order in the Word and Wisdom, which set matter in order (ἀπὸ τῆς μετοχῆς 






Since everything that exists is made by God in Wisdom – specifically, by God the 
Father through God the Son, who is both Logos and Wisdom – the principles that 
govern the world reside in the Son. Even the principles (λόγοι) that govern the 
perceptible world do not reside in the perceptible world. Rather, they reside in the 
noetic world by participating in the Son, here interpreted as the very Logos 
(Λόγος). Hence, the Son can be rightfully said to be the noetic world insofar as 
everything noetic belongs and finds its reason for existing in the Son. The Son 
himself is the noetic world and the sensible world subsists thanks to its 
participation in the noetic world, that is, the Logos. In other words, this noetic 
world ought to be intended as the highest possible level of participation in the 
Logos. On the basis of the interpretation of the Son of God as a ‘world’ Origen 
affirms further his interpretation of Jesus’ words ‘I am not of this world’ with 
reference to the soteriological role of the Son of man, that is, to Jesus’ soul: ‘And 
see if the one who says “I am not of this world” can be the soul (ψυχὴ) of Jesus 
which is a citizen of that whole world (ἐμπολιτευομένη τῷ ὅλῳ κόσμῳ ἐκείνῳ), 
traversing it in its entirety and leading his disciples to it’ (ComJn, XIX. 148). Given 
that the soul of Jesus brings his disciples out of the perceptible world, Origen 
interprets the unification between the soul of Jesus and the Logos as the capacity 
of this soul to transcend everything that is not noetic in its essence. Consequently, 
Jesus’ promise to bring his disciples with him represents the higher possible level 
of salvation which a soul can achieve.  
 
Lastly, Origen corroborated his argument by explaining the ontological 
differences between ‘below’ and ‘above’, interpreted as the difference between 
κτίσις and καταβολή. While Origen admits the possibility that something in the 
perceptible world is ‘from above’ in a geographical sense – like the heavens are 
above the earth – he still deems it impossible to conceive anything in the 
perceptible world to be ‘from above’ in an absolute sense. Similarly, the noetic 
world does not know any degradation of being, because everything in the noetic 
world is ‘from above’. The reason for this interpretation should be found in the 
very nature of the perceptible cosmos which is considered to be a “fall” or a 
“throwing down” (καταβολή) rather than a “creation” (κτίσις): 
  
That world (ἐκεῖνος ὁ κόσμος) has nothing below even as this world has 




this world, whose creation is a throwing down (ἡ κτίσις καταβολή ἐστιν), have 
anything above? For one must not hear the phrase “before the throwing down 
of the world (πρὸ καταβολῆς κόσμου)” (Jn. 17:24) in an ordinary manner, 
because the saints coined the expression “throwing down” to express such 
a concept advisedly. Otherwise, they could have said “before the creation of 
the world” (πρὸ κτίσεως κόσμου) instead of using the expression “throwing 
down” (πρὸ καταβολῆς). The whole world, therefore, and the things in it are 
included in the “throwing down” (Ὅλος οὖν ὁ κόσμος καὶ τὰ ἐν αὐτῷ ἐν 
καταβολῇ ἐστιν). But the genuine disciples of Jesus, whom he chose out of 
the world (ἐκ τοῦ κόσμου), that […] they might no longer be of the world, 
come to be outside of the throwing down of the world in its entirety (ComJn, 
XIX.149-150). 
 
It is absolutely crucial to notice that Origen’s interpretation of the whole 
perceptible world as a καταβολή does not come from anything other than the text 
of the Gospel of John, since Origen’s argument rests on the words of Jesus in 
Jn. 17:24: ‘Father, I want those you have given me to be with me where I am, and 
to see my glory, the glory you have given me because you loved me before the 
throwing down of the world (πρὸ καταβολῆς κόσμου)’.45 Here, the word καταβολή 
is explicitly taken by Origen to mean ‘a descent of all alike from higher to lower 
condition’.46 On the contrary, Origen commonly uses the word κτίσις to indicate 
everything that is derived or begotten by something else.47 Therefore, everything 
that exists has been generated in Wisdom as belonging to the noetic cosmos. 
Nonetheless, insofar as the actual creation is now a καταβολή, it is part of the 
perceptible cosmos, which is indicated by the Gospel with the term ‘this world’. 
Thus, one could say that the difference between κτίσις and καταβολή resides in 
the very meaning of the words, as the former points out to the pure generation of 
                                                 
45 The same expression is found in the Epistles of Paul, especially Eph. 1:4: ‘For he chose us in 
him before the throwing down of the world (πρὸ καταβολῆς κόσμου) to be holy and blameless in 
his sight’. However, Origen’s interpretation of the Johannine and Pauline instances is the same, 
as both verses point out to a protological/eschatological time when the souls, begotten by God, 
join the perfect contemplation of the Son in the noetic world. The event of the “throwing down” 
(καταβολή) is taken as the same event that temporally transforms the creation (κτίσις) – that is, 
everything that is begotten – into “throwing down” (καταβολή) – that is, the fallen. Anyway, I think 
that Origen is here having in mind the Johannine instance, as the verse is more consistent with 
the reference to Jesus’ soul being a citizen of the noetic world.  
46 Origen gives this definition also in On First Principles III.5.4.  
47 I have already discussed this problem in the thesis in II.2.2. On the meaning of κτίσις in Origen 
see: H. Crouzel and M. Simonetti, Origène. Traité des Principes, 40-41; H Crouzel, Origen, p. 
198-204 and T. Greggs, Barth, Origen, and Universal Salvation, p. 154. See also ComJn, 90-109, 




rational creatures, while the second to the fallen materiality of the perceptible 
world.  
   
IV.1.5 Reconstructed Dualism: The Two Worlds, Their Participation in God 
and the Body 
  
Having analysed in detail Origen’s interpretation of the concept of ‘the world’ in 
his exegesis on the Gospel of John, it is now time to draw some conclusions.  
  
First of all, it is worth underlining the consonance between Origen’s 
hermeneutical principles expounded at the beginning of the Commentary and his 
actual exegesis of the Gospel. Origen’s notion of two opposing worlds – a 
perceptible world and a noetic one – derives from his theory about the 
hermeneutical difference between the perceptible gospels, which need to be 
decoded by the interpreter, and a noetic and spiritual Gospel (εὐαγγέλιον νοητοῦ 
καὶ πνευματικοῦ) (ComJn, I.45), which is instead eternal. Just as the visible 
Gospel acquires its ontological principle in its participation in the noetic meaning 
it conveys, the perceptible world only exists by participating in the noetic one, 
which is said to furnish the principles (λόγοι) on which the perceptible world 
subsists. Thus, the same theological mechanism is used by Origen in both 
hermeneutical and metaphysical speculations. Leaving aside the question of the 
philosophical derivation of such an ontological framework,48 it is worth noting that 
it is indeed the exegetical structure that allows Origen to hold together coherently 
the Gospel’s dualism within a metaphysics whose final objective is to show the 
noetic-soteriological function of the coming of the Saviour in the world.  
  
Secondly, this analysis suggests that Origen is fully aware of the dualistic 
structure of the text of the fourth Gospel and that he intentionally replicates this 
                                                 
48 Due to brevity, it is here impossible to discuss such topic further. On the embodiment of the 
souls and on similarities and differences between the doctrine of Origen and that of held by the 
Platonic tradition see the discordant opinions of: Peter W. Martens, ‘Embodiment, Heresy, and 
the Hellenization of Christianity: The Descent of the Soul in Plato and Origen’, in Harvard 
Theological Review 108 4 (2015), p. 594-620; M. Edwards, Origen Against Plato, p. 87-122 and 
Panayiotis Tzamalikos, Origen: Philosophy of History and Eschatology, Leiden 2007, p. 17-18. 
For two radically different assessments of Platonism and Philosophy in Origen see J. S. O’Leary, 
Christianisme et philosophie chez Origène; Mark Edwards, ‘Origen's Platonism. Questions and 




dualism in his Commentary. In this regard, the verses of Jn. 8:23 – where the 
Johannine concept of ‘this world’ is fully operative – and the one of Jn. 17:24 – 
where the concept of ‘this world’ is defined as a καταβολή – have proven 
instrumental to his explanation of the meaning of the term ‘world’. Taking the 
move from that fact that Jesus and his disciples are said not to be ‘of this world’, 
Origen’s separation of the two worlds rests mainly on the concept of καταβολή 
(throwing down), for this allows him to explain that this world is not evil in its 
fundamental principles – as it is in Augustine’s interpretation – but rather in its 
imperfect participation (μετοχή) in the noetic principles that rule the universe. On 
the one hand, the world in which the elect participate is referred as κτίσις; on the 
other hand, ‘this world’ of darkness is the result of the καταβολή. Hence, Origen 
smooths the Johannine dualism since the ‘participation’ of ‘this world’ in the saved 
world partially eliminates the radical dualism between holy community and ‘world’, 
thus amending the radical irreconcilability presented by the Gospel. This 
operation should not, however, be intended as a lack of interest for – or even a 
betrayal of – the text, rather as the result of the participation of everything that 
exists in the generative principles that pose it into existence. From a soteriological 
perspective, this means that salvation is no longer interpreted as salvation out of 
the world, but rather as salvation of the world. Therefore, notwithstanding the fact 
that Origen’s dualism between noetic and perceptible world is less ‘dualistic’ than 
the Gospel of John itself, it is still a clear result of an authentic exegetical effort. 
In this regard, it is worth noting that Origen’s understanding of the double 
meaning of the world is systematically and consistently applied throughout the 
Commentary. In interpreting the ‘lamb of God who takes away the sins of the 
world’, Origen affirms the universal salvation for every creature since they 
participate by nature in the noetic cosmos. Similarly, in interpreting the Saviour 
as ‘light of the world’, Origen affirms the universal participation of every rational 
creature in the Logos.  
 
Finally, this section has analysed the way in which Origen understands the noetic 
world. First, this world is assumed by Origen to coincide with the Son. In other 
words, this world is noetic insofar as it participates in the absolute reason (Logos) 
of the Son. Being entirely noetic, this world is depicted as completely immaterial 




and incorporeal (τὰ ἀσώματα) are said to subsist.49 The lack of any body or matter 
in the noetic world is recurrently underlined by Origen, thus marking a qualitative 
difference between the noetic world and the heavens. While heavens and 
paradise are depicted to be a better place than earth but, nonetheless, within the 
perceptible world, the noetic world does contain only things that are completely 
without body (τὰ ἔξω σωμάτων) (ComJn, XIX.137; XIII.87). Therefore, the noetic 
world is very different from the place where the angels or the celestial powers 
reside.50 Even John the Baptist, who is said to be an angel, is supposed to be 
sent from heavens rather than from the noetic world. The difference between the 
two seems here to stand precisely in the fact that the heavens are not entirely 
noetic, thus allowing even to the more perfect creatures the presence of a body 
of some sort. On the contrary, the depiction of the noetic world rests in the bold 
assertion of the absolute absence of body and matter from it. However 
controversial this affirmation may be among Origen’s scholars, it does seem to fit 
both the letter and the logic of Origen’s understanding of the world in the 
Commentary. However, I do not wish to affirm here the absolute immateriality of 
eschatological creatures.51 Indeed, this purpose is beyond the interest of this 
                                                 
49 Tzamalikos rightly points out to the fact that in On First Principle II.3.6 Origen makes a 
distinction between things which are invisible (τὰ ἀόρατα) and things which are incorporeal (τὰ 
ἀσώματα). According to Origen not everything that is invisible is also incorporeal, as there are 
things that cannot be seen but still have a body, albeit different from that of human beings. 
Tzamalikos deduces from this distinction the fact that Origen never speaks of the world as 
something incorporeal, but only invisible. See P. Tzamalikos, Origen: Cosmology and Ontology 
of Time, p. 110-112. On the contrary, I have pointed out the fact that the theological concept of 
‘the world’ in Origen’s thought is applied to the incorporeal (noetic) world just as to the perceptible 
one.  
50 In this regard, it is worth mentioning Origen’s interpretation of Jn. 4:35. ‘Don’t you have a saying, 
‘It’s still four months until harvest’? I tell you, open your eyes and look at the fields! They are ripe 
for harvest’. In ComJn, XIII.2709-284, Origen interprets the fields that are ready for the harvest 
as representing the entirety of existing material beings, even the celestial ones who reside in 
heaven. Accordingly, those who lift up their eyes are those who, being transformed into the same 
image and glory, have assumed the likeness of God. This kind of transformation is the one 
depicted in this chapter as the shift between the perceptible and the noetic world.  
51 Origen’s wavering attitude on this specific problem makes this topic too long to be tackled here. 
Several scholars strongly deny that Origen admitted for any creature the possibility of existing at 
the end of time without a body. Among them see: Henri Crouzel, ‘La 
doctrine origénienne du corps ressuscité’, in Bulletin de Littérature Ecclésiastique 81 (1980), p. 
175-200, 241-266; M. Edwards, Origen against Plato, p. 87-11; Mark Edwards, ‘Origen’s Two 
Resurrections’, in The Journal of Theological Studies 46 2 (1995), p. 502-518; P. Tzamalikos, 
Origen: Philosophy of History and Eschatology, p. 309-328. On the other hand, other scholars 
maintain that, at the end of the world, creatures will be endowed with complete immateriality. See 
among them Franz Heinrich Kettler, ‘Neue Beobachtungen zur Apokatastasislehre des Origenes’, 
in Henri Crouzel and Antonio Quacquarelli (eds), Origeniana Secunda, Rome 1980, p. 339-348; 
H. Strutwolf, Gnosis als System, p. 334-356; Anders-Christian Jacobsen, ‘Origen on the Human 
Body’, in L. Perrone (ed), Origeniana Octava, p. 649-656. In the last Origeniana conference 
(Origeniana Duodecima, Jerusalem, 25-29 June 2017) an entire panel was devoted to this topic 
with two divergent relations held by Alfons Fürst and Anders-Christian Jacobsen, both entitled 




thesis. What is at stake here is the idea that salvation is a process which is 
achieved by immaterial and bodiless means, that is, by the noetic participation in 
the noetic world. Whether or not a kind of body remains in eschatological times 
to furnish the material substratum which allows creatures to maintain their 
singularity is a different question from the one under discussion here.  
 
However, it is worth noting that salvation is pointed out by Origen as consisting 
in the full incorporeal participation of Jesus’ disciples into the noetic world. The 
soul of Jesus is said to be a citizen of that noetic world and, even more 
importantly, this world is said to be the dwelling place for the disciples of Jesus. 
The noetic world is therefore depicted as the highest possible level of salvation. 
There, after having reached the ‘end of the age in his intellect’ (τὴν τοῦ αἰῶνος 
συντέλειαν τῷ νῷ), the soul will stand in pure and immaterial contemplation of the 
fullness of the Logos. In this regard, it is worth underlining the difference between 
the Devil who, because of his fall, ‘deserved to be bound to matter and body (ὕλῃ 
καὶ σώματι)’, and the saints who ‘continued to live a completely immaterial 
(ἄϋλον) and bodiless (ἀσώματον) life in blessedness’ (ComJn, I.97). Salvation is 
therefore understood by Origen as the intellectual participation in this noetic and 
bodiless world, to which the souls of Jesus’ disciples will one day belong, whilst 
the soul of Jesus already does.  
  
As this salvation is construed as participation in the Son and his epinoiai (aspects) 
– particularly the Logos – it is certainly worth asking what the role of the Holy 
Spirit is. If the end will coincide with the perfect participation of all rational 
creatures in the Logos, what role does Origen envision for the Spirit in the 
eschatological times? Where then does the soteriological role of the Spirit lies? 











The previous section of this chapter has focused on understanding Origen’s 
interpretation of the concept of ‘the world’ in the Gospel of John. It has been 
shown that, as Origen’s interpretation allows a double meaning of the term, the 
main significance of this concept points out to the existence of the noetic cosmos, 
which is also interpreted as the highest possible point of participation in God. 
Described as the fullness of logical and ontological participation of the soul in 
God, the noetic cosmos is the end toward which all λογικοὶ run. The aim of this 
new section is to understand the way in which this process is accomplished. In 
particular, it aims at understanding the role of the hypostasis of the Holy Spirit in 
the process of ascent, his relationship to the λογικοὶ and the soteriological role he 
plays in the perceptible world. In order to achieve this goal, the first subsection 
will propose a short description of the ontological differences between the Father, 
the Son and the Spirit in their relationship to the world, drawing partly from the 
conclusion of chapter II. The second subsection will analyse the relationship 
between λογικοὶ and Logos, with particular regard to the relationship between the 
Logos and the cosmos. After having analysed the kind of soteriological 
relationship between the Son and the world, the third section will analyse the 
relation between the hypostasis of the Holy Spirit and those who are called 
πνευματικοὶ because of their participation in him. Lastly, the fourth subsection will 
deal with the soteriological role of the Spirit in the cosmos, thus analysing the way 
in which the Holy Spirit works for the salvation of human beings. As the Spirit is 
part of creation – in the sense that has been generated by the Father through the 
Son – he works in creation as the ontological medium which provides the rational 
beings with the spiritual substratum that allows their growth in understanding of 
the mysteries of the Son. Hence, this work will show that the Holy Spirit is the 
soteriological agent who provides the spiritual place of growth for the noetic 






IV.2.1 Father, Son and Holy Spirit: The Worldly Works of a Unified Trinity 
   
Every investigation on Origen’s understanding of the economic functions of the 
Trinity has to begin with the Father. Described by Origen as the only one who 
truly possesses immortality, the Father is also the only being who is completely 
unbegotten and self-sufficiently God (αὐτόθεος).52 Although both the Son and the 
Spirit are said to be ‘God’, Origen grants the appellative of the God (ὁ θεός), that 
is, God par-excellence and source of all divinity (ComJn, II.17-18), only to the 
Father. As such, the Father is consistently depicted in the whole Commentary as 
that being which is impossible to define. Tackling Jesus’ words regarding the 
‘fountain of water springing up into eternal life’ (Jn. 4:25), Origen explains that, 
while the Son could be said to be living and to be life, the Father is ‘beyond (ὑπὲρ) 
eternal life’ because, being ‘greater than the Son’ (Jn. 14:28), he surpasses the 
very concept of life. Even more interesting is Origen’s understanding of the 
Johannine dualism between light and darkness. While the Son is said to be ‘light 
of the world’ – the noetic light – the Father is deemed to be darkness, for he is 
completely unknowable to anything begotten, apart, maybe, the Son and the Holy 
Spirit:  
 
For if someone should perceive the mass of speculations (θεωρήματα) about 
God and the mass of knowledge (γνῶσις) which is incomprehensible 
(ἄληπτος) to human nature and to everything that is begotten too (γενητοῖς) 
with the exception, perhaps, of Christ and the Holy Spirit, he will know how 
darkness surrounds the Father (τὸν θεόν) (ComJn, II.172). 
 
Similarly, the Father is said not to be light, nor to be ‘Logos’ insofar as he cannot 
be contained by words or rational thoughts. As such, the Father is utterly 
inaccessible to everything that is begotten except, partially the Son and the 
Spirit.53  
                                                 
52 See also: ComJn, I.119; II.75; II.123-125; XIII.219.  
53 The reason for this ‘partially’ is explained in the second chapter of this thesis. See supra, II.1.3. 
Although Origen admits that the Son is the full reflection of his Father’s glory he has to logically 
maintain the possibility that there is something of the Father’s unknowability that is not known 
even to the Son. See: ComJn, I.187; II.150; II.172. Similarly, Origen has to account for the 
possibility that there might be some aspects of the Father who are known by the Son only and 
not by the Spirit. See: ComJn, II.126-127. Nevertheless, Origen maintains that the same knowable 
attributes of the Father are possessed by the Son and, similarly, the attributes of the Son are 
possessed at the same level by the Spirit, thus enhancing an ontological subordination of priority 





As a result of his incomprehensibility, the Father cannot have any direct contact 
with creatures, for they would not be able to understand him. Therefore, the 
communication of God’s being and of his mysteries to the cosmos falls, as it were, 
on the Son and on the Spirit. In this regard, Origen explains that the pre-eminence 
of the Father over every other being is comparable with that of the Son and the 
Holy Spirit over other creatures: ‘The Saviour and the Holy Spirit transcend all 
created beings (πάντων τῶν γενητῶν ὑπερέχειν) not only by comparison, but by 
their exceeding pre-eminence. The Father exceeds the Saviour as much, or even 
more, as the Saviour exceeds the rest’ (ComJn, XIII.151).54 Therefore, the 
exceeding power and majesty of the Father over the Son is mirrored in the 
majesty of the Son over creation. The ontological priority of the Father with regard 
to the other two hypostases is reflected in the ontological priority of the Son and 
the Spirit over the rest of creation. However, as the Son and the Spirit are different 
hypostases, they are regarded by Origen as having a different relationship to 
created natures. 
 
One of the more interesting places of the Commentary where Origen tackles the 
problem of the relation between Son, Spirit and creation is the comment on 
Jesus’s words to the Samaritan, particularly Jn. 4:24 – ‘God is Spirit’ – and Jn. 
4:32 – ‘I have food to eat that you know nothing about’. Discussing the description 
of God as Spirit, Origen states that this biblical statement should not be taken 
literally as a reference to God’s essence (οὐσία) because, in other parts of the 
Bible, God is also said to be ‘fire’ or ‘light’ (ComJn, XIII.124).55 Origen explains 
that, by admitting that God’s οὐσία is Spirit, light or fire, it would also be possible 
to admit that God has a body, possibly made of ether, as some of his opponents 
say.56 On the contrary, God must be understood as light insofar as he is 
                                                 
unknowability of the Father stands in his ineffability, which is not an ontological attribute. In this 
regard, see supra, II.1.3. In this regard, I agree with D. Williams, ‘The Son's Knowledge of the 
Father in Origen’, p. 146-153. 
54 For a full account of the ontological implications of the relationship between the three 
hypostases of the Trinity see the second chapter of this thesis, particularly supra, II.1.3.  
55 Origen quotes here Dt. 4:24; Heb. 12:29; 1Jn. 1:5.  
56 Origen is probably here polemicizing against the Stoic philosophers who used to speak of God 
as ether or fire. See: Cicero, On the Nature of the Gods I.14-15. See also Porphyry as quoted in 
Eusebius, Preparation for the Gospel XV.16. A similar view was held by some influential 
Christians, such as Tertullian, Against Praxeas VII. Origen conducts the same kind of polemic 
against the idea of God’s materiality in On First Principles I.1.1-9 and Against Celsus VI.70-71. 
For a full bibliography on Origen’s discussion see: R. Heine, Origen: Commentary, […] Book 13-




‘apprehended by the intellect (νοῦ), and is invisible and incorporeal (ἀόρατον καὶ 
ἀσώματον), because he is light of the mind’ (ComJn, XIII.137). Similarly, he is 
said to be fire as he ‘consumes everything material’ in the soul (ComJn, XIII.139). 
Finally, he is Spirit insofar as he is ‘breath (πνεῦμα) of life’. Being breath of life, 
the Spirit gives life to the soul, and prevents spiritual death, that is, ‘the separation 
of the soul from God and from the Lord himself and from the Holy Spirit’ (ComJn, 
XIII.140). Thus, while those who are separated from the Holy Spirit become 
earthly, those who receive the Spirit after the fall will be recreated and then will 
be saved (ComJn, XIII.141). Origen’s understanding of the πνεῦμα in this 
passage is twofold. On the one hand, the word ‘spirit’ indicates physical life – in 
the sense of ‘breath of life’. On the other hand, he is the force of God which 
prevents the soul from detaching from its fellowship of the Trinity. In this sense, 
the Holy Spirit is understood as the servant of the Son, who recreates human 
souls, so that they might be saved by the redeeming action of the Son.  
  
In order to avoid misunderstandings, it is worth remembering here that Origen’s 
interpretation of the Johannine sentence ‘God is Spirit’ does not entail the idea 
that the Spirit is one of the epinoiai of the Son. The separation of the Holy Spirit 
from the soul is regarded as an ontological separation of the soul from the third 
person of the Trinity which results in – but is not caused by – a lack of 
understanding of God. On the contrary, fellowship with the Holy Spirit grants the 
soul the ability ‘to be saved’ by the Son. In this regard, it is worth mentioning 
Origen’s interpretation of Jn. 4:32 – ‘I have food to eat that you know nothing 
about’. Here, Origen explains that this food represents the noetic participation of 
every begotten in the begetter. Moreover, Origen affirms: 
 
Not only do human beings and angels need noetic foods (τῶν νοητῶν 
τροφῶν), but so too does the Christ of God. He is always replenishing himself 
from the Father who alone is without need (ἀνενδεοῦς) and self-sufficient 
(αὐτάρκους). […] And it is also not out of place to say that the Holy Spirit is 
nurtured (ComJn, XIII.219-221).  
 
In other words, as the Son has everything by participation in the Father, who is 
the only self-sufficient God, so the Holy Spirit exists in participation in the Son. It 




extent it participates in the Son and in the Spirit. Every other being apart from the 
Son is therefore called λογικός and acquires different degrees of perfection by 
being nurtured by the Son and by the Spirit: ‘the higher parts [of the soul] that are 
higher than the physical body, are nurtured by incorporeal thoughts and words 
(ἀσωμάτοις νοήμασιν καὶ λόγοις) and sound actions. These higher parts will not 
be dissolved into non-being if they should not be nurtured, […] but they lose their 
distinctive character’ (ComJn, XIII.204). The first characteristic of created beings 
is, therefore, their inability to lose their nature of λογικοὶ, as this trait belongs to 
their natural status. However, other λογικοὶ do not comprehend the Father’s will 
– that is, participate in the Father – as much as the Son and the Spirit do (ComJn, 
XIII.231). The differences between λογικοὶ are therefore determined by their 
levels of noetic ascent: ‘on the one hand, there is a certain grassy spiritual food 
(πνευματικὴ ποώδης τροφὴ) for the more unreasonable souls (τῶν ἀλογωτέρων 
ψυχῶν) […] on the other hand, if someone is more rational (λογικώτερος) and for 
this reason is also noetic human being (νοητὸς ἄνθρωπος), he eats noetic bread’ 
(ComJn, XIII.212-213). A clear difference is here proposed by Origen between 
the food needed by those λογικοὶ which have a lesser participation in the Logos 
(ἀλογώτεροι) and those who have a higher participation (λογικώτεροι). In the first 
case, the food is said to represent a spiritual comprehension (πνευματικὴ), 
whereas in the other to have a noetic (νοητὸς) one. This difference, between 
spiritual and noetic seems to correspond in this passage to a difference in 
understanding of God resulting from a different degree of participation in the Son 
(noetic) and in the Spirit (spiritual).57 It is worth pointing out that, no matter what 
level of comprehension a λογικός may achieve of the Logos, it still does not fully 
partake in the totality of his attributes. Therefore, Origen understands the 
relationship between λογικοὶ and the Son as one of ontological subordination of 
superiority:  
 
It is only the Son who has comprehended the complete will of the Father 
(πᾶν τὸ θέλημα τοῦ πατρός) and does it, for which reason he is also his 
image. We must also take in consideration the Holy Spirit. The remaining 
holy beings, however, do nothing contrary to the will of God; […] 
                                                 
57 The difference between spiritual participation – that is, participation in the Spirit – and noetic 





Nevertheless, this does not suffice in order to be formed according to 
complete will (ComJn, XIII.231).  
 
Differently from the Father-Son-Spirit relation, where an ontological subordination 
of priority is found – that is, a subordination of generation in which the Father is 
prior to the Son but they both possess the same attributes at the same level, the 
relationship between the Son and the λογικοὶ is defined as an ontological 
subordination of superiority/inferiority. This means that, while the Son and the 
λογικοὶ possess the same attributes, the Son possesses them more fully – that 
is, to a greater extent – than the λογικοὶ that participate in him. This passage 
shows that holy λογικοὶ may comprehend much of God, but they maintain 
nonetheless a kind of subordination toward the Son and the Holy Spirit. 
Therefore, differently from the Spirit, the λογικοὶ not only are made through the 
Son, but are also inferior to the Son.  
 
The relation between the spiritual and noetic participation of the λογικοὶ in the 
Logos and in the Holy Spirit stands as the key to understanding the relationship 
between God and the world. In this regard, this short subsection has shown that 
God’s action toward the world in Origen’s thought should be understood as both 
one and multifaceted. While the Trinity works as a whole, every person of the 
Trinity performs a different role according to his ontological characteristics. 
Therefore, before tackling the way in which Origen understands the participation 
of those λογικοὶ in the Holy Spirit, the next subsection will deal with the proper 
definition of the λογικοὶ and with their place in the noetic and perceptible world.  
  
 
IV.2.2 The Logikoi and the Son 
IV.2.2.1 Participation and Contemplation 
 
Right from the first book of the Commentary, the relationship between God and 
the logikoi is presented by Origen as the ontological correlation between the 
Logos and the entirety of the rational cosmos. Consequently, the relation between 
the cosmos and the Son is not regarded as something external to the Son’s 




Son is regarded as ‘Logos’. Therefore, commenting on the first line of the 
prologue – ‘in the beginning was the word’ – Origen inserts a difference between 
‘beginning’ and ‘Logos’, according to which the Son-in-the-Beginning is identified 
with Wisdom, while the Son in his relation to the world is identified with Logos: 
 
It is Wisdom which is understood, on the one hand, taken in relation to the 
structure of the contemplation and thoughts of all things (περὶ τῶν ὅλων θεωρίας 
καὶ νοημάτων), but it is the Logos which is received, taken in relation to the 
communication of the things which have been contemplated to all rational 
beings (τὰ λογικὰ) (ComJn, I.111).  
 
Therefore, Origen defines the Son as Wisdom, insofar as he contemplates the 
eternal plan of creation in the Father, and Logos, insofar as this plan comes into 
being (ComJn, I.113).58 As the Logos is the communication of all things to the 
logikoi, he is also regarded as the one who ‘removes everything irrational (πᾶν 
ἄλογον) from us and make us truly rational beings (κατὰ ἀλήθειαν λογικοὺς)’, so 
that ‘we become rational in a divine manner (ἐνθέως λογικοὶ) when he destroys 
in us all that is irrational and dead, insofar as he is the Logos’ (ComJn, I.267-
268). The same interpretation is given commenting on the episode of Jesus’ 
casting out of the merchants from the temple (Jn. 2:13-20). Origen takes this 
image to mean the casting out of the irrational elements (τὰ ἄλογα) from every 
soul (ComJn, X.233-245). The ontological proximity between the Son and the 
logikoi results in the interpretation of salvation as the noetic contemplation of God 
by the holy souls, symbolised by the ‘harvest’ of Jn. 4:35-36,59 where it is said to 
happen in the mind (τῷ νῷ) and to be distinctive to the rational souls (τῇ λογικῇ) 
(ComJn, XIII.298).60 This contemplation is achieved by rational beings through 
knowledge, which is the unification of one’s soul with the object of knowledge: 
‘those who have been made one with and united with something (τοὺς 
ἀνακεκραμένους τινὶ καὶ ἑνωθέντας) know that with which they have been made 
                                                 
58 In this regard see: Sarah Spangler, ‘Christology as the basis of metaphysics in Origen's 
Commentary on John’, in J. Baun, A. Cameron, M. Edwards and M. Vinzent (eds), Studia 
Patristica 46, p. 247-251. 
59 Jn. 4:35-36: ‘Don’t you have a saying, “It’s still four months until harvest”? I tell you, open your 
eyes and look at the fields! They are ripe for harvest. Even now the one who reaps draws a wage 
and harvests a crop for eternal life, so that the sower and the reaper may be glad together’. 
60 In this regard, I completely agree with Jacobsen who states: ‘revealing God to human beings 
is thus not about making the invisible God visible, but about making him understandable’. See: A. 




one’ (ComJn, XIX.22).61 As knowledge means ‘to be made one with and united 
with (ἀνακεκρᾶσθαι καὶ ἡνῶσθαι)’ it follows that it is possible to know neither the 
Son nor the Father before that ‘unity and participation’ is achieved.62 Origen 
explains in this way the verses of Jn. 8:19 ‘you know neither me nor my Father; 
if you knew me you would know the Father’. God’s relation to human beings is 
therefore represented as a unification between the rational soul and the Logos of 
God, which provides the soul with ‘a share of his own divinity (θειότης)’ (ComJn, 
XIX.25). By living in the Son’s divinity, the soul finally ‘come to behold the 
essence, or the power and nature of God beyond the essence (ἐνιδεῖν τῇ οὐσίᾳ 
ἢ τῇ ὑπερέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας δυνάμει καὶ φύσει τοῦ θεοῦ)’ (ComJn, XIX.37).  
 
The brief analysis of the relation between Logos and creation reveals three main 
aspects of Origen’s Christological soteriology. First, the Son is the only means 
through which rational creatures can contemplate God, as he is the source of 
rationality. Secondly, God’s contemplation consists in the noetic contemplation of 
the Son’s essence, especially in his epinoia of ‘Logos’. Thirdly, the Father’s 
essence is not known by rational creatures insofar as the Father is ‘beyond 
essence’. Consequently, rational creatures can only have a glimpse of him 
through the contemplation of the Son.  
 
IV.2.2.2 The Son in the Cosmological Order    
 
In the previous section, it has been argued that the Saviour performs his 
redeeming action on the rational elements present in the perceptible world, 
transforming the creatures living in the perceptible world by means of their noetic 
participation in him. Therefore, commenting on the fact that Jesus ‘knew what is 
in each human being’ (Jn.2:24), Origen provides a double meaning for the term 
‘human being’. On the one hand, human being might signify ‘everyone who is 
according to the image of God, or every rational being (παντὸς τοῦ κατ’ εἰκόνα 
θεοῦ ἢ παντὸς λογικοῦ)’ (ComJn, X.316); on the other hand, the term can also 
                                                 
61 In this regard see John M. Dillon, ‘The knowledge of God in Origen’, in Roelof Van den Broek, 
Tjitze Baarda and Jaap Mansfeld (eds), Knowledge of God in the Graeco-Roman World, Leiden 
1988, p. 219-228. Here, the author focuses his research on the question of the knowledge of God 
on the metaphor of ‘light’.  




be restricted ‘to the mortal rational being alone (ἐπὶ τοῦ θνητοῦ λογικοῦ ζῴου 
μόνου)’ (ComJn, X.317). Accordingly, Origen explains that the world is 
constituted by rational creatures which are hierarchically disposed according to 
the order dictated by their degree of noetic participation in God. The highest 
rational creatures are unified with God to the point of being defined themselves 
as “gods”: ‘There are certain gods (θεοὶ) of whom God (ὁ θεὸς) is god […] There 
are other beings besides the gods. Some of this are called “thrones”, other are 
said to be “principalities”, and others besides these are called “dominions” and 
“powers”.’ (ComJn, I.212-214). The descending hierarchy of rational beings goes 
down from the purest beings to human beings and to demons. Christ is said to 
be Saviour of this entire rational world, as Origen plainly states that ‘he has clearly 
become human being to human beings and angel to angels’ (ComJn, I.217). The 
same interpretation of the cosmic salvific role of the Saviour is attested in the 
second book. Here, discussing the Saviour’s role as the ‘light of men’, Origen 
explains that it is possible to call ἄνθρωπος every rational creature of the world, 
especially since the names of higher powers, such as “thrones”, “principalities”, 
etc, ‘are not names of the natures of living beings, but of orders (οὐχὶ φύσεων 
ζῴων ἐστὶν ὀνόματα, ἀλλὰ τάξεων) of which this or that rational nature (λογικὴ 
φύσις) has been prepared by God’ (ComJn, II.146). Therefore, it is possible to 
call ἄνθρωπος every rational being, because the nature of everything that is 
rational is the same. This nature is that of being generated according to the image 
of God, that is, in participation with the rationality of the Son-Logos. 
  
Further reflecting on the relation between Logos and logikoi, Origen defines the 
relationship between human rationality and the Logos as equal to the one 
between the Son and the Father:  
 
The logos which is each logikos has the same position in relation to the 
Logos-in-the-Beginning-with-God, which is God-the-Logos, which God-the-
Logos has with God [the Father]. For as the Father is the very-God and true 
God in relation to the image […] so is the very-Logos in relation to the logos 
in each one’ (ComJn, II.20).63  
                                                 
63 The Greek text runs: Ὁ γὰρ ἐν ἑκάστῳ λόγος τῶν λογικῶν τοῦτον τὸν λόγον ἔχει πρὸς τὸν ἐν 
ἀρχῇ λόγον πρὸς τὸν θεὸν ὄντα λόγον θεόν, ὃν ὁ θεὸς λόγος πρὸς τὸν θεόν· ὡς γὰρ αὐτόθεος 
καὶ ἀληθινὸς θεὸς ὁ πατὴρ πρὸς εἰκόνα καὶ εἰκόνας τῆς εἰκόνος, […] οὕτως ὁ αὐτόλογος πρὸς τὸν 





The relation between the rational creatures, here defined by the plural λόγοι, and 
the source of their rationality (the Logos, at the singular) is equivalent to the one 
that subsists between the Father and the Son: ‘For both hold the place of a 
source: the Father, that of divinity (θεότητος), the Son, that of reason (λόγου)’ 
(ComJn, II.21). Once established the relation between Son and logikoi as the one 
between ‘the image’ and ‘those according to the image’, Origen further divides 
rational beings into four categories, since there are first, second or third ranks of 
logoi, depending on their participation in the Logos (ComJn, II.21-24).64 The 
division of the cosmos according to different ranks of being, which differ according 
to the degree of participation in the Logos, rests on the ontological participation 
of the rational creatures in the Son, who is the source of rationality. In other words, 
the Son and the logikoi are just as inseparable as the Father and the Son. The 
Logos is naturally implanted inside each human’s heart, ‘the Word which exists 
in the nature of rational being (τῇ φύσει τῶν λογικῶν) is a teacher who is 
inseparable (ἀχώριστός) from the student’ (ComJn, II.109), so much so that he is 
the Reason for their virtue and accountability (ComJn, XX.350-357). In short, 
Origen’s understanding of the relationship between the Son and the cosmological 
order of logikoi rests on the principles of generation and participation. As the 
Father generates the Son, the Son participates in the Father. Similarly, as the 
Son generates the rational creatures, they participate in him. Therefore, even the 
Devil, is said to be a logikos (ComJn, XX.237-252).65 Nevertheless, because the 
Father is the only one who possesses the fullness of every possible attribute, no 
logikos is said to possess blessedness by nature, that is, as an inseparable 
attribute (ὡς ἀχώριστον συμβεβηκὸς τὴν μακαριότητα) (ComJn, II.124). The 
degree of blessedness depends on the level of participation in the Son, thus 
revealing their relationship to the Logos as one of ontological subordination of 
inferiority.  
                                                 
64 Similarly, Origen describes four forms of logical adoration (ComJn, II.24-31) and four orders in 
relation to the name ‘God’ and to the Logos (ComJn, II.32-33).  
65 See in particular ComJn, XX.237-252, where the devil is explicitly defined as a logikos, which 
finds its own deepest nature in its rationality, just as every other logikos. In another passage, 
(ComJn, II.91-99) Origen affirms that, to the extent the devil is the devil, he is not a creation of 
God; nonetheless, to the extent he is a rational being he is considered to be creation (κτίσις). The 
same concept is expressed again in ComJn, XX.171-181. For the very same reason, Origen 
alludes more than once to the fact that the devil, just as the entirety of the cosmos, will be 
eventually saved when Christ will destroy the death. See: ComJn, I.236; XX.220-236. This view 
is explicitly stated in ComJn, XXXII.19-40. On the salvation of the devil see: M. Scott, ‘Guarding 





The difference between the divine participation of the Son (and, consequently, of 
the Spirit) in the Father and that of the logikoi in the Son rests on the possibility 
of fall. Origen does not allow this possibility for the Son and Spirit, which, 
consequently, participate fully in every attribute of the Father. On the contrary, 
the fallen state represents the cosmological reality of every rational creature. 
Every logikos who used to partake in deity before the fall, become part of the 
cosmological order after the fall, thus assuming different forms (ComJn, 
XXXII,229-239).66 However, every rational creature maintains a substance 
(οὐσία) which is shaped according to the image of the creator, regardless of the 
fact that it can become ‘image of the earth’ (ComJn, XX.182-197). The ontological 
subordination of inferiority results therefore in the possession of the same 
attributes of the Son at an inferior level. Despite this subordination, the possibility 
of participating in the noetic world, thus contemplating the Word-in-the-Beginning, 
is given to human beings by the knowledge of the Saviour. There are human 
beings that now see the Word-in-the-Beginning. The Saviour’s soul is one of 
them, but one day even the angels are said by Origen to see the Father without 
a mediator and servant, just as the Son sees the Father. This outcome is 
perceived by Origen as the end of times, when the Son will deliver the kingdom 
to the Father (ComJn, XX.46-64) for, through the perfect contemplation of the 
Son, everyone will see the Father (ComJn, XXXII.358-367). The ultimate 
redeeming action of the Son toward his creatures appears, therefore, to be 
directed to the whole cosmos of logikoi, which will be finally restored to the 





                                                 
66 This doctrine clearly refers to Origen’s doctrine of the pre-existence of the soul. In this regard, 
see: ComJn, II.175-185, where Origen refers to the doctrine of pre-existence as ‘our own opinion’.  
67 Regarding the delivering of the kingdom to the Father and the doctrine of apokatastasis in the 
Commentary on John see: E. Prinzivalli, ‘L'uomo e il suo destino nel Commento a Giovanni’ p. 
361-379. See also: Ilaria Ramelli, The Christian Doctrine of Apokatastasis: A Critical Assessment 
from the New Testament to Eriugena. Leiden, Brill, 2014, p. 1-222; Emanuela Prinzivalli, 




IV.2.3 The Pneumatikoi and the Spirit 
 
Thus far, the relationship between creatures and God has been presented as the 
ontological bond between the Son, particularly insofar as he is Logos, and the 
logikoi, which participate in him to different extents. For many years, Origen’s 
scholars have understood this relation to be the only one that truly matters in 
Origen’s soteriology.68 However, other scholars have recognised a preeminent 
role to the Holy Spirit in Origen’s soteriology. Among them, it is worth quoting 
scholars like McDonnell and Greggs,69 whose analyses are mostly based on 
Origen’s On First Principles and Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans. 
However, few scholars have proposed a deep analysis of Origen’s pneumatology 
in his Commentary on the fourth Gospel. A significant exception are the studies 
of Markschies and Radde-Gallwitz.70 The latter has analysed fragment 38 of the 
Commentary, concluding that Origen envisions the Holy Spirit as a substantial 
reality, rather than as an activity of the Son. The former, polemicizing against 
Ziebritzki and the German tradition which has interpreted Origen’s pneumatology 
as ‘a step in the air’,71 affirms the role of the Holy Spirit as necessary in the 
process of returning the upper part of human beings to God. Expanding on the 
works of these scholars, the following sections will be devoted to unfolding the 
soteriological role of the Spirit in Origen’s thought. Like Greggs, I understand the 
Spirit as the soteriological agent which provides ‘the place of growth towards God 
in salvation’ in the period ‘between creation and the eschaton’.72 However, 
differently from both McDonnell and Greggs, I do not believe that this 
soteriological role entails a smoothing of Origen’s subordinationism. On the 
contrary, the particularity of the Spirit’s role in Origen’s soteriology comes exactly 
from his peculiar essence, that is, from his subordination to the Son, which allows 
him to perform his mediating role between God and creation. In order to fully 
understand his soteriological role, this subsection will unfold what Origen means 
                                                 
68 As an example, see the latest – and one of the most complete – monograph on Origen’s 
soteriology: A. C. Jacobsen, Christ, the Teacher of Salvation. This work barely mentions the role 
of the Holy Spirit.  
69 K. McDonnell, ‘Does Origen Have a Trinitarian Doctrine of the Holy Spirit?’; T. Greggs, Barth, 
Origen, and Universal Salvation. 
70 See: C. Markschies, ‘Der Heilige Geist im Iohanneskommentar des Origenes’, p. 277-299; A. 
Radde-Gallwitz, ‘The Holy Spirit as Agent, Not Activity’, p. 229-235. 
71 Henning Ziebritzki, Heiliger Geist und Weltseele: das Problem der dritten Hypostase bei 
Origenes, Plotin und ihren Vorläufern, Tübingen 1994, p. 224. 




when he uses the term pneumatikos, thus focusing on the relation between the 
very substance of the Holy Spirit and those who are called spirituals by 
participation in him. The second section will instead be focused on analysing what 
kind of mediating role the Spirit performs. 
 
IV.2.3.1 The Participation in the Spirit 
 
In the first lines of his Commentary, Origen addresses Ambrose, a former 
Valentinian Christian, as one ‘eager to be a spiritual (πνευματικός), no longer a 
human being’ (ComJn, I.9). The characterisation of Ambrose as a pneumatikos 
allows him to ‘lean on Jesus’ breast’, that is, to understand the spiritual Gospel 
(ComJn, I.40). A few lines later, Origen explains that every Christian who is 
‘established in the Spirit’ is able to understand ‘the Word who was restored from 
being made flesh to what he was in the beginning’ (ComJn, I.43). The ability to 
understand the spiritual Gospel is thus defined as the first characteristic of all 
those who are called pneumatikoi who, being spiritual persons, are able to 
interpret both New and Old Testament in a manner according to the Spirit 
(ComJn, XX.66-79).73 So far, this definition might appear similar to the one of 
logikoi: just as a logikos is defined by his participation in the Son, so a 
pneumatikos is such by participation in the Spirit. Nevertheless, a strong 
distinction must be made: being a pneumatikos is not a permanent possession 
since, differently from the participation in the Logos, the participation in the Spirit 
can be lost and is not regarded as inherent to the natural condition of human 
beings. Commenting on the Saviour’s description as ‘light shining on the 
darkness’, Origen struggles against the interpretation the gnostic teacher 
Heracleon gives of the word “spiritual”. According to Origen, Heracleon deemed 
                                                 
73 In the entire Commentary on John, the ability of understanding the deeper meaning of the 
Scriptures is given by the participation in the Spirit. In ComJn, X.15-17 Origen states that the 
differences between Gospels should be explained by the fact that different evangelists were 
seeing God in the Spirit (βλέπουσι τῷ πνεύματι τὸν θεὸν), reporting this in different ways 
according to the different mystical meanings they wanted to convey. Therefore, every Gospel is 
different according to the letter but similar according to the Spirit, as the source of inspiration is 
the Holy Spirit. In this regard see what I state in IV.1.1 regarding the existence of only one noetic 
Gospel. For this reason, Origen affirms that it is impossible to understand the Scriptures if one 
does not contemplate the meaning of the Holy Spirit in it (τοῦ ἁγίου πνεύματος νοῦν μὴ θεωρῶν) 
(ComJn, X.298-306). Therefore, the Spirit plays a crucial role both in the inspiration and exegesis 
of the Scriptures, for it is only by participating in the Holy Spirit that one can get the deeper 
meanings. In this regard see also: ComJn, XIII.361. A similar argumentation can be found in On 




the spiritual nature to be one of the fixed natures of the Valentinian system.74 
Origen’s critique of Heracleon is based on the idea that being pneumatikos is not 
a permanent possession (ComJn, II.133-136). Moreover, Origen points out that, 
when Paul speaks about ‘spiritual’ in 1Cor. 2:14-15, he does not say “spiritual 
human” (πνευματικὸς ἄνθρωπος), but only “spiritual one” (ὁ πνευματικὸς).75 
Consequently, Origen concludes: 
 
It is no accident that he has not added the noun “man” in the case of the 
spiritual. For the spiritual (ὁ πνευματικός) is better than “human” 
(ἄνθρωπος), since human being is characterised either by soul or body (ἐν 
ψυχῇ ἢ ἐν σώματι) or both of these together, but not also by spirit, which is 
more divine than these (θειοτέρῳ πνεύματι). The spiritual receives this title 
in accordance with his predominant participation (κατὰ μετοχὴν 
ἐπικρατοῦσαν) in the Spirit (ComJn, II.138). 
    
As the spiritual is described joining a predominant participation (μετοχή) in the 
Spirit, this description implies the fact that not only human beings are able to 
become spiritual, but also that every being in the Cosmos might participate, in 
different ways, to the Spirit. This condition is said to be that of John the Baptist, 
                                                 
74 See: ComJn, XX.147-150; XX.168-170; XX.210-218. On Origen’s polemic with Heracleon on 
the idea of fixed nature see: Jeffrey A. Trumbower, ‘Origen's Exegesis of John 8:19-53: The 
Struggle with Heracleon over the idea of Fixed Natures’ in Vigiliae Christianae 43 2 (1989), p. 
138-154. Origen’s interpretation of Heracleon’s Commentary on John has not been deemed 
trustworthy by some scholars, who think Origen has interpreted Heracleon’s Commentary on the 
basis of the Valentinian speculation on the fixity of natures of his own time, rather than reporting 
Heracleon’s view. See: Einar Thomassen, ‘Heracleon’, in Tuomas Rasimus (ed), The Legacy of 
John: Second-Century Reception of the Fourth Gospel, Leiden-Boston 2009, p. 173-210. See 
also: Ansgar Wucherpfennig, Heracleon Philologus: Gnostische Johannesexegese im zweiten 
Jahrhundert, Tübingen 2002. However, other scholars strongly criticise this line of scholarship, 
deeming Origen’s account of Heracleon’s Commentary on John to be trustworthy. See in 
particular: Manlio Simonetti, ‘Un recente libro su Eracleone’, in Adamantius 9 (2003), p. 193-208. 
Although it is impossible here to discuss these two positions in detail, I tend to agree with 
Simonetti for many reasons. First of all, it seems unlikely that Origen is deliberately making up 
part of Heracleon’s text, since this very text was circulating at Origen’s time. Indeed, Origen would 
have risked a great deal making up sections of Heracleon’s text. Secondly, if we discard the idea 
that Origen was disingenuous, the only other option is to assume that Origen completely 
misunderstood the meaning of the whole Commentary by Heracleon, which he was reading in its 
entirety. If this is the case, I find highly unlikely that we, modern scholars, could be able to 
reconstruct the real meaning of Heracleon’s word through some fragments wrongly quoted by a 
naïve author (Origen!). For this reason, I also do not find convincing at all Kaler’s claim according 
to which Heracleon cannot even be deemed to be a Valentinian. See: Michael Kaler, ‘Was 
Heracleon a Valentinian? A New Look at Old Sources’, in The Harvard Theological Review 99 3 
(2006), p. 275-289. 
75 See 1Cor. 2:14-15: ‘The natural man (ψυχικὸς ἄνθρωπος) does not accept the things of the 




who is regarded to be an angel coming from higher regions of the Cosmos, thus 
being filled with the Holy Spirit (ComJn, II.175-185).  
 
IV.2.3.2 Human Spirit and Divine Spirit 
  
In another passage, commenting on Jn. 13:21 – ‘Jesus was troubled in the Spirit’ 
– Origen further complicates the meaning of the term ‘spiritual’, by asserting that, 
according to the Scriptures, a division must be made between human soul, 
human spirit and divine Spirit:  
 
I have observed that the soul (ψυχή) is something intermediate (μέσον) and 
capable of both virtue and evil, but the spirit (πνεῦμα) of human being which 
is in him is incapable of receiving things that are inferior, for the best things 
are fruits of the spirit, and not, as one might think, of the Holy Spirit, but of 
human spirit (ComJn, XXXII.218).  
   
This statement might seem to contradict what Origen has said previously 
regarding human beings being made of body and soul. The difference between 
the two passages stands in the fact that, while in the first quotation Origen defines 
the ‘spiritual’ as the one who partakes in the Holy Spirit, like John the Baptist, in 
the second one he is speaking of the human spirit, which stands as the 
ontological ‘container’ of all spiritual things. On the basis of his understanding of 
1Thes. 5:23, Origen holds a threefold anthropology, as he states in On First 
Principles and Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans.76 It is worth mentioning 
here that some scholars have deemed Origen’s threefold anthropology to be 
more functional than ontological.77 My thesis affirms that, as Origen understands 
the Holy Spirit to be the ontological place of growth of human’s soul in its path 
                                                 
76 On First Principles, III.4.2: ‘It is plain that the will of this soul is something intermediate between 
the flesh and the spirit, undoubtedly serving and obeying one of the two, whichever it has chosen 
to obey’. A similar concept is expressed in the Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans, I.18: 
‘We frequently find in the Scriptures, and we have often discussed this topic, that human being 
may be said to be spirit, body and soul. And when it is said “the flesh desires contrary to the spirit 
and the spirit desires contrary to the flesh” (Gal. 5:17) the soul is undoubtedly placed in the 
middle’. In this regard, see also: On First Principles, I.8.3; II.6.5; II.8.4. On the other scriptural 
sources of Origen’s anthropology see: Anders-Christian Jacobsen, ‘Genesis 1-3 as Source for 
the Anthropology of Origen’, in Vigiliae Christianae 62 3 (2008), p. 213-232. 
77 See: Theresia Heither, Translatio Religionis: Die Paulusdeutung des Origenes in seinem 
Kommentar zum Römerbrief, Cologne 1990, p. 198. See also: H. U. von Balthasar, Origen: Spirit 




toward God, it makes much more sense to interpret human spirit as an ontological 
place – or, maybe, as an ontological capacity of the soul – rather than as a logical 
function. In other words, Origen is here interpreting Jesus’ being troubled ‘in the 
spirit’ by explaining that ‘this experience had come to the realm of the spirit 
(ἐπικρατείᾳ τοῦ πνεύματος)’ (ComJn, XXXII.223). Differently from the soul, which 
is able of good and evil, the spirit is only capable of good things, thus representing 
the ontological capacity of the soul to grow towards God by means of participation 
in the Holy Spirit. This interpretation is corroborated by Origen’s doctrine 
according to which ‘the saint lives in the spirit (πνεύματι), […] so everything he 
does, whatever it may be, he does it in the spirit, even to the extent that if he 
suffers, he suffers in the spirit’ (ComJn, XXXII.224). As this is true for every saint, 
that is, for every logikos who have become also pneumatikos, it is even truer for 
Jesus.  
   
Similarly, Origen explains the difference between believing and knowing 
according to the participation in the Spirit. Origen clarifies that ‘to be in the flesh’ 
means to please God in no way; contrarily, to be ‘in the body’ means to ‘walk by 
faith’ – that is, to believe without properly understanding – as simple Christians 
do. Those who do not understand ‘the spiritual things of the Scriptures (τὰ 
πνευματικὰ τῆς γραφῆς)’ are thus said to be ‘present with the body’ but ‘absent 
from the Lord’, since God is Spirit. The higher level of participation in God is then 
reached by the ‘spiritual’, as ‘the one who compares spiritual things with spiritual 
(τὰ πνευματικὰ τοῖς πνευματικοῖς συγκρίνων), and who becomes spiritual, is 
absent from the body (ἐκ τοῦ σώματος) and present with the Lord’ (ComJn, 
XIII.361). The ‘spirit’ inside human beings represents, therefore, the capacity of 
ascending towards God. This capacity is granted by the very nature of the logikos 
who possesses in his own soul the Logos of the creator. This logos is defined by 
Origen as a ‘natural intelligent disposition (ἡ εὐφυὴς ἐν λόγῳ ψυχὴ)’, possessed 
by the soul ‘by nature (φύσει)’, which allows it to worship God according to the 
‘laws that are spiritual and heavenly (τοὺς οὐρανίους καὶ πνευματικοὺς)’ (ComJn, 
X.141). Similarly, Origen explains that, as the Holy Spirit came to Christ as a dove 
in Jn. 1:32, so it comes ‘to every human being which has the lord inside (ἐν 





From what has been said so far, it appears that the role of the human spirit is that 
of providing the ontological capacity of receiving the gift of the Holy Spirit which 
is administrated by the Son, thus allowing human beings to grow in contemplation 
of the Son. As such, it plays a very important role in the process of the ascent 
towards God:  
 
I think that everyone who has once been illuminated and tasted the heavenly 
gift and has become a participant in the Holy Spirit (μέτοχόν τε γενηθέντα 
πνεύματος ἁγίου), and tasted the good word of God and the powers of the 
age to come, and has fallen away again (παραπεσόντα πάλιν), renews 
himself to repentance. […] The spiritual economy (πνευματικὴ οἰκονομία) 
related to Jesus has always been present with the saints (ComJn, XX.89-
94).78  
 
In the process of fall and ascent of rational beings towards God, the Holy Spirit 
plays a crucial role, for one acquires the spiritual capacity of leaning toward the 
Son only by participating in him. Human spirit furnishes to human beings the 
capacity of growing by participation in the Holy Spirit. This process is described 
by Origen as similar to the process that leads the human part of Christ to be 
united with the Logos. As Christ is an inseparable unity of Logos and logikos, so 
the human souls which fully participate in the Holy Spirit become one spirit in 
God: ‘And I say “of both”79 also in the case of human beings in whose case each 
human being’s soul has been mixed with the Holy Spirit (ἀνακέκραται τῷ ἁγίῳ 
πνεύματι ἡ ἑκάστου ψυχὴ) and each of those who are saved become spiritual 
(πνευματικός)’ (ComJn, I.197). By having been made one with the Holy Spirit, 
these souls became more rational than others, as they perceived the invisible 
realities of the Son (ComJn, I.200), which are the ‘spiritual aspects of the Logos 
                                                 
78 Regarding the presence of the spiritual economy in the Old Testament and its relation to 
Origen’s doctrine of prophecy in the Commentary on John see: E. Norelli, ‘La profezia nel 
Commento a Giovanni’, p. 301-331. See also my own article: G. Hermanin de Reichenfeld, 
‘Resurrection and Prophecy: The Spirit in Origen’s Exegesis’, p. 143-153. See also ComJn, 
XIII.320-321and XIII.325-326, where Origen explains that the apostles and the prophets are said 
to rejoice together because they both participate in the same Holy Spirit. On the fellowship 
(κοινωνία) of the Holy Spirit as the force that allows the prophets to prophesy see ComJn, VI.119-
126. On the Holy Spirit as the force which leads both prophets and apostles to the vision of truth 
beyond the types, that is, to the fullness of Christ, see ComJn, VI.15-20; II.199-209. On the 
difference between spirit, soul and power see: ComJn, VI.62-71. 




(τὰ πνευματικὰ λόγου)’ that allow the spiritual ones to get knowledge of every 
living being in the cosmos (ComJn, X.99-110).  
 
From this brief presentation of the meaning of pneumatikos in Origen’s theology, 
three important aspects have arisen. First, Origen’s threefold anthropology 80 
envisions a precise role for human spirit: to endow every rational creature with 
the ontological capacity of participating in the Holy Spirit. Being the recipient for 
the Holy Spirit, the spirit which is in humans is only capable of good things, 
differently from the soul, which is ontologically neutral and capable of both good 
and bad. Secondly, it has been highlighted that when Origen speaks of someone 
as ‘spiritual’ he refers to his predominant participation in the Holy Spirit. Thirdly, 
the participation in the Holy Spirit is not always achieved by human beings and, 
consequently, does not represent a natural possession as the participation in the 
Logos. Fourthly, it is only by participating in the Holy Spirit that the soul becomes 
able to contemplate the higher aspects of the Son. The next subsection will be 
focused on understanding in which way the Holy Spirit operates in human beings 
and what the differences between his role and that of the Son are. 
    
IV.2.4 The ‘Material of the Gifts from God’: The Holy Spirit as the Substratum 
of the Noetic Ascent 
 
IV.2.4.1 The Spiritual Substratum 
 
In Origen’s Commentary on John, the Spirit is consistently presented as the first 
among created beings, generated through the Son by the will and power of the 
Father. In chapter II, I have described the relationship between Spirit and Son as 
an ontological subordination of priority, which makes the Spirit subordinated to 
the Son, but still participant in the most perfect way of all his attributes. In this 
sense, the Holy Spirit is defined as a logikos, being himself in need of the Son to 
be rational.81  
                                                 
80 See also: E. Prinzivalli, ‘L'uomo e il suo destino nel Commento a Giovanni’ p. 361-379. 
81 See: ComJn, II.76: ‘The Holy Spirit seems to have need of the Son ministering to his hypostasis 
(οὗ χρῄζειν ἔοικε τὸ ἅγιον πνεῦμα διακονοῦντος αὐτοῦ τῇ ὑποστάσει), not only for him to exist 
(εἶναι), but also for him to be wise (σοφὸν), and rational (λογικὸν) and just (δίκαιον), and whatever 





The entire argument presented by Origen about the Holy Spirit’s involvement in 
the world derives from his interpretation of the verse of Jn. 1:3: ‘Through him all 
things were made’. Nonetheless, he explains the soteriological role of the Holy 
Spirit in a very puzzling passage: 
  
I think, if I may put in this way, that the Holy Spirit supplies the material of the 
gifts from God (ὕλην τῶν ἀπὸ θεοῦ χαρισμάτων) to those who are called 
saints (ἁγίοι) thanks to him (δι’ αὐτὸ) and because of participation in him (τὴν 
μετοχὴν αὐτοῦ). This material gift that I mentioned (τῆς εἰρημένης ὕλης τῶν 
χαρισμάτων) is made effective from God (ἐνεργουμένης μὲν ἀπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ); 
it is administrated by Christ (διακονουμένης δὲ ὑπὸ τοῦ Χριστοῦ); it subsists 
in accordance with the Holy Spirit (ὑφεστώσης δὲ κατὰ τὸ ἅγιον πνεῦμα) 
(ComJn, II.77). 
  
Origen’s definition of the Spirit as the one providing the matter (ὕλην) of the gifts 
is extremely puzzling, especially considering Origen’s repeated assertion, both in 
the Commentary and in other works, of the complete immateriality and 
incorporeity of the Trinity.82 Accordingly, the reference to the material of the gifts 
from God should be interpreted as a metaphor underlining the different roles 
played by the three hypostases in the salvation of the cosmos. Indeed, each role 
is connected here to the very nature of the hypostasis which accomplishes it. 
Therefore, the Father is said to produce and make effective the gift. In this sense, 
the Father is the one who rules over the gift, which is a result of his own 
energeia.83 This role utterly belongs to the absolute transcendence of the Father, 
who is the only true God and source of every will and action. This will of the Father 
is then administrated by the Son, in virtue of the eternal participation of the Son 
in the Father. Through his epinoiai, rational creatures gradually gain a noetic 
knowledge of God, until they achieve the utter contemplation of the noetic world. 
                                                 
mentioned previously (πᾶν ὁτιποτοῦν χρὴ αὐτὸ νοεῖν τυγχάνειν κατὰ μετοχὴν τῶν προειρημένων 
ἡμῖν Χριστοῦ ἐπινοιῶν)’. In this regard see supra, II.2.1.  
82 See, among the many, On First Principles I.1.6; IV.3.15. 
83 The description of the ruling aspects of the higher level of the divine as its own energeia is 
attested in Plotinus as well. See: Enneads VI.8.12. As Edwards points out, a difference between 
the two stands in the fact that the energeia of the One ‘produces nothing but the One’, differently 
from the energeia of the Father in Origen which is administrated by the Son as a gift to lower 
beings. See: M. Edwards, Origen against Plato, p. 76. The reference to the gifts comes from Paul, 




Finally, the gifts are said to subsist in the Holy Spirit. The Holy Spirit is thus 
identified as the spiritual substratum in which every creature is said to rest in 
order to contemplate God.84 Therefore, the participation in the Spirit is necessary 
in order to gain the perfect contemplation of God. The verb used by Origen 
(ὑφίστημι) to describe the works of the Spirit indicates the ‘hypostatisation’ and 
the act of giving substance to these gifts. Rather than being indicated as a 
soteriological being of secondary importance, the Holy Spirit is revealed as the 
divine agent in whom every rational creature has to participate in order to be 
called ‘saint’.85  
  
IV.2.4.2 The Spiritual and the Noetic 
 
Origen’s definition of the role of the Spirit as the one of providing the spiritual 
substratum that is necessary for rational creatures to gain salvation defines the 
domain of his soteriological agency. However, it is worth underlining once more 
that the role of the Holy Spirit is not revealing of an ontological pre-eminence – 
or even equality – of the Spirit towards the Son. On the contrary, Origen explains 
that the main soteriological agency is still carried on by the Son, by whom the 
very hypostasis of the Holy Spirit is administrated:  
 
And maybe, we ought to say that the creation (κτίσις) - but also the human 
race - in order to be set free from the slavery of corruption, was in need of an 
incarnate, blessed, and divine power (μακαρίας καὶ θείας δυνάμεως 
ἐνανθρωπούσης) which would also restore the things on earth to order. This 
activity fell, as it were, in some way to the Holy Spirit (ἐπέβαλλέ πως τῷ ἁγίῳ 
πνεύματι ἡ πρᾶξις αὕτη). Since the Spirit cannot bear it (ὑπομένειν), he 
sends forth the Saviour, because he alone is able to bear such a great 
conflict. Although it is the Father, as leader, who sends the Son, the Holy 
Spirit joins in sending him in advance (συναποστέλλει καὶ συμπροπέμπει), 
                                                 
84 M. Edwards, Origen against Plato, p. 76 says that, with this interpretation, Origen is actually 
‘foreshadowing Augustine and his medieval imitators’. I will discuss the difference of the 
participation in the Spirit for the two authors in infra, VI. 
85 For this reason, I disagree with Simonetti who claims that, even though Origen envisioned the 
Spirit as a soteriological agent, he nonetheless had difficulties in assigning a specific role for the 
Spirit which is different from that of the Son. In fact, I believe that this chapter has shown that the 
concept of spiritual substratum represents the specific operation of the Spirit in relation to 
creatures. In this sense, the role of the Spirit does differ from that of the Son. See: M. Simonetti, 




promising to descend to the Son of God at the right time (ἐν καιρῷ) and to 
cooperate in the salvation of man (συνεργῆσαι τῇ τῶν ἀνθρώπων σωτηρίᾳ) 
(ComJn, II.83). 
 
In order for the κτίσις to achieve salvation after the καταβολή,86 the Son has to 
intervene in the creation. This soteriological work cannot be performed by the 
Holy Spirit because, being generated by the Father through the Son, he is part of 
that creation (κτίσις). Nevertheless, the Spirit is said to perform an important 
soteriological role ἐν καιρῷ, that is, at the ‘right time’. The ‘right time’ Origen is 
referring to, ought to be identified with the time of this world, that is, when the 
originally good κτίσις has committed sin and has become a καταβολή. According 
to the categories of noetic and perceptible world, the Spirit could be said to work 
in the perceptible world by furnishing the logikoi with the spiritual substratum that 
they need in order to gain the perfect contemplation of the noetic world, 
constituted by the Son and his epinoiai. By participating in the substance of the 
Holy Spirit, creatures become able to get the noetic contemplation of the eternal 
realities in the Son. This interpretation is further corroborated by the fact that, 
after having described the participation of creatures in the Holy Spirit, Origen 
starts speaking of the different epinoiai of Christ (ComJn, II.89ff.).  
 
In addition, the analysis proposed so far allows us to delineate better the 
difference between the realm of the noetic (νοητῶς) and that of the spiritual 
(πνευματικῶς) in Origen’s interpretation. On the one hand, noetic is used by 
Origen to indicate an immaterial and intellectual participation in the attributes of 
the Son.87 On the other hand, spiritual is used to indicate a participation taking 
place in the realm (ἐπικρατείᾳ) of the Holy Spirit - that is, while the soul is in the 
perceptible world. For the logikos, the first is a logical participation of attributes, 
whilst the second is an ontological participation of substance,88 thus explaining 
                                                 
86 On the difference between κτίσις and καταβολή see subsection IV.1.4.  
87 Similarly, there is a difference between spiritual and noetic interpretation of the Bible: ‘We must 
not suppose that historical events are types (τύπους) of other historical events (ἱστορικὰ) and 
corporeal things of corporeal things (σωματικὰ). On the contrary, corporeal things (σωματικὰ) are 
types of spiritual things (πνευματικῶν) and historical events (ἱστορικὰ) are type of noetic realities 
(νοητῶν)’ (ComJn, X.110). 
88 This distinction that I am proposing here should not be interpreted rigidly. In all his works, Origen 
tends to use a fluctuating terminology, according to the literary genre and type of audience. 





why Origen regards the participation of the logikoi in the Logos as different from 
that participation they have in the Holy Spirit. Since ‘all rational creatures (λογικά) 
have a share in Christ’ (ComJn, II.80) according to their degree of sin and 
knowledge, rational creatures participate in the noetic world at different levels, 
thus always remaining naturally participant in the Son. On the contrary, 
participation in the Spirit – and the very definition of pneumatikoi – could be 
completely lost with sin. This difference resides in the fact that this participation 
is not instantiated in the knowledge of noetic realities, but rather in the very 
substance of the Spirit. While participating in the Son means to progressively gain 
a higher understanding of the noetic epinoiai of the Son, – Wisdom, Truth, Light, 
Justice – participating in the Spirit provides the spiritual matter, that is, the 
spiritual substratum, that allows rational creatures to detach themselves from the 
perceptible world and start living in the noetic world. 
 
IV.2.4.3 The Spirit in the Cosmos 
  
After having explained the subtle difference between noetic participation in the 
Son and spiritual participation in the substance of the Holy Spirit, it is worth 
analysing some of the most significant passages of the Commentary where 
Origen further explains the relationship between the Holy Spirit and the cosmos. 
The three most important passages are Origen’s interpretation of the adoration 
‘in Spirit and truth’ (Jn. 4), the interpretation of the temple (Jn. 8) and the washing 
of disciple’s feet (Jn. 13). Moreover, it is worth mentioning the role of the Spirit in 
the problem of the forgiveness of post-baptismal sins. In these episodes, the Holy 
Spirit’s relation to the cosmos presents these three features: 1) The Spirit is 
consistently presented as a soteriological agent which is administrated by and 
subordinated to the Son. 2) The Holy Spirit furnishes the ontological matter, that 
is, the spiritual substratum, which allows rational creatures to gain a higher 
participation in the Son. 3) The Spirit is said to operate in the present time and in 
the perceptible world, rather than in the eschatological times.  
 
In regard to the last point, it is worth noting Origen’s interpretation of Jn. 4:23: 
‘But the hour is coming, and it is now, when the true worshippers will worship the 




said some verses before (Jn. 4:21): ‘the hour is coming when neither on this 
mountain nor in Jerusalem you will worship the Father’. Origen points out that 
twice the Gospel says that ‘the hour is coming’, but only in the second it adds 
‘and it is now’. According to Origen, this reveals a difference between the two 
hours: ‘I think the first means the incorporeal worship (τὴν ἔξω σωμάτων 
προσκύνησιν) that will begin at the time of perfection. The second, however, 
means, I think, the worship of those being perfected in this life so far as it is 
possible for human nature to progress’ (ComJn, XIII.87). The difference between 
the two hours is therefore indicated by the fact that, in the time of this world, it is 
possible to worship the Father in Spirit, but it is not possible to do it in an 
incorporeal way.89 On the contrary, the eschatological adoration is envisioned as 
a complete participation in the Spirit: ‘They worship at present with the pledge of 
the Spirit. But when they shall receive the Spirit in his fullness, they will worship 
the Father in Spirit’ (ComJn, XIII.112).90 Origen’s insistence on the presence of 
the Spirit in the present time is one of the most important markers of his 
relationship to the cosmos. Although the full eschatological adoration of the 
Father will happen when the participation in the Spirit will be full, the Spirit is still 
present in the perceptible cosmos as a pledge. Therefore, human beings can 
participate in the Spirit even in this life, to the extent it is possible for their natures.  
 
A similar interpretation is given by Origen when commenting on the teachings 
given by Jesus in the temple court in Jerusalem. Here, Origen explains that the 
temple should be taken to represent the cosmos. As such, Jesus is appropriately 
speaking in it, as the Saviour has come to the perceptible world to preach about 
the noetic world. Therefore, according to Origen, the deeper meaning of Jesus’ 
words refers to the ‘noetic temple’ (νοητὸν ἱερὸν) – that is, the noetic cosmos – 
to which every human being is conducted by the power of the Holy Spirit (τῷ 
πνεύματι χειραγωγῆσαι)’ (ComJn, XIX.58). Once again, the Spirit is indicated as 
the soteriological agent in whose participation every rational creature acquires 
                                                 
89 For an interpretation of the significance of the ‘adoration in spirit and truth’ in Origen, see: 
Gaetano Lettieri, ‘In spirito e/o verità: da Origene a Tommaso d’Aquino’, in Annali di Storia 
dell’Esegesi 12 1 (1995), 49-83.  
90 Origen takes the idea of the Spirit working inside humans’ hearts in the time of this world as a 
pledge from 2Cor. 1:21-22: ‘But it is God who establishes us with you in Christ and has anointed 




the capacity of reaching the noetic world.91 Being the most honoured of all things 
of the κτίσις, the Spirit provides the ontological means through which creatures 
are able to detach themselves from the perceptible world – the καταβολή – to 
reach the contemplation of the Father, through the Son, in the Spirit.  
  
The last example comes from Origen’s interpretation of the last supper and of the 
washing of disciples’ feet. In interpreting this episode, Origen firstly refers to the 
difference between ‘breakfast’ and ‘supper’, explaining that, while the first ‘is 
suited for catechumens and precedes the completion of the spiritual day in this 
life (ἐν τῷ βίῳ τούτῳ ἡμέρας πνευματικῆς), supper is the final nourishment and 
is served to those who have already advanced further in their rationality (κατὰ 
λόγον)’ (ComJn, XXXII.5).92 Therefore, Origen understands the last supper to 
represent the final teachings for those who are already participating in the Holy 
Spirit to the highest possible degree for human beings. Nevertheless, Jesus felt 
the need to wash their feet, because the disciples are said to be cleaned only so 
far as human beings can be clean, but not as God. After that, Origen explains 
that the cleanliness of the disciples derives from their participation in the Holy 
Spirit, as ‘the Holy Spirit and the power of the Most High can dwell in those who 
are already become clean so far as human beings are concerned’ (ComJn, 
XXXII.75). Nevertheless, they still needed their feet to be washed by Jesus, as 
this act represents the washing away of the ‘dust from the earth and from worldly 
things (τῶν κοσμικῶν πραγμάτων)’ (ComJn, XXXII.116). As in the case of the 
adoration in Spirit and truth, Origen is here presenting the participation in the 
Spirit as different from that of the Son, where the first is said to be preparatory for 
the second.93 This participation in the Spirit is effective until the ‘end of the 
spiritual days in this life’. After that, the teachings of the Son are needed in order 
to wash away from the soul any ‘worldly thing’, that is, any participation in the 
                                                 
91 Interestingly enough, Origen adds that ‘Jesus did not speak all the words that he possessed 
while he was teaching in the treasury, but as many as the treasury could contain. For I do not 
think that the cosmos itself (τὸν κόσμον τὸν ὅλον) could contain the whole Logos of God’ (ComJn, 
XIX.59).  
92 Origen affirms to have explained the difference between breakfast and supper in his Homilies 
on Luke. Nevertheless, the Latin translation of his homilies by Jerome does not report any 
investigation on the matter. Origen is therefore probably referring to a homily which Jerome did 
not feel useful to translate. In this regard, see: R. Heine, Origen: Commentary, […] Book 13-32, 
p. 343 n. 8.  
93 This interpretation is further corroborated by Origen’s quotation of 1Cor. 12:3: ‘No-one can say 
“Jesus is the Lord” except in the Holy Spirit’. Origen quotes this passage here to underline the 




perceptible world. Just as the Spirit was previously said not to be able to free 
creation from sin without the help of the Son, so his actions are not sufficient here 
to provide salvation without the help of the Son (ComJn, II.83). 
 
Interpreting the soteriological role in such way, I strongly disagree with those 
scholars who assert that, in Origen’s thought, the Spirit is sometimes indicated 
as having a greater majesty compared to the Son.94 Most of these analyses rely 
on Origen’s interpretation of Mt. 12:32: ‘Anyone who speaks against the Holy 
Spirit will not be forgiven’. Commenting on this phrase Origen seems to suggest 
that blasphemy against the Holy Spirit is unforgivable.95 However, in chapter II, I 
have already shown that this view is unsustainable, as Origen interprets this 
inexcusability as referring only to the present age and not to the age to come 
(ComJn XIX.88).96 Moreover, Origen explains that the reason why the Gospel 
says ‘there will be no forgiveness’ is that all rational beings (λογικά) have a share 
in Christ and pardon will be granted to them when they turn away from their sins 
(ComJn, II.78-82). Forgiveness is given by the Son, since the Spirit is not able to 
supply that forgiveness, being less than the Son (ComJn, II.83). According to 
Origen, the nature and work of the Spirit is to sanctify other creatures. For this 
reason, only blessed creatures can participate in the Holy Spirit (ComJn, 
XXXII.75). Therefore, against this interpretation of Matthew’s passage, I would 
argue that Origen interprets Jesus’ words as referring to the Spirit’s ontological 
dependence on the Son. The Spirit is not able to forgive, for only the Son has the 
power to do it (ComJn, II.83). Therefore, Origen interprets the phrase ‘there will 
be no forgiveness’ in the sense that the Spirit is not able to give forgiveness to 
those creatures that sinned after having received him.97 
  
                                                 
94 See in particular T. Greggs, Barth, Origen, and Universal Salvation, p. 154; See also K. 
McDonnell, ‘Does Origen Have a Trinitarian Doctrine of the Holy Spirit?’, p. 10-12. 
95 See: ComJn, XIX.88; XXVIII.54-55. See also: On First Principles, I.3.2. 
96 See supra, II.2.2.  
97 For a full discussion of the problem of the forgiveness of post-baptismal sins see my own article: 







This chapter has shown the way in which the Johannine concept of ‘the world’ 
has been interpreted by Origen in his Commentary on John and, consequently, 
how Origen understands the soteriological role of the Holy Spirit in relation to ‘the 
world’.  
 
Against the interpretation of scholars like Tzamalikos, the first section has 
investigated how Origen reinterprets the Johannine dualism by envisioning a 
strong dichotomy between the noetic and the perceptible world. First, I have 
underlined the consonance between Origen’s exegetical principles and his 
interpretation of the world. Just as the Gospel is the physical and perceptible 
corpus in which the noetic seeds of divine knowledge are hidden, so the 
perceptible world – which is addressed by the Gospel and Origen as ‘this world’ 
– represents the instantiation in matter of the principles subsisting in the noetic 
world. This distinction between the two worlds, which Origen draws from the 
Gospel of John, proves that, in his Commentary, Origen is fully aware of the 
dualistic structure of the fourth Gospel. In his interpretation, the Johannine 
dualism between light and darkness, world and holy community, is interpreted as 
the universal participation of the logikoi in the noetic principles of the cosmos. In 
the perceptible world, the Logos is the noetic Light that illuminates the rationality 
of the logikoi. Through this light, the Logos shows the way to the noetic cosmos 
to all rational creatures which dwell in the perceptible world. Moreover, as the 
principles according to which the perceptible world subsists do not reside in the 
perceptible world, but rather in the noetic, Origen envisions salvation as the 
intellectual act of pulling the rational creature out of the materiality, thus disclosing 
the possibility of a purely intellectual understanding of God.98 At the end of this 
process, the logikoi will be in the Logos, who is therefore identifiable with the 
noetic world. Hence, far from negating the Gospel’s dualism, Origen transforms 
it according to his exegetical and theological principles. While a distinction 
between the perceptible and the noetic world remains, he does not resolve this 
                                                 
98 However, this does not necessarily entail the idea of the total absence of an eschatological 




opposition by postulating an eventual destruction of the perceptible world – as 
John did – rather he uses it to reaffirm his belief in the final apokatastasis and 
reunification into the noetic world that is the Logos. I have then illustrated how 
Origen envisions the difference between the two worlds as the difference 
between κτίσις, originally generated in a pure state by God and καταβολή, the 
fallen perceptible world mingled with materiality and incapable of gaining the pure 
and perfect understanding of noetic matters.  
 
In the second section, I have firstly shown that, in Origen’s Trinity, every 
hypostasis performs a different work according to his own nature: the utterly 
transcendent Father is the source of will for the salvation of the logikoi; the Son 
is the one who administrates this salvation by making himself known through the 
epinoiai and guiding the rational beings towards the noetic world; lastly, the Spirit 
is the hypostasis who provides the material substratum for salvation. Therefore, 
against the anti-subordinationist theses of Greggs and McDonnell, it has been 
shown that the soteriological importance of the Holy Spirit lies in his ontological 
subordination of priority to the Son. However, although the Spirit is subordinated 
to the Son, he does not present the ontological subordination of inferiority to the 
Son, which is instead proper of all other created beings. Unlike the logikoi, the 
Spirit maintains superiority over the rest of creation and in spite of his generated 
nature, for the Spirit is brought into being by the Father through the Son as the 
rest of creation.  
 
In addition, the second section has enquired about the difference between the 
kind of participation the logikoi have in the Son and the one they have in the Spirit. 
I have shown that the Son is depicted as the only means through which rational 
creatures can contemplate God, as he is the source of rationality. Consequently, 
God’s contemplation consists in the noetic contemplation of the Son’s essence, 
especially in his epinoia of ‘Logos’. This kind of participation has different levels 
according to each person’s rationality and represents the true substance of every 
human being. As such, the participation in the Son is a natural possession of all 
rational creatures. Origen says that this possession is noetic, insofar as it is purely 
intellectual. Contrariwise, Origen presents the participation in the Holy Spirit as 
the sharing of the very substance of the Holy Spirit. This participation is made 




place in which the Holy Spirit dwells when the soul starts to participate in him. As 
such, being a pneumatikos is not a natural possession, but a status gained and 
maintained by the rational beings through constant effort. Most importantly, the 
acquisition of the substratum provided by the Holy Spirit is instrumental to achieve 
the pure noetic understanding of the Son. To the difference between the 
participation in the Son and that in the Spirit corresponds therefore a difference 
between spiritual and noetic participation in God. While the first refers to the 
ontological participation in the very substance of the Spirit, the second is 
interpreted as a logical advancement in understanding the many epinoiai of the 
Son.  
 
In conclusion, this section has proven that Origen envisions a specific 
soteriological role for the Holy Spirit, one that is distinct from that of Son. 
Developing and interpreting the Johannine dualism, Origen understands the 
Spirit as the provider of the ontological substratum for the salvation of rational 
creatures. Because of its ontological characteristics, the Spirit’s role in the 
economy of salvation is not depicted as an eschatological one, rather as a 
mundane one, as the Spirit provides the ontological place where the logikoi of 
‘this world’ have the possibility of freeing themselves from the wretchedness of 
the perceptible world and grasp a glimpse of the noetic world, that is, the Son in 




















The opposition between God and the world is a major theme which forms and 
permeates the entire Gospel of John particularly shaping the character of the 
Holy Spirit.1 This chapter aims at enquiring about Augustine’s understanding of 
the dialectical opposition between the Spirit and the world. In particular, it will 
show how Augustine’s use of the category of “worldly” and “spiritual” is patterned 
after his comprehension of the fourth Gospel. Both these categories are 
overwhelmingly present in Augustine’s theology, and they stand as the ground 
on which Augustine builds some of his most controversial doctrines, such as the 
interpretation of God’s relation to creation, the question of human beings made 
in the image of God and the problem of evil. Therefore, through the analysis of 
Augustine’s exegesis of the fourth Gospel in the Tractates on John, it will be 
shown the extent to which Augustine’s theology is not imposed on, but rather 
shaped by the text of the fourth Gospel.2 By contrast with Origen, who patiently 
works to smooth and nuance the Gospel’s dualism in an ontological system of 
different degrees of ontological participation in the Spirit and noetic participation 
in the Logos, Augustine proposes quite a literal interpretation which emphasises 
the differences between the elect – endowed by the Spirit of God – and the world 
– permanently corrupted and in the grip of demonic passions.  
                                                 
1 For references on these statements see the section in supra, part B. 
2 Scholarship has extensively debated Augustine’s use of Scripture in building his theological 
system. In particular, different evaluations have been given on the extent to which Augustine 
tends to superimpose on the Scriptures theological concepts that he derives from the 
controversies he was involved into, such as the Donatist controversy and the Pelagian 
controversy. Regarding Augustine’s use of Scripture against the Pelagians, see: Gerald Bonner, 
‘Augustine, the Bible and the Pelagians’, in Pamela Bright (ed), Augustine and the Bible, Notre 
Dame IND 1999, p. 227–242. Bonner states that, in the Pelagian controversy, both Augustine and 
his Pelagian opponents were much more interested in using the Scriptures as a tool against the 
adversary rather than in understanding the exegetical meaning of the passages they were using. 
Although I recognise that, especially in the course of harsh controversies such the Pelagian one, 
Augustine might have used some passages of the Bible only to justify his own theological view, I 
still think that his understanding of the Gospel of John and doctrines that comes out of the 
Tractates are derived by a genuine understanding of the Gospel. This chapter will prove that this 




The problem of the significance of the concept of “the world” in Augustine is a 
multifaceted one. The complexity of the topic and, as it were, its vastness, 
explains why a systematic study on the subject is hardly traceable in Augustinian 
scholarship.3 Before proposing my analysis of the relevance of the Johannine 
concept of the world in Augustine’s theology it is worth spending some words on 
what this chapter does not aim at doing. 
  
Studying the Spirit and the world, this chapter does not want to propose a detailed 
study of Augustine’s political theology.4 Most of the scholarly works on 
Augustine’s political theology in the Tractates on John are focused on the 
Donatist controversy.5 Unlike these studies, this chapter will focus simply on the 
extent to which the opposition between the Holy Spirit and the world shapes and 
informs Augustine’s understanding of the relationship between creation and 
Creator.  
 
This chapter does not even want to use the Tractates on John as a container 
from which to draw pieces of information on Augustine’s ‘controversial theology’, 
that is, on Augustine’s theological controversies: I am here particularly referring 
to the Donatist controversy, the struggle against Arianism and, most of all, the 
Pelagian controversy. Although it is undeniable that these controversies had a 
great influence in shaping Augustine’s theological research, this chapter shall 
show that the Tractates on John present a consistent and constructive 
                                                 
3 Rather than on Augustine’s interpretation of the world, scholarship has focused on his 
interpretation of the figure of “the Jews”. In this regard, very different evaluations of Augustine’s 
relationship to the Jews have been proposed by different scholars, mostly concluding Augustine’s 
responsibility for Christian anti-Judaism. See, among the others: James Carroll, Constantine's 
Sword: The Church and the Jews: A History, Boston 2002. Other scholars have a different 
opinion, showing how Augustine challenged the anti-Jewish tradition of the Catholic Church. See: 
Paula Fredriksen, Augustine and the Jews: A Christian Defense of Jews and Judaism, New 
Haven CT 2008. For the relationship between the concept of ‘the world’ and that of ‘the Jews’ in 
the Gospel of John see infra, part B.  
4 Plenty of studies are present on this subject. Most of them are focused on Augustine’s The City 
of God and on his Letters. Among them, some are focused on the general aspects of Augustine’s 
political theology, some others on the main theological distinction between the two cities – that is, 
on the concept of amor sui and amor Dei – some others on Augustine himself as a political actor 
in his contemporary world. See: Paul Weithman, ‘Augustine’s Political Philosophy’, in Eleonore 
Stump and Norman Kretzmann (eds), The Cambridge Companion to Augustine, Cambridge 2001, 
p. 234-252. Specifically on The City of God see: Gaetano Lettieri, Il senso della storia in Agostino 
d'Ippona. Il saeculum e la gloria nel De Civitate Dei, Roma 1988.  
5 In this regard, see the recent book by Adam Ployd, Augustine, the Trinity and the Church. A 
Reading of the Anti-Donatist Sermons, Oxford 2015. This text also deals with some Tractates on 
John from an ecclesiological perspective. 
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interpretation of the concept of “the world” that cannot be reduced to an “effect” 
of the theological controversies Augustine is fighting. Rather it must be taken as 
the cause of his theological positions in the aforementioned controversies. 
Although some changes occurred in the course of the 15 years in which the work 
was produced, I will show that, rather than imposing on the Gospel his 
interpretation of “the world” according to his pastoral needs, Augustine derives 
this concept from his understanding of the Gospel. In this regard, I disagree with 
some influential scholars such as Bonner.6 
  
Another methodological consideration regards the relationship between the text 
of John and Paul’s epistles. Very often in the Tractates relevant passages from 
Paul are quoted and expounded. No scholar of Augustine will be surprised by this 
fact. The scholarly literature has very heavily emphasised Paul as the most 
important – if not the only – biblical source on which Augustine built his doctrine 
of grace, although very different evaluations on Augustine’s so called “turning 
point” can be found in this regard.7 While not denying the importance of Pauline 
influences on Augustine’s doctrine of grace, this chapter will show the 
significance of Johannine categories in his understanding of the relationship 
between God and creation. I will show that the very concept of “the world” leads 
Augustine to postulate a radical depreciation of the natural and created world as 
opposed to the gratuity of God’s grace/Spirit. In this regard, the rather sectarian 
attitude found in the fourth Gospel is of utmost importance. The Johannine 
oppositional dichotomies between light and darkness, elected and rejected, holy 
                                                 
6 G. Bonner, ‘Augustine, the Bible and the Pelagians’ p. 227–242, claims that Augustine tends to 
misread the Bible in favour of his theological positions. As far as the Gospel of John is concerned, 
although a certain degree of bias is always to be taken as granted, Augustine tends to shape his 
theological opinion from the text rather than imposing them on the Gospel. For a discussion of 
Bonner’s work see the beginning of this very section, n. 2. As a consequence of my claim, the 
chronology of the Tractates will be taken into due consideration in this chapter. Nevertheless, it 
is worth remembering the primary aim of this chapter is not to study the evolution of Augustine’s 
theology, but rather to give an account as accurate as possible of how his appreciation of the 
Spirit’s relationship to the world is drawn from his understanding of the fourth Gospel, thus giving 
an account of the way in which this relationship determines Augustine’s theology.  
7 The massive importance of Paul has also led to the scholarly debate on Augustine’s “turning 
point” regarding the doctrine of grace during the writing of the To Simplician, with different 
opinions on Augustine’s theological continuity between his first years as a convert and his late 
years as a bishop. In this regard see: supra, I.1.3. As representatives of this debate it is sufficient 
to quote here the different opinions of C. Harrison, Rethinking Augustine's Early Theology, and 
G. Lettieri, L’altro Agostino. Insofar as this chapter will be mainly focused on the Tractates on 
John, written from 406 onward, this debate will not be addressed directly. 
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community and world, are as important for Augustine’s theology as the Paulinian 
references to vessels of wrath and vessels of mercy in Rom. 9:23.  
 
In particular, the chapter will show how the interpretation of “the world” is essential 
to the construction of the idea of the massa damnata as opposed to the portion 
of grace (sorte gratia) that God chooses out of the world (TrIoh, CVI.5-6). The 
identification proposed by Augustine between the Spirit and the grace of God – 
meaning that the Spirit is himself both the giver and the gift – is constantly 
juxtaposed to the demonic defilement of the created world. In particular, the Spirit 
appears as the force who acts in the inner self of the chosen in order to re-create 
the image of God which was lost in the process of sinning. The theological 
concepts of mundus creatus (created world) and mundus recreatus (recreated 
world) are therefore put in constant dialectical opposition. As opposed to the 
communion realised by the inclusion of the chosen disciples in the Trinitarian life 
of God, the world represents the incarnate evil, neglected by God and thus 
forsaken in its perverse self-love.8 Therefore, the role of the Spirit will emerge in 
his twofold nature. On the one hand, being the ontological communion of love 
that derives from the double procession from the Father and the Son, the Holy 
Spirit is the only ontological means through which the human souls contemplate 
the Trinitarian communion, thus being the undefiled love of God who chooses the 
elect out of the world and justifies them with an act of omnipotent will. On the 
other hand, being the Spirit of love and communion in God, he is also the agent 
responsible for forsaking the world to its own destiny of depravity and death.  
     
Therefore, this chapter will be divided in three sections, each one having some 
sub-sections. The first (V.1) will tackle the ambiguity of Augustine’s interpretation 
of “the world” in the Tractates on John. The second (V.2) will deal with the 
problem of Augustine’s dualism and its relation to the Gospel of John and 
Manichaeism (V.2.1). It will then show the difference between the created world, 
that is, the world created as the image of God (V.2.2), and the re-created world, 
the world which God chose out of this world (V.2.3). The third section (V.3) will 
define the extent to which it is possible to attribute a proprium – that is, a proper 
                                                 
8 Exploring the relationship between the Holy Spirit and the world in the Tractates of John means 
therefore to enquire about the radical novelty of the Spirit, which is the active force which tears 
off the elect from the deadly grip of this world. 
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work – to each person of the Trinity. In doing so, it will first analyse the 
inseparability of the works of the Trinity (V.3.1). Secondly it will distinguish 
between those works which are attributed to Christ (V.3.2) and those which are 
attributed to the Spirit (V.3.3). By analysing the difference between Christ’s and 
the Spirit’s proprium in their relationship to the world, this section will unfold not 
only the crucial importance of Augustine’s pneumatology, but also the reasons 
why the Spirit and the elect are radically opposed to the world, which is therefore 




V.1 Dilectores Mundi Mundus Dicuntur: The Ambiguity of the 
Concept of Mundus/Saeculum in the Tractates on John 
 
 
In all the Tractates on John, the theological concept of “the world” (mundus), as 
opposed to the Spirit, stands at the heart of Augustine’s investigation. From the 
first tractate, Augustine states the necessity for every Christian to gain a spiritual 
understanding of God. As opposed to the poor understanding of the carnal man 
who ‘does not perceive the things that are of the Spirit of God’ (1 Cor. 2:14), God’s 
mercy (misericordia) provides spiritual understanding (spiritalem intellectum) to 
those who do not yet have the intellectual means to raise themselves in 
understanding the truth about God (TrIoh, I.1-2).9 The first step toward 
understanding and toward salvation is to realise that every human being, insofar 
as he is a human being, cannot claim anything for himself as a proper possession: 
ne cum putamus nos aliquid esse, cum nihil simus, non solum non accipiamus 
quod non sumus, sed et amittamus quod sumus. (TrIoh, I.4).10 This path of 
sanctification was first trod by John the Evangelist, who ‘had risen beyond all the 
mountain and peaks of the world’ (TrIoh, I.5), thus rising beyond all things which 
were made in order to achieve the true vision of God: Nisi enim transcenderet 
ista omnia quae creata sunt, non perveniret ad eum per quem facta sunt 
omnia (TrIoh, I.5).11  
   
Even from this little section of the first Tractate, the dichotomy between the two 
possible interpretations of the “world” starts to emerge. On the one hand, the 
world is the entirety of everything that is created – not only the material world but 
also every spiritual being, no matter its level of perfection.12 On the other hand, 
                                                 
9 Augustine here specifies that God’s mercy, acting through the eminent souls of the saints, urges 
human beings to become something more than human beings: quia omnes sancti, angeli; quia 
annuntiatores Dei. […] Ad hoc ergo vocat nos Deus, ne simus homines. (TrIoh, I.4). ‘For all holy 
men are angels because they are the messengers of God. […] To this, then God calls us: not to 
be mere men’. 
10 ‘Whenever we think ourselves to be something, though we are nothing, we not only do not 
accept that we are not, but even lose what we are’. 
11 ‘Indeed, had he not transcended all these things that were created, he would not have reached 
Him through whom all things were made’. 
12 Quaeris de spiritalibus creaturis, de Angelis, Archangelis, Sedibus, Dominationibus, Virtutibus, 
Principatibus? et ipsa facta sunt. (TrIoh, I.5). Augustine is possibly referring here to the ‘heaven 
of heaven’, the timeless created realm that the chosen has to reach in order to gain the maximum 
level of understanding of the Trinity by participation in it. See Confessions, XII.VIII(8); XI(14). In 
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the created world is meant to be transcended by the intellect which, through the 
help of God, aims at reaching the heights to which John the Evangelist was 
mystically taken when writing his Gospel. The necessity of overcoming and 
transcending the world is the main theme of the second tractate as well.13 The 
affirmation of the ontological stability of God and its identification with Being 
proceed in this tractate alongside with the necessity of affirming the radical 
opposition between God and the world. Through a symbolic image, Augustine 
opposes the human soul, which is ‘stretched and torn by diverse inclinations’ 
(TrIoh, II.2),14 to the eternal stability of the idipsum. To reach the aforementioned 
stability, one has to cross the ‘sea of this world’, something which is possible only 
through the help of Christ:  
  
Sic est enim tamquam videat quisque de longe patriam, et mare interiaceat; 
[…] Sic ad illam stabilitatem nostram ubi quod est est, quia hoc solum semper 
sic est ut est, volumus pervenire; interiacet mare huius saeculi qua imus, etsi 
iam videmus quo imus. […] Et quid fecit? Instituit lignum quo mare 
transeamus. Nemo enim potest transire mare huius saeculi, nisi cruce Christi 
portatus (TrIoh, II.2).15 
  
The attitude of the Christian who, clinging to the cross of Christ, is able to cross 
the sea of this world (saeculum) to reach his homeland is contrasted with the 
pride of the philosophers of this world (philosophi huius mundi) who, with a 
haughty wisdom (sapientia superba), tried to enquire about the Creator through 
the creatures (TrIoh, II.5). Therefore, the philosophers represent the wisdom of 
this world, a wisdom which attributes its findings to itself, rather than to the 
Creator, thus becoming proud: ‘however, they became proud so that they might 
be crushed’ (ut autem eliderentur, superbierunt) (TrIoh, II.5). Augustine provides 
then the hermeneutical principles according to which the concept of “the world” 
                                                 
this regard see: Donald L. Ross, ‘Time, the Heaven of Heavens, and Memory in Augustine’s 
Confessions’, in Augustinian Studies 22 (1991), p. 191-205. 
13 In the previous chapter on Augustine, I have already shown how this tractate is foundational 
for understanding Augustine’s metaphysic of God, as it is here that the concept of idipsum is firstly 
explain and discussed. See supra, III.3.1. 
14 Cum videatis ipsas animas per affectum diversarum voluntatum distendi atque discindi. 
15 ‘For it is as if one could see his homeland from afar, and a sea lays in between. […] To such 
an extent we want to go to that stability of ours, where that which is is, and it is always in the way 
it is. But the sea of this world lies in between where we are going, even if we see where we are 
going. […] And so what has he done? He has provided the wood by which we may cross the sea. 
For no one can cross the sea of this world unless carried by the cross of Christ’. 
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must be interpreted in reading the Gospel of John. Commenting on Jn. 1:10: ‘the 
world was made through him, and the world knew him not’, Augustine clarifies 
what the Gospel means with the term “world”: 
    
Quid est, mundus factus est per ipsum? Coelum, terra, mare et omnia quae 
in eis sunt, mundus dicitur. Iterum alia significatione, dilectores mundi 
mundus dicuntur. Mundus per ipsum factus est, et mundus eum non 
cognovit. […] Sed qui non cognoverunt? Qui amando mundum dicti sunt 
mundus. Amando enim habitamus corde: amando autem, hoc appellari 
meruerunt quod ille ubi habitabant. […] Sic et mundum, qui inhabitant 
amando mundum. Qui sunt? Qui diligunt mundum: ipsi enim corde habitant 
in mundo. Nam qui non diligunt mundum, carne versantur in mundo; sed 
corde inhabitant coelum (TrIoh, II.11).16 
   
First, Augustine points out the double meaning of mundus. The term might signify 
the good creation of God, who created not only the material world, but also all the 
spiritual beings who dwell in it. In other Tractates, this interpretation recurs as 
related to the common work of the Trinity, who created the world in a single 
inseparable act: si unus Deus Pater et Filius et Spiritus sanctus, unus mundus 
factus est a Patre per Filium in Spiritu sancto (TrIoh, XX.9).17 Alongside the 
affirmation of the commonality of the works of the Trinity, Augustine is also 
stressing here the actual existence of only one world. The so-called spiritual 
world, which owes its name to its privileged relationship to the Holy Spirit, does 
not originally belong to a different substance from that of the other world – that is, 
the forsaken one.18 Nevertheless, the interpretation of the world as the good 
creation of God is soon retracted by Augustine in favour of the most common 
interpretation of the world as ‘those who love the world’. Therefore, those who 
                                                 
16 ‘What does it mean: “the world was made through him”? The sky, the earth, the sea, and all the 
things which are in them are called the world. But the second time, in another sense, the lovers 
of the world are called the world: “The world was made through him and the world knew him not”. 
[…] But who did not know? Those who are called “the world” from their love of the world. Indeed, 
by our act of loving we dwell with our heart. By their act of loving they deserved to be called with 
the same name as that place where they were dwelling. […] So too, we call the world those who 
love the world by their dwelling. Who are they? Those who love the world, for they dwell in the 
world with their heart. For those who do not love the world abide in the world with the flesh; but in 
their heart, they dwell in heaven’.  
17 ‘If God the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit is one, then one world was made by the Father, 
through the Son in the Holy Spirit’. 
18 Moreover, the spiritual regeneration of the chosen world is not visible but hidden in the hearts 
of the believers until the end of this age. See, in this regard, Augustine’s interpretation of the 
parable of the tares (Mt. 13:24-30) in Augustine, Sermons on the New Testament 23.  
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love the world are called with the same name of the place they love. Right from 
TrIoh, II it appears clear that Augustine’s interest in the Johannine category of 
mundus does not focus on its cosmological, but rather on its anthropological 
significance. To be mundus in a Johannine sense does not come from a 
cosmological membership in the created order, but from an act of will – that is, 
the dilectio – according to which the human subject belongs either to this world 
or to heaven.19 Such difference is strongly stressed by Augustine in the 
pneumatological section of the Gospel, particularly in the comment on Jn. 
14:17.20 Augustine states that the world, which means the lovers of the world 
(mundi dilectores), cannot receive the Spirit, because the love of God poured out 
through the Holy Spirit is contrary to the love of this world. Indeed, the Spirit can 
only be seen by invisible eyes (TrIoh, LXXIV.3-5).  
  
Finally, it is possible to appreciate a third possible meaning of the term world in 
Augustine’s interpretation. In this sense, this term is neither related to the world 
that was firstly created by God nor to the wretched world, but to the saved world 
as opposed to the damned. Such an explanation occurs in the comment on Jn. 
17:21: ‘May they (the saved) also be in us (the Father and the Son) so that the 
world (mundus) may believe that you have sent me’. In this section, Augustine 
makes a clear distinction between the elected world and the world which is 
damned according to predestination. On the one hand, there is a world for which 
Jesus does not pray at all, for he is not unaware that it has been predestined 
(neque ignorant quo sit praedestinatus); on the other hand, there is a world that 
Christ does not come to judge but to save (TrIoh, CX.2). This good world, which 
is taken up and freed from sin by Christ, is the world not persisting as an enemy, 
such as the world predestined for damnation (mundus damantioni 
praedestinatus), but made friend from an enemy, for God chose (elegit) this world 
before the foundation of the world (TrIoh, CX.4-5). 
  
Therefore, it is possible to understand different senses of the term mundus. First, 
mundus originally represents the good creation of God. Nevertheless, this world 
                                                 
19 The same concept is repeated in TrIoh, III.4-5: Si omnia ista testimonium dederunt, quomodo 
mundus eum non cognovit, nisi quia mundus dilectores mundi, corde habitantes mundum? Et 
malus mundus, quia mali habitatores mundi: sicut mala domus, non parietes, sed inhabitantes. 
20 ‘He (The Father) will give you […] the Spirit of truth. The world cannot accept him, because it 
neither sees him nor knows him. But you know him, for he lives with you and will be in you’. 
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was irredeemably corrupted by sin. Interpreting Jn. 8:43-44 – ‘you belong to your 
father, the devil, and you want to carry out your father’s desires’ – Augustine 
points out the original goodness of the world, for every nature is created good 
(Bona est enim omnis natura), but human nature has been spoiled through ill will 
(sed vitiata est hominis natura per voluntatem malam) (TrIoh, XLII.9-11).21 
Therefore, the world became the child of the devil by imitation, not by birth, and 
the devil is not prince of the world by nature, but by the evil will of the lost world 
(TrIoh, LII.10-11). This wicked world of which the devil is prince is depicted 
according to two characteristics: uncontrollable love for his own glory and pride 
(superbiam) (TrIoh, XXVIII.4-6). Therefore, Augustine takes the blind man who is 
healed by Jesus in Jn. 9 as a figure of this world (TrIoh, XLIV). The world is blind 
because it does not recognise its own sin. By thinking itself not to be blind, the 
world shows its ‘vain, proud and incurable arrogance’ (TrIoh, XLV.1-5).22 
 
The concept of the wretched mundus is therefore coincident with the one of 
saeculum. Throughout the tractates, Augustine uses the words mundus and 
saeculum interchangeably. Indeed, they are both theological signifiers of the 
present condition of human beings, which is marked by ontological weakness – 
for the world ontologically lacks true Being – and by the presence of time. In this 
sense, although Augustine sometimes uses the term mundus to indicate created 
being, and saeculum to indicate the present age,23 it is possible to state some 
equivalence between the two terms. Indeed, they both refer to the wretched 
condition of the creature who finds his source of happiness in the world rather 
than in God.24 In this sense Augustine interchangeably uses in the Tractates the 
phrase dilectores mundi (TrIoh, II.11) and amatores huius saeculi (TrIoh, 
XXVIII.8; LII.1-3). Equally, the salvific mission of Christ is said to be undertaken 
‘in the night of this world’ (in nocte huius saeculi) (TrIoh, XXXV.6-9), that is, in the 
                                                 
21 See also: TrIoh, XLII.15-16. 
22 Vanam et superbam et insanabilem arrogantiam. See also: TrIoh, LI.10-13 
23 See for example TrIoh, XV.9, where Augustine speaks of the present age as the sixth age of 
this world (aetate saeculi sexta). The same interpretation is given in TrIoh, IX.6 in reference to 
the six water jars at the wedding feast in Cana.  
24 In this regard see: Timo Nisula, Augustine and the Functions of Concupiscence, Boston MA 
2012, p. 187. The author rightly recognises how the term mundus is mainly used by Augustine 
‘not only to the good order of things, but to those who loves the created realities as their source 
of happiness’. As far as the Tractates on John are concerned, this chapter will show that 
Augustine mainly characterises the term world in this way. The wretchedness of the world is 
particularly stressed in the second part of the commentary, where the term mundus is constantly 
treated as massa damnata, as the next sections of this chapter will show.  
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world of darkness (mundi tenebrarum) (TrIoh, LXXIX.2), unable to comprehend 
the salvation brought by Christ (TrIoh, III.5).25  
 
As a consequence, despite the structural ambiguity of the term, the term “world” 
(mundus) is almost always used by Augustine with regard to evil humans living 
over the whole globe. The very concept of “world” is thus taken to mean “world of 
darkness” (mundi tenebrarum). Hence, it must not be taken as the whole creation 
(universam creaturam), but as its darkness, represented by the lovers of the world 
from among whom, nonetheless, some are chosen not by their merit but by the 
grace of God (mundi istius amatorum: ex quibus tamen electi sunt, non per suum 
meritum, sed per Dei gratiam) (TrIoh, LXXIX.2) to be transformed by means of 
the Holy Spirit.26 Only occasionally mundus can also be used for good human 
beings scattered around the globe (TrIoh, LII.10-11).  
  
                                                 
25 Commenting on Jn. 1:5, Augustine states: Quia lux in tenebris lucet, et tenebrae cam non 
comprehenderunt. O homines, nolite esse tenebrae, nolite esse infideles, iniusti, iniqui, rapaces, 
avari, amatores saeculi: hae sunt enim tenebrae. Lux non est absens, sed vos absentes estis a 
luce. 
26 See also TrIoh, LXXV.2. 
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V.2 Spiritus/Caritas vs Mundus/Saeculum. The Opposition 
between Mundus Creatus and Mundus Recreatus. 
 
V.2.1 Augustine’s Dualism: Between John and Mani 
 
Augustine’s affirmation of a radical gap between the absolute goodness of God 
and the wretchedness of his creatures results in a dualistic theology, which 
succeeds in accentuating, rather than smoothing, the theological binary 
oppositions found in the Gospel, such as those between good and evil, flesh and 
spirit, darkness and light, sinners and chosen ones. Both in recent and in less 
recent times, Augustine’s dualistic framework has been interpreted by some 
scholars as a sign of his ongoing engagement with Manichaeism. During the 
course of the twentieth century, scholars have discussed this topic at length, 
drawing different conclusions.27 Between the fifties and the eighties many 
scholars, such as Adam and van Oort, identified a clear Manichaean influence in 
many of Augustine’s theological doctrines, particularly on his account of the 
cities;28 whilst contemporary critics prefer to focus on Augustine’s conversion as 
evidence of Augustine’s ongoing engagement with Manichaeism. For instance, 
Jason David BeDuhn challenges Augustine’s self-depiction of his own conversion 
to catholicism in Confessions VIII. Many modern scholars would agree with 
BeDuhn’s view that for Augustine ‘the new sources of one’s self gradually supply 
elements that displace and integrate with previously existing convictions and 
                                                 
27 The scholarly debate on Manichaean influences on Augustine started at the beginning of the 
nineteenth century. As already noted by John Kevin Coyle, ‘Saint Augustine’s Manichean 
Legacy’, in John Kevin Coyle (ed), Manichaeism and its Legacy, Leiden 2009, p. 307-328, the 
beginning of this debate can be identified with Albert Bruckner, Julian von Eclanum. Sein Leben 
und seine Lehre. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des Pelagianismus, Leipzig 1897. The author had 
the merit of revitalising an ancient polemic which accused Augustine’s thought of being deeply 
influenced by Manichaeism, as Augustine’s Pelagian opponents used to do. Bruckner’s 
perspective was criticised and rejected by Ernesto Buonaiuti, Sant’Agostino, Roma 1917.  
28 During the fifties, some scholars reflected on Augustine’s account on the two cities as deeply 
influenced by Manichaeism. Among others, see: Alfred Adam, ‘Das Fortwirken des Manichäismus 
bei Augustin’, in Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte 69 (1958) p. 1–25. In the eighties, van Oort and 
others focused on Manichaean influences on Augustine regarding the ideas of sin and desire. 
See: Johannes van Oort, ‘Augustine and Mani on Concupiscientia Sexualis’, in Jan den Boeft and 
Johannes van Oort, Augustiniana traiectina: communications présentées au Colloque 
International d'Utrecht 13-14 novembre 1986, Paris 1987, p. 137-152. For a comprehensive 




habits’.29 Nevertheless, BeDuhn’s account becomes more problematic when he 
substantially identifies Augustine’s anti-Manichaeism with the ‘“optimistic” stress 
on the goodness of creation (“all existence as such is good,” On True Religion 
11.21) and its permeation by divine order (“matter participates in something 
belonging to the ideal world, otherwise it would not be matter,” ibid.)’.30 This 
identification implies that, after an initial anti-Manichaean period expressed in his 
On True Religion,31 which is theologically rooted in the identification of Being and 
Good, Augustine progressively retrieved a Manichaean-like anthropology by 
gradually shifting from a platonising optimism to a Manichaean-like dualism:  
  
This darker, less intrinsically “optimistic” vision of the status of the soul in 
relation to God may at first have been merely a metaphysical technicality 
serving primarily as an anti-Manichaean corrective; but it gradually cast its 
shadow on every corner of Augustine’s reflections on the human 
predicament32  
  
While this perspective has the benefit of appreciating the ambiguity and 
dynamism of every newly converted self-identity, it risks identifying Augustine’s 
theological dualism as a residual element of his former Manichaean beliefs. Such 
an assumption might be challenged by the fact that Augustine’s dualism shows a 
steady growth from the years of his conversion to the last years of the Pelagian 
controversies. According to the Confessions, Augustine seems to have grown 
progressively discontented with the Manichaean faith mainly for philosophical 
reasons. The incapacity of the Manichaean system to propose a convincing 
account of the structure of the universe and of human faith progressively tore his 
faith away. These rational concerns were addressed by Augustine by the 
subsequent study of Neo-Platonism and, lastly, by the conversion to Christianity. 
Henceforth, the main difference between the Manichaean-Augustine and the 
Post-Manichaean-Augustine stands in a completely different evaluation of the 
nature of evil and of the goodness of creation. This tension within Augustine’s 
                                                 
29 See: Jason David BeDuhn, Augustine's Manichaean Dilemma, Volume 1. Conversion and 
Apostasy, 373-388 C.E., Philadelphia 2010, p. 245.  
30 Jason David BeDuhn, Augustine’s Manichaean Dilemma, Volume 2: Making a “Catholic” Self, 
388–401 C.E., Philadelphia 2013, p. 53. 
31 For an in-depth analysis of Augustine’s Manichaean influence in his work On True Religion see: 
in Josef Lössl, ‘Augustine on “The True Religion”: Reflections of Manichaeism in De vera religione’ 
in Johannes Oort (ed), Augustine and Manichaean Christianity, Leiden 2013, p. 137-153. 
32 Ibidem  
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theology had already been identified by Pelagians; however, they confused the 
rational evaluation of a good creation with an ‘optimistic’ evaluation of human 
nature. Augustine himself was indeed accused by his Pelagian opponents of 
being a Manichaean and of proposing a doctrine of justification which is not 
biblical.33  
 
Although it is not the aim of this work to propose a thorough assessment of 
Manichaean influences on Augustine in the years between 406-420 AD – that is, 
when he was writing his Tractates on John – the issue of an alleged Manichaean 
influence in the early decades of the fourth century contrasts greatly with my 
conclusions. While the former scholarly hypothesis implies that Augustine is still 
holding to a cosmological dualism in commenting on the fourth Gospel’s 
dichotomies, my work shows that Augustine’s dualism is not imposed on the text 
of the Gospel, but is rather drawn from it. It seems to me that, rather than 
hypothesizing some kind of unconscious debt to his former Manichaean identity 
– an identity which was refused and rejected for over twenty years before the 
Tractates were first preached – it would be more useful to try to understand the 
way in which the very text under analysis actively shapes Augustine’s dualism. 
Augustine’s dichotomy between sinners and chosen does not come from a 
difference in nature between the two; hence, like the Gospel of John, Augustine 
does not propose a cosmological dualism. Dualism exists as a result of a free act 
of God’s will, since no difference in nature can be found within human nature, 
which is created good but altogether lost its goodness because of sin.  
  
This brief digression on Augustine’s alleged Manichaeism serves the purpose of 
preparing the reader for the discussion on the problem of the Imago Dei in 
Augustine’s Treatises. It is precisely here that the main difference between 
Augustine and Manichaeism emerges. In all the Tractates on John, Augustine 
consistently presents a firm and strong belief in the human being as the 
ontological image of the Creator, so much so that the goodness of human nature 
is to be found in its being the image of the Trinity who created it. Therefore, the 
following section will analyse the ambivalent relationship between the concept of 
                                                 
33 These accusations of crypto-Manichaeism in Augustine by his Pelagian opponents can be 
clearly found in Augustine’s own response to Julian of Eclanum, who was a Pelgian himself. See: 
Augustine, Against Two Letters of the Pelagians and Against Julian.  
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“the world” and the human being as Imago Dei. In this regard, I will show that 
Augustine’s interpretation of salvation is to be understood as a re-creation rather 
than a restoration.  
 
V.2.2 Mundus Creatus: The ‘Image Within’ as Opposed to the World in a 
Dualistic Framework 
 
The topic of the imago Dei has already been discussed in relation to the Trinity 
when I observed that being the Son the Father’s image, he is in a perfect 
relationship of identity with the Father, with whom he exists as a unity in the Holy 
Spirit.  
 
Building on my previous conclusions, this subsection aims at discussing 
Augustine’s doctrine of the image as far as human being is concerned.34 This is 
discussed by Augustine in several places, but it finds its most complete 
expression in Augustine’s On the Trinity,35 where he focuses on the ontological 
structure of the soul – divided in memory/intellect/will – as God’s image.36 
 
Here, however, I will give an account of the double meaning of this doctrine in 
Augustine’s Tractates on John, with particular regard to his exegesis of the 
Prologue and Jn. 5:19.37 By contrast with the Father/Son relationship, being 
                                                 
34 Much scholarship is found concerning Augustine’s doctrine of the image in his early and mature 
thought. With regard to Augustine’s doctrine of the image in his early years see: Gerald P. 
Boersma, Augustine's Early Theology of Image. A Study in the Development of Pro-Nicene 
Theology, Oxford 2016. The book not only discusses at length Augustine’s doctrine of the image 
in his early works, but also proposes a detailed study of this doctrine in Western theologians of 
the third and fourth century, such as Tertullian, Hilary of Poitiers, Marius Victorinus, and Ambrose 
of Milan. The author then analyses their influence in the construction of Augustine’s thought.  
35 Among many places see: On the Trinity, X.11.17 and XII.7.12. 
36 Regarding the doctrine of the image in Augustine’s On the Trinity, many works have been 
written. For a clear and comprehensive analysis with the contemporary scholarship regarding this 
text see the unprecedented work of classification by Roland Kany, Augustins Trinitätsdenken: 
Bilanz, Kritik und Weiterführung der modernen Forschung zu “De trinitate”, Tübingen 2007. In the 
first part of this massive volume, the author maps different trends of interpretation of Augustine’s 
masterpiece. For another quite recent study on Augustine’s theology of the image in his mature 
thought, with particular focus on On the Trinity see: Luigi Gioia, The Theological Epistemology of 
Augustine's De Trinitate, Oxford 2008. See also: Gaetano Lettieri, ‘La dialettica della conoscenza 
nel De Trinitate’, in Luigi Alici (ed), Interiorità ed intenzionalità in sant’Agostino, Rome 1990, p. 
145-176. For a detailed study on the tripartite structure of the mens in Augustine see: G. O'Daly, 
Augustine’s Philosophy of Mind.  
37 In the Tractates, the doctrine of human being as imago Dei is not explained fully and 




image of God does imply an ontological degradation.38 The gap between humans 
and their creator is explained by Augustine in both metaphysical and moral terms: 
human beings are incapable of being the perfect image of God due to the 
wretched condition of sinning creatures and to the ontological condition of finite 
beings. However, what it is most interesting to note here is the fact that the 
process of regaining the image is always expressed by Augustine as a process 
of detachment of the soul from “the world”. Hence, this section shall show how 
the theological concept of “the world” plays a fundamental role in shaping 
Augustine’s doctrine of the imperfection of the human image when compared to 
God.  
  
In trying to understand the relationship between “the world” and the doctrine of 
the image it is firstly worth noting that the world (either mundus or saeculum) is 
never said, in the Tractates, to be image of God. On the contrary, Augustine 
explicitly states that although creation must be intended as something good, the 
world itself should not be taken as meaning the “image of God”. Augustine firstly 
faces this problem when commenting on Jn. 1:3-4.39 This couple of verses posed 
a serious problem to ancient interpreters due to the lack of punctuation in ancient 
manuscripts.40 The verse could mean ‘without him nothing was made that has 
been made’, or, on the contrary, ‘without him nothing was made. What has been 
made in him was life’. The latter interpretation was particularly problematic to 
Augustine, for it could involve the Manichaean idea that even soulless parts of 
the creation (like a stone) have life, thus participating in some way in the life of 
God (TrIoh, I.16). Therefore, Augustine partially opts for the former reading, 
declaring that one ought to understand ‘life’ as referring only to the Word itself: 
 
Pronuntia sic: Quod factum est; hic subdistingue, et deinde infer, in illo vita 
est. Quid est hoc? Facta est terra, sed ipsa terra quae facta est, non est vita: 
                                                 
38 The influences of Platonic – in particular Plotinian – metaphysic in Augustine’s doctrine of the 
image is quite evident. 
39 ‘Through him all things were made; without him nothing was made that has been made.  In him 
was life’. 
40 When dealing with this kind of problems caused by the absence of punctuation, Augustine 
suggests interpreting the passage grounding the interpretation on the authority of other passages 
of the Scriptures, or on the Church’s teachings or on the context. See: On Christian Doctrine, 
III.2.2-5. On the Latin translation of John’s Gospel Augustine was using and particularly on these 
verses see: H. Houghton, Augustine’s Text of John, p. 187-189. 
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est autem in ipsa sapientia spiritaliter ratio quaedam qua terra facta est; haec 
vita est (TrIoh, I.16).41 
 
Through this expedient, Augustine is trying to avoid the risk of identifying creation 
with divine life. Nonetheless, creation is deemed to be ‘life’ as long as it is in 
sapientia, that is, in the creative knowledge of God. In order to explain the double 
meaning of creation as both not-life and life, Augustine uses the example of the 
carpenter making a chest. Before making the actual chest, the artisan already 
possesses the chest in his creative knowledge (in arte) (TrIoh, I.17).42 Before 
existing as a discrete object, the chest exists in the soul of the carpenter. 
Therefore, insofar as the chest is in his soul, the chest is life, while insofar as it is 
a discrete object, it is not life. Equally, the creation is life in God, for God made 
everything in wisdom, but it is not life as a separate object: 
 
Quia quod factum est, in ipso vita erat: et antequam fieret, vita erat. Quod 
factum est, non est vita: sed in arte, hoc est, in Sapientia Dei, antequam 
fieret, vita erat. Quod factum est, transiit: quod est in Sapientia, transire non 
potest. Vita ergo in illo erat, quod factum est. Et qualis vita? […] vita erat lux 
hominum (TrIoh, III.4).43 
 
By stating the difference between the creation in arte Dei and the creation as a 
discrete object which has its own existence apart from God, Augustine is stating 
the impossibility of considering “the world” – even in its good meaning of 
“creation” – as the image of God. Augustine also affirms that what the Gospel 
calls “life” can be properly predicated only of the Logos. Nevertheless, Augustine 
does not deny the existence of this attribute in an imperfect way beyond God. In 
                                                 
41 ‘Read it thus: “that which was made” – punctuate here, and after that put: “in him is life”. What 
does this mean? The earth was made; but the earth itself which was made is not life. There is, 
however, in wisdom itself, in a spiritual way, a certain reason by which the earth was made: this 
is life’. 
42 On the creation in arte see also TrIoh, XXXVII.8-10. There, Augustine explains that, like a 
builder makes a construction, the Word made all things firstly in his creative knowledge (in arte) 
and then as a discrete object. However, things made in the creative knowledge are better, for 
they do not collapse. 
43 ‘Because “what was made, in him was life”, and before it was made, there was life. What was 
made is not life; but in his creative knowledge, that is, in the Wisdom of God, before it was made, 
there was life. What was made passed away; what is in wisdom cannot pass away. What was 
made, therefore, was life in him. And what sort of life? […] “the life was the light of men”’.  
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this sense, the soul too is said to be the life of the body (TrIoh, III.4).44 The 
difference between the two ways of being “life” resides in the fact that while the 
soul gives life to a piece of matter, God is said to be the “life of man” only, as 
distinguished from the rest of creation. Therefore, Augustine interprets the human 
mind as the only place where the image of God properly shines: 
  
Non distas a pecore, nisi intellectu. […] Unde ergo melior es? Ex imagine 
Dei. Ubi imago Dei? In mente, in intellectu. Si ergo ideo melior pecore, quia 
habes mentem qua intellegas quod non potest pecus intellegere; inde autem 
homo, quia melior pecore; lux hominum est lux mentium. Lux mentium supra 
mentes est, et excedit omnes mentes. Hoc erat vita illa per quam facta sunt 
omnia (TrIoh, III.4).45 
  
The light signifies the rationality of the Logos, whose absolute reason has a 
special relationship only with the rational mind (rationales mentes) found in 
human beings (TrIoh, I.18).46 The identification of the rational mind as the 
privileged locus where the image of God shines does not entail an ontological 
identity of human reason with that of God (TrIoh, XX.11). While Augustine admits 
that God’s light shines in every human being, not every human being is capable 
of perceiving it. This incapability is due to their belonging to the world (TrIoh, I.19 
                                                 
44 In this regard, see: On the Trinity, XIV.18.24. There, Augustine speaks of the final participation 
of the human body in the image of God. Indeed, since Christ took a body and the body of Christ 
resurrected and participate in the divine life, so the body of the elect will be rescued as well. In 
this way, Augustine resolves the problem of his over platonising identification of the imago dei 
with the mind only. While the mind is still deemed to be the only place where the image of God is 
to be found, Augustine allows an eschatological recovery of the body. As the soul gives life to the 
body on earth, it will give life in the afterlife. Equally, in On the Trinity, VII.3.5 Augustine explains 
that, just as the soul will be shaped according to the image of the Holy Spirit, the body will be 
shaped according to the image of the Son, which is the only person of the Trinity who has a body. 
Regarding the participation of the body in the image of God, see the good analysis by G. P. 
Boersma, Augustine's Early Theology of Image, p. 257-265. 
45 ‘You do not differ from an animal except in the intellect. […] How then are you better? From the 
image of God! Where is the image of God? In the mind, in the intellect. If therefore you are better 
than an animal precisely because you have a mind with which you may understand what the 
animal cannot understand and, therein a man because you are better than a cow, the light of man 
is the light of minds. The light of minds is above all minds and transcends all minds. This was that 
life through which all things were made.’ On the distinction between human beings and animals, 
on the basis of the rational capacity of human beings, see also: On the Trinity, XV.11. Regarding 
Augustine’s doctrine of the image in the fifteenth book of On the Trinity see: Cheuk Yin Yam and 
Anthony Dupont, ‘The Role of Imago Dei in Augustine's Speaking of Trinity: A Study of Neglected 
Book XV of De Trinitate’, in Ciudad de Dios: Revista Agustiniana 225 2 (2012), p. 325-359. 
46 In all his mature production Augustine is very consistent in indicating the mens as the proper 
place where the image of God shines. In On the Trinity, XII.7.12 he explicitly denies that the body 
was made in the image of God. Besides the occurrences found in the TrIoh, see also: 
Confessions, XIII.22 and The Literal Meaning of Genesis, VI.27.  
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and III.5). Therefore, Augustine explains how the verse of Jn. 1:9 – ‘it was the 
true light which enlightens every man who comes into the world’ – should be 
interpreted according to Jn. 1:10 – ‘he was in the world, and though the world 
was made through him, the world did not recognize him’. Although the creation 
recognises its creator, the world, that is, the lovers of the world, do not (TrIoh, I.5 
and II.11).  
  
The reason the world cannot be the image of God does not reside only in its 
ontology – that is, its lack of true Being – but mainly in its incapacity to transcend 
itself in a pure act of love for God. Therefore, the world is not imago Dei – both in 
the sense of “creation” and in the sense of the lover of the world – but rather the 
human mind is.47 The mind itself is also indicated as the subject of decision: Ipse 
enim considerator istorum omnium, discriminator, distinctor et quodammodo 
appensor in libra sapientiae, animus est (TrIoh, XX.12).48 Therefore, commenting 
on Jn. 5:19 – ‘the Son can do nothing by himself; he can do only what he sees 
his Father doing’ – Augustine appeals to the mind of his listeners, begging them 
to abandon worldly images and perceive only the true image of God imprinted in 
their minds:  
 
Redite ad cor: quid itis a vobis, et peritis ex vobis? […] Redi ad cor; vide ibi 
quid sentias forte de Deo, quia ibi est imago Dei. In interiore homine habitat 
Christus, in interiore homine renovaris ad imaginem Dei, in imagine sua 
cognosce auctorem eius (TrIoh, XVIII.10).49 
 
The first step of the believer who wants to see God is to return inside his own 
heart.50 Within the heart, human beings discover the image of God, which is 
                                                 
47 The mind is alternatively defined by Augustine as mens, cor, animus, ratio and intellectus. In 
this regard see the entire episode of the Samaritan woman in TrIoh, XV; See also Exposition on 
the Psalms, XLII.6: “Ergo intelligimus habere nos aliquid ubi imago Dei est, mentem scilicet atque 
rationem”. See also the precedent footnote.  
48 ‘The soul is the one who considers all thing, who distinguishes, who differentiates, who in some 
way weights them in the scale of wisdom’. 
49 ‘Return to your heart! Why do you go away from yourselves and perish from yourselves? […] 
Return to your heart! See there what perhaps you perceived about God because the image of 
God is there. In the inner man Christ dwells; in the inner man you are renewed according to the 
image of God. In his image recognise the author’. 
50 Augustine’s exhortation to return to the heart in order to know the true essence of one’s souls 
has been commented by many scholars. With regard to the doctrine of the image in Augustine’s 
mature theology see: Matthew Drever, Image, Identity, and the Forming of the Augustinian Soul, 
Oxford 2013. See in particular the fifth section: ‘Know thyself’ p. 110-141, where the author 
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hidden to the world because it does not belong to the world. The act of returning 
to the heart is thus presented as the act of grace, which moves the will away from 
the images of the world, painted as shades and darkness (TrIoh, XVIII.11). 
Without being distracted by the earthly images, the mind is indeed capable of 
understanding how it is possible to conceive a vision which is not mediated by 
the senses of the body.51 This intellectual vision starts from the understanding of 
theoretical concepts – such as Justice and Goodness – as this understanding 
belongs to the intellect alone. Nevertheless, this journey is not yet completed in 
the heart. This introspection, which is accomplished by training and study, does 
not itself grant the true vision of God. Indeed, God is truly apprehended only when 
one is able to transcend not only the bodily senses, but the mind itself. 52 
 
In this regard, in the twentieth tractate – which deals solely with the exegesis of 
Jn. 5:19 – Augustine makes clear the impossibility of speaking of an ontological 
proximity between the Being (that is, God) and its image (the soul). In the tractate 
not only the body is disregarded as mortal and corruptible, but even the mind 
does not properly pertain to the reality of ‘Being’: Magna ergo res est animus. 
Sed quomodo dico, est? Transi et ipsum; quia et ipse animus mutabilis est, 
quamvis melior sit omni corpore (TrIoh, XX.12).53 Therefore, it is only through 
transcending the mind that one can apprehend God. This journey was undertaken 
by John the Evangelist, who transcendit mentem suam ipsa ratione animi sui 
(TrIoh, XX.13).54  
 
                                                 
discusses Augustine’s interpretation of the Oracle of Delphi in On the Trinity, occurring during his 
search for the divine image in the soul.  
51 In On the Trinity, XII.4.4 Augustine refers to this capacity as the contemplative part of the mind 
which is the only true image of God. Being God’s image, it is able to contemplate the eternal truth 
of God.  
52 See, in this regard, Augustine’s statements in TrIoh, XX.11: Quaere in Patre et Filio 
separationem, non invenis. […] Nam si in his versaris, quae sibi errans animus facit; cum 
imaginibus tuis loqueris, non cum Verbo Dei: fallunt te imagines tuae. Transcende et corpus, et 
sape animum: transcende et animum, et sape Deum. Non tangis Deum, nisi et animum transieris. 
(‘Look for separation in the Father and Son and you do not find it. […] For if you busy yourself in 
these things which the erring mind makes for itself, you speak with your own images, not with the 
Word of God; your images deceive you. Transcend the body also and savour the mind. Transcend 
the mind also and savour God. You do not reach out and touch unless you have also passed 
beyond the mind’). 
53 ‘A great thing is the mind. But how do I say “is”? For the mind itself also is mutable even though 
it is better than every single body’. 
54 ‘He transcended his own intellect by the very reasoning power of his mind’. 
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The apprehension of God is therefore presented by Augustine as both possible 
and impossible. It is possible insofar as the human mind, being created as the 
image of God, naturally possesses the light of reason. It is metaphysically 
impossible insofar as the human being is finite, thus being unable to participate 
in God’s essence perfectly. It is impossible insofar as human beings are tied down 
by the images of this world, thus making them incapable of apprehending the 
existence of the perfect Image, that is, the Son. It is possible insofar as the grace 
of God allows the human being to transcend his own being and see the totality of 
God with the intellect. All these pairs of mutually exclusive possibilities are held 
together in Augustine’s exegesis.  
 
In any case, it is worth noting how Augustine’s exegesis is not only concerned 
with the metaphysical problem of the relationship between the perfect image of 
the Son and the ontologically degraded image of human beings, but mainly with 
the necessity of drawing the worldly images away from the hearts of the believers 
in order to make them rediscover the image of God in their mind. In addition, not 
only the world is not deemed to be the image of God, but it actively stands as the 
theological opposite of God’s images. By loving the darkness of the worldly 
images, human beings are constrained from seeing the pure light of the Logos. 
Therefore, in order to apprehend the image within, human minds have to be 
regenerated by God through the power of his grace. This process of regeneration, 
which will be the argument of the next section, eventually leads to the separation 
between two worlds: the saved world and the forsaken one.  
 
V.2.3 Mundus Recreatus: The Recreation of the Lost Image  
 
The process of rediscovery of the image of God in the inner self depicted in the 
previous subsection must not be confused with a concession to any kind of 
intimism or emotionalism, in Augustine’s thought.55 In this section, I shall focus 
on the Johannine perspective according to which Augustine intends the salvation 
                                                 
55 Contrariwise, this section will show that Augustine’s focus in the Tractates on John is not on 
the doctrine of the image intended as the place where an ontological identity between Creator 
and creature is found, but rather on the renewal of the fallen image through the work of Christ and 
the Holy Spirit. In this section, I will only partly enquire about the differences between the 
soteriological role Christ and that of the Spirit, for this will be the focus of the next section. 
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of human being much more as a recreation rather than as a restoration. Against 
the opinion of some influential scholars, I will therefore show that Augustine 
conceives a great difference between the grace which is given for creation and 
that given for re-creation. In other words, following the Johannine logic which 
identifies the creation with ‘the world’, Augustine shows an understanding of 
soteriology which interprets salvation as the act of pulling human being out of the 
world. In this sense, rather than being understood as an act of transformation of 
the world, salvation is presented as an act of separation of the elect from the 
world.  
 
Given the exegetical nature of the Tractates on John, Augustine does not aim at 
presenting here a comprehensive discussion on how original sin entered into the 
world and was transmitted from the first couple to the whole human race.56 Just 
as the Gospel of John, Augustine takes the presence of evil in the world for 
granted. Right from its Prologue, the Gospel presents the refusal of the world to 
accept the salvation brought by the Logos. By refusing salvation the world 
becomes wicked. Accordingly, Augustine’s attention is much focused on 
interpreting the dichotomies between the wicked world and the saved one. 
Creation itself is not naturally corrupted in a Manichaean sense, nevertheless, 
the severity of sin is such as to irreparably transform ‘creation’ – that is, the good 
creation of God – into ‘world’ – where the light shines but is not accepted. 
Therefore, by focusing on the relationship between creation and recreation, this 
section shows the extent to which Augustine’s soteriology is driven by the Gospel 
of John much more than scholarship has recognised so far. 
  
Just as with many of the most important themes of Augustine’s Tractates, the 
tension between creation and re-creation emerges from the exegesis of the 
                                                 
56 On the transmission of the original sin through sexual concupiscence (traducianism) Augustine 
wrote much in other works. Among the many see: Against Julian, V, 4.18, IV, 14.65, VI, 19.60; 
On the Grace of Christ, and on Original Sin, II, 40.45; The City of God, XIV, 16; On the Trinity, 
XII, 9. 14; On Genesis against the Manichees, II, 9.12. This doctrine remains one of the most 
debated among modern scholars. See among the many: T. Nisula, Augustine and the Functions 
of Concupiscence; Jesse Couenhoven, ‘St. Augustine’s Doctrine of Original Sin’, in Augustinian 
Studies 36 (2005), p. 359-396; See also the work of Pier Franco Beatrice, Tradux peccati. Alle 
fonti della dottrina agostiniana del peccato originale, Milano 1978, which has been recently 
translated into English by Adam Kamesar: The Transmission of Sin: Augustine and the Pre-
Augustinian Sources, Oxford 2013. In this book, Beatrice traces back in the second and third 




Prologue. In the first tractate, Augustine proposes a comparison between the 
beginning of the Gospel57 and the first verse of Genesis.58 Here Augustine 
strongly underlines that the very Logos who effected creation is the same who 
effects the re-creation of the elect. Thus, Augustine identifies three different 
moments: the creation of everything that exist; the sin of human beings, who 
corrupted the image of God in their heart; the re-creation of human beings by the 
Logos (TrIoh, I.12).59 Along with these three movements, God is indicated as the 
dispenser of salus. This Latin word indicates both the physical health and the 
spiritual salvation brought by the Saviour (TrIoh, XXX.1-3; XXXIV.4). With regard 
to the double meaning of the word salus, Augustine connects two passages of 
the Gospel where the Logos is said to be ‘light’. In the first, the Logos is said to 
be ‘light of all humankind’ (Jn. 1:4) while in the second he is said to be ‘light of 
the world’ and ‘light of life’ (Jn. 8:12). Accordingly, insofar as the Lord is light of 
the world, he will save – that is, give salus to – everyone, from human beings to 
beasts, from angels to brute animals (TrIoh, XXXIV.3). This kind of ‘salvation’ 
(salus) derives from the interpretation of creation itself as a miracle of God, who 
provides to the entire creation the ontological means to exist. In this sense the 
very creation is interpreted as an act of grace and mercy (TrIoh, IX.1-2). 
Nonetheless, insofar as the Logos is ‘light of all humankind’ he provides a special 
salus for human beings, who bear his image within: 
  
Si ergo sicut multiplicata est misericordia Dei (Ps. 35:7-8), ab illo homines et 
iumenta salvantur; nonne homines habent aliquid aliud quod eis Deus 
praestet creator, quod iumentis non praestat? Nullane discretio est inter 
animal factum ad imaginem Dei, et animal subditum imagini Dei? Est plane! 
[…] Aliam habent salutem in re, aliam in spe (TrIoh, XXXIV.4).60 
                                                 
57 Jn. 1:1: ‘In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God’. 
58 Gen. 1:1: ‘In the beginning God created the heavens and the earth’. 
59 TrIoh, I.12: Iam enim factus es per Verbum, sed oportet te refici per Verbum: si autem mala 
fuerit fides tua de Verbo, non poteris refici per Verbum. Et si tibi contigit fieri per Verbum, ut per 
illud factus sis, per te deficis: si per te deficis, ille te reficiat qui te fecit: si per te deterior efficeris, 
ille te recreet qui te creavit. (‘You have already been made through the Word, but you need to be 
made anew through the Word. But if your faith in the Word is deficient, you will not be able to be 
made anew through the Word. And if it has been given to you the fact that you exist through the 
Word, so that you are made through the Word, yet it is through yourself that you became defective. 
If you became defective through yourself, let him who made you remake you: if you made yourself 
worse through yourself, let the one who created you re-create you’). 
60 ‘Therefore if, as God’s mercy has been multiplied, men and beasts are saved by him, do not 
men have something else which God the creator may present to them which he does not present 




The commonality of salus between men and animal is therefore referred by 
Augustine as that grace which allows everything created to live and exist. Many 
times in the Tractates Augustine repeats that the very existence of the world is to 
be considered as miracle and grace. Every work of God is a miracle. The 
governance of the whole world is a miracle (TrIoh, XXIV.1-4). Every seed of grain 
is a miracle. The creation of the world by the Word is a miracle (TrIoh, VIII.1-2; 
IX.1-2;).61 Therefore, the creation of the mind or intellect (mens-intellectus) of a 
single person who is made at the image of God and re-made through Christ 
(factus-renovatus) is presented as a miracle (TrIoh, VIII.3). 
    
At first glance, the identification of both creation and re-creation as acts of grace, 
or even ‘miracles’, might be interpreted as an indication of similarities between 
the two operations. In this regard, many scholars have recognised that Augustine 
himself deems creation to be a form of grace. Indeed, without the ontological help 
of the Trinity, creation itself would cease to exist. Therefore, they concluded that 
is not possible to speak about a natural order in which grace has no place and a 
supernatural order of salvation which is governed by the grace of God. As a 
consequence, for example, Romano Guardini states that ‘for Augustine grace is 
a category not only of salvation, but also of existence’.62 Similarly, Jared Ortiz 
supports Carol Harrison’s claim that ‘everything is of grace: both creation and 
recreation are the work of the Trinity. There is no gap between creation and 
redemption’.63  
  
This scholarly position, particularly that of Harrison, is entirely focused on 
Augustine’s metaphysics, according to which the very finitude of the created 
world makes it ontologically unstable to the point of needing the work of the Trinity 
                                                 
subjected to the image of God? Certainly, there is! […] One has a salvation in present reality, 
another in hope’. 
61 Augustine’s discourse on miracles is strictly connected to his exegetical intents. According to 
him, the reader of the Gospel should not be amazed by the miracles performed by Jesus because, 
ultimately, the very existence of the world is a miracle. Therefore, it is much more important the 
symbolic meaning of miracles found in the Gospel rather than the effect they had on those who 
witnessed. Similarly, for the salvation of human beings, it was much more important that the Logos 
became man, rather than what he did as a man, as it will be shown in much details later on in this 
chapter. See: TrIoh, IX.1-2; XVII.1-3; XXIV.1-4; XXX.1-3. 
62 Romano Guardini, The Conversion of Augustine, Westminster MD 1960, p. 124 
63 C. Harrison, Rethinking Augustine p. 114. See also: Jared Ortiz, You Made Us for Yourself: 
Creation in St. Augustine's Confession, Minneapolis MN 2016. See in particular the section 
‘Creation and Re-creation’, p. 37-40. 
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to subsist. Nevertheless, my analysis of the Johannine categories in Augustine’s 
tractates aims at nuancing this opinion by showing that, although Augustine 
undeniably considers creation to be a work of grace, he still values the works of 
salvation as more important than those of creation. Consequently, there is a 
radical gap between the works of creation and that of redemption. This 
consideration comes not only from metaphysical reasons, but also from 
existential reasons related to Augustine’s own interpretation of the problem of evil 
in the world. Moreover, the very understanding Augustine shows of salvation as 
spiritual salvation, that is, the entering of the Trinitarian communion of the Holy 
Spirit, entails a status which is utterly superior to that of “simple” creation. It is not 
for no reason, indeed, that Augustine utterly refuses in the Tractates to consider 
“the world”, even in its highest meaning of originally good “creation”, to be the 
image of God.  
 
Considering creation as a work of grace does not entail that the grace which is 
given by God to creation is the same as the one given by God to those who reach 
salvation. While salus is given to both human beings and animals in re, only to 
human being it is given also in spe (TrIoh, XXXIV.4).64 Similarly, while God is said 
to be ‘light of the whole world’, he is also said to be ‘light of humankind’ in the 
sense that only human beings, insofar as in their mind is the image of God, have 
the capacity to apprehend that light. The difference between the two kinds of 
grace stands in the exclusiveness of the second. Similarly, while the work of 
creation embraces everything that exists, that of re-creation pertains to a special 
grace which is granted only to a few. The exclusiveness of the grace which is 
given to the ‘few’, as opposed to the ‘many’ who do not see the light and remain 
in the darkness, assumes in Augustine a strong Johannine connotation. In 
commenting on the healing of the blind man in Jn. 9, Augustine detects in the 
blindness of the man the current state of human race. The Johannine dichotomy 
between light and darkness, of which the blind man is a symbol, is here explained 
in Pauline terms as the hiatus between the utterly corrupted human nature where 
‘vice grew in the place of nature’ and the light brought by Christ (TrIoh, XLIV.1).65 
                                                 
64 On the difference between salvation in present reality (salus in re), and salvation in hope (salus 
in spe) see supra. 
65 Genus humanum est iste caecus: haec enim caecitas contigit in primo homine per peccatum, 
de quo omnes originem duximus, non solum mortis, sed etiam iniquitatis. […] Quandoquidem 
Apostolus dicit: Fuimus et nos aliquando natura filii irae, sicut et caeteri. (Eph. 2:3) […] 
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This interpretation is wholly consistent with the Johannine dichotomy between the 
holy community and “the world”. Indeed, this is exactly the way in which 
Augustine interprets the Gospel’s prologue when the Word is said to be refused 
by ‘his own’ (Jn. 1:11). ‘His own’ are all human beings whom God made before 
they became corrupted and forgot about him.66  
  
This work of re-creation is marked by the separation of the elect from the world. 
In this way, Augustine’s interpretation of the wording ‘his own’ presents a shift 
from the universal meaning related to all human beings who possess reason to 
the exclusive meaning related to the ones who have accepted Christ and his 
salvific role. This radical shift in Augustine’s theology is consistent with what I 
have shown in the first section regarding the meaning of the term ‘world’. While 
the term ‘world’ might sometimes be interpreted as ‘creation’, that is, the 
ontological substance which is created by God through an act of grace, it should 
nonetheless be usually interpreted as the forsaken part which is no longer able 
to recognise its creator due to the severity of its own sin, that wiped out its good 
nature. The contrast between the grace which is universally given and that which 
is given only to the elect marks the difference between the elect and the world. In 
Augustine’s interpretation of grace it is therefore possible to detect a radical 
displacement between what is given to the many and what is given to the few. 
Equally, this interpretation is referred by Augustine to the Law which is given by 
God in the Old Testament. This Law, which was given to all the people of Israel 
was not given to save, but to condemn (TrIoh, III.1-2).67 That is how Augustine 
interprets the verse of Jn. 1:16 that envisages a further outpouring of grace in the 
                                                 
Quomodo natura, nisi quia peccante primo homine, vitium pro natura inolevit? Si vitium pro natura 
inolevit, secundum mentem omnis homo caecus natus est. (‘This blind man is the human race. 
This blindness happened through sin in the first man, from whom we all have taken the origin not 
only of death, but also of wickedness. […] In as much as the Apostle, says: “All of us, too, were 
once by nature children of wrath, even as the rest”. How “by nature”, except that when the first 
man sinned, vice grew in the place of nature? If vice has grown in the place of nature, every man 
is born blind as regard to his mind’). 
66 Through his mercy and grace (gratia) the Son of God came to untie human beings from their 
sins so that they can cross the sea of this world (TrIoh, II.12-15). In this way, human beings are 
said to be re-made through Christ, thus becoming sons through grace, sons of God according to 
his Word (TrIoh, II.12-15).  
67 Regarding the impossibility of fulfilling the law without God actively helping human beings with 
his grace, that is, his love, see also: TrIoh, III.11-14; VII.8-12; VII.15-17; XVII.1-3; XVII.6; XXVI.1; 
XXVI.1; XLI.9-13; IL.21-25; LXV.1; LXXXIX.1-4. In this sense love, which is the Holy Spirit, is not 
only the fulfilment of the law, but spiritually becomes the law itself. In this regard, see the last 
section of this chapter.  
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elect – ‘Out of his fullness we have all received grace in place of grace already 
given’: 
   
Qui pertinent ad Adam? Omnes qui nati sunt de Adam. Qui ad Christum? 
Omnes qui nati sunt per Christum. Quare omnes in peccato? Quia nemo 
natus est praeter Adam. Ut autem nascerentur ex Adam, necessitatis fuit ex 
damnatione: nasci per Christum, voluntatis est et gratiae (TrIoh, III.12).68 
 
The opposition between being necessarily born of Adam, thus being part of ‘the 
world’, and being born of Christ, is one of the main themes which runs through 
the Tractates. Augustine’s language aims at underlining the necessity of 
condemnation as opposed to the gratuitous gift of faith. This gift of faith is not the 
cosmological grace which grants existence to everything that exists, but is rather 
an invisible grace that God personally allots to some human beings who are 
gratuitously chosen when they are still ‘darkness’ and part of ‘the world’.  
 
This line of thought marks Augustine’s interpretation of the figure of Nicodemus. 
In the Gospel, Nicodemus is said to approach Jesus by night (Jn. 3:2). This night 
is interpreted by Augustine as the darkness of the world, which is still not 
enlightened by the light of the Logos (TrIoh, XI.1-4). Through the encounter with 
Jesus, Nicodemus experiences a spiritual regeneration and the rebirth from the 
Spirit: cum ergo sint duae nativitates, ille unam intellegebat. Una est de terra, alia 
de coelo; una est de carne, alia de Spiritu; una est de mortalitate, alia de 
aeternitate; una est de masculo et femina, alia de Deo et Ecclesia (TrIoh, XI.6).69 
Here as well, Augustine’s language reproduces the dichotomy between that 
grace which is given through creation and that which is given through election.70 
                                                 
68 ‘Who belongs to Adam? All who have been born of Adam. Who belongs to Christ? All who have 
been born through Christ. Why are all in sin? Because no one has been born apart from Adam. 
That they be born from Adam was necessarily because of damnation. But coming through Christ 
pertains to will and grace’. 
69 ‘Although there are two births, he only knew one. One is from earth, the other from heaven; one 
is from the flesh, the other from the Spirit; one is from mortality, the other from eternity; one is 
from male and female, the other from God and Church’. 
70 This second grace passes through the mediating role of the Church and its sacraments, being 
operated by the Holy Spirit (TrIoh, XI.5-6; XII.1-2; XII.5-6). In the first group of Tractates (TrIoh, I-
XVI) it is possible to detect a strong anti-Donatist polemic. Therefore, Augustine stresses much 
the necessity of sacraments and of being fully part of the catholic community in order to achieve 
salvation. For further information on the Donatist controversy in the Tractates on John see: A. 
Ployd, Augustine, the Trinity and the Church. In any case, the mediation of the sacraments 
distributed by the catholic Church does not grant salvation in itself. Indeed, this dispensation must 
be operated by the invisible work of the Spirit.  
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The condition acquired through spiritual rebirth is not permanent because, 
differently from Christ, human beings are said to be sons by grace, not by nature. 
Therefore, in commenting on Jn. 12:46 – ‘I have come into the world as a light, so 
that no one who believes in me should stay in darkness’ – Augustine explains 
how the withdrawal of Christ would naturally lead human beings to their previous 
condition of darkness: lumina ergo sunt omnes sancti; sed credendo ab eo 
illuminantur, a quo si quis recesserit tenebrabitur (TrIoh, LIV.4).71 This is exactly 
how the originally good creation became “the world”.  
      
As human beings are not able to be light without the active help of Christ, the 
work of the re-creation of the human image by God is said to be operated by both 
Christ and the Holy Spirit. Commenting on Jn. 2,21 – ‘but the temple he had 
spoken of was his body’ – Augustine identifies in the mystical doctrine of the body 
of Christ the means through which re-creation of human beings happens. 
Augustine describes it as something happening intus in secreto (inside in the 
secret place), where human beings understand how God humbled himself in 
Christ in order to re-create them (humilis ut nos reficeret) (TrIoh, X.1).72 
Commenting on Jesus’ tiredness at the well of Jacob in Jn. 4, Augustine marks a 
clear distinction between the work of creation and the one of re-creation:  
 
Fortitudo Christi te creavit, infirmitas Christi te recreavit. Fortitudo Christi fecit 
ut quod non erat esset: infirmitas Christi fecit ut quod erat non periret. 
Condidit nos fortitudine sua, quaesivit nos infirmitate sua (TrIoh, XV.6).73 
 
                                                 
71 ‘All the saints are light; but, in believing, they are enlightened by him from whom, if anyone 
withdraws, he will be darkened’.  
72 The connection between humility and the capacity of being re-created by Christ is not an 
accidental part of Augustine’s discourse, but it rather represents its core. While the work of 
creation is presented by Augustine as a show of power by God, the work of recreation is operated 
through the weakness of Christ. Therefore, the renovation of the human image happens through 
what Augustine calls ‘the two births of Christ’: Duae nativitates Christi intelleguntur; una divina, 
altera humana: una per quam efficeremur, altera per quam reficeremur (TrIoh, XII.8) (‘Two births 
of Christ are understood, one divine, and the other human; one through which we were to be 
made, the other through which we were to be remade’). In this regard see TrIoh, XXV.13-19, 
where Augustine comments on Jn. 6:38: ‘For I have come down from heaven not to do my will 
but to do the will of him who sent me’. As opposed to the obedience of the Son who dies to 
accomplish the Father’s will, the pride of human beings makes them incapable of performing 
God’s will even if this would lead them to salvation. 
73 ‘The strength of Christ created you, the weakness of Christ re-created you. The strength of 
Christ caused what was-not to be; the weakness of Christ caused what-was to perish not. He 
produced us in his strength; he sought us in his weakness’. 
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While the work of creation speaks of the power of God, the work of re-creation 
speaks of his mercy towards human being. Therefore, Christ is the one who not 
only performs the work of creation, but even the one who takes human beings 
out of their world by stripping off their sins and re-creating them through his 
incarnation. Similarly, commenting on one of the most significant passage of the 
Gospel – Jn. 8.23-25: ‘you are of this world, I am not from this world’ – Augustine 
states that, in the multitude of the unbelievers, only some were chosen by Jesus 
for eternal salvation. Therefore, only few of them will have the possibility of 
understanding who Jesus is, that is, hominis formator et reformator, creator et 
recreator, factor et refactor (TrIoh, XXXVIII.8).74 
 
As the incarnation of Christ grants that human souls are renewed by God, so the 
Holy Spirit provides the ontological means through which this work of God is 
operated. The effusion of the Holy Spirit is indeed the effusion of grace itself. In 
the course of the Tractates, Augustine identifies the Holy Spirit as both the gift 
and the giver of that love which makes human beings able to re-discover the 
image of God hidden within. Indeed, the Spirit works both as the sign of unity of 
the holy community and the unity itself that holds together the societas of the 
elect.75. As the Holy Spirit is the ontological bond of love in God, he is also the 
ontological bond of love in the elect which makes the re-creation of the elect 
possible.76 The action of the Holy Spirit is deemed to be necessary in order to be 
able to perform good deeds. Indeed, if God does not help the human being with 
his grace (adiuvaret gratia), which is given through the Holy Spirit, no one can 
fulfil the law (TrIoh, XXVI.1).77 Similarly, in the episode of the Samaritan woman, 
the Holy Spirit is the fountain of water and the gift of God which allows human 
beings to be converted (TrIoh, XV). According to Jn. 6:63, where Jesus urges the 
disciples to recognise that ‘the words I have spoken to you are spirit and life’, the 
Spirit is presented as the only means through which Peter was able to recognise 
                                                 
74 ‘Fashioner and re-fashioner of man, the creator and re-creator, the maker and re-maker’.  
75 Regarding the way in which the Holy Spirit works in the Augustine’s Tractates, his opposition 
to the world and his proper work as distinguished from that of the Son see the next section: infra, 
V.3.  
76 On the Spirit as the bond of unity in the community in Tractates see: TrIoh, XVII.7-10 and 
XXVII.5-6. 
77 Therefore, this process of re-discovery is attributed to God. Even if reborn by the Word of God 
(renati) human beings are not renewed by Christ (innovati) in such way as to be stripped 
(expoliati) of mortal and corruptible parts from Adam. But the spiritual part (spirituale) which uplifts 
the soul is clearly a gift of God and his mercy (donum dei et misericordia eius) (TrIoh, XXI.1). 
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Jesus as ‘the Holy One of God’ (Jn. 6:69). Specifically, Augustine explains that 
Peter was able to understand only through the effusion of the Holy Spirit in him: 
Videte quemadmodum Petrus, dante Deo, recreante Spiritu sancto, intellexit 
(TrIoh, XXVII.9).78 
 
While the Spirit re-creates Peter’s heart making it possible for him to profess his 
faith in Christ, Augustine underlines the difference between Peter, who was 
chosen by God for being re-created through the Holy Spirit, and Judas, who was 
chosen by God to be used as a tool. While Augustine explains that electi in laude 
solent dici (TrIoh, XXVII.10),79 he also states that, while Peter was chosen by 
God in a positive sense, Judas was chosen so that through his evil works, God 
could permit something good to happen: Artifex illo utitur; et magnus artifex, si 
illo uti non nosset, nec eum esse permitteret (TrIoh, XXVII.10).80 It is worth noting 
though, that also in this case, the difference between Peter, who has been re-
created through the Holy Spirit, and Judas, who was created by God but not re-
created by the Spirit, is striking.81 While both participate in the ‘grace’ of creation, 
only Peter participates in the Holy Spirit, who re-creates his interiority, orienting it 
toward God. On the contrary, God uses Judas’ evil works in order to accomplish 
his will. Therefore, Augustine’s insistence on the fact that, were Judas not chosen 
as a negative actor in God’s plan, God would not have allowed him even to exist, 
is the ultimate evidence of the difference between the portion of people who is 
only part of creation and the one which is re-created through the Holy Spirit. The 
re-creational work operated by God is indeed a special grace personally 
orientated only to some human beings which surpasses that given by creation 
and existence.  
  
So far, this section has shown how Augustine is constantly led by the Gospel of 
John to propose a difference between the protological creation made good by 
God and “the world”, that is, creation as it is now, after sin. While God still provides 
                                                 
78 ‘You see in which way Peter believed: with God giving him (the ability) and the Holy Spirit re-
creating him’.  
79 ‘We are accustomed to call “chosen” in praise’. 
80 ‘The maker uses him; and the great maker, if he did not know how to use him, would not even 
permit him to be’.  
81 Regarding Origen’s and Augustine’s interpretation of the passage of Jn. 13, particularly 
focusing on the figure of Judas, see the excellent article by G. Lettieri, ‘Origene, Agostino e il 
mistero di Giuda’. 
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existence to the world, he does not provide it with the necessary aid not to sin. 
The difference between the original creation and the world is best summoned in 
a passage where Augustine provides a clear distinction between the concept of 
human being as created by God, and human being as it is now: 
  
Quasi duae res sunt, homo et peccator. Quod audis homo, Deus fecit: quod 
audis peccator, ipse homo fecit. Dele quod fecisti, ut Deus salvet quod fecit. 
Oportet ut oderis in te opus tuum, et ames in te opus Dei. […] Initium operum 
bonorum, confessio est operum malorum. Facis veritatem, et venis ad lucem 
(TrIoh, XII.13).82 
 
Augustine’s theorization of two substances should not be confused with a legacy 
from his Manichaean past. As Augustine makes clear in other passages, vice has 
not replaced the goodness of God’s creation in re. As a consequence, vice should 
be distinguished from nature (TrIoh, LXII.16).83 Nevertheless, the present 
condition of every human being who comes into this world is that of the sinner, 
not that of the original human being. Therefore, insofar as human beings exist in 
this world, they are of this world where, in Augustine’s words, vitium pro natura 
inolevit (TrIoh, XLIV.1).84 This existential condition is expressed by the difference 
between those who are created and then abandoned by God and those who are 
re-created: 
    
Attendat unusquisque vestrum, fratres mei, quid habeat christianus. Quod 
homo est, commune cum multis: quod christianus est, secernitur a multis; et 
plus ad illum pertinet quod christianus, quam quod homo. Nam quod 
                                                 
82 ‘It is as if there are two things, man and sinner. What is called man, that God has made; what 
is called sinner, that man himself has made. Destroy what you have made that God may save 
what he has made. You must hate your own work in yourself and love God’s work in you. The 
beginning of good work is the confession of evil works. Do the truth and come to the light’.  
83 The passage runs like this: Venit ergo Dominus Deus ad hominem peccatorem. Duo nomina 
audisti, et hominem, et peccatorem. Quod homo est, ex Deo est: quod peccator est, non est ex 
Deo. A natura vitium secernatur: agnoscatur natura, unde Creator laudetur; agnoscatur vitium, 
propter quod medicus invocetur. (TrIoh, XLII.16) ‘Therefore, the lord God came to man the sinner. 
You have heard two names, both man and sinner. In that he is a man, he is of God; in that he is 
a sinner, he is not of God. Let the vice be distinguished from the nature. Let the nature be 
recognised from which the creator is to be praised; let the vice be recognised on account of which 
the Physician is to be summoned’. 
84 ‘Vice has grown in place of sin’. 
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christianus, renovatur ad imaginem Dei, a quo homo factus est ad imaginem 
Dei (TrIoh, V.12).85 
 
Once again, the work of re-creation of the human image is deemed to be more 
precious than the work of creation, as it is personally directed to the single human 
being and, most of all, it is exclusive to some human beings only whom God has 
chosen out of the world. Being chosen out of the world, they are separated from 
the world, thus forming the holy community of the saints. This Johannine logic is 
enhanced by Augustine to the point of asking explicitly, when preaching about 
the resurrection of Lazarus, in Jn. 11:1-54, whether it should be considered to be 
a greater thing to create or to resurrect: 
 
Si ergo per illum facta sunt omnia, quid mirum est si resurrexit unus per illum, 
cum tot quotidie nascantur per illum? Plus est homines creare quam 
resuscitare. Dignatus est tamen et creare et resuscitare; creare omnes, 
resuscitare quosdam (TrIoh, XLIX.1).86 
 
The complex relationship between creation and recreation set up by Augustine in 
the Tractates is therefore resolved in acknowledgment of the mystery of a God 
who deemed it good to create all and resurrect some. In this quotation, Augustine 
does not aim at giving a definitive answer to the question. Anyway, as the 
quotation comes from the episode of the resurrection of Lazarus, Augustine 
resolves the exegetical problem by making the resurrection of Lazarus a symbol 
of the spiritual resurrection of all Christians in the final days.87 Much more 
revealing of Augustine’s true attitude is instead his comment on the passage of 
Jn. 14:12: ‘whoever believes in me will do the works I have been doing, and they 
will do even greater things’. Here Augustine wonders what kind of ‘greater things’ 
                                                 
85 ‘Let each and every one of you examine closely, my brothers, what a Christian has. In that he 
is a human being, he shares (his humanity) with many; in that he is a Christian, he is separated 
from many. And the fact that he is a Christian has more relevance to him than that he is a human 
being. For in that he is a Christian he is remade according to the image of God by whom he was 
made a human being according to the image of God’ 
86 ‘If, therefore, all things were made through him, what wonder is it if one person arose through 
him since so many are born through him every day? It is a greater thing to create persons than 
to resurrect them. Yet, he deemed it to be good both to create and to resurrect – create all and 
resurrect some’ 
87 On Augustine’s interpretation of the miracles found in the Gospel see supra.  
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Christians might do when compared with the one made by Christ;88 Augustine 
answers: 
 
Sed et in coelis, Sedes, Dominationes, Principatus, Potestates, Archangeli, 
Angeli opera sunt Christi; numquid etiam his operibus maiora facit, qui 
operante in se Christo, cooperatur aeternam salutem ac iustificationem 
suam? Non hic audeo praecipitare sententiam: intellegat qui potest, iudicet 
qui potest, utrum maius sit iustos creare quam impios iustificare. Certe enim 
si aequalis est utrumque potentiae, hoc maioris est misericordiae (TrIoh, 
LXXII.2-3).89 
 
In this case, I would say that Augustine’s deliberate refusal to answer is 
nonetheless an answer to the question. Indeed, while in creating not only human 
beings, but also much purer creatures, God shows his grace in the form of power, 
in justifying unjust creatures he also shows mercy. While the ontological power 
of God is shown in both, for even wicked creatures still need God in order to exist, 
God’s mercy and love is shown only in the justification of the wicked. This work 
of justification is much more striking when considering that God deemed good to 
justify only some wicked and forsake others. God’s reasons for acting in such a 
manner are obscure to Augustine, who cannot find a rational explanation for this, 
but still believes it must be good, for this is God’s decision. In other words, the 
exclusivity of the work of recreation is the means through which the elect 
understand the depth of God’s love for them. This exclusive love is identified not 
only with the grace of God, but also with the Holy Spirit himself. To be recreated 
means to enter in the Trinitarian community which is indeed instantiated in the 
                                                 
88 The following quotation starts like this: Ipsum credere in Christum, opus est Christi. Hoc 
operatur in nobis, non utique sine nobis. […] Prorsus maius hoc esse dixerim, quam est coelum 
et terra, et quaecumque cernuntur in coelo et in terra. Et coelum enim et terra transibit; 
praedestinatorum autem, id est eorum quos praescit, salus et iustificatio permanebit. In illis 
tantum opera Dei, in his autem etiam est imago Dei. ‘To believe in Christ is also itself a work of 
Christ. He works this in us, surely not without us. […] Truly, I would say that this is greater than is 
heaven and earth and whatever things are seen in heaven and on earth. For heaven and earth 
will pass away, but the salvation and justification of the predestined, that is, of those whom he 
foreknows, will abide. In the former are only God’s works, but in the latter is also God’s image. 
89 But even in the Heavens, the Thrones, the Dominations, the Principalities, the Powers, the 
Archangels, the Angels, are works of Christ. Does he do even greater works than these, he who, 
when Christ is working in him, works out together his salvation and justification? I do not dare to 
rush here this idea along. Let him understand who can, let him judge who can, whether it is greater 
to create the just than to justify the wicked. Anyway, for sure, if they are both of equal power, the 
latter is of greater mercy’. 
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Holy Spirit.90 In this sense, the grace of salvation is much more precious of the 
one given by creation because of the gift of the Spirit. In creation, you are given 
existence; in salvation, you are given God.  
 
In this regard, Augustine’s reflection on the problem of re-creation is intimately 
shaped by the Gospel of John’s understanding of the spirit. Commenting on 
Jesus’ prayer for the disciples in Jn. 17:14 – ‘I have given them your word and 
the world has hated them, for they are not of the world any more than I am of the 
world’ – Augustine points out that ‘not to be of the world’ means to be reborn of 
the Holy Spirit: 
 
Hoc eis regeneratione collatum est: nam generatione de mundo erant, 
propter quod iam eis dixerat: Ego vos de mundo elegi (Jn. 15:19). Donatum 
est ergo eis ut sicut ipse, nec ipsi essent de mundo, eos ipso liberante de 
mundo. […] Nam si propterea illi iam non de mundo, quia renati sunt de 
Spiritu sancto (TrIoh, CVIII.1).91  
 
The re-creation worked by God through Christ and the Holy Spirit allowed the 
disciples to be pulled out of the ‘damaged and condemned stock in which they 
were born’ (vitiata atque damnata stirpe generatum est) (TrIoh, CXV.2) and enter 
into the communion of the Holy Spirit in God. Taking the elect from the world, 
which is condemned to perdition, represents the deeper meaning of Augustine’s 
understanding of the idea of re-creation. Indeed, the unity between the Spirit and 
the chosen ones is achieved by the separation of those who are chosen from the 
world from which they come from. However one might want to interpret his 
doctrine of grace in relation to the predestination, this section has provided 
sufficient evidence to show that Augustine’s interpretation of re-creation must be 
understood as a separation-from, rather than a regeneration-of the world. Most 
importantly, it is worth reiterating that Augustine’s system of thought is drawn 
from, rather than imposed on, the text of the fourth Gospel. Indeed, the higher 
                                                 
90 The identification of the Holy Spirit with the Trinitarian communion will be further discussed in 
the next section: infra, V.3. 
91 ‘This was conferred to them by regeneration; for by generation they were of the world, and 
because of this he had already said to them: “I have chosen you out of the world”. Therefore, it 
was granted to them that they themselves, as he, might be not of the world, since he himself was 
freeing them from the world. […] Indeed, if they now were not of the world is because they were 
reborn of the Holy Spirit’.  
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V.3 The Proprium of the Spirit: Christ, the Holy Spirit and the 
World as Massa Damnationis 
 
  
In the two previous sections, the opposition between the created world and the 
re-created world has been analysed to underline the extent to which Augustine’s 
doctrine of re-creation is structured according to the Johannine contraposition 
between Jesus’ followers and ‘the world’. In particular, I have analysed the way 
in which, according to the Johannine identification of creation with ‘the world’, 
Augustine proposes a view of re-creation that marks the shift between God’s 
grace that is necessary for creation and the one that is necessary for re-creation. 
While the grace of creation is given to everybody and the very power of God 
allows the world to subsist, the grace given for re-creation is the sign of the 
personal love of God for some of his creatures which are separated from the 
world and brought in the communion with the Holy Spirit. Only this grace makes 
the human being capable of seeing God and, consequently, be saved.  
  
This new section will analyse the relationship between ‘the world’ and the two 
divine soteriological agents who work in it: Christ and the Holy Spirit. Since the 
beginning of the 20th century, scholarship has discussed Augustine’s 
pneumatology in relationship to his soteriology at length.92 In particular, scholars 
have questioned whether it is possible to ascribe a particular role to the Holy Spirit 
in the works of salvation. This section aims at understanding what role the Spirit 
performs in the salvation of human beings in Augustine’s Tractates on John and 
the extent to which Augustine draws his soteriological pneumatology from the 
fourth Gospel. In order to analyse the difference between the role of Christ and 
that of the Holy Spirit, this section will first discuss the ontological problems 
related to the ascription of a particular role to each one of the three hypostases. 
Then, this issue will be linked with the proper role of Christ and the Holy Spirit, 
thus expounding the different soteriological roles of the two persons. Regarding 
                                                 
92 Among the many works on Augustine’s pneumatology see in particular: Michel Rene Barnes, 
‘Augustine’s Last Pneumatology’, in Augustinian Studies 39 2 (2008), p. 223-234. In this article, 
Barnes concentrates on TrIoh, XCIX and on Augustine’s work Against Maximinus, that is, the last 
work where Augustine explains his Trinitarian theology before his death. While focusing on these 
two texts, Barnes discusses the late understanding of the Spirit as “Creator” and the association 
of “power” with the Holy Spirit as mainly related to his debate against Homoians.  
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Christ, Augustine mainly focuses on three doctrines: the unity of the person, the 
predestination Christ and his role in the final judgement. Therefore, this section 
will show how Christ’s action toward humanity is said to be universal and 
particular at the same time. While the very incarnation of the Word is deemed to 
be a grace which God grants to all humanity, the person of Christ is also the giver 
of a special grace, which is personally given and exclusive. This grace, that allows 
the elect to enter the communion with God, is identified with the Holy Spirit. This 
interpretation is particularly stressed in commenting on the pneumatological 
books of the Gospel (Jn. 14-16), where Jesus promises to send the Holy Spirit to 
his disciples. While the sending of the Holy Spirit by Jesus is also interpreted as 
the scriptural proof of the double procession of the Spirit from both the Father and 
the Son, Augustine takes this sending as the means by which the elect enter in 
communion with God.93 Therefore, Augustine understands actual salvation as 
fully spiritual. In other words, salvation is and is in the Holy Spirit, for the Holy 
Spirit is both the object and the subject of salvation. In this regard, the 
identification between the Holy Spirit and caritas – which is indeed a Johannine 
theme – is crucial.  
 
Finally, this section aims at understanding the way in which Augustine interprets 
the proper relationship between the Spirit and the world. Differently from Christ 
who, through the incarnation, is seen by the world, the Spirit is considered to be 
completely alien from the world. Therefore, Augustine attributes the final 
judgement of the world only to the Son. Indeed, the world is not able to see either 
the Father or the Spirit, but only the Son. The irreconcilability between the Spirit 
and the world is made even sharper by fact that the Spirit resides only in the elect; 
consequently, only those who are already in God have the possibility to perceive 
the Spirit. Augustine’s interpretation of the Trinitarian participation of the elect in 
the Holy Spirit necessarily leads to the consequence of the absence of the Spirt 
from the world. The strong dichotomy between the world and the Saviour found 
                                                 
93 Augustine interprets the sending of the Spirit by the Son as both referred to the soteriological 
role of the Spirit and to his ontological role inside the Trinity. Generally speaking, Augustine tends 
to read all relationship between the persons of the Trinity as both ontological and soteriological 
statement. In this regard, I agree with Lewis Ayres who plainly recognises this exegetical pattern. 
See: Lewis Ayres, ‘Spiritus Amborum: Augustine and Pro-Nicene Pneumatology’, in Augustinian 
Studies 39 2 (2008), p. 207-221, in particular p. 215. On the same subject see: M. R. Barnes, 
‘Augustine’s Last Pneumatology’, p. 225: ‘Augustine reads virtually all statements about the 
relationship of Son and Spirit as also signifying aspects of their eternal relationship’. 
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in the Gospel of John is therefore radically mirrored in Augustine’s pneumatology. 
While Christ has to deal with the world, at least in the act of condemning it, the 
Spirit is in no sense ever mingled with the world. While the work of Christ is 
therefore that of choosing people out of the world and to deliver them to the Father 
by means of the Holy Spirit; the work of the Spirit is only referred to the saved 
portion which is chosen out. It is indeed the remoteness of the world from the 
Trinitarian union, which is the Holy Spirit, to make it irredeemably damned. 
 
V.3.1 Unity and Relationship in God: The Inseparability of the Works of the 
Trinity 
   
In the chapter regarding the Spirit in God I have shown how the Gospel of John, 
particularly Jn. 5:26,94 shapes Augustine’s way of understanding the relationship 
between the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit.95 Having ‘life in himself’, the Son 
joins the Father in the eternal self-sameness of the idipsum and is also 
responsible for the procession of the Spirit, for the Father is said to grant by 
generation to the Son the capacity to generate their mutual bond eternally. The 
ontological consequences of this Trinitarian relationship have already been 
discussed and will not be repeated here. The problem at hand concerns the 
economic functions of the aforementioned hypostases. When commenting on 
passages such as Jn. 10:30 – ‘I and the Father are one’ – Augustine applies the 
concept of idipsum not only to the essence of the Trinity, but also to the works 
that the Trinity performs. By negating any ‘subordinationist’ interpretation of the 
hypostases, Augustine states that the unity in God must be understood as unity 
of both divine essence and actions. According to the Latin pro-Nicene tradition to 
which he belongs, Augustine is affirming that the works of the Trinity are 
inseparable (TrIoh, LXXIV.3-5; LXXVIII.1-3; XCI.4).96 Moreover, Augustine 
maintains that each person of the Trinity does not exist in reality as a separate 
                                                 
94 ‘For as the Father has life in himself, so he has granted the Son also to have life in himself’. 
95 For full bibliographical discussion see supra, III.1. 
96 Augustine deems the inseparability of the works of the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit to 
be a distinctive sign of the catholic faith. As such, his attitude towards the problem is exemplified 
in TrIoh, XX.3, where Augustine exhorts the listeners to try to understand such doctrine which is 
treated as an apostolic teaching: Catholica autem fides habet, quod Patris et Filii opera non sunt 
separabilia. Hoc est quod volo, si possum, loqui Caritati vestrae: sed secundum illa verba 
Domini: Qui potest capere capiat (Mt. 19:20). Qui autem capere non potest, non mihi adscribat, 
sed tarditati suae; et convertat se ad illum qui cor aperit, ut infundat quod donat. 
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person, but only exists in relationship with the others (TrIoh, LXXVII.2; XCV.1). 
As a consequence, when the Gospel ascribes the performance of a work to a 
single hypostasis, the entire Trinity is to be understood as performing it (TrIoh, 
XCIV.5). Thus, Augustine finds in Jn. 5:19-20 – ‘whatever the Father does, the 
Son does likewise. The Father loves the Son and shows him all that he himself is 
doing’ – the perfect representation of the Trinity-in-itself and of the inseparability 
of his works: 
  
Catholica fides hoc habet, firmata Spiritu Dei in sanctis eius, contra omnem 
haereticam pravitatem, quia Patris et Filii opera inseparabilia sunt. Quid est 
quod dixi? Quomodo ipse Pater et Filius inseparabiles sunt, sic et opera 
Patris et Filii inseparabilia sunt. Quomodo Pater et Filius inseparabiles sunt? 
Quia ipse dixit: Ego et Pater unum sumus (Jn. 10:30). Quia Pater et Filius 
non sunt duo dii, sed unus Deus, Verbum et cuius est Verbum, unus et 
Unicus, Deus unus Pater et Filius caritate complexi, unusque caritatis 
Spiritus eorum est, ut fiat Trinitas Pater et Filius et Spiritus sanctus. Non ergo 
tantum Patris et Filii, sed et Spiritus sancti, sicut aequalitas et inseparabilitas 
personarum, ita etiam opera inseparabilia sunt (TrIoh, XX.3).97 
 
According to Augustine’s reasoning, insofar as the three persons are the eternal 
process which is the true Trinity, the three persons are inseparable. As such, 
each of them is one God and one idipsum, but the three of them are equally one 
God and one idipsum. The doctrine rests on the conception of the Spirit as the 
procession of both Father and Son and as the bond of love in which, caritate 
complexi, Father, Son and Spirit become one Trinity.98 
                                                 
97 ‘The catholic faith, made firm by the Spirit of God in the saints, holds this against every heretical 
depravity: the works of the Father and the Son are inseparable. What is it that I have said? Just 
as the Father himself and the Son himself are inseparable, so also the works of the Father and 
the Son are inseparable. In what way the Father and the Son are inseparable? Because he 
himself said: “I and the Father are one” (Jn. 10:30). For the Father and the Son are not two gods, 
but one God, the Word and the one from whom the Word is, they are one and the only one, one 
God, Father and Son, combined in love; and the Spirit of their love is one, so that there is found 
the Trinity, Father and Son and Holy Spirit. Therefore, as there is an equality and inseparability 
of the persons, not only of the Father and the Son, but also of the Holy Spirit, so also the works 
are inseparable’. Augustine goes on by saying: Adhuc planius dicam quid sit, opera inseparabilia 
sunt. Non dicit catholica fides quia fecit Deus Pater aliquid, et fecit Filius aliquid aliud: sed quod 
fecit Pater, hoc et Filius fecit, hoc et Spiritus sanctus fecit. Per Verbum enim facta sunt omnia: 
quando dixit et facta sunt, per Verbum facta sunt, per Christum facta sunt. 
98 See also the references to the individua caritas which is the perfect unity of and in God. See 
TrIoh, XVIII.4. See also TrIoh, XVII.7-10 and XXVII.5-6, where Augustine uses Acts 4.32 in order 
to describe both the work of the Holy Spirit in human hearts and the work of the Spirit in the Trinity. 
These instances will be analysed later in this chapter.  
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From an ontological point of view, the perfect unity of the Trinity is therefore found 
in the Holy Spirit, for his very existence gives witness to the Trinitarian union. In 
this sense, so far as God is concerned, the different persons of the Trinity do 
perform different roles by means of their relationship. These specific roles do not 
pertain to each person individually, but to the relationship between each other. 
Indeed, the unity between God’s essence and action makes the very essence of 
the Trinity a relational one. Thus, the Father is Father insofar as he has a Son, 
the Son is Son insofar as he has a Father and the Spirit is Spirit insofar as he is 
the Spirit of both and both are Spirit. Being the Spirit of both, he shares their 
essence and by his very existence he is the hypostatical union between the two.  
 
Because of this relational role, the Spirit is said to be love. So far as this section 
is concerned, it is worth noting that Augustine’s depiction of the Spirit as caritas 
is not metaphorical and is absolutely crucial in understanding the relation 
between the Trinity’s essence and its works. God is love insofar as the Holy Spirit 
instantiates the eternal union and communion between the Father and the Son. 
Commenting on Jn.17:3,99 Augustine describes the Holy Spirit as the substantial 
and consubstantial love of both, through which the Trinity is a perfect unity: 
  
Consequenter enim et Spiritus sanctus intellegitur, quia Spiritus est Patris et 
Filii, tamquam caritas substantialis et consubstantialis amborum. Quoniam 
non duo dii Pater et Filius, nec tres dii Pater et Filius et Spiritus sanctus; sed 
ipsa Trinitas unus solus verus Deus. Nec idem tamen Pater qui Filius, nec 
idem Filius qui Pater, nec idem Spiritus sanctus qui Pater et Filius; quoniam 
tres sunt Pater et Filius et Spiritus sanctus; sed ipsa Trinitas unus est Deus 
(TrIoh, CV.3).100 
 
Augustine is here stating the impossibility of understanding the unity between the 
Father and the Son without acknowledging the reality of the Spirit as eternal 
                                                 
99 Jn. 17:3: ‘Now this is eternal life: that they know you, the only true God, and Jesus Christ, whom 
you have sent’.  
100 ‘Consequently, the Holy Spirit too is understood, because he is the Spirit of the Father and of 
the Son, as the substantial and consubstantial love of both. For there are not two gods, Father 
and Son, nor three gods, Father and Son and Holy Spirit, but the Trinity itself is the one, sole, true 
God. Yet neither is the Father the same one who the Son is, nor is the Son the same one who 
the Father is, nor is the Holy Spirit the same one who the Father and the Son are, because they 
are three, Father and Son and Holy Spirit, but the Trinity itself is the one God’. 
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caritas between the Two. Indeed, while there is a generative relationship between 
the first two Trinitarian hypostases – testified by the very names of ‘father’ and 
‘son’ – there cannot be unity between them outside the Holy Spirit. In the whole 
Tractates, Augustine unravels this Trinitarian framework by applying it to the 
binitarian logic which he found in the Gospel of John. While the depiction of the 
Spirit as love is justified from the doctrine of the double procession of the Spirit 
from both the Father and the Son – a doctrine which Augustine builds from a 
close exegesis of some passages of the fourth Gospel (Jn. 15:26; 16:12-15; 
20:22 etc.) – Augustine explains the relationship between the Son and the Father 
in terms of a loving relationship which is instantiated in their perfect fruit, the Holy 
Spirit.101 
 
Furthermore, Augustine states that si duo dii sunt, non est ibi summa caritas 
(TrIoh, XIV.9).102 In other words, by accepting any form of subordination between 
the Father and the Son one admits that their love – and, consequently, their unity 
– is not perfect. It appears that here the very conception of the Spirit as 
‘procession’ inside God points to the idea of a Trinity which is one insofar as it is 
an eternal process of generation and procession. As constituents of this process, 
Father, Son and Spirit are not logical modes of being of a single entity, but rather 
existent hypostases in which the entire process is eternally accomplished. In this 
regard, the doctrine of the idipsum acts as a guarantor of the unity and steadiness 
of God and of the process of mutual relationship which the Trinity is. The self-
sameness of God gives to Augustine the possibility of attributing every action that 
a single person performs in the world to all the three persons of the Trinity.  
 
Before moving to the next part of this section, which will analyse the proper work 
of the Son and of the Spirit in dealing with the creation, it is worth noting that 
Augustine explains the inseparability of the work of the Trinity as a consequence 
of the Trinity’s essence. The unity of its essence results in the necessary unity of 
essence and actions according to the principle of the quod habet hoc est which I 
                                                 
101 In this regard see: TrIoh, XIV.9: Deus misit Deum. Iunge ambos, unus Deus, Deus verax 
missus a Deo. De singulis interroga, Deus: et de ambobus interroga, Deus. Non singuli Deus et 
ambo dii, sed singulus quisque Deus et ambo Deus. Tanta enim ibi est caritas Spiritus sancti, 
tanta pax unitatis, ut de singulis cum interrogatur, Deus tibi respondeatur; de Trinitate cum 
interrogatur, Deus tibi respondeatur. 
102 ‘If there are two gods there is not the greatest love there’.  
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have explained in chapter two. However, just as the three persons of the Trinity 
are inseparable in the Trinity and yet they perform different roles in the Trinitarian 
relationship, so the Trinity acts as a whole towards created creatures but to every 
person is ascribed a specific role. 
 
V.3.2 Augustine’s Trinitarian Gospel: Christ’s Proprium in Relation to the 
World 
 
The figure of Christ in Augustine’s soteriology in the Tractates is – not surprisingly 
– crucial. It is not my intention here to propose a systematic interpretation of 
Augustine’s Christology. Such matter, particularly difficult due to the lack of a 
systematic work on the role of Christ by Augustine, has already been proposed 
by many scholars throughout the last century, with quite opposite evaluations.103 
Rather than proposing a full account of this matter, this section will try to unfold 
the way in which Augustine interprets the proprium of Christ, that is, the proper 
works of salvation operated by Christ, and his relationship to “the world” in 
commenting the Gospel of John, as opposed to the proprium of the Spirit.  
   
Identified since the beginning of the Tractates with the ‘light that was coming into 
the world’ (Jn. 1:9), Christ is regarded as the soteriological agent who frees the 
elect from the world, leading his people to the glory of the Father.104 Further 
developing the Johannine parallel between the ‘Word that takes flesh’ and the 
                                                 
103 During the first fifty years of the last century the scholarly debate was focused on the alleged 
orthodoxy (or unorthodoxy) of Augustine’s Christology on the basis of the later dogmatic 
pronouncements of Chalcedon. See: Otto Scheel, Die Anschauung Augustins über Christi Person 
und Werk, Tübingen 1901. A change of perspective was operated by Tarsicius J. van Bavel, 
Recherches sur la christologie de saint Augustin; l'humain et le divin dans le Christ d'après saint 
Augustin, Fribourg 1954, who identified Docetic treats in Augustine’s Christology. For a more 
recent work suggesting the centrality of Christology in Augustine’s theology see: Goulven Madec, 
La Patrie et la voie: Le Christ dans la vie et la pensée de Saint Augustin, Paris 1989. For a full 
account of the scholarly debate on Augustine’s Christology see: Dominic Keech, The Anti-
Pelagian Christology of Augustine of Hippo, p. 12-15. In his book Keech argues for a strong 
influence on Augustine’s Christology of Origenian themes, stating that ‘his sustained use of 
Origen’s interpretation of Romans 8:3 at the heart of his Christology, together with his attack on 
Jerome in the 390s and 410s, should be taken to indicate a deeper, unflinching appreciation of 
Origen’s work and influence’ (p.19). According to this perspective, the author claims that ‘later 
critique of Pelagianism worked in part to draw attention away from Caelestius’ attack on Origen 
and the construal of his own theology of the Fall as essentially Origenist in character’ (p.5). 
Unfortunately, the extent of my work does not allow for a full comparison between Origen’s and 
Augustine’s Christology. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that, while a deep influence of Origen’s 
work on the young Augustine is still a little more than an educated guess, the lack of a deep 
engagement with Origen’s work is quite clear in Augustine’s later writings.  
104 See, among the many: TrIoh, II.2-3; III.3-4; VII.4-7; XII.12-13; XLIV.4-6; CVI.5-6. 
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‘lamb of God’ (Jn. 1:17; 1:36), Augustine explains to what extent the works of 
salvation are carried on by Christ-the-lamb, whose blood outbalances the sins of 
the world (mundus) (TrIoh, VII.4-7). As a consequence, salvation is only operated 
through Christ (TrIoh, XXII.1) and directed towards the world, according to the 
Johannine saying that ‘God did not send his Son into the world to condemn the 
world, but to save the world through him’ (Jn. 3:17). Augustine’s interpretation of 
this passage is crucial, for it shows both Augustine’s understanding of the double 
meaning of the term ‘world’ and the basis of his Christological soteriology. In 
interpreting this passage, Augustine declares that, when the Lord came into the 
world, he found no one without sin (TrIoh, XII.12). As a consequence, Augustine 
interprets the passage according to the subsequent words of the Gospel: ‘Light 
has come into the world, but people loved darkness instead of light because their 
deeds were evil’ (Jn. 3:19). As we have seen, Augustine puts the faults for this 
sin entirely in human hands, thus distinguishing between two different ways of 
being human: Quasi duae res sunt, homo et peccator. Quod audis homo, Deus 
fecit: quod audis peccator, ipse homo fecit. Dele quod fecisti, ut Deus salvet quod 
fecit (TrIoh, XII.13).105 While the world and human beings were both created good 
by God, human beings become sinners to the point that their sin is defined almost 
as their res. Augustine’s attention here is mainly focused on the incarnation of 
Christ himself and the fact that, because of the incarnation, the judgement of 
sinners cannot be said to be anything but right: Venit Salvator ad mundum […] 
Salvari non vis ab ipso; ex te iudicaberis.[…] Nondum apparuit iudicium, sed iam 
factum est iudicium. Novit enim Dominus qui sunt eius, novit qui permaneant ad 
coronam, qui permaneant ad flammam (TrIoh, XII.12).106 Those who ‘persevere 
to the flame’ are the identified with the darkness, and defined as massa 
peccatum.  
 
V.3.2.1 The Son of God; the Son of Man; the World 
 
                                                 
105 ‘It is as if there are two things: human being and sinner. What is called human being, that God 
has made; what is called sinner, that human being himself has made. Destroy what you have 
made, that God may save what he has made’.  
106 ‘The Saviour came to the world […] You do not wish to be saved by him; you will be judged of 
yourself […] Judgement has not yet appeared, but judgement has already been made; for the 
Lord knows who are his; he knows those who are to persevere to the crown and those who are 
to persevere to the flame’. 
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Even from the short analysis of this passage it appears that, in interpreting the 
Gospel of John, Augustine’s interpretation is focused on underlining the fact that 
human beings ‘have loved the darkness rather than the light’ (Jn. 3:19). In his 
own words, he declares that this is the most profound meaning of the text at hand: 
Ibi posuit vim: multi enim dilexerunt peccata sua, multi confessi sunt peccata sua 
(TrIoh, XII.13).107 In other words, Augustine is here stating that the most important 
meaning of the text at hand stands in the fact that the incarnation of the Word 
acts as a separation between those who are light and those who are darkness. 
Therefore, much more than what Christ did, Augustine values the very incarnation 
as the watershed in the history of salvation. By assuming human flesh without 
being part of the massa peccatum, (TrIoh, IV.10-12) Christ is already showing the 
Father’s love towards the world.  
  
This interpretation is confirmed by Augustine throughout the entire Tractates. 
Commenting on the miracle of Jesus at the pool in Bethesda, (Jn. 5:1-8) 
Augustine states: 
 
Magis gaudere quam mirari debemus, quia Dominus noster et salvator Iesus 
Christus homo factus est, quam quod divina inter homines Deus fecit. Plus 
est enim ad salutem nostram quod factus est propter homines, quam quod 
fecit inter homines (TrIoh, XVII.1).108 
 
Augustine’s insistence on the importance of the incarnation, rather than on the 
works that Christ performed during his life, profoundly marks his interpretation of 
the Gospel of John. As Christ is born out of the massa peccatum, he gives human 
beings the means through which they are saved. This salvation is represented as 
a rebirth, a second birth in Christ (TrIoh, III.11-13).109 As a consequence of 
Augustine’s primary focus on the incarnation – rather than on the actions – of 
Christ, the author’s attention is mainly directed towards the very nature of Christ, 
                                                 
107 ‘He put the real importance there: many have loved their sins, many have confessed their sins’.  
108 ‘We ought to rejoice more than be amazed that our Lord and Saviour, Jesus Christ, become 
man than that God performed divine acts among men. For what he became for men is more 
valuable for our salvation than what he did among men’.  
109 This process of rebirth is said to deprive human beings of their own ‘glory’, that is, of their own 
pride, giving room to the action of God in humans’ hearts so that, while the glory of humans 
decreases, the glory of God increases (TrIoh, XIV.4-5; XIX.19). 
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his divine birth and the unity of the divine and human aspects in him.110 Therefore, 
Jesus’ answer to the mother at the wedding in Cana was aiming at explaining 
that Mary is the mother of his humanity only, not of his divinity, and that his 
miracles were carried on by the power of his divine nature.111 The distinction 
between what Christ says and does as God and what Christ says and does as 
man is an exegetical rule which Augustine applies in all Tractates.112 This rule 
must not only be taken as an exegetical technicality which allows Augustine to 
deal with difficult passages of the Gospel. Indeed, this distinction is always 
paralleled with the understanding of the human part of Christ as Jesus’ weakness. 
This weakness is the means through which human beings are saved, as testified 
by the episode of the Samaritan at the well in Jn. 4:6.113 The process of re-
creation, which was examined in the previous section of this chapter, is therefore 
accomplished through the human part of Christ. As Christ’s divine power (the 
Word) creates human beings, his weakness re-creates them (TrIoh, XII.8-9; 
XIII.1-5).  
                                                 
110 Augustine sets this distinction since commenting on the first miracle of the Gospel at the 
wedding in Cana (Jn. 2:1-12). In TrIoh, VIII.8-9 he explains that the interpreter ought to distinguish 
what Jesus said to his mother with regard to his divinity and what he says with regard to his 
humanity. Augustine explains that, insofar as Christ is God, he is born of the Father without a 
mother, insofar he is man, is born of a mother without a father. See: TrIoh, VIII.8: Ille singulariter 
natus de Patre sine matre, de matre sine patre; sine matre Deus, sine patre homo; sine matre 
ante tempora, sine patre in fine temporum. The very same idea is again repeated in commenting 
on Jesus’ speech on the Bread of Life (Jn. 6:25-53). See: TrIoh, XXVI. 10. 
111 Augustine is here denying the idea of Mary as Theotokos. In any case, Augustine died before 
the Council of Ephesus in 431 declared Mary to be the Mother of God. Augustine’s interpretation 
of the figure of Mary is mostly explained in Of Holy Virginity, III.3. According to Augustine, Mary 
ought to be considered as the most blessing of all Christians, because she accepted to obey to 
the will of God. Therefore, Augustine’s Mariology is more centred on her obedience to God and 
her predestination rather than on her undefiled nature. For Augustine’s Mariology see: Luigi 
Gambero, Mary and the Fathers of the Church: The Blessed Virgin Mary in Patristic Thought, San 
Francisco 1999, p. 216-229; Geoffey D. Dunn, ‘The Functions of Mary in the Christian Homilies 
of Augustine of Hippo’, in Jane Baun, Averil Cameron, Mark Edwards and Markus Vinzent (eds), 
Studia Patristica 48, Leuven 2010, p. 433-447; Pauline Allen, ‘The International Mariology Project: 
A Case-Study of Augustine's Letters’, Vigiliae Christianae, 60 2 (2006), p. 209-230; Michele 
Pellegrino, La vergine Maria. Pagine scelte di (sant') Agostino, Milan 1993.  
112 See, among the others, the episode of the Samaritan at the well (Jn. 4:6), were Jesus’ 
tiredness is interpreted as referred to his humanity only: TrIoh, XV.6. See also the episode of 
Jesus’ weeping after Lazarus’ death (Jn. 11:33), in TrIoh, LI.18-20. 
113 See TrIoh, XV.6: Vis videre quam iste Filius Dei fortis sit? Omnia per ipsum facta sunt, et sine 
ipso factum est nihil (Jn. 1:13) […] Infirmum vis nosse? Verbum caro factum est, et habitavit in 
nobis (Jn. 1:14). Fortitudo Christi te creavit, infirmitas Christi te recreavit. Fortitudo Christi fecit ut 
quod non erat esset: infirmitas Christi fecit ut quod erat non periret. Condidit nos fortitudine sua, 
quaesivit nos infirmitate sua. (‘Do you want to see how this Son of God is strong? “All things were 
made through him and without him was made nothing”; […] Do you want to know how he was 
weak? “The Word was made flesh and dwelt among us”. The strength of Christ created you; the 
weakness of Christ recreated you. The strength of Christ caused what was not to be; the 
weakness of Christ caused what was not to perish. He established us in his strength; he sought 




Augustine’s observations on the double birth of Christ mark only the beginning of 
his speculation on Christ’s nature. Augustine’s reflections on the nature of Christ 
and on his relationship to the Father arise – just as Augustine’s Trinitarian 
reflections! – from the text of John 5, particularly Jn. 5:19 – ‘the Son can do 
nothing by himself; he can do only what he sees his Father doing’ – and Jn. 5:26 
– ‘as the Father has life in himself, so he has granted the Son also to have life in 
himself’.114 Commenting on the difference established by the Gospel between the 
‘Son of God’ and the ‘Son of man’ (Jn. 5:25-29), Augustine proposes a systematic 
view on how to interpret the relationship between the two:  
  
Haerendo enim ad unitatem personae filius hominis Filio Dei, facta est una 
persona, eademque Filius Dei, quae et filius hominis. Quid autem propter 
quid habeat, dignoscendum est. Filius hominis habet animam, habet corpus. 
Filius Dei, quod est Verbum Dei, habet hominem, tamquam anima corpus. 
Sicut anima habens corpus, non facit duas personas, sed unum hominem; 
sic Verbum habens hominem, non facit duas personas, sed unum Christum. 
Quid est homo? Anima rationalis habens corpus. Quid est Christus? Verbum 
Dei habens hominem (TrIoh, XIX.15).115 
 
Augustine states that God has assumed the entire human nature in Christ, thus 
making it possible for every component of human being (both soul and body) to 
                                                 
114 Augustine interprets Jesus’ words in Jn. 7:16 – My Doctrine is not of myself’ – as meaning ‘I 
am not of myself’ (non sum a meispso), the eternal generation of the Son from the Father does 
not allow for any separation in nature and substance (natura et substantia) between the two 
persons. TrIoh, XXIX.5: Hoc videtur mihi dixisse Dominus Iesus Christus: Mea doctrina non est 
mea, ac si diceret: Ego non sum a meipso. Quamvis enim Filium Patri dicamus et credamus 
aequalem, nec ullam in eis esse naturae substantiaeque distantiam, nec inter generantem atque 
generatum aliquod interfuisse temporis intervallum. Therefore, Augustine interprets the 
superiority of the Father as only related to the flesh (that is, the human part) of Christ: Ita Pater et 
aequalis, et maior: aequalis Verbo, maior carne; aequalis ei per quem fecit nos, maior eo qui 
factus est propter nos (TrIoh, XVIII.2). 
115 ‘Indeed, by adhering to the unity of the person, the Son of man with the Son of God was made 
one person; and the Son of God is the same person as the Son of man. But one must distinguish 
what he has and why. The Son of man has a soul, has a body. The Son of God, who is the Word 
of God, has human nature, as the soul has body. As a soul, having a body, does not make two 
persons, but one man, so the Word, having human nature does not make two persons, but one 
Christ. What is human nature? A rational soul having body. What is Christ? The Word of God 
having human nature’.  
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be saved. This discourse is pronounced, polemicizing against those who believe 
that there is no resurrection of the body.116  
 
It is worth underlining how the assumption of the Son of man (the human part) in 
the Son of God makes it possible to predicate both human weakness and divine 
power of Christ. As a consequence, commenting on Jesus’ weeping before the 
resurrection of Lazarus in Jn. 11:33, Augustine states that Jesus is willingly 
troubled, insofar as he is troubled in the Son of man by decision of the Son of 
God (TrIoh, LI.18-20). The very same argument, according to which Christ is God, 
rational soul and body, is repeated in every situation when Jesus is trouble in 
Gospel (TrIoh, XXIII.5-6; XLVII.7; LXIX.1-4; LXX.1).117  
 
As Augustine takes the doctrine of the unity of the persons to signify the complete 
unity that the man Jesus enjoyed with the Father, so this doctrine is of 
fundamental importance in describing the way in which the Son was sent to the 
world. In commenting on Jesus’ statements ‘I am going to the Father’ (Jn. 14:28), 
Augustine explains that insofar as the Son of man is not equal to the Father he 
was going to the Father, insofar as he is the Only Begotten he never withdrew 
(TrIoh, LXXVIII.1-3). In this way, although the Son is sent by the Father on earth, 
the Son is said both never to have ceased to be in heaven with the Father and to 
ascend to the Father in heaven (TrIoh, XXVII.1-4; CV.4-5). Moreover, insofar as 
it is in heaven and it is one, the entirety of Christ is a member of the Trinity. 
Although the Son of God was made man, he never ceased to be God, never 
departing from the bosom of the Father (TrIoh, XXVIII.1; XXXV.1-5). The Son of 
man was not always in the bosom of the Father, thus he needs to ascend to the 
Father in Christ through the Son of God. Nevertheless, their unity being perfect, 
they are now one Christ in the Trinity (TrIoh, XXVII.1-4; LXXVIII.1-3).118 To this 
                                                 
116 In this regard, Augustine makes explicit mention of the Apollinarists. Nevertheless, they are a 
purely theoretical polemical target, for it seems that there were no Apollinarists where Augustine 
was preaching. In this regard see: TrIoh, XXIII.6 and XLVII.9.  
117 When commenting on the last supper (Jn. 13:21: ‘After he had said this, Jesus was troubled 
in spirit and testified, “Very truly I tell you, one of you is going to betray me”’), Augustine explains 
that Christ transfigured in himself the affection of human weakness, sharing human suffering in 
his soul by the unity of the persons (TrIoh, LX.1-5). 
118 Augustine describes Christ as that unity where the Word of God has the power and the will, 
while the human part of Christ acts according to the Word’s will. Similarly, commenting on Jesus’ 
death on the cross, Augustine reflects on the way in which Christ laid down his life. Since from 
the incarnation the soul and the Word are forever and indissolubly united, Augustine interprets 
the flesh of Christ to lay down his life, for it is not possible to think about any separation in Christ 
after the incarnation (TrIoh, XLVII.10-13). 
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extent, Christ is the perfect union between God and the human being: being 
completely united in the spiritual communion with the Son of God, the Son of man 
enters in the perfect Trinitarian communion of God.  
 
With regard to the relationship between the human and the divine part of Christ, 
the taking on of the Son of man by the Word is regarded by Augustine as an act 
of grace: Iste filius hominis sequestratus quadam gratia Spiritus, et secundum 
carnem filius hominis, […], iste homo etiam Deus est (TrIoh, XXV.11).119 
Augustine’s consideration that the Son of man is such by the operating grace of 
the Spirit is burdened with soteriological consequences. Indeed, this grace is 
explicitly identified with the proper work of the Holy Spirit throughout the 
Tractates: 
  
Quando autem ait Ioannes Baptista: Non enim ad mensuram dat Deus 
Spiritum, (Jn. 3:34) de ipso Dei Filio loquebatur, cui non est datus Spiritus ad 
mensuram; quia in illo inhabitat omnis plenitudo divinitatis. Neque enim sine 
gratia Spiritus sancti est mediator Dei et hominum homo Christus Iesus […] 
Quod enim est Unigenitus aequalis Patri, non est gratiae, sed naturae: quod 
autem in unitatem personae Unigeniti assumptus est homo, gratiae est, non 
naturae (TrIoh, LXXIV.3).120 
 
This citation further divides the divine part of Christ, that has always been one 
with the Spirit in the perfect unity of the Trinity, from the human part of Christ, that 
has been chosen by the Spirit by grace, that is, regardless of its previous 
merits.121 This same grace which is given to human being not by nature but by 
mercy is the one that is found in the man Christ, for even in the case of Christ 
                                                 
119 ‘This Son of man has been set apart by a certain grace of the Spirit, and he is Son of man 
according to the flesh […] but man is also God’. 
120 ‘Now, when John the Baptist said “God does not give the Spirit by measure”, he was speaking 
of the Son of God himself to whom the Spirit was not given by measure because all the fullness 
of divinity dwells in him. For neither without the grace of the Holy Spirit is he the mediator of God 
and men, the man Jesus Christ; […] For that he is the Only Begotten, equal to the Father, is not 
of grace but of nature; but that the man was taken up in the unity of the person of the Only 
Begotten is of grace, not of nature’. 
121 Insofar as God’s plan for salvation is eternal, this grace precedes every merit that the Son of 
man could possibly have had. In this regard, commenting on Jesus’ words in Jn. 15:10 – ‘If you 
keep my commands, you will abide in my love, just as I have kept my Father’s commands and 
abide in his love’ – Augustine maintains that the expression ‘abide in my love’ ought to be read 
as ‘abide in my grace’. Indeed, if one does not already abide in God’s grace he is not able to keep 
the Father’s commandments. 
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there is not any merit which precedes the assumption of the man (TrIoh, 
LXXXII.3-4). A similar understanding of Christ’s role as a mediator is given by 
Augustine regarding the glorification of the Son. As the glorification is one of the 
major themes of the Gospel, Augustine’s reflection on it is particularly 
significant.122 According to the Gospel’s passage of Jn. 13:31-32 – ‘Now the Son 
of man is glorified and God is glorified in him’ – Augustine explains that this 
glorification is found in the human nature of the Son of man that was taken on by 
the eternal Word and thus endowed with immortal eternity (TrIoh, LXIII.3). This 
glorification is the archetype of what will happen when, victus a Christo, transierit 
hic mundus, et nemo in populo Christi remanebit immundus (TrIoh, LXIII.2).123 
Augustine’s words pun between immundus (unclean) and mundus (world) 
reveals in this case the prototypical nature of the incarnation, laying the 
ontological foundations for the resurrection of all the elect. At the final judgement 
then, the people of Christ will be definitely separated from the mundus immundus 
by the operating grace of the Holy Spirit, which will unite those who are chosen 
in the Trinitarian communion, just as it has already happened in Christ.  
 
V.3.2.2 The Predestination of Christ 
 
Commenting on another fundamental passage of the Gospel – ‘Father, […] 
Glorify your Son, that your Son may glorify you. […] glorify me in your presence 
with the glory I had with you before the world began’ – Augustine again explains 
that this glory is referred to the form of a servant, for the glory of the Word always 
was (TrIoh, CIV.2-3; CV.1-2). Therefore, the Father glorified the Son of man in 
the sense that he made him one with the Word in Christ, while Christ glorified the 
Father by making him known to human beings.124 Moreover, Augustine explains 
that the ‘glory that I had before the world began’ reveals the predestination of the 
man Jesus, because no human nature, including the one of Christ, has something 
                                                 
122 On the subject of glory and glorification in the Gospel of John see: Andreas J. Köstenberger, 
‘The Glory of God in John's Gospel and Revelation’, in Christopher W. Morgan and Robert A. 
Peterson (eds), The Glory of God, Wheaton ILL 2010, p. 107-126. 
123 ‘when this world, conquered by Christ, will pass away and no one in the people of Christ will 
remain unclean’ 
124 See TrIoh, CV.3: Summa tunc Dei clarificatio; quia summa gloria, quae graece dicitur δόξα. 
Unde dictum est δόξασον, quod latini quidam interpretati sunt, clarifica; quidam, glorifica. A 
veteribus autem gloria, qua gloriosi homines dicuntur, ita est definita: Gloria est frequens de aliquo 
fama cum laude. […] Ibi erit Dei sine fine laudatio, ubi erit Dei plena cognitio; et quia plena 
cognitio, ideo summa clarificatio vel glorificatio. 
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that has not received by God. The verb ‘glorify’ in the past tense further reveals 
that everything Christ did, he was predestined to do: Qui enim certis et 
immutabilibus causis omnia futura praedestinavit, quidquid facturus est fecit 
(TrIoh, CV.5).125  
 
The predestination of Christ is not an incidental element.126 The fundamental 
importance of such doctrine has been already recognised by scholars such as 
Madec and Bernard.127 Indeed, this predestination is the basis of the salvation of 
every human being: Quisquis igitur Dei Filium praedestinatum negat, hunc 
eumdem filium hominis negat (TrIoh, CV.8).128 Indeed, just as every other human 
being, the Son of man is said not to be such by merit, but by the grace of the 
Spirit (TrIoh, CVI.5). This is therefore the way in which Augustine interprets the 
evangelical passage of Jn. 15:15 – ‘I have chosen you out of the world’:  
  
Quos Deus Filius de mundo elegit cum Patre, idem ipse homo Filius de 
mundo eos accepit a Patre: non enim Pater illos Filio dedisset, nisi elegisset. 
[…] Nunc autem homo idem ipse Filius accepit eos qui non erant ipsius, quia 
et formam servi accepit Deus idem quae non erat ipsius.(TrIoh, CVI.5) 129 
   
Through the predestination of the Son of man, God sanctifies his chosen people 
in himself. God does it by predestination, as by predestination he sanctifies the 
Son of man (TrIoh, CVIII.4-5). Through this predestination, the mediator between 
God and human beings receives the power to choose other human beings out of 
the world. As incarnation poses the ontological basis for the redemption of human 
nature, the very human nature of Christ reveals the eternal predestination of 
those who are chosen by God. Therefore, it is shown here that the proprium of 
Christ stands in his being the first of the predestined. As the Son of man is 
                                                 
125 ‘For he who has predestined all future things all future things by certain and immutable causes 
has (already) done whatever he will do’.  
126 On Christ as the first predestined human see also: On the Predestination of the Saints, 
XXXI.15; On the Gift of Perseverance, LXVII.24. 
127 The first work to analyse this theme properly is that of René Bernard, ‘La Prédestination du 
Christ total selon Saint Augustin’, in Recherches Augustiniennes 3 (1965), p. 1–58. See also: G. 
Madec, La Patrie et la voie, p. 272.  
128 ‘Therefore, whoever denies that the Son of God was predestined denies that this same one 
was the Son of man’. 
129 ‘Those whom the Son of God had chosen out of the world together with the Father, the very 
same Son of man has received from the Father; for the Father would not have given them to the 
Son unless he had chosen. […] But now the very same Son of man has received them who were 
not his, because the same one as God also received the form of the servant, which was not his’. 
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predestined to be united with the Word, those who are chosen by God out of the 
world are able to enter the Trinitarian communion by the works of the Holy Spirit. 
Moreover, Augustine states that just as the human nature of Christ does not 
disappear in the Word, but is ruled by the Word, so the human nature of the 
chosen will not disappear in the Trinitarian communion, but will maintain its 
singularity:  
 
Hoc quidam sic intellegendum putarunt, tamquam natura humana quae 
suscepta est a Verbo, converteretur in Verbum, et homo mutaretur in Deum; 
imo, si diligentius quod opinati sunt cogitemus, homo periret in Deo. […]. 
Porro si natura humana in Verbum mutata atque conversa, Verbum Dei 
quantum erat et quod erat hoc erit, ubi est homo si non perit? Sed ad hanc 
opinionem, quam veritati prorsus non video convenire, nihil nos urget si […] 
intellegamus praedestinationem claritatis humanae quae in illo est naturae; 
et hoc iam praedestinando factum fuisse antequam mundus esset (TrIoh, 
CV.6-7).130 
 
By the very predestination of Christ all predestinations begin. Therefore, 
predestination is not only the sign of every human nature, but it is also the way in 
which Augustine explains the persistence of singularity after the final judgement 
in the communion of the chosen with God. Indeed, being loved by God with an 
infinite and eternal love – which is the Holy Spirit himself – entails a free and 
voluntary act of choice operated by God. Being God eternal and without time, this 
choice is eternally made and then projected onto the world. In this way, the very 
existence of the world stands as the sign of God’s care, as he draws the elect out 
of the world by an act of eternal love. This act is operated personally, rather than 
universally. By loving some of his creatures and rejecting others, God is showing 
the care he has for each one of his chosen, thus assuming that the singularity of 
each creature survives even after the reunion with God. All of this has been firstly 
settled in Christ, the Mediator between God and man.  
                                                 
130 ‘Some thought that this should so be understood as though the human nature that was 
assumed by the Word would be transformed into the Word and the man changed into God; rather, 
if we should ponder more diligently what they thought, the man was lost in God. […] Moreover if, 
once the human nature has been changed and transformed into the Word, the Word of God will 
be exactly as great as it was and exactly what it was, where is the man if not lost? But, to this 
opinion, which I do not see to be at all consistent with the truth, nothing impels us, if […] we 
understand the predestination of the human nature which is in him, and that this was already done 




V.3.2.3 The Final Judgement 
  
After having analysed Christ’s role as the first of those who are chosen by 
predestination to enter in the everlasting Trinitarian communion, it is worth now 
explaining Christ’s role in the final judgement. According to the text of John, 
Augustine treats the final judgment as a proper work of the Son.131 Augustine’s 
speculation takes the move from John 5, which appears again to be the keystone 
of Augustine’s interpretation of the fourth Gospel. In particular, the verses of Jn. 
5:26-27 acquire a fundamental meaning in explaining Christ’s proprium: ‘For as 
the Father has life in himself, so he has granted the Son also to have life in 
himself. And he has given him authority to judge because he is the Son of man’. 
Augustine explains that, since not every soul will have the capacity of 
understanding God, not every soul will actually see God as it is at the end of the 
world (TrIoh, XIX.13). Therefore, it is necessary that God will appear both in his 
divine and human form. The dead will rise in the human mind (in mente) through 
the Son of God, and they will rise in the flesh (in carne) through the Son of man 
(TrIoh, XXIII.5-6). The reason the judgment is of the Son is that Christ will appear 
in the form of servant so that also the wicked will see him: 
  
Talis apparebit iudex, qualis videri possit et ab eis quos coronaturus est, et 
ab eis quos damnaturus est. Forma ergo servi videbitur, occulta erit forma 
Dei. Occultus erit in servo Filius Dei, et apparebit filius hominis; […] Et quia 
ipse solus apparebit in forma servi, Pater autem non apparebit, quia non est 
indutus forma servi (TrIoh, XIX.16).132 
  
By appearing in the form of the Son of man, Christ will make the judgment visible 
also for those who will not be saved by God. Indeed, nobody can see God if this 
is not granted by God. This idea stands at the centre of Augustine’s 
understanding of the relationship between the Trinity and human beings: no one 
                                                 
131 See in particular: TrIoh, XIX.14-15; XIX.16-18; XXI.11-16; XXIII.5-6; XXXV.1-5; XXXVI.10-13; 
CVI.4. 
132 ‘The judge will appear such as can be seen both by those whom he will crown and by those 
whom he will condemn. Therefore, the form of the servant will be seen, the form of God will be 
hidden. The Son of God will be hidden in the servant and the Son of man will appear; […] And 
because he alone will appear in the form of the servant, the Father will not appear because he 
has not been clothed with the form of a servant’. 
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can see God if he is not in communion with God. This communion is considered 
to be the proper work of the Spirt. This is also confirmed by the interpretation of 
Jn. 8:16: ‘But if I do judge, my decisions are true, because I am not alone. I stand 
with the Father, who sent me’. Augustine here explains that the judgment of the 
Son is true and just because it is willed by the entire Trinity. This Trinitarian 
communion will nevertheless be seen only by those who are part of it, that is, by 
those chosen people who have already entered the communion of God in the 
Holy Spirit.  
 
Before moving on to analysing the proprium of the Spirit and his relationship to 
the world, it is worth making some concluding remarks on the role of Christ. This 
section has shown that Augustine’s doctrine of the unity of the person which 
grounds its scriptural basis on Jn. 5, has fundamental repercussions which lead 
to interpreting the prerogatives of Christ in three different ways. 
 
First, it implies that the very act of taking flesh by the Word – that is, the 
incarnation – is more significant than what Christ has done. Indeed, this is an act 
of undeserved grace which allows human beings to be saved. This kind of 
reasoning, which fits very well in the Prologue of John’s Gospel, is connected by 
Augustine with the distinction in Christ between the Son of God and the Son of 
man. Secondly, having taken flesh, the Son of man is the first of the predestined. 
As this taking flesh is operated through predestination, every human being is 
saved by an act of grace which happens through predestination. Therefore, 
salvation is an undeserved act of grace which is operated by God in and through 
the Holy Spirit. 
 
Thirdly, only Christ has been provided with the power of judging. Christ’s role in 
the final judgement allows Augustine to understand God’s relationship to the 
world as something which is alien from God’s essence. The human part of Christ 
– the Son of man – allows Augustine to keep God distanced from the world. As it 
is impossible to understand the Trinity if one is not in communion with the Trinity, 
Augustine affirms that only those who are already taken in the Trinitarian 
communion by means of the Holy Spirit will be able to see God, while those who 




All these roles that Christ performs, which represent the proprium of Christ, could 
not be performed by Christ alone without the Holy Spirit. Nevertheless, this 
section has shown how, while working together, Christ and the Spirit do perform 
different roles. As this section has been focused on the works of Christ, the next 
one will analyse the proprium of the Spirit.  
 
V.3.3 Augustine’s Trinitarian Gospel: The Holy Spirit’s Proprium and the 
Absolute Irreconcilability between the Spirit and the World  
  
The previous section of this chapter has made clear the close interconnection 
between the works of Christ and that of the Spirit. Each person possesses a 
specific role, which is derived both from his ontological origin– and from his 
different ways of relating to creation: as for the Son, the incarnation; as for the 
Spirit, the sanctification. In this respect, it has been shown how the proprium of 
Christ is mostly related to the incarnation, the unity of the person and the final 
judgment. This section will instead analyse the proprium of the Spirit. 
 
Just as Christ, the Spirit is said to perform a myriad of different actions and works 
throughout the exegesis of John. First, the Spirit is said to be the inspirer of the 
Scriptures, both Old and New Testament, and to have been present and active 
in the prophets even before the coming of Christ (TrIoh, XXXII.6-8; LII.6-9).133 
Secondly, he is interpreted as the third person of the Trinity, which substantiates 
the ontological union between the Father and the Son (TrIoh, IX.7; XIV.9; XVIII.2-
4; XXXIX.5; CV.3). Thirdly, the Spirit is the source of love (fons caritatis) which 
unifies the Church in one fellowship (TrIoh, XXXII.8). He is therefore very often 
described as the sign of love and unity (TrIoh, V.8-11; VI.1-2; IX.7-8; XVII.7-10). 
Moreover, the Spirit is taken to be the means by which human beings are able to 
know God (TrIoh, XXXII.5). As a consequence, he must be considered as the 
active force that converts humans and teaches truths about Christ (TrIoh, XL.1-
2; XLVI.1-4).  
 
                                                 
133 Commenting on the prophecy of Caiaphas in Jn. 11:49-54, the Spirit is also said to be able 
and willing to foretell the future even through evil men, for ‘all the things that Caiaphas prophesied 
were said in regard to predestination (secundum praedestinationem)’. See TrIoh, IL.27-28. 
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In addition, the role of the Spirit is also visible in the union between the Son of 
God and the Son of man in Christ. The unity of the person in Christ is made 
possible by the power and work of the Holy Spirit that eternally chose the Son of 
man to be united with the Son of God. By commenting on Jn. 17: 5 – ‘And now, 
Father, glorify me in your presence with the glory I had with you before the world 
began’ – Augustine clearly explains how the glory which belonged to Christ before 
the foundation of the world has to be interpreted as the predestination of the Son 
of man who, by the grace of the Holy Spirit, as opposed to his original nature, is 
united with the Son of God (TrIoh, CV.4 and CV.6-7). As this grace is identified 
with the Holy Spirit, it is said to precede any merit of the Son of man, and to be 
without equal (TrIoh, LXXXII.3-4). Not being Son of God by nature, but by grace 
(TrIoh, LXXIV.3-5) the Son of man incarnates the very possibility of Salvation 
which is given by predestination to human beings by being born of the Holy Spirit. 
In this context, the difference between Christ and other human beings lies in the 
fact that, while every human being who is saved by God is originally born of the 
world and re-born of the Spirit, Christ was always born of the Spirit: Nam si 
propterea illi iam non de mundo, quia renati sunt de Spiritu sancto; propterea ille 
nunquam de mundo, quia natus est de Spiritu sancto (TrIoh, CVIII.1).134 This re-
birth which the disciples experience in the Holy Spirit has to be interpreted 
according to the interpretation of regeneration as re-creation rather than 
restoration (TrIoh, CVI.5-6), as explained in a previous section of this chapter. In 
a similar but yet different way, the Spirit depends on Christ for the salvation of 
human beings. According to the letter of the text of John, the Spirit is sent from 
Christ to creatures and is said ‘to speak not of himself but of what he heard of the 
Son’ (Jn. 16:13-14). As I will show, the quotation from this passage is as crucial 
in understanding the proprium of the Spirit in his relationship to the world as it 
had been in analysing his ontological role in the second chapter.  
   
This section does not aim at presenting a full account of Augustine’s 
pneumatology. Rather, it is focused on understanding what, according to 
Augustine’s interpretation of the Gospel of John, can be preached proprie of the 
Spirit in his relationship to the world. Therefore, I will firstly analyse the 
occurrences where the Spirit is properly characterised as love and is identified 
                                                 
134 ‘For if they now were not of the world because they were reborn of the Holy Spirit, he was 
never of the world because he was born of the Holy Spirit’.  
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with the gift of God, that is, grace of God. It is quite clear that some of these 
attributes cannot be said to derive uniquely from a Johannine influence on 
Augustine’s thought, but also from his reading of the letters of Paul – with 
particular regard to the doctrine of grace. Nevertheless, this section will show how 
Augustine’s identification of the Spirit with love, and his characterisation of him 
as the gift of God is deeply consistent with – or even drawn from – his 
understanding of the pneumatology of the fourth Gospel. This identification of the 
Spirit with love is crucial for understanding the proprium of the Spirit in his 
relationship to creation. On the one hand, as the Spirit is the substantial and 
consubstantial love of the Father and the Son (caritas substantialis et 
consubstantialis; TrIoh, CV.3), he is also the one who acts as perfect unity. Only 
in the Spirit human beings are able to see God and to join his perfect and 
everlasting peace. On the other hand, the very nature of the Spirit as God in its 
everlasting unity and perfect relationship implies a severe division between the 
Spirit and the world. The Johannine shape of Augustine’s theology adds a radical 
dualism between the Spirit and the world to the interpretation of the Spirit as love. 
As the Spirit is love and unity for the chosen, he is damnation for the world, which 
is not chosen and therefore is neglected and forsaken in its depravity. It is indeed 
the very absence of the Spirit that makes the world such.135  
 
V.3.3.1 Holy Spirit: Love and Grace 
   
In the Gospel of John, the Spirit makes his first appearance in Jn.1:32, when John 
the Baptist makes his testimony: ‘I saw the Spirit come down from heaven as a 
dove and remain on him’. According to Augustine, the dove is a symbol of 
simplicity (simplicitas), which is indeed the first characteristic of unity (TrIoh, V.8-
11).136 Therefore the dove itself is also a symbol of unity. It is such because the 
dove is innocent and never lacerates or kills anyone, not even flies (TrIoh, VI.3-
8). In addition, the moans of the dove are symbols of the way in which the Holy 
                                                 
135 This understanding of the Spirit, which is mostly drawn from the fourth Gospel, poses serious 
problems of theodicy. Augustine is fully aware of the problem and does not avoid the question. 
Nevertheless, in line with the pneumatological section of the fourth Gospel, Augustine describes 
the world as the massa damnationis, the forsaken rest which is destined to damnation. 
136 Besides the obvious identification of the dove with the Holy Spirit, Augustine states that the 




Spirit teaches human beings to moan in this world (in hoc saeculo), so that they 
understand their condition as outcasts in this world (TrIoh, VI.2). Therefore, in the 
appearance of the dove the very Trinity appears: the Father appears in the voice, 
the Son in the man, the Spirit in the dove. The unity of the church signified in the 
dove abides in Christ (TrIoh, VI.3-8), while the dove is the Spirit in unity (TrIoh, 
VI.9-11).137 In that the dove is the unity acquired by Church by the Holy Spirit, 
Augustine explains that the most deep teaching obtained from the image of the 
dove is twofold: on the one hand, it teaches that humans do not have to love the 
things of the world; on the other hand, it shows that the whole fruit of Christ is 
love (TrIoh, VII.1-3). Similarly, commenting on the casting out of the merchants 
from the temple court in Jn. 2:14-16, Augustine describes the dove sellers as 
those who want to sell the Holy Spirit. But the dove is not for sale, for, since the 
dove is the Holy Spirit, the dove represents grace: Columba non est venalis: 
gratis datur, quia gratia vocatur (TrIoh, X.6).138  
  
The identification of the dove with the Holy Spirit is particularly interesting when 
it is put in connection with the recognition of the Spirit as love and grace.139 This 
theme is present in all Tractates, beginning with the exegesis of the water jars in 
Cana containing two or three measures each (Jn. 2:6), where Augustine states 
that scrutatae Scripturae indicant quod Spiritus sanctus caritas est (TrIoh, 
IX.7).140 The episode of the Samaritan woman at the well in Jn. 4 shows that, as 
the Holy Spirit is the love of God and in God, he is also the gift of God which is 
                                                 
137 Augustine distinguishes here between the two symbols of the Holy Spirit in the Gospels: the 
dove and the fire. While the dove represents the Spirit in unity, the tongues of fire represent the 
Spirit in various nations (TrIoh, VI.9-11). Moreover, as simplicity is meant by the dove, fervour is 
symbolised by the fire (TrIoh, VI.3-8). This interpretation of the dove and the fire shows clearly 
Augustine’s polemical intent against the Donatists. Indeed, through the characterisation of the 
Spirit as both scattered in the nation and united in the dove, Augustine is criticizing the exclusivity 
of the Donatist church in favour of the universality of the catholic Church.  
138 ‘The dove is not for sale; it is given gratis, for it is called grace’. On the grace which is given 
gratuitously and not before of previous merits see: TrIoh, III.8-9. 
139 Among the many instances where the grace of God is directly identified with the Holy Spirit in 
the Tractates, see in particular: TrIoh, XIV.8; XVII.6; XCII.1-2. 
140 ‘A thorough investigation of the Scriptures will show that the Spirit is love’. Here Augustine 
adds that his love is not cheap. On the contrary, it is the most important gift of God to human 
beings: Et ne putetis vilem esse caritatem. Quomodo autem vilis est, quando omnia quae dicuntur 
non vilia, cara dicuntur? Si ergo quae non sunt vilia, cara sunt; quid est carius ipsa caritate? 
(TrIoh, IX.7) (‘And do not think that love (caritas) is cheap. On the contrary, how it is cheap when 
all things which are not cheap are called dear (cara)? Therefore, if things that are not cheap are 
dear, what is dearer that dearness itself (carius ipsa caritate)?’). Besides the Johannine examples 
that I am going to analyse, Augustine finds confirmation to his identification of God with love from 
many scriptural passages, particularly 1Jn. 4:16 and Rom. 5:5. Therefore, whoever misses love, 
he misses the Holy Spirit also, thus missing God. 
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given to chosen human beings. When Jesus accuses the woman of not knowing 
‘the gift of God’ (Jn. 4:10), Augustine explains that the Samaritan actually ignores 
the fact that the gift of God is the Holy Spirit (donum dei est spiritus sanctus) 
(TrIoh, XV.12). This identification is confirmed by the necessity of adoring the 
Father ‘in Spirit and truth’ (Jn. 4:24), that is, in the temple of God which is inside 
one’s own intellect (TrIoh, XV.23-28). In this re-creation of the image one 
discovers the gratuity of the gift, that is, of the Holy Spirit himself, who illuminates 
those who search for him (TrIoh, XV.18-19). Similarly, commenting on Jn. 6:44 – 
‘No one can come to me unless the Father who sent me draws them’ – Augustine 
explains that no one is able to fulfil the law if grace does not help him (adiuvaret 
gratia). Indeed, only love (caritas) can fulfil the law, love of heaven, given to 
human beings by the Holy Spirit. (TrIoh, XXVI.1).141  
 
The necessity of the presence of the Holy Spirit in order to fulfil the law has 
implications for Augustine’s conception of God’s justice which will be discussed 
later on. For now, it is worth underlining that this love, identified with the gift of 
the Spirit, drives the actions of the chosen, making them able to become worthy 
of participating in God. This line of thought is particularly developed by Augustine 
in the so-called pneumatological books of the fourth Gospel (Jn. 14-16). 
Commenting on Jn. 15:26 – ‘When the Advocate comes, whom I will send to you 
from the Father, the Spirit of truth who goes out from the Father, he will testify 
about me’ – Augustine points out the incapacity of the disciples to give testimony 
until the love of God was poured forth in their heart by the Holy Spirit (caritas dei 
diffusa per spiritum sanctum) (TrIoh, XCII.1-2).  
 
In this regard, the figure of Peter is particularly significant, as in Peter love itself 
(amor) was weak and restricted until the Holy Spirit, infused by an abundance of 
more bountiful grace, strengthened and enlarged his will. Similarly, in other 
tractates Peter is said to have understood the truth about the Son of God only 
because God granted him understanding and the Holy Spirit renewed him (dante 
                                                 
141 Similarly, commenting on other episodes of the Gospel, Augustine explains that this love is 
the fulfilment of the Law which was given through the prophets. As love is said to be given through 
the grace of God and through the Holy Spirit (caritas unde? Per gratiam Dei, per Spiritum 
sanctum), human beings are said not to have it from themselves. Rather, it is a gift of God, a 
great gift (Dei donum est, et magnum donum) (TrIoh, XVII.6). 
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deo recreante Spiritu sancto intellexit) (TrIoh, XXVII.9-10).142 As a consequence, 
the re-creation and the fulfilment of the Holy Spirit, that is, of the gift of the grace 
of God (impleti spiritu sancto, hoc est, dono gratia dei) (TrIoh, XCIII.2-4), gives to 
the disciples the strength to endure the persecutions described in Jn. 16:1-3 
(TrIoh, XCIV.1-4).143 As in the case of Peter, the Spirit is identified as the agent 
of re-creation of human beings in the Tractates (TrIoh, CVIII.1).  
 
According to the Johannine understanding of the Spirit as the one who ‘will make 
known to you’ (Jn. 16:15), this work of re-creation is often presented as the 
knowledge of the Father and of the Son (TrIoh, XCVI.4-5; XCVII.1). As the Holy 
Spirit is the one who teaches spiritual things, he is also the agent who, together 
with the Son, makes the Father known to creation. For this reason, commenting 
on Jn. 17:3 – ‘this is eternal life: that they know you, the only true God, and Jesus 
Christ, whom you have sent’ – Augustine states that the Holy Spirit has to be 
understood as well. Being the substantial and consubstantial love of both, he 
works together with Christ in the works of salvation (TrIoh, CV.3). As this work of 
salvation is often presented as knowing God, the Holy Spirit is said to be 
absolutely crucial in gaining some knowledge about God, for nothing of God can 
be understood by human beings without the Spirit (TrIoh, XXXII.5).  
 
V.3.3.2 Holy Spirit: Unity and Communion 
 
Besides the identification of the Spirit as the one who testifies about the Father, 
the Spirit also plays the crucial role of the one who grants human beings to be 
sharers in the commandment of love. The Johannine derivation of the 
identification of Spirit and love is particularly stressed in the exegesis of this 
commandment. Both in Jn. 15:12 and Jn. 13:34 Christ defines this commandment 
– ‘love each other as I have loved you’ – as his most important teaching and 
legacy. Augustine stresses this Johannine theme by declaring it the only true 
commandment, because where there is love, necessarily there are also found 
                                                 
142 These words are pronounced by Augustine commenting on Jn. 6:67-70 where Peter 
recognises Christ as the Son of God.  
143 ‘All this I have told you so that you will not fall away. They will put you out of the synagogue; 
in fact, the time is coming when anyone who kills you will think they are offering a service to God. 
They will do such things because they have not known the Father or me’. 
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faith and hope.144 Moreover, in loving their neighbours, humans also love God 
(TrIoh, LXXXIII.2-3; see also XVII.7-10). The commandment of love is then 
connected by Augustine with the passage of Jn.14:15-17: ‘If you love me, keep 
my commands. And I will ask the Father, and he will give you another advocate 
to help you and be with you forever: the Spirit of truth’. Here Augustine wonders 
how Christ can ask us to keep his commandment of love since, unless we have 
the Holy Spirit, we can neither love God nor keep his commandments (TrIoh, 
LXXIV.1). Augustine replies that intellegamus Spiritum sanctum habere qui diligit, 
et habendo mereri ut plus habeat, et plus habendo plus diligat. Iam itaque 
habebant Spiritum discipuli (TrIoh, LXXIV.2).145 Nevertheless, the Spirit was 
given to the disciples twice ut commendaretur ad Spiritum sanctum pertinere 
dilectio (TrIoh, LXXIV.2).146 The whole point of the tractate is to demonstrate that 
sine Spiritu sancto Christum nos diligere et mandata eius servare non posse 
(TrIoh, LXXIV.2).147 In my opinion, against the idea of some influential scholars 
like Bonner, who claims that Augustine tended to misread the Bible in favour of 
his theological positions, it would be wrong to understand these words as a mere 
testimony of the ongoing polemic against the Pelagius and his followers.148 
Rather, these words are testimonies of one of the most interesting achievements 
of Augustine’s mature pneumatology. This is deeply influenced by the Johannine 
theology and regards the way in which the Spirit acts as the hypostatised agent 
of unity and communion not only inside the Trinity, but in relation to the elect as 
well.  
  
Dealing with the passage of Jn. 16.27 – ‘The Father himself loves you because 
you have loved me and have believed that I came from God’ – Augustine explains 
that the true meaning of Jesus’s words lies in their connection with 1Jn. 4:10: ‘We 
love because he himself has first loved us’. Then, Augustine adds: 
  
                                                 
144 The same idea is repeated in Homilies on the First Epistle of John, VII.8: Dilige, et quod vis 
fac: sive taceas, dilectione taceas; sive clames, dilectione clames; sive emendes, dilectione 
emendes; sive parcas, dilectione parcas: radix sit intus dilectionis, non potest de ista radice nisi 
bonum existere. 
145 ‘We understand that he who loves has the Holy Spirit, and by having deserves to have more, 
and by having more to love more. And so, the disciples already have the Spirit’.  
146 ‘In order that love might be shown to belong to the Holy Spirit’. 
147 ‘Without the Holy Spirit we cannot love Christ and keep his commandments’. 
148 G. Bonner, ‘Augustine, the Bible and the Pelagians’ p. 227–242. I have discussed Bonner’s 
work in the introduction of this chapter. 
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Prorsus donum Dei est diligere Deum. […] Non enim amaremus Filium, nisi 
amaremus et Patrem. Amat nos Pater, quia nos amamus Filium; cum a Patre 
et Filio acceperimus ut et Patrem amemus et Filium: diffundit enim caritatem 
in cordibus nostris amborum Spiritus, per quem Spiritum et Patrem amamus 
et Filium, et quem Spiritum cum Patre amamus et Filio (TrIoh, CII.5).149 
 
The reason why it is not possible to love God before being loved by him stands 
in the very nature of ‘love’. This love is not to be considered as ‘affection’ or 
‘feeling’, but as an ontological bond which unifies lover and beloved in one. 
Therefore, whoever claims to love the Son without loving the Father does not 
really love the Son, but only a false idol which he made for himself (TrIoh, 
LXXIV.1-2). As a consequence, whoever loves the Son loves the Father who sent 
the Son. In loving them, he loves the Holy Spirit. Indeed, the Holy Spirit is the 
love of the Father and the Son, as he proceeds from both. In other words, 
whoever loves the Father and the Son is in the Holy Spirit and, to a certain extent, 
is the Holy Spirit himself. This is also the way in which the Spirit is said to glorify 
Christ: pouring out love in the hearts of believers and making them spirituals 
(diffundendo caritatem spiritalesque faciendo), the Spirit reveals to them how the 
Son is equal to the Father (TrIoh, C.1).  
  
Therefore, Augustine’s description of the Holy Spirit as love should be taken 
literally. The most interesting passages in this regard comes from Tractates 
XIV.9; XVIII.2-4; XXXIX.5, that have already been analysed in the third chapter.150 
In these tractates, the Spirit is both the eternal love between the Father and the 
Son in the Trinitarian union and the agent who keeps the souls of the chosen 
ones in unity with God. All these tractates comment on portions of the Gospel 
where the problem of the relationship between the Father and the Son is tackled. 
In TrIoh, XIV.9 Augustine is commenting on Jn. 3:34: ‘For the one whom God has 
sent speaks the words of God, for God gives the Spirit without limit’. Here 
Augustine uses the example of Acts 4:32151 to explain the perfect unity created 
                                                 
149 ‘Even to love God is a gift of God. […] For we would not love the Son unless we loved the 
Father too. The Father loves us because we love the Son, since from the Father and the Son we 
have received that we love both the Father and the Son, for the Spirit of both pours forth love in 
our hearts, and through this Spirit we love both the Father and the Son, and this Spirit we love 
together with the Father and the Son’. 
150 See: supra, III.5. 
151 See Acts 31-34: ‘After they prayed, the place where they were meeting was shaken. And they 
were all filled with the Holy Spirit and spoke the word of God boldly. All the believers were one in 
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by the Spirit not only in God, but also in the souls of the first community. Similarly, 
commenting on Jn. 5:20 ‘For the Father loves the Son and shows him all he does’, 
Augustine explains that the perfect unity of the Father and the Son comes from 
the perfect love which is one and is of both: the Holy Spirit. According to the 
principle si individuam caritatem, perfectam unitatem,152 Augustine also explains 
the unity of the Church as the testimony of the perfect love which reigns in the 
Trinity (TrIoh, XVIII.2-4). Finally, in TrIoh XXXIX.5 Augustine states:  
  
Si accedentes ad Deum, multae animae per caritatem una anima est, et 
multa corda unum cor; quid agit ipse fons caritatis in Patre et Filio? Nonne 
ibi magis Trinitas unus est Deus? Inde enim nobis caritas venit, de ipso 
Spiritu sancto (TrIoh XXXIX.5).153 
  
The proprium of the Spirit is therefore to be found in the fact that his very 
existence represents the unity of the Trinity-in-itself and of the Trinity with human 
beings. This unity is the fruit of the same agent both in God and in human beings, 
insofar as the very same Spirit operates in the Trinity, in the Church and in the 
hearts of the chosen ones. The difference stands in the measure to which the 
Spirit is given. Indeed, while to the Son the Spirit is ‘given without limit’ (Jn. 3:34), 
to human beings in this life he is given only as a pledge (TrIoh, XXXII.5 XCVI.4-
5).154 Consequently, Augustine’s pneumatology renders salvation an act of 
spiritual unification between God and the chosen ones. In other words, Augustine 
portrays salvation itself as the proprium of the Spirit, insofar as salvation is 
achieved by the unity between the chosen and the Holy Spirit, which is himself 
the unity of God. From this perspective it is easy to notice that every accusation 
against Augustine of creating an unbridgeable distance between the immanent 
                                                 
heart and mind. No one claimed that any of their possessions was their own, but they shared 
everything they had. With great power the apostles continued to testify to the resurrection of the 
Lord Jesus. And God’s grace was so powerfully at work in them all that there were no needy 
persons among them’. 
152 ‘If there is perfect love, then there is perfect unity’.  
153 ‘If, coming to God, many souls through love are one soul, and many hearts are one heart, what 
does the very Fountain of love do in the Father and the Son? Is not the Trinity there even more 
one God? For love comes to us from there, from the Holy Spirit himself’. Augustine goes on 
saying: Si ergo caritas Dei diffusa in cordibus nostris per Spiritum sanctum qui datus est 
nobis, multas animas facit unam animam, et multa corda facit unum cor; quanto magis Pater et 
Filius et Spiritus sanctus, Deus unus, lumen unum, unumque principium? 
154 In this regard, see, in particular, TrIoh, XCVI.4-5 where, commenting on Jn. 16:12 12 ‘I have 
much more to say to you, more than you can now bear’, Augustine states that the fullness of the 
truth, that is, the perfection of love in the Spirit, cannot be fulfilled in this life. Nevertheless, a vision 
can be fulfilled through the Holy Spirit, of which we now receive a pledge.  
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Trinity and the economic Trinity is deprived of foundation.155 Indeed, the Spirit 
himself is the bridge through which and in which creatures are admitted in the 
Trinitarian union. As the proprium of the Spirit properly resides in the 
sanctification of creatures, his unifying role derives ontologically from his 
procession from the Father and the Son. In this regard, it could be stated that 
Augustine pneumatology is largely dependent on the verses of Jn. 16:12-15: ‘But 
when he, the Spirit of truth, comes, he will guide you into all the truth. He will not 
speak on his own; he will speak only what he hears […] The Spirit will receive 
from me what he will make known to you’. By contrast with the Son, the Holy 
Spirit does not have a human aspect. Therefore, there is no unity of the person 
in the Holy Spirit. Therefore, this passage cannot be explained, as it was the case 
of Jesus in Jn. 5:15156 according to the obedience that the human part owes to 
the divine one. In a passage that I have already quoted in chapter III.4.2, 
Augustine writes: 
 
Ac per hoc Spiritus sanctus ut etiam de Filio procedat, sicut procedit de Patre, 
ab ipso habet Patre. Hic utcumque etiam illud intellegitur, quantum a talibus 
quales nos sumus, intellegi potest, cur non dicatur natus esse, sed potius 
procedere Spiritus sanctus. […] Filius quippe nullus est duorum, nisi patris 
et matris. […] Quia nec filius hominum simul et ex patre et ex matre procedit: 
sed cum in matrem procedit ex patre, non tunc procedit ex matre; et cum in 
hanc lucem procedit ex matre, non tunc procedit ex patre. Spiritus autem 
sanctus non de Patre procedit in Filium, et de Filio procedit ad 
sanctificandam creaturam; sed simul de utroque procedit: quamvis hoc Filio 
Pater dederit, ut quemadmodum de se, ita de illo quoque procedat (TrIoh, 
XCIX.9).157 
                                                 
155 I refer here to the works of Rahner, LaCugna, Gunton. See: K. Rahner, The Trinity; C. M. 
LaCugna, God for Us; C. E. Gunton, ‘God the Holy Spirit’. For a critical discussion of these authors 
see supra, III.1.  
156 ‘By myself I can do nothing; I judge only as I hear, and my judgment is just, for I seek not to 
please myself but him who sent me’. 
157 ‘And because of this the Holy Spirit has it from the Father himself that he proceeds also from 
the Son, just as he proceeds from the Father. Here, to some extent, it is understood, as far as it 
possible to understand for someone such as we are, why the Holy Spirit is not said to have been 
born, but rather to proceed. […] For indeed no one is the Son of two except of a father and a 
mother. […] For neither does the son of human beings proceed at the same time both from the 
father and from the mother. But when he proceeds from the father into the mother, he does not 
proceed from the mother; and when he proceeds into the light of the day from the mother, he 
does not proceed from the father. But the Holy Spirit does not proceed from the Father into the 
Son, and from the Son proceed to sanctify the creature; but he proceeds from both at the same 
time, although the Father has given this to the Son, that the Holy Spirit proceeds as from himself, 




As the rule of the quod habet hoc est is applied both to the Spirit and to the Son, 
Augustine explains the double procession of the Spirit from the Father and the 
Son as the sign of his ontological and soteriological proprium. While the 
procession of the Spirit upholds his ontological role as the hypostatic union 
between Father and Son, the simultaneous procession from both provides him 
with a soteriological agency utterly distinct from that of the Son. In other words, 
the Spirit, more than any other person, does not ‘speak of his own’ insofar as he 
is the very love that bonds the other hypostases. Therefore, sanctification is the 
proprium of the Spirit exactly because he proceeds from both the Father and the 
Son, thus being the bond of love that unifies the Trinity in one, and the chosen 
creatures with the Trinity. As a consequence, salvation, that is, sanctification of 
the creatures, is explicitly said to pertain proprie only to the Spirit, as Augustine 
explains in crucial passage almost at the end of the Tractates: 
 
Nempe enim sanctitas vel sanctificatio ad sanctum proprie pertinet Spiritum: 
unde cum et Pater spiritus sit, et Filius spiritus sit, quoniam Deus spiritus est 
(Jn. 4:24); et Pater sanctus, et Filius sanctus sit: proprio tamen nomine 
amborum Spiritus vocatur Spiritus sanctus (TrIoh, CXXII.8).158 
 
From this quotation it is made particularly clear why Salvation is a spiritual matter. 
Indeed, sanctification of creatures pertains properly (proprie) to the Holy Spirit as 
the Spirit is the unity between Father and Son. As such, he is called Spirit, a name 
that does not pertain to the generation – as ‘Father’ and ‘Son’ – but rather to the 
commonality of essence of the two person from whom he proceeds. Since, 
according to Jn. 4:24, ‘God is Spirit’, the hypostatised union between Father and 
Son must be Spirit as well. Therefore, salvation itself is a spiritual matter insofar 
as it is the vey proprium of the Holy Spirit.  
 
As the works of the Holy Spirit pertain to the salvation and sanctification of human 
beings, it is worth underlining the two ways in which salvation is operated. In the 
Tractates – just as in the rest of Augustine’s works – the Holy Spirit is both the 
                                                 
158 ‘Indeed, certainly holiness or sanctification pertain properly (proprie) to the Holy Spirit, and in 
this regard, although both the Father is spirit and the Son is spirit because God is spirit, and the 




agent who operates inside human hearts and the one who fills the church with 
his love, unifying it and making it the body of Christ. While the Church is identified 
with the mystical body of Christ, the Spirit is said to be the one who gives unity to 
that body (TrIoh, CX.4-5): Ecclesiae caritas quae per Spiritum sanctum diffunditur 
in cordibus nostris, participum suorum peccata dimittit: eorum autem qui non sunt 
eius participes, tenet (TrIoh, CXXI.4).159 In the explanation of the necessity of the 
mediating role of the Church it is possible to appreciate the joint action of both 
the Holy Spirit and Christ in the salvation of human beings, each one according 
to his proprium.160 The incarnation of Christ provides human beings with the 
mystical body, that is, the Church. In the Church, human beings become 
participant of the unity of God; it is a proper work of the Holy Spirit to produce that 
unity which is found in the spiritual Church. The action of the Spirit works only in 
those who are already part of the spiritual Church in heaven, as the Spirit 
sanctifies only those creatures who he already found in the body of Christ: spiritus 
enim facit viva membra. Nec viva membra spiritus facit, nisi quae in corpore quod 
vegetat ipse spiritus, invenerit (TrIoh, XXVII.6).161 In a similar way, Augustine 
explains how one should understand the fact that the Spirit was not yet given 
before the glorification of Christ (Jn. 7:39): the unity of the Church was not yet 
present. Consequently, everyone who is outside this unity is outside salvation 
and does not have the Spirit:  
 
Accipimus ergo et nos Spiritum sanctum, si amamus Ecclesiam, si caritate 
compaginamur, si catholico nomine et fide gaudemus. Credamus, fratres; 
quantum quisque amat Ecclesiam Christi, tantum habet Spiritum sanctum. 
                                                 
159 ‘The love of the Church which is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Spirit dismisses the 
sins of those who participate in it, but it retains the sins of those who do not participate in it’. 
Augustine is here commenting on Jn. 20:22-23: ‘And with that he breathed on them and said, 
“Receive the Holy Spirit. If you forgive anyone’s sins, their sins are forgiven; if you do not forgive 
them, they are not forgiven”’.  
160 Similarly, commenting on Jn. 6:63 – ‘The words I have spoken to you are Spirit and life’ – 
Augustine explains that the eating of the flesh and blood of Christ makes Christian spiritual 
members of the very body of Christ. This body of Christ is the Catholic Church, whose sign is 
unity. Then he adds: Ut autem simus membra eius, unitas nos compaginat. Ut compaginet unitas, 
quae facit nisi caritas? Et caritas Dei unde? […] Ergo Spiritus est qui vivificat (TrIoh, XXVII.6) 
(‘But that we may be his members, unity joins us together. That unity may join together, what 
causes it except love? And whence is the love of God? […] Therefore, “it is the Spirit which gives 
life”’). 
161 ‘For the Spirit produces living members. But the Spirit does not produce living members except 
for those who he has found in the body which the Spirit himself enlivens’.  
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[…] Habemus ergo Spiritum Sanctum, si amamus Ecclesiam: amamus 
autem, si in eius compage et caritate consistimus (TrIoh, XXXII.8).162 
 
As Christ gives the body in which all believers are united with God, the Holy Spirit 
provides the love and unity that makes the Church the real place of manifestation 
of God. This love, which maintains Christians inside the unity of the Church, is 
the sign of the holiness of the Church, which is made holy by the Spirit who 
resides in it.  
 
V.3.3.3 The Spirit and the World 
 
So far, it has been shown how the Spirit’s proprium ought to be found in his very 
nature of love and unity. His soteriological characteristic is to provide the 
ontological material through which the chosen are taken out of the world into 
communion with God. What it is still to be analysed is the very nature of the 
relationship between the Holy Spirit and the world. This issue has been already 
partially addressed in the course of this chapter, but it is now the time to 
systematise it, because this relationship is crucial in demonstrating how 
Augustine’s theology is deeply influenced by Johannine themes.  
 
In the section regarding the proprium of Christ it has been shown how Augustine, 
following his reading of the Gospel, deems the final judgement to pertain only to 
the Son. This reason is found in the fact that the Son is able to be seen both by 
wicked and good at the end of time. Indeed, since the wicked are incapable of 
seeing God, they will only perceive the Son of man. The corollary of this discourse 
is that the wicked are not able to see the Father or the Holy Spirit at all, not even 
at the end of time, because only those who are united with the Holy Spirit can 
perceive God. Augustine confirms this idea in his interpretation of the parable of 
the good shepherd (Jn. 10:1-18). In the parable, Christ is said to be the good 
shepherd, the gate and the gatekeeper, for he is the one who opens the gate to 
God. Nevertheless, Augustine does not seem entirely happy with this 
                                                 
162 ‘Therefore, we also receive the Holy Spirit if we love the Church, if we are joined together by 
love, if we rejoice in the Catholic name and faith. Let us believe, brothers, that as much as each 
one loves Christ’s Church, so much does he have the Holy Spirit. […] Therefore, we have the 
Holy Spirit if we love the Church; but we love if we are within its unity and love’.  
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explanation; thus, he suggests the idea that the gatekeeper is the Holy Spirit. 
Indeed, the Spirit is the one that ‘teaches all truth’ (Jn. 16:13). Therefore, he is 
the one that opens the gate – that is, Christ – to those who are predestined to 
enter in the kingdom of the Father (TrIoh, XLVI.4).163 The teachings of the Spirit 
are the one which allow the chosen sheep to enter the gate.  
 
This example, just as the others that will follow, shows the other side of the coin 
of Augustine’s conception of the Spirit as unity and love. Indeed, while the Spirit 
is the agent of unity among those who are chosen by God, he is also the agent 
of separation between the chosen and the world. In the whole Tractates, the 
perfect love and unity created by the Spirit among the elect is constantly opposed 
to the wretchedness of ‘the world’ that does not perceive the Spirit, thus not being 
able to comprehend anything about God. Therefore, Augustine explains the fact 
that the Spirit is given after the resurrection as signifying that, at the resurrection, 
the love of the Spirit will definitively separate the elect from the rest of the world: 
ut in resurrectione nostra caritas nostra flagret, et ab amore saeculi separet, ut 
tota currat in Deum (TrIoh, XXXII.9).164 The topic of the two loves (amor sui or 
amor saeculi vs amor Dei) is well testified in all Augustine’s mature works. 
Nevertheless, the Tractates of John are particularly interesting insofar as it is 
possible from here to understand how much this theme owes to the Johannine 
text on which Augustine is commenting.  
 
In this regard, one of the most interesting figures in the fourth Gospel is the 
Samaritan woman, whom Augustine takes as a symbol of the difference between 
the love of the world and the love of God. The Samaritan represents the Church 
which is not yet justified before the coming of Jesus and which receives its 
justification through the Holy Spirit. Therefore, the Samaritan’s act of drawing 
water from the well represents the pleasure of this world: Etenim aqua in puteo, 
voluptas saeculi est in profunditate tenebrosa: hinc eam hauriunt homines hydria 
                                                 
163 See: TrIoh, XLVI.4: Nulla est ergo necessitas aliquid aliud quaerere, nulla necessitas: sed 
fortasse est voluntas. Si est voluntas, noli exorbitare, noli a Trinitate discedere. Si personam aliam 
quaeris ostiarii, Spiritus sanctus occurrat: non enim dedignabitur ostiarius esse Spiritus sanctus, 
quando ipsum ostium esse dignatus est Filius. Vide ostiarium forte Spiritum sanctum: ipse 
Dominus discipulis suis de Spiritu sancto dicit: Ipse vos docebit omnem veritate (Jn. 10:13). 
Ostium quid est? Christus. Quid est Christus? Veritas. Quis aperit ostium, nisi qui docet omnem 
veritatem?. 
164 ‘that our love may be on fire in our resurrection and may separate us from the love of this 
world, that all our love may run to God’. 
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cupiditatum. (TrIoh, XV.16).165 As the water of the Samaritan is said to be the 
dark depths of the world, the Lord is offering to her something different: 
Promittebat ergo saginam quamdam et satietatem Spiritus sancti (TrIoh, 
XV.17).166 This spirit is the gift of God, (Donum Dei est Spiritus sanctus) (TrIoh, 
XV.12), which is given gratuitously to the Samaritan so that she might be finally 
separated from this world and enter in the communion with God. This very Spirit 
changes the interiority of the Samaritan making her the true temple of God, 
thanks to the rediscovering of the image of God within herself (TrIoh, XV.23-28).  
 
It is worth noting that, although present in every tractate, the radical opposition 
between the Spirit and the world is particularly emphasised in the 
pneumatological books of the Gospel, that is, those where the role of the Spirit 
as love and unity is particularly stressed. As much as the unity and perfect love 
found in the Holy Spirit is underscored, his separation from the world is made 
more evident. In this regard, Augustine is directly influenced by the text of the 
Gospel, as shown by the exegesis of Jn. 14:16-17: ‘And I will ask the Father […] 
the Spirit of truth. The world cannot accept him’. Augustine writes:  
 
Mundum quippe ait hoc loco, mundi significans dilectores, quae dilectio non 
est a Patre. Et ideo dilectioni huius mundi, de qua satis agimus ut minuatur 
et consumatur in nobis, contraria est dilectio Dei, quae diffunditur in cordibus 
nostris per Spiritum sanctum […] Non enim habet invisibiles oculos mundana 
dilectio, per quos videri Spiritus sanctus, nisi invisibiliter non potest (TrIoh, 
LXXIV.4).167  
 
Therefore, the world is said not to be able to see the Spirt insofar as the world is 
conceived as the very opposite of the love of God. Similarly, in TrIoh, LXXVI.2, 
this love, which is the Spirit, is said to be the one that separates the saints from 
the world (Dilectio sanctos discernit a mundo). This love is said to be only for 
                                                 
165 ‘For the water in the well is the pleasure of the world in its dark depths, here men drink it from 
the water jar of desires’. 
166 ‘He was promising, therefore, a certain abundance and fullness of the Holy Spirit’.  
167 ‘For he says “world” in this place, signifying the lovers of the world, a love that is not from the 
Father. And therefore contrary to the love of this world, about which we have our hands full that 
it be lessened and suppressed in us, is the love of God, which is poured in our hearts by the Holy 
Spirit.[…] For worldly love does not have the invisible eyes through which the Holy Spirit can be 
seen, but only invisibly’. 
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those whose dwelling places are already prepared by the Father and the Son by 
predestination, according to the exegesis of Jn. 14:3.  
 
Anyway, the role of the Spirit as the agent which causes the clear separation 
between human beings is not perceivable in this life by human senses. 
Commenting on John the Baptist’s words in Jn. 3:32168 Augustine explains how 
only John the Baptist was able, through the grace of the Spirit which he received 
from God (gratia Spiritus, quam accepit a Deo) to see the differences between 
the two worlds: that one of the chosen and that of the forsaken: Attendit ergo in 
spiritu divisionem, in genere autem humano commixtionem; et quod nondum 
locis separatum est, separavit intellectu, separavit cordis aspectu; et vidit duos 
populos, fidelium et infidelium (TrIoh, XIV.8).169 Whilst in the Spirit there is a 
division between the chosen people of God and the world, in this life there is 
mingling. Only once the people of God are unified in one fellowship, the Spirit is 
the one who condemns the world to be forsaken to its own destiny.170  
 
This separation operated by the Spirit inside human hearts is described as the 
casting out of the devil from the world. Therefore, commenting on Jn. 12:31 – 
‘Now is the time for judgment on this world; now the prince of this world will be 
cast out’ – Augustine explains that the judgment which the Gospel is speaking 
about in this verse is not the judgment of damnation that will happen at the end 
of the world, but rather the judgment of separation operated by the coming of 
Christ through the Holy Spirit:  
 
Dici etiam iudicium non damnationis, sed discretionis […] Possidebat ergo 
diabolus genus humanum, et reos suppliciorum tenebat chirographo 
peccatorum; dominabatur in cordibus infidelium. […] Per Christi autem fidem 
[…] millia credentium a dominatu liberantur diaboli, Christi corpori copulantur, 
et sub tanto capite uno eius Spiritu fidelia membra vegetantur. Hoc vocabat 
                                                 
168 ‘He testifies to what he has seen and heard, but no one accepts his testimony’. 
169 ‘Therefore, he observed a division in the Spirit, but a mingling in the human race; and what 
was not separated in place, he separated in understanding, he separated in the sight of his heart. 
And he saw two multitudes: the believers and the unbelievers’. 
170 In this regard see also TrIoh, XCIII.2-4, where Augustine explains that the casting out of the 
synagogues described in Jn. 16:1-3 is to be interpreted as something positive: once separated 
from any worldly congregation, the apostles are able to join the spiritual unity in the Holy Spirit.  
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iudicium, hanc discretionem, hanc a suis redemptis diaboli expulsionem 
(TrIoh, LII.6).171 
 
The work of separating the chosen and the forsaken is therefore described as the 
casting out of the devil from the hearts of those who were previously subjected to 
his power. Once more, it is possible to observe how this work of separation 
happens through the coming of Christ, so that the chosen might be united with 
his body, and becomes operative in the Holy Spirit, which is given by Christ so 
that the chosen ones might join the communion of God.172 
 
For this reason, the world is said to hate the believers. Commenting on the 
section of the Gospel regarding the hate of the world towards Christians (Jn. 
15:18-24), Augustine explains that it is necessary (necesse est) that the world 
hates the believers, for they do not love what the world loves. Since they are out 
of the world due to the communion with the Holy Spirit, the world must hate them, 
for it does not belong to where they belong (TrIoh, LXXXVII.1). It is easy to notice 
here how much Augustine’s pneumatology and the interpretation of the 
relationship to the world is drawn from the fourth Gospel. Instead of trying to 
smooth the radical contraposition between the chosen people and the world, 
Augustine accentuates it. Similarly, when commenting on the commandment of 
love in Jn. 13:24, Augustine further stresses the contrast between those who are 
in the love of the Holy Spirit and those who are not: 
   
Dilectio ista nos innovat, ut simus homines novi. […] Nemo ibi moritur, quo 
nemo pervenit, nisi huic saeculo moriatur, non morte omnium, qua corpus ab 
anima deseritur; sed morte electorum, qua etiam cum in carne mortali adhuc 
manetur, cor sursum ponitur. […] Hinc fortasse dictum est: Valida est sicut 
mors dilectio (Cant. 8:6). Hac enim dilectione fit ut in isto adhuc corruptibili 
corpore constituti moriamur huic saeculo, et vita nostra abscondatur cum 
                                                 
171 ‘I have told you that a judgment of separation, not of damnation is here spoken of. […] 
Therefore, the devil was in possession of the human race and was holding them guilty of capital 
crimes by the signature of their sins; he was ruling in the hearts of the unbelieving; […] However, 
through the faith of Christ […] thousands of believers were freed from the domination of the devil, 
were joined to Christ’s body, and under so great a head, by his one Spirit, his fruitful members 
were enlivened. This he called judgement, this separation, this expulsion of the devil from his own 
redeemed ones’. 
172 This action strips off the carnal desires from the hearts of the chosen ones (exspoliationem a 
corde cupiditatum carnalium), thus erasing the vice of the race (vitium propaginis), since God 
cleanses the faults by his Holy Spirit (TrIoh, XXX.4-7). 
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Christo in Deo: imo ipsa dilectio est mors nostra saeculo, et vita cum Deo. Si 
enim mors est quando de corpore anima exit, quomodo non est mors quando 
de mundo amor noster exit? Valida est ergo sicut mors dilectio. Quid ea 
validius, qua vincitur mundus? […] Ipsa est dilectio ab omni mundana 
dilectione discreta, […] ut mutua dilectione constringamur inter nos, et tam 
dulci vinculo connexis membris corpus tanti capitis simus (TrIoh, LXV.1-
2).173 
   
As Augustine explains that ‘love itself is our death to the world and our life with 
God’, one has to understand this love as the Holy Spirit. Becoming participant in 
the Holy Spirit implies the act of getting out of the world to become one with the 
body of Christ through the love of the Holy Spirit. As the incarnation of Christ 
saves human beings by his body, the unifying action of the Holy Spirit unites 
those whom God has previously chosen to gain the eternal contemplation of the 
Trinitarian communion. For this reason, Augustine plainly declares that the verse 
of Jn. 16:8 – ‘when he (the holy Spirit) comes, he will prove the world to be in the 
wrong about sin and righteousness and judgment’ – shows the proprium of the 
Holy Spirit (proprie tribuit hoc Spiritui sancto) (TrIoh, XCV.1). While the judgment 
of evil belongs only to the Son, the unification of the chosen with God is the work 
of the Spirit. Therefore, the unity of love, achievable only through the Holy Spirit, 
proves the world wrong about – that is, convicts it of – justice, sin and judgement 
(TrIoh, XCV.1). This is why, according to Augustine, the Gospel attributed this as 
a proprium of the Holy Spirit. While the salvation of human beings is 
accomplished by the entire Trinity, the sanctification of the creatures is said to 
belong properly to the agent that makes the Trinity itself an eternal communion. 
It is indeed the very nature of the Spirit of love and communion between the 
Father and the Son, acquired through the eternal procession from both, which 
makes the Spirit the agent through which final salvation is gained. These very 
                                                 
173 ‘This love renews us so that we may be new men. […] There no one dies, where no one comes 
unless he should die to this world, not by the death of all in which the body is abandoned by the 
soul, but by the death of the chosen in which, even when one still remains in mortal flesh, the 
heart is set on high. […] Perhaps about this it was said “Strong as death is love” (Cant. 8:6). For 
by this love it comes to pass that, dwelling in this still corruptible body, we die to this world and 
our life is hidden with Christ in God: or, rather, love itself is our death to the world and our life with 
God. For if death occurs when the soul goes out of the body, how is it not death when our love 
goes out of the world? Therefore, strong as death is love. What is stronger than that by which the 
world is conquered? […] This is the love which is separated from any worldly love, […] so that we 
should be bound together with each other by mutual love and, with the members fastened 
together by so sweet a chain, we may be the body of so great a Head’. 
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characteristics are those which make the Spirit and the world two irreconcilable 








Broadly speaking, the aim of this chapter has been to reflect on the influences 
which the text of the fourth Gospel had on Augustine’s mature pneumatology, 
particularly on the dialectical relationship found in Augustine’s Tractates between 
the Holy Spirit and the world. I have shown how Augustine moved away from the 
Johannine meaning of “world of the protological creation” to affirm the one of 
“world of present darkness”. Therefore, although the word mundus occasionally 
indicates creation as such, Augustine usually understands it as referring to the 
“lovers of the world”. Thus, the theological concept of mundus/saeculum comes 
to signify the totality of the wicked creatures that have irredeemably lost their 
original goodness by means of their own will. Hence, mundus/saeculum is an 
equivalent of the renowned Augustinian notion of massa damnata. Contrariwise, 
the Holy Spirit has been acknowledged as the agent that unifies some beloved 
creatures with God, in order to tear them away from the world and make them 
enter into his eternal peace. This process of unification, represents the very 
proprium – that is, the proper work – of the Spirit.  
 
In order to understand how the Spirit works in the world, I have first tackled the 
issue of the imago Dei in Augustine, showing the differences between the original 
creation and the re-creation in Spirit. I have demonstrated that the doctrine of the 
“image within” is clouded by the many worldly and wicked images that human 
beings make for themselves. It is indeed the pure original created image that one 
needs to rediscover. From this Augustinian understanding of the imago Dei, it 
follows that the world was originally meant to be the good creation of God, but 
was distorted by the depravities in which human beings have fallen, thus 
becoming mundus/saeculum in its pejorative connotation. In order to re-activate 
the “image within”, human beings need to exit the world and to be regenerated 
by the power of God’s grace. This process of removing the chosen from the world, 
which is condemned to perdition, is presented by Augustine as a radical work of 
re-creation. Furthermore, taking the cue from the fourth Gospel’s dualism, 
Augustine presents the work of re-creation as a separation-from the world, rather 
than a regeneration of it. Indeed, this process of separation from the world 
constitutes a grace which is much bigger than the one that was originally given 
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for creation. Contrary to scholars such as Harrison, Ortiz and Guardini, I have 
shown the way in which the grace of re-creation, which God performs only on 
some chosen creatures, is deemed by Augustine to be much more precious than 
the grace given for creation.174 The very exclusiveness of the grace which is given 
to the ‘few’ who are chosen, as opposed to the ‘many’ who are forsaken, indicates 
the bountiful mercy of God, who donates his grace according to his own desires. 
This exclusive love is then identified with the Holy Spirit. To be recreated means 
to enter in the Trinitarian community which is indeed instantiated in the Holy Spirit. 
Therefore, grace given for re-creation is the sign of the personal love of God for 
the chosen among his creatures, who are separated from the world and brought 
in the communion with the Holy Spirit. This process of re-creation eventually 
leads to the separation between two worlds: the saved world and the forsaken 
one. In this regard, the influence of the Johannine Gospel on Augustine’s thought 
is very evident.  
  
This chapter has then analysed the proper relationship between ‘the world’ and 
the two divine soteriological agents who work in it for the salvation of the chosen: 
Christ and the Holy Spirit. First of all, it has been made clear in which way it is 
possible to speak of a proprium of Christ and of the Spirit. Although Augustine 
maintains that the Trinity always works together as a whole, each person of the 
Trinity has a different relational role (proprium). Secondly, I have identified the 
propria of Christ and the Holy Spirit.  
 
Through the division between Son of God and Son of man – representing the 
divine and human part of the Saviour – Christ’s embodiment is interpreted by 
Augustine as an act of undeserved grace that allows humans to be re-created. 
These two parts constitute the one person of Christ, who acts according to the 
will of the Son of God. This very union between the Son of God and the Son of 
man has been shown to happen through the work of the Holy Spirit. It is the Holy 
Spirit, insofar as he is love and unity in the Trinity, to allow human beings to be 
united with God. Just as Christ’s incarnation was operated by the Father’s gratia 
gratis data, making Christ the first of the predestined ones, the grace of salvation 
is the undeserved act of grace operated by, in and through the Holy Spirit on 
                                                 
174 See: C. Harrison, Rethinking Augustine, p. 114; J. Ortiz, You Made Us for Yourself, p. 37-40; 
R. Guardini, The Conversion of Augustine, p. 124 
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God’s chosen people. In this logic, Augustine considers the final judgement as a 
proprium of the Son, because only the chosen will be able to see God as he really 
is. Hence, judgment pertains to the Son insofar as the wicked ones will see only 
the human part of Christ, while his divine part will remain hidden from them. By 
attributing the final judgment only to the Son, Augustine is stating that only those 
who are already in communion with God can actually see God. In other words, 
Augustine is here negating to the world every possibility of perceiving God, since 
the world is and remains something alien and completely separated from God’s 
communion.  
 
The final part of this work analysed and discussed the proprium of the Holy Spirit 
in his different connotation of ‘gift of God’, love and grace, unity and communion. 
These characterisations of the Spirit have been deduced mainly by Augustine 
from the text of the fourth Gospel and are closely linked to Augustine’s analysis 
of the Spirit’s ontological role and origin within the Trinity. Being the hypostatised 
communion between the Father and the Son, the Spirit is also the soteriological 
agent who creates perfect unity and communion between the chosen ones and 
God. Consequently, it is only through the sanctifying action of the Spirit that the 
Church is united in one fellowship. Hence, the Spirit is identified with the agent of 
re-creation, for the whole process of re-creation is accomplished in the Holy Spirit 
through the resurrection of Christ. Since the Spirit is the ontological bond of love 
between the Father and the Son, he is also the bond of love in which the chosen 
are saved; in other words, one could say that salvation is really a spiritual matter, 
for the very nature of the Holy Spirit determines his soteriological role. As a matter 
of fact, this is also the reason why the Holy Spirit is called “holy” and “spirit”: he 
is Spirit insofar as he shares the essence of the two persons from which he 
proceeds, and he is Holy insofar as his proprium stands in the sanctification of 
the creatures. This sanctification consists in the contemplation of the Trinitarian 
communion, since the ability of knowing God is something which is given only to 
the chosen, which are already participant in the Holy Spirit.  
 
These conclusions challenge the scholarly position of Rahner, LaCugna and 
Gunton (to name a few) which detects an unbridgeable distance between 
Augustine’s Trinity and human beings. In opposition to their views, I have shown 
that the nature and action of the Holy Spirit makes the chosen people enjoy the 
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same love of the persons of the Trinity. If an unbridgeable distance exists within 
Augustine’s system, this ought to be identified with the radical separation 
between the Spirit and the world. Since the Spirit is love and communion in God, 
his nature is utterly irreconcilable with the world. In this respect, I have identified 
the Johannine contribution to Augustine’s theology in the formulation of a radical 
dualism between the Spirit and the world, since the Spirit is in no sense ever 
mingled with the world. Thus, just as the Spirit is love and unity for the chosen, 
he is also damnation for the world, which is not chosen and therefore is neglected 
and forsaken in its depravity. Therefore, while Christ works in the choosing of 
those people who are predestined to be chosen out of the world, the Spirit only 
works in that portion of the chosen which is predestined to salvation. It is indeed 
the remoteness of the world from the Trinitarian union, which is the Holy Spirit, 
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VI. The Holy Spirit, the Trinity, the 
World and the Gospel of John: A 
Comparative Analysis 
VI.1 The Grounds and Aims of the Comparison 
 
 
In the course of the twentieth century, Patristic scholars and systematic 
theologians have tried to unfold and problematize the different approaches to 
the Trinitarian discourse carried out by “Greek” and “Latin” theologians of the 
first five centuries of the Christian era. The scholarly tendency of dividing 
between a “Greek” and a “Latin” Trinitarism takes the move from Théodore de 
Régnon’s work at the end of the nineteenth century.1 Although de Régnon did 
not probably intend to establish a “paradigm” regarding the differences between 
Eastern and Western patristic theologies, as proven by Hennessy,2 the 
reception of his work led many scholars to propose a rigid distinction between 
Eastern and Western Trinitarian theology.3 According to this paradigm, the 
basic distinction between Eastern and Western theologians must be found in 
the affirmation of God’s unity as grounded in the Father, for eastern theology, or 
                                                 
1 T. de Régnon, Études de théologie positive sur la Sainte Trinité. 
2 Kristin Hennessy, ‘An Answer to de Régnon’s Accusers: Why We Should Not Speak of “His” 
Paradigm’, in Harvard Theological Review 100 2 (2007), p. 179-197. Hennessy argues that, 
when speaking of the difference between “Greek” and “Latin” theology, de Régnon does not aim 
at proposing a division between Greek speaking and Latin speaking Fathers, but rather 
between Patristic theology of the third and fourth century (both Greek and Latin speaking) and 
the subsequent interpretation of that theology made by Latin scholastic medieval theologians. 
Moreover, she states that, far from aiming at creating a rigid separation between Eastern and 
Western theological trends in patristic times, de Régnon’s project should be understood as an 
ecumenical and apophatic approach aiming at offering an alternative to the rigid Neo-
Scholasticism of his days: ‘De Régnon himself sought to bring about a rapprochement of these 
two approaches in light of the persistent mystery of the Trinity and the failure of any single 
system, even Neo-Thomism, to express this mystery fully’. In this regard, she agrees with 
Barnes, when he states that: ‘We are almost to the point where we can say that modern 
theology, needing the doctrinal opposition between “Greek” and “Latin” Trinitarian theologies, 
invented it’. See: Michel René Barnes, ‘The Fourth Century as Trinitarian Canon’, in Lewis 
Ayres and Gareth Jones (eds), Christian Origins: Theology, Rhetoric, and Community, London 
1998, p. 47–67, 61.  
3 The subsequent critique of this paradigm by Barnes identifies these scholars as perpetrators 
of this misleading opposition: Frederick Crowe, Doctrine of the Holy Trinity, Willowdale 1966; 
James Mackey, The Christian Experience of God as Trinity, London 1983; John O’Donnell, 
Trinity and Temporality: The Christian Doctrine of God in the Light of Process Theology and the 
Theology of Hope, Oxford 1983; David Brown, The Divine Trinity, La Salle IL 1985; C. LaCugna, 
God for Us. In this regard see: M. R. Barnes, ‘De Régnon Reconsidered’, p. 55.  
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grounded in God’s essence, according to Latin theology. As a consequence, 
proponents of this model, like Brown and Zizioulas, have tended to identify this 
opposition as exemplified by the difference between the Cappadocian Fathers’ 
and Augustine’s Trinity. Brown summarises this approach up in this way: ‘In 
short, the difference is constituted by whether one starts with the one as given 
or the Threeness. Augustine will be taken as the obvious representative of the 
former approach […] the slightly earlier Cappadocian Fathers of the latter 
model, particularly Gregory of Nyssa’.4 Similarly, in Zizioulas’ words, ‘the West 
began with the unity of God and then moved to the Trinity, while the East 
followed the opposite course’.5 In the last 25 years, a new tendency has 
emerged, following the works of scholars such as Studer, Barnes, Ayres and 
Coakley – to cite only a few.6 Aiming at disrupting the old East-vs-West 
paradigm, these scholars affirmed the continuity between Greek and Latin 
Patristic theologians, showing that differences and similarities between 
theological trends should be understood in the context of different – and 
evolving – pro-Nicene factions, rather than in the geographical and linguistic 
                                                 
4 See D. Brown, The Divine Trinity, p. 243. This passage is quoted from Kristin Hennessy, ‘An 
Answer to de Régnon’s Accusers’, p. 187.  
5 John Zizioulas, ‘The Doctrine of the Holy Trinity: The Significance of the Cappadocian 
Contribution’, in Christoph Schwöbel (ed), Trinitarian Theology Today: Essays on Divine Being 
and Act, Edinburgh 1995, p. 44-60. For a critique of Zizioulas’ perspective see: Lewis Ayres, 
‘“Remember That You Are Catholic” (serm. 52.2): Augustine on the Unity of the Triune God,’ in 
Journal of Early Christian Studies 8 1 (2000), p. 39-82. Ayres bases his critiques on four points. 
First, Augustine describes the unity of God according to the pro-Nicene doctrine of the 
inseparability of operations of the three persons; secondly, Ayres states that Augustine’s 
doctrine does not aim at distinguishing divine essence as in any way separable from the 
persons; thirdly, Augustine’s doctrine of the Trinity is functional to his understanding of 
incarnation; fourthly, ‘he uses a doctrine of divine simplicity, in ways parallel to his 
predecessors, to focus attention both on what it means for the Trinitarian persons to be truly 
inseparable, and on the nature of our task if we are to grow in understanding of the divine unity’ 
(p.41).  
6 M. R. Barnes, ‘De Régnon Reconsidered’; L. Ayres, Nicaea and Its Legacy; Basil Studer, ‘La 
teologia trinitaria. 
in Agostino d'Ippona: Continuità della tradizione occidentale?’, in Studia Ephemeridis 
Augustinianum 46: Cristianesimo e specificità regionali nel Mediterraneo latino, Roma 1994, p. 
161-177. Of the same author, see also: Basil Studer, ‘History and Faith in Augustine’s De 
Trinitate. The 1996 Augustine Lecture’, in Augustinianum 28 (1997), p. 7-50. Overall, have 
Barnes and Ayres used this new methodology to focus mainly – but not only – on Augustine’s 
works, while Coakley’s attention has been devoted to the Cappadocians’ side. See: Sarah 
Coakley, ‘“Persons” In the “Social” Doctrine of the Trinity: A Critique of Current Analytic 
Discussion’, in S. Davis, D. Kendall, and G. O'Collins (eds), The Trinity: An Interdisciplinary 
Symposium, p. 123-144; Sarah Coakley, ‘Re–thinking Gregory of Nyssa: Introduction—Gender, 
Trinitarian Analogies, and the Pedagogy of The Song’, in Modern Theology 18 4 (2002), p. 431-
443. This paper served as an introduction to the volume edited one year later: Sarah Coakley 
(ed), Re-thinking Gregory of Nyssa, Oxford 2003, with the contributions of both Lewis Ayres, 
‘On Not Three People: the Fundamental Themes of Gregory of Nyssa’s Trinitarian Theology as 
Seen in To Ablabius: On Not Three Gods’, p. 15-44 and Michel René Barnes, ‘Divine Unity and 
the Divided Self: Gregory of Nyssa’s Trinitarian Theology in its Psychological Context’, p. 45-66. 
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difference between Greek speaking in the East and Latin speaking in the West.7 
Therefore, they claim that a substantial theological difference between East and 
West never really existed. This new trend has produced a variety of studies on 
the development of Trinitarian theology in Early Christianity, particularly on 
Augustine, his Christian predecessors, and the influences previous and 
contemporary Greek and Latin thinkers had on him.8 The interest aroused by 
Augustine in particular in this new trend is justified by the fact that he was 
previously taken as the most important exponent of the “Latin” theology.9  
 
Among the general reassessment of influences and interrelationship between 
East and West, there have been a number of fruitful studies on the relationship 
between Origen and Augustine. In the introduction of this work, I have briefly 
assessed the two scholarly trends which compare Origen and Augustine. 
Firstly, there are those studies which have tried to detect different instances of 
the influence of Origen on Augustine.10 Nevertheless, the influence of Origen’s 
works on Augustine’s thought is not the main argument of my thesis, thus this 
problem has been addressed only tangentially. However, I have detected no 
influence of Origen’s Commentary on Augustine’s Tractates. Whether 
Augustine read some of Origen’s works in his youth or not, it does not seem to 
have influenced his exegesis of the fourth Gospel. Secondly, some scholars 
have also produced comparisons on single theological arguments or pieces of 
exegesis, trying to show differences and similarities between these two 
theologians. Among these works, it is certainly worth mentioning those of 
Lettieri,11 O’Leary,12 Ludlow13 and Slotemaker.14 My thesis fits into this latter 
historiographical trend.15 Regardless of the influence Origen might have had on 
Augustine, these authors are so often chosen by scholars as a source of 
                                                 
7 On the debates following the council of Nicaea in the west and on the different of pro-Nicaean 
theologians see: Daniel H. Williams, Ambrose of Milan and the End of the Arian-Nicene 
Conflicts, Oxford 1995; see also: L. Ayres, Nicaea and Its Legacy.  
8 See, among the many, M. Edwards, ‘Augustine and His Christian Predecessors’, p. 215-226; 
in the same volume (M. Vessey and S. Reid (eds), A Companion to Augustine), see also: 
Michael Stuart Williams, ‘Augustine as a Reader of His Christian Contemporaries’, p. 227-239. 
9 On Augustine, see in particular L. Ayres, Augustine and the Trinity.  
10 See: supra, I.1.3.  
11 See: G. Lettieri, ‘Origene, Agostino e il mistero di Giuda’; Gaetano Lettieri, ‘Apocatastasi 
logica o apocalisse della carne? Origene e Agostino’. 
12 J. O’Leary, ‘The Invisible Mission of the Son in Origen and Augustine’. 
13 M. Ludlow, ‘Spirit and Letter in Origen and Augustine’. 
14 J. T. Slotemaker, ‘The Primity of the Father in Origen of Alexandria and Augustine of Hippo’. 
15 All the aforementioned authors will be discussed in this chapter.  
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heuristic comparison because of their major impact on subsequent theological 
traditions, the Greek eastern and Latin western respectively. Even if they do not 
totally encapsulate the later eastern and western traditions, we can say that 
understanding Origen and Augustine (and the differences between them) could 
help scholars understand those traditions better. Therefore, the juxtaposition of 
Origen’s and Augustine’s interpretation of the Trinity, the World and the Spirit 
according to their understanding of Johannine theology does not aim at proving 
any influence and contact between the two. Rather, through this heuristic 
comparison, this thesis aims at clarifying the different modes in which the two 
authors, who lived almost two centuries apart in very different cultural 
environments, interpreted and understood those Johannine themes.  
 
In other words, I neither want to re-affirm the old East-West paradigm, nor do I 
want to study the possible influence of Origen’s doctrines on Augustine. Rather, 
my heuristic comparison will contribute to scholarship by clarifying the thought 
of two of the most influential theologians of ancient – and, probably of all – 
times by investigating their pneumatology in light of the dualistic framework 
which they both derived from the Johannine Gospel. The aim of this 
comparative methodology that I am proposing in this thesis lies in a re-
evaluation of the two authors’ pneumatologies, but also in a new assessment of 
the Johannine derivation of their Trinitarian thought, soteriology, and conception 
of evil. Although these two authors lived in very different times and geographical 
contexts, they were nonetheless using the Gospel of John as the source of 
theological authority. Even if the pro-Nicene and anti-Manichaean concerns of 
Augustine differ greatly from the pastoral and anti-gnostic interests of Origen, 
both authors identify the fourth Gospel as the most important source of 
revelation for understanding the role of the Spirit, his place in the holy Trinity, 
his relation to the world and to human beings. Hence, the study of the centrality 
of the Gospel of John for the theology of Origen and Augustine represents a 
valuable contribution to the on-going debate regarding not only the theologies of 
these two great theologians, but also regarding the history of Christian 
pneumatology. 
 
A balanced approach between the two historiographical trends – the Greek-
Latin paradigm and the reassessment of pro-Nicene theology – should neither 
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overestimate the differences between Latin and Greek speaking patristic 
theologies, nor underestimate the importance of the different languages used by 
eastern and western theologians. In this regard, it is utterly undeniable that 
authors such as Origen had much greater influence on eastern writers – such 
as the Cappadocian Fathers – rather than on Augustine, who did not read his 
work in the original language. This consideration is not true for all the Latin 
Fathers – the most obvious examples of the contrary being Ambrose and 
Jerome. Nevertheless, the astonishing importance that Augustine’s theology 
gained in Western Europe in early medieval theology eventually results in the 
later estrangement of Latin and Greek theologies.16 For this reason, my 
heuristic comparison will treat Origen and Augustine partly as representatives of 
two different theological trajectories. As this chapter will show, they do 
represent two opposite ways of interpreting Christian soteriology.17 
Nevertheless, these theological trajectories are not to be identified with Greek 
and Latin patristic theological speculations as a whole, but rather they should be 
seen as two different ways of interpreting the fundamental texts of Christianity. 
Some Origenian influence is present in many eastern and western theologians 
up to the present day. The same can be said for Augustinian influence.   
 
Before analysing the differences between Origen’s and Augustine’s 
interpretation of John with regard to the Trinity, the world and the Spirit, it is 
worth remembering some basic similarities of intent between the two authors 
which I have shown in the course of this thesis - similarities which make the 
present comparison possible.  
  
The first consideration comes from the very texts of Origen’s ComJn and 
Augustine’s TrIoh. It is true that there are differences in literary genre 
(commentary and homily respectively) audience (learned Christians, such as 
Ambrose, and the mixed audience of Augustine’s dioceses) and extension 
                                                 
16 On the possibility that Augustine’s read Origen’s works in translation, see supra, I.1.3. In this 
regard see, in particular, the work of: G. Heidl, The influence of Origen on the Young Augustine.  
17 In this sense, even if Augustine’s understanding of Origenism is probably mediated through 
the trivialization of his thought that took place during the Origenists controversies, his reference 
to Origen as the most influential of ‘those merciful thinkers’ who support the idea of universal 
salvation in City of God reveals an opposite conception of the history of human salvation. See: 
City of God, XXI.17. When Augustine refers directly to Origen, he usually refers to his erroneous 
opinion regarding soteriology. See: Retractations, I.7.6 and 2.44. On Heresies, XLII-XLIII. 
Unfinished Work against Julian, V.7. 
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(ComJn was never finished and survived fragmentarily, while TrIoh is 
complete). Nevertheless, both authors’ works present a consistent interpretation 
of the Trinity which does not seem to undergo substantial change during the 
many years of writing. In Origen, the explanation of the relationship between 
Father, Son and creatures depicted in the first two books of the ComJn matches 
perfectly that of ComJn, XXXII.350-357, while the Spirit appears to have the 
same ontological position and soteriological role in all the books.18 In Augustine, 
both the ‘generative logic’ based on the text of Jn. 1:1, 5:19, 5:26, 8:24, 16:13, 
20:22 and the three keystones of his Trinitarian metaphysics – that is, the 
identification of God as idipsum and Being; the rule of the quod habet hoc est; 
the double procession of the Spirit – are consistently evident throughout the 
whole text. It is then possible to postulate that both authors understood their 
commentaries as coherent and consistent works in which their Trinitarian 
doctrines are explained according to the text of the Gospel.  
  
The second consideration concerns Origen’s and Augustine’s own evaluation of 
the significance of the fourth Gospel for their respective theologies. In my 
analysis, I have shown that both Origen and Augustine explicitly think of the 
Gospel of John as the most important text of the Scriptures, the one where the 
divinity of Jesus is fully expounded. Origen defines it the ‘firstfruits of all 
Scriptures’, the text that allows all the Scriptures to become Gospel, according 
to his hermeneutical principles.19 Augustine affirms the superiority of John the 
evangelist over all the others, thus declaring his Gospel the most sublime of 
all.20 This consideration is important as it reminds the reader that neither ComJn 
and TrIoh should be considered – as some scholars have considered them – as 
exegetical works from which to draw random quotations that fit inside a 
theological system based on more systematic works of the two authors – e.g. 
On First Principles, On the Trinity.21 Nor should theological doctrines found in 
these treatises be considered “superior” or expressing the author’s thought 
more fully than the ones found in the exegetical works. On the contrary, 
                                                 
18 The consistency of Origen’s Christology and soteriology in the Commentary on John has 
been also observed by Jacobsen in the section of his monograph explicitly devoted to this text. 
See: A. C. Jacobsen, Christ, the Teacher of Salvation, p. 121-151. 
19 See supra, IV.1.1.   
20 See supra, III.2;   
21 Regarding Origen, see, for example, Greggs’ treatment of the ComJn as less important than 
other works. See: T. Greggs, Barth, Origen, and Universal Salvation, p. 153 n. 9; On Augustine 
see: D.J. Milewsky, ‘Augustine's 124 Tractates on the Gospel of John’. See also supra, I.1.1. 
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theological concepts expressed in these latter works should be held in the 
highest regard, as they represent speculation on the book both authors regard 
as the most important text of the Bible. Given the astonishing importance that 
biblical exegesis has for the two authors, this consideration should lead 
scholars to value doctrines expressed in these texts as much as – or, possibly, 
even more than – those expressed in the systematic treaties. While the latter 
better express an author’s system, the former are more able to express their 
theological intention.  
   
The third consideration derives from the second and it explains both why it is so 
important to study Origen’s and Augustine’s doctrine of the Trinity in its relation 
to the concept of “the world” and why the commentaries on John are so 
important. The reason stands in the fact that both authors considered the study 
of the Trinity and its relation to created beings as the most important task a 
Christian can undertake. This task is only achieved through the study of 
Scriptures. Using the words of Jacobsen, the main intent of Origen’s exegesis 
and pastoral activity ‘is not about making the invisible God visible, but about 
making him understandable’.22 This assumption has been confirmed by my 
investigation, which has shown how Origen’s soteriology ought to be considered 
as consisting of different steps of noetic and intellectual understanding of God. 
Salvation itself is the gradual ethical and noetic apprehension of the Son and of 
his relation to the Father.23 Similarly, the study of the doctrine of the Trinity is 
everything but an intellectual divertissement for Augustine. When preaching to 
his audience, Augustine shows more than anything the driving urgency to save 
souls. There is no place in this or in any other work of his for intellectual triviality 
or random speculation for the sake of knowledge. On the contrary, according to 
Augustine’s own hermeneutic, the study of the Trinity benefits the reader with 
the grace of God which is poured into the hearts of believers, making them able 
to understand – or, more correctly, partially understand – the mystery of God.24 
Understanding the Trinity and its relation to the world means, therefore, entering 
the Trinitarian communion by participation in the Holy Spirit.25 
 
                                                 
22 See: A. C. Jacobsen, Christ, the Teacher of Salvation, p. 308. 
23 See in particular supra, IV.1 and IV.1.4. 
24 See supra, III.5.  
25 See in particular supra, V.3.3. 
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This comparative chapter is therefore focused on the three themes, towards 
which Origen and Augustine represent two different approaches: the 
understanding of the immanent Trinity, the dualism between God and the world, 
the proper role of the Holy Spirit. Regarding their understanding of the 
“immanent” Trinity, Origen puts forward a paradigm that understands the 
participation of attributes as the focal point of the oneness and Threeness of 
God; on the other hand, Augustine’s understanding of the Trinity uses a 
paradigm of identity to understand God’s self-relation. These two metaphysical 
constructions, each one deriving from a different understanding of the 
Johannine Gospel, have fundamental consequences when it comes to 
soteriology, that is, to the interpretation of the so-called “economic” Trinity. In 
this regard, Origen and Augustine have been accused of two opposite attitudes, 
both equally bad according to their detractors. While Origen has been accused 
by various scholars of drawing God too near to creation, Augustine, on the other 
hand, has been charged of building an unfillable abyss between God and his 
creatures.26 The comparison in this chapter will demonstrate that both these 
accusations are misplaced. Moreover, it will show that the different uses the two 
authors make of the Gospel of John reveal the two authors’ intentions in 
tackling the problem of evil and understanding the connection between intra-
Trinitarian relations and the world. The study of the role and function of the Holy 
Spirit is the key to understanding these problems. In this regard, the main 
difference between the two stands in their interpretation of the Gospel dualism 
between God/holy community and the world. According to the Trinitarian 
paradigm of participation, Origen presents a theology which generally smooths 
the gospel’s dualism by interpreting God’s salvific act as a gradual 
transformation of the world, which will eventually become fully spiritual and 
participate in God. Quite differently, Augustine, according to his paradigm of 
identity, tends to accentuate the Gospel’s dualism. The perfect unity and identity 
of the Trinity is instantiated in the Holy Spirit, thus establishing the absolute 
separation between Spirit and world. In short, the identification of different 
paradigms – participation/transformation for Origen, and identity/separation for 
Augustine – and the analysis of the authors’ derivation of these paradigms from 
the fourth Gospel represent the key contribution of my research to scholarship.   
                                                 
26 Both these accusations will be analysed in the course of this chapter and bibliographical 
references will be provided in due course.  
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VI.2 The Spirit in God: Origen’s and Augustine’s Understanding 
of the “Immanent” Trinity in Their Commentaries on John 
 
VI.2.1 The Generation of the Son   
 
In a paper first presented at the Origeniana Decima conference, Slotemaker 
proposed a comparison between Origen’s and Augustine’s concept of the 
“primity” of the Father.27 The author affirmed that, contrary to what de Régnon’s 
followers had asserted, no difference ought to be found between Origen and 
Augustine regarding the idea of the primity of the Father, that is, the doctrine 
according to which the Father ‘takes logical and casual priority, though not 
temporal priority, among the Father, Son and Holy Spirit’.28 Expanding on 
Slotemaker’s conclusion – according to which ‘both theologians focus acutely 
on the relational and scriptural language of Father and Son’29 – my research 
has highlighted that, in their quest for a Trinitarian doctrine that solves the 
problem of the relation between simplicity of God, or his oneness, and the intra-
divine relationships of the three persons, Origen and Augustine have three 
points of contact. First, both Origen and Augustine have been shown to build 
their Trinitarian discourse by focusing on the relation between Father and Son 
and having the text of John as their focal point.30 Secondly, both authors uphold 
the doctrine of the eternal generation of the Son from the Father, and they 
would agree in saying, in Widdicombe’s words, that the Father-Son relation is 
‘distinct from and metaphysically prior to the relation between God and 
creation’.31 Thirdly, both authors understand that the fact that the Father is 
called “father” implies the idea that he has a son and, therefore, both agree in 
considering the relationship between Father and Son as eternal and inherent to 
the very nature of the hypostases.32 In other words, the Father is such because 
of the Son and vice-versa, but only the Father is logically prior to the Son.  
                                                 
27 J. T. Slotemaker, ‘The Primity of the Father in Origen of Alexandria and Augustine of Hippo’.  
28 Ibidem, p. 857. 
29 Ibidem, p. 871. 
30 See supra, II.1.3 and III.4. 
31 Peter Widdicombe, The Fatherhood of God from Origen to Athanasius, Oxford 2000, p. 67. 
See supra, IV.2.1 and V.3.1. 
32 See supra, II.1.3 and III.4.2. However, the ontological implications of this relation on the 





Nevertheless, my analysis has shown some basic differences in interpreting the 
Gospel of John which greatly affect the two authors’ understanding of the 
Trinity. Beginning with the Father-Son relationship, it is worth saying that, firstly, 
while Origen derives most of his Trinitarian speculation from the verse of Jn. 
1:1-3,33 particularly from the fact that ‘the Logos was with God and the Logos 
was God’, most of Augustine’s Trinitarian speculation comes from Jn. 5:26, ‘For 
just as the Father has life in himself, so he has granted the Son also to have life 
in himself’. Both authors base their speculation on the idea of the priority of the 
Father. Nevertheless, their approaches are very different. On the one hand, 
Origen grants the appellative of God-in-Himself (αὐτόθεος) to the Father only, 
while Son and Spirit are made God only by participation, according to the 
distinction between ὁ θεὸς (God-in-himself, the Father) and θεὸς (God by 
participation, the Son).34 On the other, Augustine affirms the idea that the 
Father is principium (Jn. 8.25) of the Trinity, but he also postulates the complete 
identity of idipsum and Being for all the three hypostases. In other words, while 
Origen believes that all attributes of God must be predicated properly of the 
Father only, Augustine postulates not only the sameness of attributes, but also 
a shared essence between Father and Son, affirming that, just a s the Father is 
in-himself the idipsum, by generating the Son he granted him to to be the very 
same thing that in-himself (not by participation) he is (Jn. 5:26).35 The basic 
difference between the two authors’ conceptions of the Trinity is then mirrored 
by their different theological concerns. 
 
Origen’s exegesis builds a system according to which he tries to solve the 
problem of the uniqueness of God and the ontological existence of each person 
of the Trinity by resorting to the idea of participation. While the oneness of God 
is located in the Father only, the Son and the Spirit could be properly said to be 
divine because of their perfect participation in the Father’s being. This perfect 
participation entails the possession of all the attributes of the Father at their 
maximum level. Since the Son is subordinated to the Father from which he 
eternally receives everything that he has, I have defined Origen’s 
                                                 
33 ‘In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God. He was 
in the beginning with God. All things came into being through him’ 
34 See supra, II.1.3. 
35 See supra, III.4. 
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subordinationism as an ontological subordinationism of priority. According to 
this idea, all attributes of the Father are predicated of the Son also, thanks to 
the perfect participation of the Son in the Father. Nevertheless, the unity and 
oneness of God is located only in the Father, as confirmed by the short creed 
Origen proposed commenting on Jn. 13:19 – ‘you may believe that I am’ – in 
ComJn, XXXII.187-189. There, the first rule of faith (‘First of all, believe that 
God is one’) is referred to ὁ θεὸς,36 that is, the Father, while faith in the Son and 
the Spirit is relegated respectively to the second and third rules of faith.37 On the 
other hand, Origen also wants to defend the absolute transcendence and 
ineffability of the Father. In general, Origen shows two different concerns: the 
first is to exalt the uniqueness of the nature of the Only-Begotten, that is, of the 
Son, beyond any other created being; the second is to defend the absolute 
transcendence of the Father above every other being, including the Son. In this 
sense, Origen’s speculation is driven by a genuine concern of harmonizing the 
special relationship between Father and Son presented from Jn. 1.1 with the 
repeated affirmation of the Father’s superiority (e.g. Jn. 14:28, ‘the Father is 
greater than I’). Therefore, the Father is ineffable and utterly incomprehensible. 
As such, while Origen deems it to be ontologically right to predicate to the 
Father any attribute properly, he also deems necessary to assert the fact that 
the Father transcends every attribute. Therefore, while the Son is light and truth, 
because by eternal participation in the Father he possesses both “light” and 
“truth”, the Father is both light and beyond light, truth and beyond truth. The 
main difference between the Father and the Son stands, therefore, in this 
ineffable and meta-ontological nature of the Father. Indeed, the Son lacks the 
ineffability of the Father. In any case, Origen does not regard ineffability as an 
ontological attribute. Indeed, by stating that the Father is beyond being, Origen 
asserts the Father in-himself could not be fully understood according to any 
ontological category. As such, in Origen’s reasoning, the fact that the Son lacks 
the ineffability of the Father does not make him ontologically inferior to the 
Father. Indeed, this characteristic of the Father of surpassing ontology itself 
could be possible regarded as an ontological characteristic. Therefore, while an 
ontological subordination of priority is affirmed, also a meta-ontological 
subordination is implied. This whole system, built by Origen to give an account 
                                                 
36 Πρῶτον πάντων πίστευσον ὅτι εἷς ἔστιν ὁ θεός. 
37 See supra, II.1.2. 
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of unity and relation between Father and Son, rests, therefore, on the idea that 
the unity of God and the divinity of the three hypostases can be affirmed where 
two ontological entities possesses the same attributes at the same level. In this 
way, Origen is able to affirm: 1) The ontological priority of the Father; 2) The 
ineffable meta-ontological nature of the Father (his being ineffable and over 
every essence; 3) The fact that the acts of will and power properly reside in the 
Father only, and are merely mirrored in the Son. In the Father-Son relationship 
as depicted by Origen, the Father acts in the Son, but the Son does not act in 
any way in the Father. Therefore, while the will of the Father is said to be the 
will of God tout court, the will of the Son is merely the mirror of the will of the 
Father. This one-way relationship differs greatly from Augustine’s account. 
  
While Origen starts from the undefiled and unknowable meta-essence of the 
Father and from his eternal generation of the Son in order to explain the 
uniqueness of God’s being and will, this thesis has shown, against Marion, that 
Augustine explains the Father-Son relationship through the idea of idipsum and 
Being.38 First of all, differently from Origen, Augustine’s Trinitarian speculation 
in the Tractates always begins from the opposition between the true essence of 
God and the inadequate essence of creatures. In other words, when speaking 
of the Trinitarian relationship, Augustine’s first concern is to show the 
ontological stability of God as opposed to the instability of the world, resulting in 
time and mutability. God is metaphysically superior to the world because he is 
self-sameness, principium and unchangeable Being. Reflecting on the idea of 
perfect stability and self-sameness of God, Augustine uses the concept of 
idipsum and Being in order to establish the identity of Father and Son. 
Augustine argues that it is not possible to predicate any attribute of God which 
is not already inscribed in God’s essence. As such, not only attributes, but also 
actions are neither “substances” nor “accidents” that differ from God’s essence, 
but rather are inscribed in God’s very substance.39 Therefore, Augustine 
explains that to be, to be right, to be just and to know are the same thing in 
God. As a consequence, God’s actions are the same as his own essence. This 
                                                 
38 J. L. Marion, ‘Idipsum’, p. 167-189. See: supra, III.3. 
39 It is worth reminding the reader here that, in this thesis, the words “essence” and “substance” 
are used interchangeably. The reason of this choice stands in the fact that, although Augustine 
postulated a difference between the two in On the Trinity VII.5.10, he still used the two terms 
interchangeably in the Tractates. However, in my analysis I have made clear that he always 
used these terms as meaning “essence”. See supra, III.3. 
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is particularly true insofar as the Trinity is concerned. Augustine is able to 
interpret the perfect identity in God of knowing and being as the key factor that 
explains both the derivation of the Son from the Father and the self-sameness 
of the two. This identity makes it possible to speak of the Trinity as perfect unity 
acting in a self-relation according to its own essence. This identity of attributes 
and being is expressed by Augustine as the rule of the quod habet hoc est. As a 
consequence, Augustine can affirm that the Son and the Spirit not only possess 
being just as the Father does, but that they are Being, just as the Father is. 
Building on the texts of Jn. 5:26 (‘just as the Father has life in himself, so he has 
granted the Son also to have life in himself’), but also 8:19 and 16:13, Augustine 
affirms that, by being begotten, the Son not only has the same attributes of the 
Father, but he is the same as the Father. Hence, he is God not in participating 
in the Father, but in himself. This difference between participation and identity 
stands as the main difference between the two authors’ Trinitarian discourse. In 
this regard, it is worth noticing that Augustine’s rebuttal of Arianism is extremely 
focused on its alleged subordinationism. In a previous chapter, I have shown 
that Augustine’s accusation is centred on the idea that Arian subordinationism 
breaks the unity of the Trinity for, according to Augustine, perfect unity entails 
perfect identity.40 Therefore, Augustine affirms that the Trinity exists in reality 
only as a perfect unity. While Father, Son and Spirit exist as different ontological 
hypostases, God exists only as one being in reality.  
 
In short, by contrast with Origen, for Augustine it is not possible to distinguish 
the Father and the Son by their power and being, but only by generation and 
mutual relationship. In his idea, God is simple because there are no differences 
between the persons and all three persons exist together as a unity. In Origen, 
the lack of ineffability of the Son and thus the possibility of understanding the 
Father as superior to the Son is the result of a subordinationism which sees in 
the Father the source of divinity and will. The Father must be ineffable and the 
Son must not. In Augustine, by contrast, the shared deity between Father and 
Son – that is, having same attributes – is not considered as a sufficient 
                                                 
40 See: supra, III.4.2. References to Arianism should not be taken as if I wanted to repeat the 
false accusation against Origen of being an Arian. My analysis has already made clear the 
differences between the two. Nevertheless, it is extremely interesting to notice that Augustine’s 
criticism is focused on subordinationism as such, that is, against every theological system that 
entails the idea that Father and Son exist as separated entities in reality.  
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guarantee of the perfect unity of God; nor can Augustine accept the application 
of unity and self-sameness of God to the Father only, like Origen did.41 The fault 
Augustine would have found in Origen’s argument would therefore be that of 
considering the hypostases as ontological entities existing distinctly one from 
the other, instead of understanding them as existing only as a unity. Therefore, 
the difference between the two theological systems stands in the interpretation 
of the generation of the Son as establishing either the participation of the Son in 
the Father or his identity with him. Both systems are based on the text of the 
Gospel, particularly on the necessity of balancing the superiority of the Father 
with the equality between the Son and the Father. Nevertheless, the two 
authors put a different emphasis on different passages, thus building two very 
different Trinitarian metaphysics. However, the difference between the two 
systems appears even more clearly in their pneumatology. 
  
VI.2.2 The Procession of the Spirit 
  
So far, I have analysed the differences between the depictions of the generation 
of the Son in Origen and Augustine. However, it is the conception of the Spirit’s 
procession and role that marks the real difference between the two authors’ 
Trinitarian theologies. In other words, it is in their pneumatologies that the 
difference between the paradigm of participation and that of identity emerges 
most clearly. In the case of Augustine, the Spirit is the ontological means that 
makes the relation of identity possible inside the Trinity. The Trinity exists as a 
unity because the mutual process of generation/being generated between 
Father and Son is instantiated in the person of the Spirit. As such, the Holy 
Spirit is described as the hypostatised common essence of the two. The 
procession from both makes the Spirit not only the instantiation of their common 
“generative” essence, but also of their mutual love, here understood as the 
eternal process of generation.42 On the contrary, despite the importance of the 
                                                 
41 It is clear that the impossibility for Augustine of accepting such an ontological framework 
derive also from his pro-Nicene necessity of following the rule of the Deus de Deo. This rule is 
at the core of TrIoh, XX-XXII, as well as in his second book of On the Trinity (particularly II.1.2) 
and in his Arian Sermons. On the homilies, see: William A Sumruld, Augustine and the Arians: 
the Bishop of Hippo's encounters with Ulfilan Arianism, London 1994. See also L. Ayres, Nicaea 
and its Legacy, p. 364-381. 
42 At the end of the eighth book of On the Trinity, Augustine seems to move away from his own 
analogy of the Trinity of lover-beloved-love stating that, through this analogy, ‘what is sought 
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Holy Spirit in Origen’s soteriology, the Spirit is not a fundamental actor in the 
intra-Trinitarian process. Being generated by the will of the Father through the 
operation of the Son, the Spirit has no role in the immanent Father-Son 
relationship, nor is the Spirit hermeneutically necessary to understand that 
relationship.  
 
My analysis of the ontological role of the Spirit in Origen has shown that the 
Spirit proceeds from the Father through the Son in the same way in which all 
created beings proceed from the former through the latter. The Spirit is brought 
into being from the Father through the Son, according to the passage of Jn. 1:3: 
‘All things came into being through Him’. Therefore, this thesis has shown that, 
on the one hand, the Spirit should be understood to be κτίσις, in the sense that 
he has been brought into being through the Son; on the other hand, the Spirit is 
fully divine and part of the Godhead, as he possess all the attributes of the 
Father and the Son by means of participation in the Son, who administrates his 
hypostasis.43 Therefore, the perfect possession of all the attributes of God 
results in the Spirit’s divinity. I have defined this relation as an ontological 
subordination of double priority, since not only the Father, but also the Son is 
ontologically prior to the Spirit. The difference between the Holy Spirit and the 
rest of the created world is therefore located in the fact that the Spirit is able to 
conform himself to the will of the Father perfectly. Just as for the Son, the 
divinity of the Spirit comes from the fact that he shares the same perfect will: the 
will of the Father. In this regard, I have shown that there are two important 
aspects of the Trinitarian role of the Spirit in Origen’s theology. First, the Spirit 
does not seem to have any role in the Father-Son relationship, apart from the 
                                                                                                                                               
(the Trinity) has not yet been found, but the place is now being found where it is to be sought’. 
See On the Trinity, VIII.10.14. After that, Augustine proposes a few “psychological” Trinities to 
elucidate the concept of the Trinity. Nevertheless, the persistent use of the metaphor of love in 
the TrIoh should not be discarded as a “simple” way to explain the Trinity to his unlearned 
congregation. On the contrary, the metaphor of love remains the most important one in 
Augustine’s Trinitarian though for two reasons: first, his fidelity to the biblical (in particular, 
Johannine) assertion that ‘God is love’ (1Jn. 4:7) and that the Spirit is love; secondly, because 
the reason why this analogy does not perfectly reflect the immanent Trinity is that it is 
impossible to ascribe to a single person of the immanent Trinity a single role (that of lover or 
beloved), because in the Trinity every person acts in the same way as the other two. 
Nevertheless, this inconvenience is found in other psychological analogies as well (like 
memory-intellect-will). The appellative of love remains, therefore, the most important descriptor 
of the Spirit because it describes both the perfect process of unity and communion of the Trinity 
and because it also represents the means of unification of those who are justified in God. In this 
regard, see my analysis is supra, III.5. 
43 See: supra, II.2.1 and II.2.2. 
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one of being generated. Secondly, the Holy Spirit is neither called “Holy” nor 
called “Spirit” because of his Trinitarian relationship; rather, he is called Spirit in 
reference to his relation to the rest of the created world.44 Origen’s interpretation 
is based on two key texts of the Gospel: the aforementioned text of Jn. 1:3 and 
that of Jn. 4:24, where God is said to be Spirit.45 In particular, the comment on 
the verse of the prologue represents the most important contribution in our 
possession regarding Origen’s reflection on the divine role of the Spirit. 
Compared to the emphasis on the revealed – and, to some extent, 
unapproachable – nature of the Spirit found in On First Principles which many 
scholars have underlined, my analysis has shown how the Commentary on 
John is the most mature attempt to build a coherent Trinitarian metaphysics 
which assigns a specific role to each hypostasis.46 In particular, it solves the 
dilemma over the created/divine nature of the Holy Spirit. As, in Origen’s worlds, 
it is impossible to have ‘even a suspicion of the existence of the Holy Spirit’ 
outside of the Scriptures, his reflection on the Spirit is indeed driven by the 
‘firstfruit’ of the Gospels.47 
 
Augustine shows a completely different understanding of the Trinitarian role of 
the Spirit. First of all, Augustine’s pneumatology is based on the text of Jn. 
16:13-15, where the Spirit is said ‘not to speak of his own’ and to receive ‘what 
he hears’ from the Son.48 It is worth reminding the reader that Augustine’s 
theology is built on the pro-Nicene assumption that the works of the Trinity are 
inseparable. Therefore, Augustine assumes that, since works of the Father and 
the Son are inseparable, they must be inseparable in essence, according to the 
doctrine of the homoousios.49 Furthermore, since their essence is one and their 
works are one, then the whole Trinity, including the Spirit, is one in reality and in 
works. However, since Father, Son and Spirit exist in reality only as unity, 
                                                 
44 See: supra, IV.2. 
45 Regarding Origen’s interpretation of Jn. 4:24, see supra, II.2.1 and IV.2.1. 
46 For a study mainly based on On First Principle see, for example: Helmut Saake, ‘Der 
Tractatus Pneumatico-Philosophicus des Origenes in Περὶ ἀρχῶν 1 3’, in Hermes 101 (1973), p. 
91-114. 
47 See: On First Principles, I.3.1. 
48 ‘But when he, the Spirit of truth, comes, he will guide you into all the truth. He will not speak 
on his own; he will speak only what he hears, and he will tell you what is yet to come. He will 
glorify me because it is from me that he will receive what he will make known to you.  All that 
belongs to the Father is mine. That is why I said the Spirit will receive from me what he will 
make known to you’. 
49 See: supra, III.4.2.  
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Augustine faces the problem of justifying the ontological existence of the three 
persons in a way that does not entail an accusation of modalism. For these 
reasons, he insists on their relational nature. As the Trinity is the eternal 
process of generation and being generated between the Father and the Son, 
the Spirit is depicted as the person which instantiates the communality of 
essence, action and being of the Trinity. The brilliance of this Trinitarian formula 
resides in the correspondence of the economic role of the Spirit with his 
ontological role in the Trinity. As the Spirit is the ontological bond of love inside 
the Trinity which holds Father and Son together, so he is the bond of love which 
allows creatures to be saved by entering into the Trinitarian communion. The 
three hypostases have, therefore, a relational nature, in the sense that the 
Father is Father insofar as he has a Son, and the Son is Son insofar as he has 
a Father. The proprium of the Spirit in the Trinitarian formula resides in his 
being the commonality of everything between Son and Father; as such, the 
Spirit is said to proceed from both. It is indeed in the procession of the Spirit that 
the Trinity reveals its true unity. While the priority of the Father is maintained as 
the ontological origin of the Trinitarian communion, the very relational nature of 
the Spirit indicates the perfect communion of the three persons according to a 
method that is not “descendent” but “circular”. Differently from Origen, there is 
not a one-way descending relationship between Father and Son, because they 
both share their generative nature in the procession of the Spirit, where their 
commonality of nature and being is evident. Previous chapters have shown how 
this Trinitarian system is based on the exegesis of Jn. 5:26, that is, the idea that 
the Father gives to the Son the possibility of having ‘life in himself’ and on Jn. 
16, where the Spirit is administrated by the Son and the Father. In this sense, 
the relationality of Augustine’s Trinity, although mediated by his pro-Nicene 
concerns, carries the marks of Johannine theology.  
  
The main difference between Origen’s and Augustine’s understanding of the 
Trinity comes, therefore, from the procession of the Spirit. It is worth reminding 
the reader here of Augustine’s discussion of this procession, where he asserts 
that, according to Galen’s principles of human generation, filius quippe nullus 
est duorum, nisi patris et matris.50 Because Augustine would deem it absurd 
                                                 
50 ‘For indeed no one is the Son of two except of a father and a mother’. For the discussion of 
the generative principles in late antiquity see: supra, III.5. 
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both to declare that the Son is the “mother” of the Spirit or that the Spirit is the 
second Son of the Father, Augustine explains that Spiritus autem sanctus non 
de Patre procedit in Filium, et de Filio procedit ad sanctificandam creaturam; 
sed simul de utroque procedit (TrIoh, XCIX.9). 51 According to the principles of 
Jn. 5:26, the Father has given to the Son the capacity of generating the Spirit 
just as he does. It is interesting to note that the conception according to which 
the Spirit proceeds from the Father to the Son, and then is sent from the Son to 
sanctify creatures describes exactly Origen’s doctrine of the Procession of the 
Spirit.52 Although Origen does not say that the Spirit proceeds “into” the Son, 
but “through” the Son – thus explaining why the title of Only-Begotten is a 
prerogative of the Son – his doctrine of the Trinity shows a kind of pattern 
according to which the Spirit is merely a soteriological agent of the Son from 
whom he is sent for the sanctification of creatures. Hence, Origen’s 
subordinationist and descending interpretation of the Trinity appears very 
different to the “circular” interpretation given by Augustine. This difference is 
mainly located in their interpretations of the Spirit.  
 
Through a close analysis of the two authors’ exegeses of John, this thesis has 
shown that differences in Origen’s and Augustine’s Trinitarian theology derive 
mostly from two factors: the different emphasis placed on certain passages of 
the fourth Gospel, and a different interpretation of same passages. In regard to 
the former point, the differences arise particularly from the passages where God 
is said to be Spirit (e.g. Jn. 4:24) and where the Spirit is said to help the Son in 
                                                 
51 ‘But the Holy Spirit does not proceed from the Father into the Son, and from the Son proceed 
to sanctify the creature; but he proceeds from both at the same time’. 
52 In this sense, it is possible to say that Augustine attacks any “descending” Trinitarian 
theology, not only that represented by Arians and Semi-Arians, but maybe also that of other 
pro-Nicene theologians, possibly also the Cappadocians. Regarding the problem of 
subordination among Trinitarian hypostases, there is no consensus among scholars whether 
the Cappadocian Fathers’ conception of the Trinity should be considered more similar to that of 
Athanasius or that of Origen. If the latter is true, as Harnack, Holl and Meijering maintain, 
Augustine might have sensed a problem in their Trinitarian speculations related to the 
“descending” attitude. Meesters, on the contrary, believes that the Cappadocians are much 
closer to Athanasius than to Origen. In any case, I think it would be extremely fruitful to compare 
the findings of this thesis with the fourth and early fifth century debates on the Trinity, with 
particular regard to the influence Origen’s subordination of priority had on the Cappadocians’ 
Trinitarian theology and on the perception Augustine had of the problem. See: Albert C. 
Meesters, ‘The Cappadocians and their Trinitarian conceptions of God’, in Neue Zeitschrift für 
Systematicsche Theologie Und Religionsphilosophie 54 4 (2012), p. 396-413; Eginhard P. 
Meijuring, ‘The Doctrine of the Will and the Trinity in the Orations of Gregory of Nazianzus’, in 
Nederlands Theologisch Tijdschrift 27 3 (1973), p. 224-234; Karl Holl, Amphilochius von 
Ikonium in seinem Verhältnis zu den großen Kappadoziern, Tübingen 1904. A. von Harnack, 
Lehrbuch der Dogmengeschichte. 
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his salvific mission and to be administrated by the Son (e.g. Jn.16:13-15; Jn. 
20:22, etc).53  
 
On the affirmation of God as Spirit, I have shown that Augustine can support 
neither the idea that to be “Spirit” is a contingent attribute of Father and Son, 
nor the idea that the Spirit is a universal of which Father and Son are 
participants. The reason for Augustine’s denial of this possibility comes from his 
reading of the Gospel affirmation about the Spirit as ontologically related both to 
the economic function of the Spirit in salvation and to his ontological functions 
within the immanent Trinity. The hermeneutical principles that drive Augustine’s 
interpretation of the Gospel are responsible for this reading which establishes a 
very new paradigm of Christian Trinitarianism. Consequently, as already wisely 
noted by Adam Kotsko – although his work is based on Augustine’s On the 
Trinity – Augustine deems the Spirit to be God in a very privileged sense, 
because not only “God is Spirit”, but the Spirit is also defined as coinciding with 
love, which is the proper definition of God in the Scriptures.54 As the Spirit is 
unity in relation, that is, communion, so he instantiates in his person the entire 
divinity, which is indeed unity in relation. The depiction of the Trinity as the 
eternal process of generation and relationality represent the very essence of the 
Trinity and is fully understood in the Holy Spirit. In this sense, neither the Spirit 
is merely the ‘essence’ of the other two hypostases, nor is a contingent attribute 
of them.55 
  
My analysis of Origen’s interpretation of these passages has shown that, on the 
one hand, Origen considered them as a sufficient proof of the divinity of the 
Spirit. On the other hand, Origen’s interpretation does not allow for a 
consonance between the “immanent” and “economic” reading of these 
episodes. In other words, I have shown that Radde-Gallwitz is right in 
considering the Spirit as an ontological agent rather than an activity, according 
to Origen.56 Radde-Gallwitz’s analysis is based on Jn. 3:8 ‘The Spirit blows 
where he wills’. Nevertheless, by means of Origen’s interpretation of Jn. 4:24, I 
                                                 
53 See in particular supra, IV.2.2 and III.5. 
54 Adam Kotsko, ‘Gift and Communio: The Holy Spirit in Augustine’s De Trinitate’, in Scottish 
Journal of Theology 64 1 (2010), p. 1-12. 
55 See in this regard the debate between Ayres and O’Leary analysed in supra, III.5. 
56 A. Radde-Gallwitz, ‘The Holy Spirit as Agent, Not Activity’.   
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have also demonstrated that although the Spirit is divine, he does not 
instantiate the essence of God in any way. When Origen has to explain why, 
according to John, “God is Spirit”, he firmly rebuts the idea that the appellative 
“spirit” could be taken to mean the essence of God, or the common essence of 
Father and Son.57 As a consequence, he explains that God has to be 
understood as Spirit in the same way in which he is taken to be “light”. Just as 
God is light insofar as he illuminates the intellect, so is he spirit insofar as he 
gives the “spirit of life” to his creatures. This consideration is extremely 
important, as it reveals two ideas. First, it hints at the fact that the “Spirit” is not 
considered by Origen to be the essence of God: the Spirit has therefore a 
different οὐσία from that of the Son, who in turn has a different οὐσία from that 
of the Father.58 Secondly, it shows that the hypostasis of the Holy Spirit is not 
so-called because of his Trinitarian relation, but only with reference to his 
soteriological action in the world. The Spirit is ‘Holy’ because he sanctifies 
creatures, and he is ‘Spirit’ because his essence allows him complete 
immateriality and participation, through the Son, in the deity of the Father. The 
fundamental difference between Origen’s and Augustine’s Trinitarian 
constructions, which I have analysed in this brief comparison, stands precisely 
in this argument, that is in how exactly the Spirit is understood to be spirit. 
While, on the one hand, Origen’s interpretation of the Gospel’s passage allows 
the interpreter to affirm that “the Spirit is God”, it still does not allow him to say 
that “God is the Spirit”. On the contrary, according to Augustine, not only the 
Spirit is God, but God is such because of the Spirit. 
 
To conclude this comparative section on the immanent Trinity in Origen and 
Augustine’s interpretation of the Gospel of John, it is worth returning to the 
article by Slotemaker quoted at the beginning of this section. On the one hand, I 
would agree with him in considering both Origen’s and Augustine’s Trinitarian 
logic as deeply engaged with the relational and scriptural language of Father 
and Son, thus rebuking accusations of “essentialism” or “personalism” in their 
theology.59 On the other hand, by contrast with him, I do not think it is possible 
to ‘bracket the procession of the Spirit from the Father and the Son’ off from the 
                                                 
57 See: supra, II.2.1; IV.2.1 and IV.2.3.2. 
58 See: supra, II.1.3 and II.2.1. 




discourse on the primity of the Father.60 Indeed, the question of the priority of 
the Father cannot be properly understood if it is not put in relation with the 
question of the procession of the Spirit.61 In the same footnote, Slotemaker 
quotes Ayres’ claim that Augustine’s doctrine of the procession of the Spirit from 
Father and Son is ‘at its core a restatement of the Father’s principium within the 
Trinity’.62 My analysis has shown that, while I agree with both on the 
consideration of the Father’s principium as one of the most important markers of 
Augustine’s Trinitarian doctrine, the real difference between Origen and 
Augustine is found in their understanding of the procession of the Spirit. While 
the paradigm of participation propounded by Origen understands the Father as 
an utterly inaccessible being, in which the Son participates by generation and in 
which the Spirit participates only by participation in the Son, the paradigm 
proposed by Augustine postulates the identity of the three hypostases, thus 
making the Spirit the “privileged” hypostasis of God, for only in him the perfect 
communion of the Trinity is instantiated. For this reason, Origen has been 
accused over the years to be a crypto-Arian before the letter, Augustine of 
being a “modalist” or “essentialist”.63 My analysis has shown that none of these 
accusations have been proven to survive when put in the face of the Johannine 
exegesis at the heart of the two authors’ Trinitarian systems. 
  
                                                 
60 Ibidem, p. 857 n. 8. 
61 Among scholars who still consider the primacy of the Father as the most important difference 
between Greek and Latin tradition see the two volumes by John Behr, The Way to Nicaea, New 
York 2001; John Behr, The Nicene Faith: formation of Christian Theology, New York 2004. 
Particularly about the primity of the Father in Augustine, and the influence of the dogmatic 
pronouncement of the council of Nicaea on his thought see: John Behr, ‘Calling on God as 
Father: Augustine and the Legacy of Nicaea’, in G. E. Demacopoulos and A. Papanikolaou 
(eds), Orthodox Readings of Augustine, p. 153-165. 
62 L. Ayres, ‘Sempiterne Spiritus Donum: Augustine's pneumatology and the metaphysics of 
Spirit’, p. 147, n. 5. 
63 For an extensive bibliography on the accusation of Arianism against Origen see: R. Williams, 
Arius: Heresy and Tradition, p. 131-157. On Augustine, see: A. von Harnack, History of Dogma 
IV. On Augustine’s alleged essentialism see: Jean Zizioulas, Being as Communion: Studies in 
Personhood and the Church, New York 1985. 
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VI.3 The Spirit and the World: The Relationship between the 
Trinity and the World in Origen and Augustine 
    
  
The previous section has shown that the main difference between Origen’s and 
Augustine’s understanding of the Trinity in their interpretation of the Gospel of 
John is to be found in two different paradigms for understanding the relation of 
the hypostases: one based on the concept of participation, the other on the 
concept of identity of the three hypostases existing together in reality only as a 
unity.  
 
While the previous section has analysed the implication of the two paradigms 
for the understanding of intra-Trinitarian relationships, this section will show 
what consequences they have for the two authors’ soteriologies. Before 
starting, however, it is worth freeing the field from a frequent misunderstanding 
regarding the relation between the interpretation of the Trinity “in-itself” and the 
Trinity “in the economy of salvation”. By making this distinction, I do not want to 
assert that the two authors believe in a rigid distinction between the two. On the 
contrary, both authors derive their soteriology from the exegesis of the Gospel, 
where the intra-divine relation between Father and Son – and, at least to some 
extent Holy Spirit – is not rigidly divided from their works of salvation. 
Consequently, we must understand Origen’s and Augustine’s theological 
constructions with regard to the immanent Trinity and to the economic Trinity as 
intertwined. In other words, the distinction between the immanent Trinity and the 
economic Trinity is a scholarly distinction, which helps one to understand 
Origen’s and Augustine’s Trinitarian theology, especially their pneumatologies. 
Hence, I will show that the paradigm of participation described by Origen in 
regard to the immanent Trinity stresses how salvation is to be considered as a 
gradual process of transformation of what is now evil – that is, the world – 
through its gradual participation in the goodness of God, that is, through its 
participation in the economic Trinity. The Son and the Spirit work in this process 
of transformation, each according to his own nature. On the other hand, the 
paradigm of identity in Augustine’s immanent Trinity – a Trinity which is 
understood as an eternal process of generation and procession – is essential to 
305 
 
his understanding of salvation as the separation of good from evil when one 
considers the work of the economic Trinity. It is then necessary for modern 
scholars to interpret the two aspects of the Trinity – both immanent and 
economic – together, in order to understand the theological motivations that 
guide the two authors in their speculations. If one does this, one can see that 
the main theological difference between the two soteriologies stands in the two 
authors’ interpretation of evil.64 On the one hand, Origen asserts the relativity of 
evil and the transitory nature of this world, which eventually result in the 
transformation of this world into the noetic world. On the other hand, 
Augustine’s theology is built on his stunned dismay at the presence of evil in the 
world, which leads to a soteriology where the salvation of the elect, understood 
as the entering into the very Trinitarian communion of the Holy Spirit, is 
achieved only through the separation between what is “of God” and what is “of 
the world”. The Trinitarian paradigms of participation/transformation and 
identity/separation rest, ultimately, on the two authors’ metaphysical and 
existential understanding of this problem, expressed by the Johannine 
contraposition between the Jesus (and his holy community) and the world. 
Therefore, before analysing the proprium of the Spirit in the two authors’ 
soteriology, this section will start with their interpretation of the Johannine 
concept of “the world”.  
   
VI.3.1 ‘He Was in the World; yet the World did not Know Him’ 
  
According to an expression first coined by Bultmann, one of the main 
characteristics of the Gospel of John is that of presenting a ‘dualism of decision’ 
which contrasts with the ‘cosmological dualism of Gnosticism’.65 In other words, 
the message at the core of John’s Gospel urges its listeners to a radical 
decision according to which one could either be ‘born again’ or remain in the 
grip of the demonic and corrupted world to which one naturally belongs.66 This 
expression of dualism has been generally accepted by scholars although some, 
like Michaels, have questioned the idea that the main point of the Gospel should 
be found in “conversion”, arguing that the accent of the Gospel is rather found in 
                                                 
64 In this regard I agree with G. Lettieri, ‘Origene, Agostino e il mistero di Giuda’, p. 130. 
65 Rudolf Bultmann, Theology of the New Testament, New York 1951, Vol. 2 p. 21. 
66 Ibidem, p. 25. 
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“revelation”: ‘the coming of Jesus into the world simply reveals who belongs – 
and who does not belong – to his Father’.67 In this regard it is particularly worth 
noting Pétrement’s opinion, according to which John’s Gospel is voluntarily 
contradictory in  this regard, thus affirming both does in fact teach both the 
importance of free will for salvation, and the existence of a radical difference in 
nature between God and the world. In this sense, the world ‘is the principle 
opposed to God, even though it is not an absolutely first principle’, and such a 
contradiction in John’s Gospel should be interpreted as a testimony of a kind of 
dualism which is ‘nothing more than an extreme accentuation of 
transcendence’, where a ‘profound distinction between God and the world is 
found’.68 Regardless of the scholarly discussion on the room left to free will by 
the fourth Gospel, scholars of both Jewish and Christian extraction have 
recognised the dualistic framework ruling the fourth Gospel, as well as the 
urgency of the choice that the believer is called to make. According to Reinhartz 
‘the beloved disciple, takes his offer with utmost gravity and urges the reader to 
do the same. It is a matter of life and death, good and evil’.69 In calling them to 
this choice, the author of the Gospel necessarily divides human beings into two 
groups: the believers and the “others”. This quite sectarian attitude has been 
recognised by many scholars who have in turn described the fourth Gospel as 
“countercultural”, “sectarian” and dominated by the radical contraposition 
between Jesus and the world. Gundry describes this attitude in a very lucid 
paragraph:  
 
John not only leaves the world outside the scope of Jesus’ praying and 
loving and of believers’ loving. He also describes the world as full of sin; as 
ignorant of God, God’s Son and God’s children; as opposed to and hateful 
of God’s Son and God’s children; as rejoicing over Jesus’ death; as 
dominated by Satan; and as subject to God’s wrath.70 
   
Although Bauckham and other scholars – such as Carson – point to the fact that 
there was hardly a Christian community in the first century which was not 
                                                 
67 J. Ramsey Michaels, The Gospel of John, p. 42.  
68 S. Pétrement, A Separate God, p. 175, 172, 171. 
69 A. Reinhartz, Befriending the Beloved Disciple, p. 24-25. 
70 R. H. Gundry, Jesus the Word according to John the Sectarian, p. 63-64.  
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“countercultural” and “sectarian”, the point of Gundry’s analysis remains intact.71 
The fourth Gospel is utterly dominated by the contraposition between the 
goodness of the celestial Saviour, who comes “among his own” to save them, 
and the utterly perverse world which refutes his message and actively works for 
the death of Jesus and his disciples.  
     
This radical dualism between the elect and the world has been the object of my 
research, which has unfolded Origen’s and Augustine’s interpretation of such 
dualism in their exegesis of John. As evidence of both authors’ high level of 
commitment to the text, my analysis has shown that in both Origen and 
Augustine the theological concept of ‘the world’ has a huge importance. In this 
regard, it is first worth underlining that both authors interpret the concept of the 
world as a theological category rather than as a strictly cosmological one. In 
other words, both authors are fully aware that the Gospel’s use of this category 
should not only be interpreted as referring to the physical structure of the 
universe, but also as the ethical marker of the distinction between God and 
sinners. This consideration is valid for both Origen and Augustine.  
 
Despite the fact that Origen’s interpretation of the difference between the 
perceptible cosmos and the noetic cosmos is based on the equation of the 
physical or perceptible world with the cosmological one, this should not be 
taken as a denial of the Gospel’s idea of “the world” as a theological concept; 
rather the difference between the perceptible cosmos and the noetic cosmos 
depends on Origen’s metaphysical principles according to which, as rightly 
pointed out by Hengstermann, ethical choices ultimately result in cosmological 
                                                 
71 Richard Bauckham, ‘John for Readers of Mark’, in Richard Bauckham (ed), The Gospel for All 
Christians: Rethinking the Gospel Audiences, Edinburgh 1998, p. 147-171. Arguing that the four 
Gospels were not written for distinctive communities, but for a wide circulation among all 
Christians, Bauckham claims that the Gospel of John was written by an author who was already 
in possession of the written version of the Gospel of Mark. Therefore, the text of John should be 
considered to be complementary to the Gospel of Mark. Against Bauckham’s interpretation see: 
Wendy E. Sproston North, who challenges Bauckham on the basis of his interpretation of Jn. 
3:24 and Jn. 11:2. See: Wendy E. Sproston North, ‘John for Readers of Mark? A Response to 
Richard Bauckham’s Proposal’, in Journal for the Study of the New Testament 25 4 (2003), p. 
449-468. Regarding Carson’s interpretation of the “sectarian” attitude of John’s Gospel see 
Carson’s claim that the sermon on the mountain in Matthew’s Gospel is no less sectarian that 
John’s attitude. Donald A. Carson, ‘The Challenge of the Balkanization of Johannine Studies’, in 
Paul N. Anderson, Felix Just, Tom Thatcher (eds), John, Jesus, and History, Volume 1: Critical 
Appraisals of Critical Views, Atlanta 2007, p. 133-164.  
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positions.72 In this regard, Origen’s interpretation differs radically from that of his 
Valentinian gnostic opponents. In his rebuttal of Gnosticism, Origen has 
particularly Valentinian Gnosticism in mind.73 While Origen’s perceptible world 
presents different degrees of perfection according to each creature’s use of free 
choice, gnostic cosmologies understand the difference between the world and 
the elect as referring to the difference in nature between those who are spiritual, 
psychic or hylic. In this sense, the anti-gnostic concerns of Origen are 
configured as a struggle for the defence of free choice against Valentinian 
determinism expressed by the fixity of the three natures.74 Therefore, on the 
one hand, the Valentinian interpretation of the world results in a cosmological 
dualism, where the difference in cosmological degrees are interpreted as 
differences in kind. On the other, Origen proposes an ethical dualism, where 
differences in cosmological degrees are the result of different choices.  
 
In this regard, Origen’s concern to deny a cosmological dualism is similar to 
Augustine’s anti-Manichaean interpretation. Although Augustine does not 
present a metaphysic where cosmological positions and ethical choices are 
mutually related, he still has to fight a heterodox dualism according to which the 
difference between world and elect is identified in the difference in nature 
between the two. Accordingly, one of the most important outcomes of this thesis 
has been the identification a deep anti-Manichaeanism in Augustine’s 
interpretation of the Johannine concept of “the world”. This contrasts with 
BeDuhn’s opinion.75 For as “dualistic” as Augustine’s interpretation is, this 
dualism is never displayed in the form of a cosmological dualism, like 
Manichaean dualism. On the contrary, for Augustine, “the world” is a mere 
theological concept, while the original creation of God is always depicted as 
good. In this sense, there is no need for scholars to look for deep Manichaean 
influences on Augustine’s psyche in order to explain his dualism, for his dualism 
is utterly Johannine, rather than Manichaean. Neither there is any need of a 
cosmological dualism to deny free choice.  
                                                 
72 Christian Hengstermann, Origenes und der Ursprung der Freiheitsmetaphysik, Münster 2016.  
73 In this regard see: supra, IV.2.3.1. 
74 Whether Valentinian determinism was the position held by Heracleon or whether Origen is 
imposing on Heracleon’s text the opinion of the Valentinian Gnostics of his own time is not 
important here. In both cases, Origen felt that the best way to undermine his opponents’ idea 
was to show the insanity of the three natures’ idea. For this debate see: supra, IV.2.3.1. 




The Johannine provenance of Augustine’s dualism is also proved by the various 
significations of the term “the world” which Augustine allows. Augustine 
understands the term “world” to mean both the physical world, that is, the good 
creation originally made by God, and lovers of the world, that is, those who live 
in the world according to their own love, and not according to the love of God. 
To these two categories, Augustine adds the existence of a spiritual world, that 
is, the world consisting of the elect pulled out from the wretched world by the 
redeeming action of God. However, Augustine almost always uses the term 
“world” in his exegesis to refer to the wicked world, that is, the collection of the 
lovers of the world.  
 
Quite differently, my analysis has shown that, although Origen allows many 
meanings of the term “world”, the most significant interpretation is established in 
the difference between the perceptible (αἰσθητὸς) and the noetic (νοητὸς) 
world.76 The former is the system of heavens and earth and all their inhabitants, 
while the latter is completely immaterial and bodiless, representing the ultimate 
state of perfection that a creature can attain by the perfect participation in all the 
epinoiai – that is, the attributes – of the Son. This interpretation of Origen’s 
conception of the world greatly differs from the one given by Tzamalikos. My 
interpretation perfectly mirrors Origen’s interpretation of the perceptible Gospel 
as reflecting the noetic realities of the spiritual Gospel written in heaven. Both 
worlds (and both Gospels) exist in reality, but the latter perfectly exists 
according to the full participation in God, while the former only exists thanks to 
the ontological participation in the intellectual principles of the latter. 
Accordingly, the perceptible world is “below” in an absolute sense, as it is 
transitory and will eventually be saved by the redeeming action of the ‘lamb of 
God who takes away the sins of the world’.  
   
In this regard, it is worth noting, following Ludlow’s argument, that Origen’s and 
Augustine’s reading of the concept of “the world” does not come from an 
alleged difference between a hermeneutical reading – that of Origen – and a 
                                                 
76 See: supra, IV.5. 
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theological or soteriological reading – that of Augustine.77 On the contrary, in 
both authors it is possible to appreciate a strong connection between 
hermeneutics and theology. In Origen, the difference between the two worlds 
corresponds to the transformative power of biblical interpretation. Just as the 
capacity of the reader is able to transform the visible Gospel into the noetic, so 
the perceptible world becomes the figure of the noetic when the reader acquires 
the spiritual capacity to understand the hidden meaning of the text. In 
Augustine, the concept of the world is a sign which acquires theological 
significance thanks to the visitation of the grace of God that gives to the elect 
the understanding of the wickedness of the world and, consequently, pulls them 
out of the world.  
  
While both authors understand the world as a hermeneutical and theological 
concept, their radically different readings of John start to emerge more clearly in 
their interpretation of “the world” as a negative concept. According to Origen, 
the “sin” of the perceptible world derives only from its imperfect participation in 
the fullness of the noetic world. Consequently, Origen shows an interpretation of 
evil as something which not only does not belong to the structure – that is, the 
substance – of the world, but is in-itself something that is alien to the deep 
rational nature of the created order. In other words, evil is a transient affection 
which will not affect the world forever; rather, it can be considered as an 
accident which will be eventually resolved. On the contrary, Augustine’s 
understanding of the culpability of the world is inherently inscribed both in the 
ontological essence and, most of all, in the irredeemably perverse will of the 
world’s inhabitants. On the one hand, the world is depicted as ontologically 
weak insofar as it lacks the marker of the true being. While God represents 
                                                 
77 See: M. Ludlow, ‘Spirit and Letter in Origen and Augustine’. Ludlow’s article does not take the 
concept of “the world” as its focal point of research, rather focusing on Origen’s and Augustine’s 
interpretation of Spirit and Letter (2 Cor. 3), showing that the common allegation according to 
which Origen read this opposition in an hermeneutical sense, while Augustine returned to its 
theological or soteriological interpretation is misplaced. On the contrary, she proves that 
‘Origen’s approach is theological (not just hermeneutical), but his theology is much more 
focused on the text of Scripture. There is a sense in which, for him, scripture contains all of 
salvation-history and that beyond it there is nothing else that needs to be said. In Augustine, on 
the other hand, the signs of which scripture is composed are potent examples among others 
that exist outside the text’. The present comparison shows that a similar consideration can be 
done with the concept of “the world”. This theological concept is burdened in both cases with 
soteriological implications, although Origen’s exegesis is more focused on the transformative 
power of the text, while Augustine’s one on its role as a sign of the coming grace. In any case, 
Ludlow’s article is much more concerned with the hermeneutical and exegetical problem than 
my thesis.  
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perfect Being, the idipsum always identical to itself, the world, by its own 
finitude, is ontologically in need of being supported and kept in place by the will 
of God. Therefore, the world is able to exist only because of the good will of 
God who, through an act of grace, allows the world to subsist.78 Nevertheless, 
the metaphysical weakness is not the core focus of Augustine’s reflection on the 
world. Rather, the world is mainly depicted as massa peccati because of its 
inexcusable sins. The most important fault of the world is therefore found in its 
act of will. This will is irredeemably perverted since the sin of Adam, thus 
marking the radical separation between God and the world.  
 
In this sense, Origen’s and Augustine’s interpretations could not be more 
different: on the one hand, Origen proposes an exegesis that aims at smoothing 
out the radical dualism of the Gospel, by focusing his attention on the 
redeeming action of the Saviour. If evil is not structural, it can be eliminated. In 
Johannine terms, Origen focuses more on the fact that the Saviour came to the 
world to save it, rather than on the hate that the world feels toward the Saviour. 
Consequently, he boldly affirms the eventual universal salvation of the entire 
world – including Judas and the Devil. On the other hand, Augustine’s focus on 
the perversity of human will makes the world’s sin inexcusable. In this sense, 
Augustine’s dualistic theology accentuates the binary oppositions found in the 
Gospel (spirit/flesh; darkness/light; sinner/chosen; Saviour/world).  
  
Origen’s paradigm of participation/transformation is particularly visible in his 
interpretation of Jn. 8:23 – ‘You are from below, I am from above; you are of this 
world, I am not of this world’ – and Jn. 17:24.79 The difference between those 
who are ‘below’ and those who are ‘above’ is taken by Origen to be the 
qualitative difference between those who live perfectly in the noetic world and 
those who are still part of the perceptible world. This same concept is 
expressed by the difference between κτίσις and καταβολή. While the first 
                                                 
78 However, the ontological weakness of the created order does not imply the idea that the 
world is ontologically bad. On the contrary, insofar as the world exists, it is good, for everything 
that has being, even if it is not true Being, is good. For this reason, from a mere metaphysical 
point of view, the world could not be said to be wicked, but only to be weak. Nevertheless, after 
the original sin, the ontological weakness of the world has become a sign of its corruption. This 
distinction is one of the main markers of difference between Augustine’s and the Manichaean’s 
cosmologies. See: supra, V.2.1.  
79 Jn. 17:24: ‘Father, I desire that those also, whom you have given me, may be with me where I 
am, to see my glory, which you have given me because you loved me before the throwing down 
(καταβολή) of the world’. 
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represents the undefiled creation, born from God before sin and participating 
perfectly in the noetic world, the second is the ‘throwing down’ of that very 
creation after the fall. Creation as it is now is therefore identified with the 
καταβολή. It is worth noting here that, through the distinction between noetic 
and perceptible, κτίσις and καταβολή, Origen’s exegesis seeks to maintain the 
dualistic structure of the Gospel through an intellectualistic relativizing of its 
pivotal concepts. In this sense his exegesis is driven by, nor imposed on the 
fourth Gospel. A qualitative distinction between the noetic and the perceptible 
world is maintained, but the internal structure of Origen’s system understands 
this difference as merely temporal, as the perceptible world is eventually going 
to be saved by its participation in the noetic. In other words, the world is not 
deemed to be evil in its fundamental principles, but only in its imperfect 
participation in the noetic world, which in turn furnishes the principles (λόγοι) on 
which the perceptible world subsists. Therefore, it is the world as a whole which 
is the object of God’s salvific mission, as the entire world shall be eventually 
transformed and shall participate perfectly in the immaterial and bodiless life of 
the noetic world, that is, in all the perfect epinoiai of the Son.  
   
By contrast, Augustine strongly opposes the idea that the world could now be 
considered to be the image of God in any respect, since his exegesis tends to 
distance the absolute gratuity of God’s grace from the world. Therefore, the 
“life” and “light” brought by the Saviour in Jn. 1:4 cannot in any way be 
understood by the world, as the world is no longer the image of God, but only 
the image of itself. In this regard, this thesis has shown that Augustine makes a 
sharp distinction between the world in Sapientia Dei, that is, in the original 
creative knowledge of God, and the world as it is now, that is, ruled by sin and 
pride. In this sense, I have also shown the difference between the two kinds of 
salutes that Augustine allows for creatures. On the one hand, there is physical 
salus, that is, the gift of being. This is given to the whole world, and it is a grace 
from God. On the other hand, there is the salus of salvation, which is not given 
to the world, but only to the few who are chosen out of the world. Against the 
opinion of some influential scholars such as Harrison, Ortiz and Guardini, my 
research has shown that this grace is identified by Augustine with the grace of 
re-creation, and it is deemed to be very different from the grace of creation 
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given to the whole world.80 This is for two reasons: first, the grace of re-creation 
is exclusive; secondly, it marks the separation of the saved from the world. The 
Johannine logic which radically opposes the “few” elect from the “many” of the 
world is the ground on which Augustine builds his theory of salvation as the 
separation from the world of the few who are chosen by God and choose to 
follow Jesus. 
  
Ultimately, Origen understands the world as formed by rational creatures 
hierarchically disposed according to their level of participation in the epinoiai of 
the Son. As such, the work of salvation is not represented by the estrangement 
of the saved from the sinning world, but rather as the universal salvation of the 
whole world. In this regard, it is safe to affirm that Origen’s dualism is much less 
dualistic than the fourth Gospel. Nevertheless, the dichotomies between elect 
and the world are mirrored in his idea of the relation between noetic and 
perceptible world. As the noetic world is described as completely immaterial and 
incorporeal, Origen understands salvation as purely a noetic movement of 
participation and transformation. Salvation is achieved by immaterial and 
bodiless means and consists in a purely noetic and intellectual understanding of 
the mysteries of God by participating in the noetic and bodiless world.81  
  
On the other hand, Augustine’s speculation is focused on his stunned 
recognition of the omnipresent pervasiveness of evil in the world and in human 
affairs. Therefore, the world does not have the good characteristics of God’s 
creation, but is rather depicted as the place where vitium pro natura inolevit. 
Therefore, the very idea of re-creation implies a slight depreciation of creation. 
Creation itself is interpreted as an act of grace, a miracle, and an act of mercy. 
Nevertheless, the grace of creation is considered to be a route less than the 
grace of salvation. Through the latter grace one is separated from the world and 
becomes a sharer in the Holy Spirit. Augustine’s very interpretation of what 
being a “Christian” means is focused on the idea that the Christian is the one 
                                                 
80 These scholars believe that no substantial gap between grace given for creation and that 
given for salvation is detectable in Augustine’s thought. Consequentially, grace given for 
existence and that given for redemption is the same. See my discussion in supra, V.2.3. 
81 Of course, this does not mean that Origen is denying or undermining in any way the 
importance of incarnation. Indeed, it could not have been possible to undertake this noetic path 
without the incarnation of the Lord. Nevertheless, the path the believers are called to undertake 
is, in its higher level, entirely noetic.  
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who is separated from the many and brought out of the world. In this sense, 
Augustine plainly affirms that being a Christian, that is, being separated from 
the world and joined in the perfect identity with the Holy Spirit, is more important 
than being human. In other words, re-creation is more important than creation.  
  
The difficulty of fully grasping the “deeper meaning” of the Gospel of John – that 
is, of presenting a coherent and unbiased exposition of the Johannine theology 
– makes it almost impossible for the modern interpreter to express a definitive 
judgment of which “paradigm” presented by the two authors is more faithful to 
the text of the Gospel. Such a judgment is irredeemably biased by each 
scholar’s understanding of the text according to the different trends of 
interpretation of the text which arose in the twentieth century and are still living 
today.82 Ultimately, a clear answer to this question implicates a strong 
statement on what Christianity itself is about. As the analysis proposed in this 
thesis aims only at furnishing scholarship with a heuristic comparison of the two 
paradigms in order to further our understanding of Origen and Augustine, it is 
not my intention here to furnish a precise answer to this question. Nevertheless, 
it is worth saying that, if, with Gundry’s words, ‘what comes out [of the Gospel] 
is the magnitude of God’s love, not a partly positive view of the world’, it is 
possible to present some reflections on the two different paradigms.83  
 
On the one hand, through the paradigm of participation/transformation, Origen 
is mainly concerned with building a theological system where the “good news” 
of the Gospel is interpreted as the universal gift of life and salvation to all 
creatures. Christianity itself and the very incarnation of the Saviour is therefore 
interpreted as the rational movement which allows creatures to better 
themselves through a process of constant transformation to the better, that 
finally ends in the universal salvation of all rational beings. A universal faith in 
reason and progress marks this system with the stigmata of a rational faith 
which is able eventually to overcome evil. The light which shines in the 
darkness is the core of the message, while the meanness and wickedness of 
the world is relativized as mere temporal phases for a cosmos which is 
                                                 
82 For a short introduction on these trends, from the patristic era to the modern interpretations 
see: M. Edwards, John Through the Centuries, p. 1-14. 
83 R. H. Gundry, Jesus the Word according to John, p. 64. 
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ineluctably marching on to eternal salvation. The ‘magnitude of God’s love’ is 
the Johannine concept that drives Origen’s speculation, and it is expressed in 
this universality which does not leave behind even the most wretched of all 
creatures. The weakness of this paradigm can be summarised in two points: 
First, it results in a certain reductionist idea of evil, which is no longer seen – as 
it was in the Gospel – as the pervasive and tragic condition ruling the whole 
world, but as a mere step to overcome. Secondly, the universal salvation of the 
world – rather than out of the world, as the Gospel would suggest – might result 
in the loss of the urgency of the choice the believer has to make. Following 
Jesus and renouncing to the world is thus no longer ‘a matter of life and death’, 
but a rational choice that can, as it were, be postponed without harming the final 
condition of the deciding subject.84 In this regard, it would probably be unfair to 
accuse Origen to be utterly oblivious of the problem of evil, as his whole system 
is built to give a rational explanation to this problem. In other words, Origen’s 
faith in rationality allows him to reflect on evil without being overwhelmed by it. 
However, it is for the reader of this thesis to decide whether or not reflecting on 
evil and not being overwhelmed by it is in itself a sign of obliviousness. 
   
On the other hand, Augustine’s paradigm of identity/separation is mainly 
concerned with building a theological system which accounts for the distressing 
and all-pervading presence of evil in the world. In this sense, his faithfulness to 
the text stands in considering the world as the utterly dark maze which is ruled 
by the Devil and is only capable of hating and murdering. Rather than 
considering evil as a transient accident, Augustine’s reflection is completely 
focused on the horrified contemplation of the mystery of evil. Therefore, 
Augustine’s solution does not aim at giving a reassuring answer to the reason 
for the presence of evil, but rather at proclaiming the incomprehensible love of 
God for those human beings which he came to save by descending into the 
world. In this sense, salvation is intended as separation because it is in no way 
the salvation of the world, but rather salvation out of the world. This salvation is 
then interpreted as the removal of a few elect from the world. The ‘magnitude of 
God’s love’ – that is, the main theme of the Gospel of John – shines, therefore, 
exactly in the absolute gratuity of salvation, which is given to human beings only 
because of God’s incomprehensible love. Contrarily to Origen, the descent of 
                                                 
84 A. Reinhartz, Befriending the Beloved Disciple, p. 25. 
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the saviour cannot be justified with a partially positive view of the world, but only 
as an act of pure love.85 Augustine’s system is therefore built to urge human 
beings to recognise the wickedness of their hearts and the perversity of the 
world. In this sense, the choice that human beings are called to make is as 
urgent as it is decisive. On the other hand, the corruption of world makes it 
impossible for the world itself to be saved by its own strength – or rationality.  
 
While some would accuse Origen of holding the problem of evil in low regard, 
Augustine has to respond to the charge of not presenting any reason for the 
choice God makes of saving some human beings over others.  
  
VI.3.2 The Spirit in the World 
  
The comparative analysis I have carried on so far has shown points of 
difference and of convergence between Origen’s and Augustine’s ways of 
understanding of the Trinity, with a particular focus on the Spirit, and their 
interpretation of Johannine dualism between God and the world. Before starting 
the last comparison on the proper role of the hypostasis of the Spirit in the 
world, it is worth reminding the reader, once more, that the structure of this 
thesis, which divides its analysis into an examination of the “immanent” and the 
“economic” Trinity does not entail a rigid separation of the two in Origen’s and 
Augustine’s theology. On the contrary, my analysis has shown that, on the one 
hand, understanding the ontological role and function of the Spirit in the 
“immanent” Trinity is crucial to understanding his soteriological agency; on the 
other, the very understanding of the “immanent” Trinity by the two authors is 
closely related to their soteriological concerns. This is true both for Origen and 
for Augustine, although in very different ways. In the thesis, I have argued that 
the link between Trinitarian thought and soteriology is particularly visible in the 
two authors’ pneumatologies. In this last section, I will therefore carry on the 
comparison on the relation between the Son, the Spirit and the world. 
    
In an article published in the last year of the past century, O’Leary proposed a 
comparison between the “invisible mission of the Son”, that is, the works of the 
                                                 
85 See: supra, V.1 and V.2. See also: R. H. Gundry, Jesus the Word according to John, p. 64. 
317 
 
Son in the world as a result of his sending from the Father, in Origen and 
Augustine. O’Leary identifies different activities of the Son in the world. In 
particular, he focuses on four: illumination of rational creatures, appearance to 
the Patriarchs, indwelling in the prophets and incarnation. Then O’Leary states 
that, while Origen interprets these activities of the Logos as reflecting different 
degrees of presence of the Son in the world, Augustine understands these 
activities as different modes of presence of the Son.86 Accordingly, while Origen 
understands the different presence of the Son in these activities as a difference 
in degree, Augustine understands it as a difference in kind. Therefore, Origen is 
the proponent of a Christology of continuity, since his soteriology is based on 
the level of participation of the soul in the very Logos. The link between mission 
of the Son in the world and his procession from the Father is therefore very 
tight. As such, the difference between the activities of the Logos, just as the 
difference between rational beings, depend only from a different degree of 
participation (or presence) of the Logos. Contrariwise, Augustine presents a 
tension between two opposing possibilities: the understanding of the Son’s 
mission as reduced to a mere external apparition, or an appraisal of his mission 
as the external manifestation of the procession of one person to another in the 
immanent Trinity.87 The latter possibility is the one that O’Leary declares to be 
the “Origenian” solution. Anyway, O’Leary believes that this tension is resolved, 
in Augustine’s account, in favour of the former. Thus, O’Leary accuses 
Augustine’s soteriology of denying a strong connection between mission and 
procession.88  
 
In this regard, O’Leary fits into a debate that has torn Augustine scholarship 
apart for at least a century. On the one hand, scholars like Schindler (and 
O’Leary himself) maintain that there is only an analogical relationship between 
mission and procession in Augustine’s thought. Therefore, the mission of the 
Son and the Spirit in the world ought to be understood as a mere indicator and 
                                                 
86 J. O’Leary, ‘The Invisible Mission of the Son’, p. 605.  
87 Ibidem, p. 612.    
88 Although O’Leary recognises that Augustine once presents – in On the Trinity IV.27-29 – the 
idea of the mitti est cognosci, which the author defines an Origenian theme, he still thinks that 
this theme does not have in Augustine the same strength that it had in Origen, due to the 
dogmatic constraint of his pro-Nicene theology.  
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signifier of the intra-Trinitarian theology.89 On the other, the opposite accounts 
firstly proposed by Schmaus,90 then updated and developed (albeit with some 
differences) by Arnold91 and Studer,92 interpret Augustine’s account of mission 
to be closely connected to that of procession. As a consequence, in Schmaus’ 
words, ‘the sending is not only an eternal procession, but an eternal procession 
with external manifestation’.93 In addition to fitting into the first line of 
scholarship, O’Leary also backs the criticism proposed by Harnack94 and 
Scheffczyk,95 according to whom, by differentiating between the immanent and 
the economic Trinity, Augustine’s Platonist worldview irredeemably de-
potentiates the relational value of biblical revelation. Therefore, O’Leary states 
that Augustine ‘fails to close the gap created by the sign-signified, image-
archetype pattern to biblical relationship between God and his creatures’.96 
Finally, O’Leary assumes that Augustine’s inability to back the ‘Origenian 
continuity between immanent and economic Trinity’, identified with the mitti est 
cognosci theme, is due to his strong commitment to Nicaean orthodoxy and to 
his own Platonist schema of image-archetype.97 However, all these accusations 
follow from the first one, directed toward both Origen and Augustine, of being 
subjugated to ‘the governing constraint of a metaphysical framework in which 
the dyads of sensible/intellible, temporal and eternal, intervened as supreme 
explanatory principles at every moment, scarcely allowing the phenomena 
                                                 
89 See: Alfred Schindler, Wort und Analogie in Augustins Trinitätslehre, Tübingen 1965, p. 144-
145. 
90 Schmaus is one of the boldest assertors of the strict connection between mission and 
procession in Augustine. See: Michaël Schmaus, Die Spannung von Metaphysik und 
Heilsgeschichte in der Trinitätslehre Augustins, in Frank Leslie Cross (ed), Studia patristica 6, 
Berlin 1962, p. 503-518. 
91 J. Arnold, ‘Begriff und heilsökonomische Bedeutung der göttlichen Sendungen in Augustinus’ 
De Trinitate’. Arnolds builds on Schmaus’ works but, differently from the latter, does not interpret 
mission and procession as the very same thing, but rather sees the former as depending and 
existing together with the latter.  
92 Studer understands the ‘temporal economy’, that is, the soteriological role of the Trinity in the 
world, as a symbol of the ‘eternal theology’, that is, of Trinitarian relations. See: B. Studer, 
‘History and Faith in Augustine's De Trinitate’. Regarding Augustine’s interpretation of the Trinity 
see also: B. Studer, Augustins De Trinitate. Eine Einführung; Basil Studer, ‘Augustins De 
Trinitate, eine christliche Botschaft’, in Augustinianum 45 2 (2005), p. 501-517; Basil Studer, 
‘Augustins De Trinitate in seinen theologischen Grundzügen’, in Freiburger Zeitschrift für 
Philosophie Und Theologie 49 (2002), p. 49-72. 
93 M. Schmaus, Die psychologische Trinitätslehre des hl. Augustinus, p. 164. 
94 A. von Harnack, History of Dogma II.  
95 See his remarks in Johannes Feiner and Magnus Lohrer (eds), Mysterium Salutis Grundriss 
Heilsgeschichtlicher Dogmatik. Band II. Die Heilsgeschichte vor Christus, Einsiedeln 1967, p. 
204. 
96 J. O’Leary, ‘The Invisible Mission of the Son in Origen and Augustine’, p. 620. 
97 Ibidem, p. 620.  
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behind Jn. 1:1498 to unfold their significance freely’.99 Despite such sharp 
criticisms of Augustine’s Trinitarian construction, O’Leary recognises passim the 
presence of the idea of an intra-Trinitarian sending and the idea that mission 
reveals procession precisely in Augustine’s Tractates on John, but he states 
that ‘the full Origenian resonance of the mitti est cognosci motif are absent’.100  
  
This consideration is, I think, of the utmost importance for my argument. First, 
my analysis of Origen’s and Augustine Trinitarian thought in their interpretation 
of the Gospel of John reveals the intimate Johannine logic which governs the 
construction of their theological systems. For this reason, the accusations cast 
against Augustine by Harnack, Rahner, O’Leary and others, of creating an 
unbridgeable gap between immanent and economic Trinity fails to see the main 
point of his theological construction. Something similar can be said of the 
accusation thrown against Origen that he does not allow enough difference 
between God and creation. The paradigms of participation/transformation and 
identity/separation respond, in both cases, to a genuine Johannine concern to 
understanding the relation between Father, Son and Spirit and, most of all, to 
connect this relation with the overwhelming problem of tackling evil. Secondly, 
even if some truth could be found in the accusation of interpreting the Gospel of 
John according to metaphysical categories derived from Greek philosophy, 
rather than from the Bible itself, I think it is more important to recognise the 
intellectual effort that the two authors took in harmonising their understanding of 
the immanent Trinity with the economic one. Nor it would be fair to ask these 
authors to interpret the text according to the intellectual categories developed at 
the beginning of the twentieth century.  
 
Thirdly (and most importantly), regarding the problem of the mission – that is, of 
the connection between the intra-Trinitarian relationship and the soteriological 
agency of each hypostasis in the world – my analysis has shown how reductive 
it would be to interpret the soteriology of both authors without taking into full 
account their pneumatologies. O’Leary’s argument barely considers the role of 
the Spirit in the relation between the Trinity and the world. In this regard, I think 
                                                 
98 ‘The Word became flesh and made his dwelling among us. We have seen his glory, the glory 
of the one and only Son, who came from the Father, full of grace and truth’. 
99 J. O’Leary, ‘The Invisible Mission of the Son in Origen and Augustine’, p. 621. 
100 Ibidem, n. 79 p. 619. 
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the lack of emphasis on their pneumatologies results in overstating the two 
authors’ metaphysical concerns without taking full account of their relation to 
soteriology. On the contrary, the close study of their doctrine of the Spirit in the 
living context of Johannine exegesis has shown that it would not be fair to 
accuse Origen of divinising creatures – and, in turn, of making God a creature – 
or to accuse Augustine of separating God too much from creation, as his 
interpretation of the role of the Spirit in the Tractates is mostly based precisely 
on the relation between internal procession and external manifestation.101 The 
main difference between the two authors is that, while Origen understands the 
connection between intra-Trinitarian relationships and the world as a matter of 
transformation by the creatures’ noetic participation subsisting in the Holy Spirit, 
Augustine identifies in the Holy Spirit himself both the immanent and economic 
means by which creatures are separated from the world and enter in the unity of 
God’s contemplation.  
   
The first point of coincidence between the two authors stands in the affirmation 
that the works of the Trinity are inseparable. According to the canons of Nicaea, 
Augustine deems this trope to be a firm catholic teaching which cannot be 
challenged, but only explained. Similarly, though for different reasons, Origen’s 
affirmation in On First Principles I.3.7 that nihil in Trinitate maius minusve 
dicendum est ought to be interpreted in the sense that all three hypostases 
cooperate in the work of salvation. The Trinity works together in the salvation of 
the world. Therefore, the difference between the two authors ought to be found 
in the fact that, while Augustine explains this common work as resulting from 
the unity of the Trinity in reality, Origen understands it as depending on the very 
substance of each person. In other words, according to Origen, every person 
exists on his own and has a distinctive essence. According to their essence, 
each person performs a different soteriological role. Quite differently, according 
to Augustine, the Trinity works as a unity because it exists in reality only as a 
unity. In such a Trinity, each person has a different role only in relation to the 
other persons. Therefore, while both authors think that each person of the 
Trinity has a different role in salvation and yet the Trinity works together as a 
unity, Augustine states that every person performs a different work only 
because of the immanent relations between the hypostases. Origen, on the 
                                                 
101 See supra, II.2.2; III.5; IV.2.4. 
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other hand, differentiates the works of the various hypostases by their own 
οὐσίαι.  
  
Regarding the work of the Father and Son, Origen postulates the idea that the 
Father can have no relationship to the world which is not mediated by the Son. 
This fact depends on his ineffable and meta-ontological nature, which is 
beyond-essence. Therefore, the Father is the source of divinity and divine 
energeia which is known only through the Son. According to the passage of 
ComJn, II.77, Origen deems every hypostasis to have a different soteriological 
role according to his own nature. Therefore, the Father is the one providing 
divinity and energeia, the Son administrates the gifts (through his epinoiai), the 
Spirit is the one in whom the elect subsist. This division resembles that in On 
First Principles I.3, where the Father provides being, the Son rationality and the 
Spirit holiness. As noted by Ziebritzky, this division implies a certain degree of 
subordinationism.102 Nevertheless, my analysis has shown that this 
subordinationism ought to be intended as a mere ontological subordinationism 
of priority, as both the Son and the Spirit participate perfectly in the will and 
attributes of the Father, differently to the creatures, for whom an ontological 
subordinationism of superiority is detected. With regard to the Son, Origen 
understands his very hypostasis to be instantiated in the epinoia of Wisdom, 
which represents the perfect participation of the Son in the Father. As such, the 
Son is Wisdom in himself and Logos to the world. Consequently, Origen 
considers salvation to be the perfect noetic participation in the higher epinoiai of 
the Son, particularly the Logos. This noetic participation allows the saved to 
attain a certain unity with God. Nevertheless, this unity is always attained 
through the Son, as it is possible for no creature – including the Holy Spirit – to 
gaze directly on the Father. As the logikoi are generated through the Son and 
have their name according to the natural participation in his rationality, so their 
salvation is a matter of the Son’s agency.  
    
While in Origen the Father is merely known by the Son, thus establishing a 
mutual relationship which is merely epistemic, in Augustine the Father exists 
with the Son and the Spirit as a unity. Therefore, the actions of the Trinity are 
                                                 
102 H. Ziebritzki, Heiliger Geist und Weltseele: Das Problem der dritten Hypostase bei Origenes, 
Plotin und ihren Vorläufern, p. 207-215.  
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inseparable insofar as they are performed by the one God. Regarding the role 
of the Son, my analysis has shown that, in the Tractates, Augustine is mainly 
focused on the very act of the incarnation and on the unity of the persons in 
Christ. While the act of re-creation is attained through the human part of Christ, 
which makes it possible for human beings to be saved, Augustine focuses a lot 
on the unity between the Son of man and the Son of God. Such unity exists by 
grace, that is, by predestination before the constitution of the world. This unity is 
therefore obtained in the Holy Spirit and, as such, it is the prototype for the unity 
that the elect will obtain in and by the Holy Spirit. Hence, in the person of Christ, 
the separation between chosen human beings and the world is shown by the 
grace of the Holy Spirit.  
 
One of the main differences between Origen’s and Augustine’s soteriology is 
therefore found in the relation between Christology and pneumatology. In 
Origen, incarnation is a matter of participation of Jesus’ soul in the Son – thus 
also representing his full participation in the noetic world. For human beings, 
this noetic participation is obtained only by participating in the spiritual 
substance of the Holy Spirit. In Augustine, on the other hand, the act of 
incarnation reveals the relational nature of each hypostasis: the Son is the one 
in whom the unity of the persons happens, but this unity is possible only 
because of the relational nature of the Holy Spirit, which is unity itself.  
 
These considerations are crucial for understanding the relation between the 
Holy Spirt and the world. In my analysis, I have shown that the principle guiding 
Augustine’s Trinity is operative both for the economic and for the immanent 
Trinity, and can be summarised in the formula: si individuam caritatem, 
perfectam unitatem.103 The Spirit is the same agent in God and in human 
beings, as he is the agent of perfect unity for both. Accordingly, Augustine 
understands the Spirit’s proprium in soteriology as being the agent of salvation 
itself, because, just as he furnishes the ontological means through which the 
Trinity is one, so he instantiates the unification between God and the elect. The 
                                                 
103 TrIoh, XVIII.4. Quare, inquit? et tu non duos deos dicis aequales sibi? Hoc ego non dico: 
aequalitatem enim istam sic intellego, ut ibi intellegam etiam individuam caritatem; et si 
individuam caritatem, perfectam unitatem. Si enim caritas quam misit hominibus Deus, de multis 
hominum cordibus facit cor unum, […] quanto magis Pater Deus et Filius Deus in fonte 
dilectionis Deus unus est? In this regard see supra, V.3.3. 
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so-called “unbridgeable gap” evoked by some scholars is therefore filled by the 
very procession of the Holy Spirit. In this regard, Augustine explicitly criticises 
any conception according to which the Spirit proceeds from the Father into the 
Son and then from the Son to sanctify the creatures. In other words, Augustine 
cannot accept any Trinitarian doctrine according to which the Spirit is only an 
agent of sanctification of creatures with no role in the Father-Son relationship. 
Therefore, he affirms that the name “Spirit” is due to his Trinitarian procession 
and is perfectly mirrored in his soteriological agency. This conception is 
reflected in Augustine’s pervasive use of the language of love. The Spirit is love 
insofar as he is the bond, unity for the chosen and separation from the world. As 
such, the Spirit is love insofar as he gives to the chosen the knowledge of the 
Father, the Son and their common unity. Augustine’s denomination of the Spirit 
as love should, therefore, being taken literally. As love, both in the immanent 
and economic Trinity, he is the ontological means that reconciles God with his 
creatures.  
  
On the other hand, Origen presents a system where the Spirit proceeds from 
the Father through the Son. The Son is then responsible for the administration 
of the hypostasis of the Spirit which, in turns, proceeds to sanctify the creatures. 
In this sense, Origen’s account could be said to be closer to the Gospel of John. 
According to the different characteristics of Son and Spirit, Origen presents a 
soteriology which firmly distinguishes the role of the Spirit from that of the Son. 
Participation in the Spirit is therefore described as an ontological participation in 
the substance of the third hypostasis, but such participation is not permanent, in 
the sense that it can be lost. Nevertheless, this participation is absolutely 
necessary in order to attain salvation, as it instantiates the cosmological change 
for each and every creature which obtains a higher – or lower – understanding 
of the noetic aspects of the Son. By postulating the existence of a human spirit 
which works as the ontological capacity of the soul for participating in the Holy 
Spirit, human beings become “one spirit” with God. Thus, the human spirit is 
only capable of good things because of its close connection with the Holy Spirit, 
through which the elect subsist in God. Nevertheless, while the elect attain a 
substantial participation in the Spirit, participation in the Son is described as the 
noetic/rational understanding of his different aspects. Consequently, the lack of 
reference to participation in the Spirit in Origen’s eschatology should not be 
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taken as proof of the irrelevance of the Holy Spirit in his soteriology, as 
Hauschild and others took it to be.104 On the contrary, Origen describes the 
eschatological union with God as a participation in the Son, not in the Spirit, 
because this participation requires a perfect – or, at least, more perfect – 
knowledge of all the aspects of God. These aspects are apprehended by 
creatures in the Son, not in the Spirit. Nevertheless, the Spirit plays a crucial 
role, as he gives to the creatures the spiritual substance through which they 
become able to understand God.105 
 
Ultimately, this thesis has shown how the differences between Origen’s and 
Augustine’s conceptions of the Spirit, his role in the intra-Trinitarian relationship 
and his role in soteriology are greatly influenced by their exegesis of John. The 
paradigms of participation/transformation and identity/separation which I have 
spotted in this thesis have been shown to be derived from, not imposed on, 
each author’s reading of the text. In both cases, the focus on the Johannine 
concept of the world in its connection with the Father-Son-Spirit relation signals 
a driving soteriological concern at the ground of the two authors’ theological 
constructions. In this regard, this thesis has also shown the close link, in both 
Origen and Augustine, between Trinitarian theology and soteriology. Therefore, 
the ontological subordination of priority presented by Origen, just as the double 
procession of the Spirit as the basis of the Trinitarian communion for Augustine 
do not represent mere “metaphysical technicalities”, but they are both the basis 
and, as it were, the consequence of the two authors’ driving soteriological 
concerns. It’s all about saving souls, not about toying with complex logical 
concepts. In both cases, the exegesis of the Gospel has been shown to be not 
only legitimate, but extremely coherent as well. While Origen understands the 
sending of the Spirit as a gift coming from God to the world, Augustine 
interprets it as the gift of love, which separates the elect – who love in a 
different way – from the world. This work of separation, which is not seen in this 
life, is intended as a judgment of separation operated in the Holy Spirit by the 
coming of Christ. Therefore, while Origen sees the gift of the Spirit as the 
transformation of the world which ultimately leads the elect to the contemplation 
                                                 
104 W. D. Hauschild, Gottes Geist und der Mensch, p. 86-150; W. D. Hauschild and V. H. 
Drecoll, Pneumatologie in der alten Kirche. 
105 In this regard see supra, IV.2.3 and IV.2.4. 
325 
 
of God, Augustine understands it as death to the world and life in God. In this 
sense, the Spirit is never mingled with the world, and the world will never see 
nor understand the Spirit, as in order to understand the Spirit one must possess 
the grace of the Spirit. Ultimately, Augustine understands the Spirit as the agent 
of unity, that is, the person who reveals unity and relation of God and in God. 
Being the agent of unity, the Spirit is also the marker of separation.  
 
Rather than being taken as representatives of the “eastern” and “western” 
paradigm of Christianity, these two authors’ doctrines and “paradigms” have 
been analysed as two theological trajectories of Christian thought that, driven by 
the spiritual Gospel, deal with some of the most important Christian theological 
concerns of all time: how to interpret the dualism between God and the world, 
how to tackle the problem of evil, how the Spirit of God is present in the world 
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